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Abstract
The anti-realist maintains that all thoughts that we may entertain are thoughts whose 
truth-values we can in principle come to recognise. The realist refuses to make any such 
claim about the limits o f our thinking. The anti-realist purports to arrive at her position 
on the basis o f considerations which relate to the manifestability o f understanding, i.e. 
the idea that grasp of thoughts must be manifested in linguistic abilities. Thus she 
argues against the realist that this requirement cannot be met unless truth is understood 
not to extend beyond what we can know. Turning the tables, I argue that it is the anti­
realist who cannot vindicate her position on these grounds. Some thoughts are apt for 
objective truth: their truth cannot be equated with their current assertibility. Our grasp o f 
such thoughts is not yet manifested in our ability to assert or deny sentences. Once we 
have identified patterns o f linguistic usage which display our grasp o f such thoughts 
however, it transpires that there is no reason either to believe that their truth-values can 
in principle be recognised.
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Preface
I f  philosophy is an activity, then philosophical writing is a constant source o f 
dissatisfaction. Anyway, now it's done and I am wholly responsible for the result. S till I 
would like to thank the following friends and institutions without whose help this work 
would not have come into existence: Marco lorio for getting me hooked on philosophy, 
endless nights o f philosophizing and helpful comments on an earlier draft; Wolfgang 
Carl for making me stay in philosophy, for his teaching which so much shaped my 
philosophical thinking, and for his support; O laf Müller for letting me attend the birth o f 
his thesis and for his midwifery while I was giving birth to mine: his philosophical mind 
is an inexhaustable supply o f inspiration; Lorenz Kiüger and Gunther Patzig for their 
encouragement, support and good advice; the German National Scholarship Foundation 
for financial support during the academic year 1995/96; the German Academic 
Exchange Service (DAAD) for generous research grants which allowed me to stay in St. 
Andrews throughout the academic years 1996/97 and 1997/98; Patrick Greenough for 
those glorious days and nights in Southgait when we delved into the bottomless pit o f 
anti-realism; the other members o f the Southgait Group: Lars Binderup, Lais Bo 
Gundersen, Duncan Pritchard, Jesper Kallestrup and Paul Markwick for constant 
challenge and criticism; Stewart Shapiro for helpful comments and suggestions whose 
consideration has much enhanced the final draft; Thelma M itchell for her efforts to 
improve my writing style; Sabine Rosenkranz, my mother, for her unconditional support 
and care; and Michael Kuzina for all his love which has bridged the Channel so easily.
I  am also indebted to my examiners, Timothy Williamson and John Skorupski, 
whose detailed criticisms prompted important refinements and revisions, as well as to 
Stephen Read for valuable comments on an earlier draft.
This work owes most to Crispin W right who, thanks to his ingenuity, open- 
mindedness and good humour, not only helped me see more clearly but made me see 
regions o f philosophical space I did not know before. Despite his recently expressed 
preference for what he calls 'platitudes', he shares a distaste for easy answers to 
simplified questions. For this I am most grateful.
I dedicate this work to the memory o f my father, Klaus Rosenkranz, who gave 
me the stamina and confidence needed to go through all this. I f  only he could have seen 
that becoming an academic philosopher does not make you a lonely soul, caught in 
silent thought and bowed over dusty books. Wittgenstein said that philosophy is an 
activity. I would like to add: philosophy would not be what it is i f  it was not pursued by 
many agents.
Introduction
W ith the advent o f modem analytic philosophy, the traditional epistemological 
questions "How is knowledge possible?" and "What are its limits?" gave way to the 
more fundamental questions "How is thinking possible?" and "What are the lim its o f 
what we can think about?" Knowledge is knowledge that some thought or other is true. 
Thus, the possibility o f knowledge requires the subject's ability to think how things are. 
Indeed, the analytic philosopher's concern with thinking is primarily with thinking how 
things are: she is less concerned with other modes o f mental activity which it may, to 
some ends and purposes, still be useful to call modes of thinking. We now see how the 
more fundamental questions are related to the questions they ousted: in order to explain 
how knowledge is possible, we must explain how it is possible for us to think how 
things are; and the limits o f what we can know cannot transgress the lim its o f what we 
can think o f as being a certain way.
Thoughts, i.e. the contents o f our thinking as thus understood, are by their very 
nature capable o f being either true or false, for knowledge entails truth— and knowledge 
claims may be unsuccessful in virtue o f their failure to present what is true. It is 
furthermore essential to thoughts that they can be shared. Otherwise, there could be no 
saying whether someone else's thinking constitutes knowledge o f how things are. For, as 
Wittgenstein reminds us, i f  my knowledge claims were forever debarred from being 
assessed by others, the concept o f knowledge could never legitimately be applied to 
them. To think that I know that I think truly w ill not take me beyond my thinking it: 
self-ascriptions o f knowledge lack authority unless they allow for double-checking by 
others. ^  But in order to assess whether someone really knows what she purports to 
know, we must be able to tell what it is she purports to know, hence, what it is she 
thinks. Obversely, anything that cannot be shared between thinkers is external to the 
contents o f potential knowledge claims, hence external to the thoughts these thinkers 
may entertain. It is this idea which underlies Frege’s attempt to isolate the logical from 
the psychological: subjective features that accompany our thinking do not enter into an 
account o f what thoughts are, just as they do not enter into an account o f what the 
contents o f knowledge claims are.2
How can thoughts be shared? An answer to this question presupposes an answer 
to the question o f how we might come to think these thoughts in the first place, i.e. how 
we might come to grasp them. Frege held that we, as human beings, do not have access 
to thoughts other than by means o f language, although he did not have much to say
' Witlgenslein [OnC]: §§ 12-15.
~ Cr. Carl [FSR]; chapter two.
about how we may access them by this means.However this may be, at least we cannot 
communicate what we think other than by means o f language. It is therefore natural to 
approach the question "How is thinking possible?" by means o f analysing our ability to 
use language. For, once we have shown how thoughts can be expressed and 
communicated by linguistic means, we have guaranteed that thoughts are free from any 
subjective elements peculiar to the individual thinker. And insofar as thoughts are 
essentially communicable, a criterion o f identity for thoughts communicated seems to 
furnish us with all we need in order to understand what it is to think these thoughts; it 
does not matter whether we are concerned with content-bearing mental states or content- 
bearing linguistic acts, the question how either come to be content-bearers seems to 
require the same kind o f answer.*^
These considerations are familiar, notably from Michael Dummett’s work. We 
must not forget, however, that the successful communication of thoughts, though an 
achievement in its own right, presupposes achievements o f quite another kind. The 
subject who communicates her thoughts must already have succeeded in representing 
how things have to be in order for her representing to be a representing o f how things 
actually are. In other words, we not only need an account of how one thinker can discern 
what another thinker thinks, we also need an account of how someone manages to think 
how things have to be in order for her to think truly. This question tends to be neglected 
once we focus on the practical abilities required for successful communication. As 
Dummett oberves,
[o]ur grasp o f [the] contents [o f the sentences o f our language] could not exist [...] as a 
purely external practice. By the very nature o f language, we could not learn its use as a 
means o f interacting with others without simultaneously learning to use it as a vehicle for 
our own thoughts. It is precisely because this interior use of language as a medium of our 
thinking, and o f our representation o f reality, is from an early stage integral to our whole 
conscious life that we travesty the facts i f  we call it a 'practical ability', even though it is 
never severed from, and remains responsible to, the use o f language in conversing with 
others.'*’
Dummett's appeal to the "interior use" o f language, although evoking behaviourist 
ideology, is just another reaffirmation that the philosopher's concern with thinking can 
ultimately be satisfied by an account o f language use. But i f  there is more to the ability 
to think thoughts than the ability to use language as a means o f communicating these 
thoughts, then what is it?
Talk about representations has become less fashionable nowadays. This is 
mainly due to the empiricist idea that representing is a state o f mind inflicted upon the
Frege [SKM]: 269; [L/b]: 145.
^ Dummetl [PTL]; 322-23.
 ^Dummett [LBM ]: 103.
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thinker by reality, rather than a mental activity which the application o f concepts has to 
be seen as. This idea may well be bankrupt. But there is a sense o f "representation" in 
which representations are not the imprints left by more or less vivid experiences, but the 
results o f judgement and contemplation.
On this reading, to represent is to attain a state which effects a division o f all 
possible states o f affairs into those which would render this state a state o f thinking 
truly, and those which would render it  a state o f thinking falsely. The ability to represent 
is accordingly the ability to offer something for the world to answer to: i f  states o f 
affairs o f the first kind obtain, then one's thinking yields a representation o f how things 
actually are, otherwise not. Talk about states o f affairs and their obtaining is o f course 
just a rehashing, in ontological terms, o f the cognitive processes we try to elucidate. To 
invoke it is therefore just as unhelpful as Russell's recasting o f epistemological 
distinctions in terms of ontological distinctions between objects o f knowledge.
However explanatorily inert, this conception of representation at least renders 
intelligible why, i f  communication presupposes thinking, one may nonetheless be drawn 
towards the idea that an account o f language use w ill provide us with all we need in 
order to understand how thinking thoughts is possible. For i f  the ability to think is not a 
susceptibility to receive, but rather a capacity to achieve, then the question how thinking 
is possible becomes the question o f what we have to be able to do in order to arrive at a 
representation o f reality. And this question must have the same kind o f answer no matter 
which level o f description o f what we do we settle on, as long as it is guaranteed that we 
could not do what we so describe unless we had the requisite ability, and could not be 
said to have this ability unless we could do what we so describe. (A pianist may exercise 
her ability to play Beethoven sonatas even i f  the piano strings are cut; and she may 
likewise exercise it by playing an amplified piano so as to reach a wider audience.)
What can be thought must be communicable. Given that our ability to think is 
about the most delicate o f skills we possess, only the most refined means o f 
communication w ill serve the purpose. Our use o f language is the most refined 
technique o f communication we possess. It is because there is no hidden mental screen 
on which representations are projected, but activity all the way down, that there is no 
obstacle in looking at the outermost manifestations o f this activity, i.e. verbal behaviour. 
It is in this sense that thinking may be called a mode of silent speech. Just as 
Schroedinger's thought experiment was intended to present a macroscopic test-case for 
the adequacy o f a microscopic description, the idea that an account o f thinking in terms 
o f linguistic abilities ought to be possible, is intended to present a test-case for the 
adequacy o f a philosophical account o f thinking.
The question how thinking is possible is the question o f what the practical 
abilities are that allow us to effect a division between all possible states o f affairs that
vu
render our thinking a thinking truly and those which do not. As I have suggested, 
following the lead o f Wittgenstein and Dummett, an answer to this question must be 
possible by appeal to linguistic abilities.
The idea that thinking is not a state but an operation— whether silently 
performed or made public in speech— gives rise to some perplexities. These perplexities 
show that we cannot dispense w ith the empiricist imagery that easily. For, as Dummett's 
remarks further suggest, we would get the phenomenology o f representation wrong i f  
we settled for no more than what we do when we perform these operations. These 
operations, however we externalise them, must issue in a cognitive achievement. Le. a 
representation o f how things may or may not be. And here, we wish to say that, i f  our 
thinking is a case o f thinking truly, we have something akin to a map o f how things 
actually are. Although metaphorical, this comparison goes further than the idea that we 
arrive at something like a set o f instructions that tell us how to navigate. Rather, we 
want to say that, i f  we think truly, we arrive at something that fa ithfully reflects what 
reality is like, that matches reality, whether or not we set sail.
Knowing-r/zar is not a case o f knowing-Zzm^y, and it is not an act either: it is a 
state o f mind that represents how things are. Knowing-that is knowing o f some thought 
or other that it is true. Hence thinking, although an activity, must be suited to issue in a 
state o f mind that represents how things are. How then can exercises o f practical 
abilities, such as the ability to use language, issue in a cognitive achievement o f this 
kind? How is it that, by performing in a certain way, we manage to attain a state for 
reality to answer to? And how can we act in such a way that reality renders the outcome 
o f this performance true or otherwise? (A tango performance may match the instructor’s 
demonstration, but that it does so w ill never be matched by this performance.)
Thoughts may be true or false; so may their linguistic expressions. The use o f 
their linguistic expressions is furthermore constrained by rules o f proper use. Indeed, in 
order for the communication o f thoughts to be possible, there w ill have to be rules o f 
this kind, compliance w ith which is necessary for making oneself understood as 
expressing this thought rather than another. On the one hand, it is not essential to the 
linguistic expressions themselves that they express the thoughts they do such that we 
could tell from the expressions alone what they communicate. On the other hand, to say 
that it is essential to the way they are produced, that expressions express what they do, 
is likely to render the project o f giving an account o f thinking in terms o f linguistic 
abilities futile: it invites the idea that utterances have a certain thought as their content 
by virtue o f being preceded, or caused, by an act of thinking this thought. We would 
thereby sever the connection between the operations in virtue o f which that act is an act 
o f thinking this thought on the one hand, and the operations that make our utterances 
acts of expressing it on the other. The idea must rather be that expressing a thought is
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one way to think that thought— not an effect o f an act o f thinking that lies further up the 
causal chain.
The thoughts we think relate to reality in that reality may render them true or 
false. They could not bear this relation to reality, or at least we could not think these 
thoughts i f  we did not, in some way or other, interact with reality. Our ability to think is 
exercised in response to phenomena to which we are exposed. The need to communicate 
requires rules; these rules, however implicit, turn the phenomena to which we react in 
thinking— interaction w ith which allows our thoughts to be about reality in the first 
place— into phenomena that render the use o f expressions appropriate. I f  our interaction 
w ith such phenomena accounts for the aboutness o f our thoughts, then studying these 
rules must help us explain how the expressions whose use they govern come to have the 
truth conditions that they do. And once we can explain this much, we can explain how it 
is possible for our thinking to be capable o f being rendered true or false by reality.
The fact that there has to be something that sets our cognitive machinery in 
motion, however, does not yet ensure that this machinery's operations aie concerned 
with, or about, that which sets it in motion. Quite generally, the phenomena to which we 
react verbally, and which render this reaction appropriate, are not what the expressions 
that we use on this occasion are about. In other words, these phenomena may warrant 
our use o f these expressions, but they need not render them true, Davidson has 
suggested that in the most basic cases, we do indeed talk about the phenomena 
awareness o f which leads to our talking.*^ But even i f  it were appropriate, this suggestion 
w ill not provide us with a general model o f how we manage to talk about reality: not all 
cases are basic in this sense.
Frege was at a loss to understand how rules that govern the manipulation o f 
symbols could ever confer truth conditions on them.^ Rather, he believed that in order 
for our use o f such symbols to qualify as more than indulgence in a self-contained game, 
our grasp o f the thoughts they express must already be presupposed.^ According to 
Frege, it is our concern with knowledge that distinguishes our use o f language from 
mere game playing.^ He therefore rightly emphasizes the representational dimension o f 
our speech, and the objectivity o f the standard by which it is to be assessed: truth is not 
o f our making, it is not established by whatever makes our linguistic moves moves 
which conform to the rules by which we play, rather it is established by reality itself.
 ^Davidson [EC]: 332.
7 [GG/II]: § 95.
8 [G G /II]:§§  90-91.
9 [GG/II]: § 92.
•9 The Wittgensteinian analogy between assertions and moves in a game is therefore misleading: the truth 
o f an assertion corresponds to the winning of the game, not to a property o f a move that is conducive to 
winning— individual assertions have an end in their own.
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Still, Frege himself never tried to explain how symbols can come to express thoughts, 
i.e. have truth conditions, i f  not in virtue o f the rules set up for their use, nor how we can 
come to grasp the thoughts thus expressed i f  not by mastering these rules."
In contrast, Wittgenstein was convinced that symbols could not be endowed with 
any meaning in any other way, and he argued that our grasp o f meaning is not a matter 
o f intellectual intuition, but rather a matter o f k n o w - h o w . B u t  he himself never 
addressed the question in virtue o f which rules symbols may be endowed with truth 
conditions.'^ Instead, he shifted our attention to other than representational uses to 
which linguistic expressions can be put.'"^
We may say that Wittgenstein laid more emphasis on understanding in the sense 
o f Verstehen (successful communication), while Frege laid more emphasis on 
understanding in the sense o f Verstand {nous). This ambiguity o f the term 
"understanding" neatly captures the problem with which we are here concerned: the 
problem, namely, to explain how the rule-governed behaviour we display in verbal 
exchanges can so much as confer truth conditions on the expressions we use, and how 
behaving in this way can be conceived as the result o f our concern with truth and 
knowledge. Therefore, I  shall call this problem the Problem o f Understanding.
It has become fashionable in recent philosophy to discredit the questions to 
which this problem gives rise, in two ways: either by not answering them in the way 
they were intended, or by refusing to answer them at all. Deflationism about truth may 
serve as an ample illustration o f this tendency.
Deflationists hold that, at least in the homophonie case, ascriptions o f truth to a 
given sentence mean the same as the sentence to which truth is being ascribed.'^ This is 
a very puzzling claim, for a sentence by means o f which we ascribe truth to another
sentence S refers to S and says o f S that it is true. For instance, the sentence
""Snow is white" is true" refers to the sentence "Snow is white" and says o f this
sentence that it is true. But the sentence "Snow is white" refers to snow and says o f
snow that it is white. How, i f  this is so, can both ""Snow is white" is true" and 
"Snow is white" mean the same thing? Neither is it remotely plausible to hold that a 
truth about the sentence "Snow is white" entails a truth about snow, nor is it remotely 
plausible to hold that a truth about snow entails a truth about the sentence 
"Snow is white". The state o f snow has no impact on how it is referred to, otherwise, we 
could not have called snow by other names unless snow itself had changed. Likewise,
' ' Frege [L/b]: 145.
Wiugenstein [PG]: §§ 10-12, 22-24; [PI]: §§ 138-42. 
As noted by Brandom [M IE]: 76.
'^Wittgenstein [PG]: §§ 19-20; [PI]: §§ 1-27.
Cl. Field [D VM j: 250-51, 265-66.
the state o f an expression has itself no bearing on the state of the objects it refers to, 
otherwise, we could change the world by altering linguistic conventions.
To this complaint it may be replied that, appearances notwithstanding, 
""Snow is white" is true" does not really refer to the sentence "Snow is white"— at least 
this is the reply suggested by the deflationist's appeal to substitutional quantification. 
This kind o f quantification allows us to quantify into quotation contexts to the effect 
that writing ""Snow is white" is true" becomes just another way o f writing 
"Snow is white", and i f  writing the latter does not involve reference to the sentence 
written, neither does writing the former.
Alternatively, the deflationist may reply, o f course, ""snow"" refers to "snow", 
while "snow" refers to snow; and since snow is not "snow", they refer to different 
things. Indeed, ""Snow is white" is true" does not even say what "Snow is white" says: 
the former says that "Snow is white" is true, the latter says that snow is white. For 
"snow" refers to snow because "snow" is the very expression which we use in order to 
state what it refers to, i.e. snow; and "Snow is white" says that snow is white because it 
is the very sentence which we use in order to state what it is that it says.'^ Yet, all this 
does not show that they do not mean the same.
What we wanted to know is in which way a sentence must be used in order to be 
true, say, just in case snow is white, independently that is, of whether snow is or is not 
white. In treating ""Snow is white" is true" as a syntactic variant o f "Snow is white", the 
deflationist answers this question by appeal to a grammatical rule: "Snow is white" is 
true i f  and only i f  snow is white, because "Snow is white" is the sentence it is. In 
treating ""Snow is white" is true" as meaning the same as "Snow is white", the 
deflationist holds that it is in virtue o f the meaning which the truth predicate is 
stipulated to have, that "Snow is white" has the truth conditions it has. Evidently, 
sameness o f meaning must not here be understood in terms of sameness o f truth 
conditions or satisfaction conditions.'^
A  sentence does not become capable o f being true or false, however, solely in 
virtue o f the fact that it means the same as another sentence which contains an ascription 
o f "true" to this sentence. To say with Wittgenstein that a sentence qualifies as truth-apt 
insofar as we apply the calculus o f truth functions to it, is likewise unsatisfactory.'^ We 
wanted to know how language relates to things other than language, yet now we are told 
how one part o f language relates to another.
Dummett has argued that a satisfactory answer to the question, 
"How is thinking possible?" w ill at the same time yield an answer to the question,
'6 Field [D VM j: 252, 260; [PHT]: 324-27. 
'7 Field [DCT]: 61-62.
'8 Wiugenstein [PGj; §§ 79-80; fPI]: § 136.
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"What are the limits o f what we can think about?" According to Dummett, an account o f 
what it is for sentences to be used in such a way that they are endowed with truth 
conditions w ill license the conclusion that their truth conditions are conditions whose 
obtaining we can recognise: since it is we who present something for reality to answer 
to, there is no sense attached to the idea that reality may answer but cannot be heard.
This is, however, a conclusion the realist thinks we cannot be entitled to endorse. Thus, 
according to Dummett, realism has to be rejected.
As I shall argue, Dummett arrives at his answer to the question,
"What are the lim its o f what we can think about?" on the basis o f an inadequate answer 
to the question, "How is thinking possible?" His anti-realist conclusion is therefore a j
non sequitur. This thesis is intended to provide a satisfactory answer to the latter 
question which at the same time shows that no answer to the former can be given on its 
basis. To this extent, I shall be concerned with a defence o f realism. The account o f i
understanding I shall offer is, however, limited in scope: it applies only to non- |
evaluative empirical discourse. Accordingly, nothing w ill follow for the status o f j
mathematical or moral discourse, and the role which the notions o f truth and truth |
conditions may be said to play in these areas. But it is just as doubtful whether j
mathematical or moral talk is genuinely representational while, in this regard, non- j
evaluative empirical discourse clearly serves as our paradigm. And since Dummett's ' !
anti-realism is supposed to be a global thesis about the limits o f our thinking, it w ill do t
to undermine it locally. |
In chapter one I set out to get into shaiper focus what is at stake between realists î
and anti-realists. I argue that the realism/anti-realism debate ought to be divorced from j
the debate about classical logic. On the one hand, logical revisionism w ill not yet be |
motivated by an anti-realist conception o f truth. The argument to the conclusion that, for |
any proposition P, either P is true or otherwise, is intuitively compelling: P cannot be j
both, P cannot be neither, hence P must be one or the other. This argument w ill not lose i
its appeal i f  it is pointed out that it can constitute a proof o f the conclusion only to the 1
extent that it begs the question; nor w ill it do so i f  it is assumed that truth does not <
exceed the know able. On the other hand there is no reason to think that i f  this argument ,i
can successfully be undermined the realist cannot avail herself o f whatever it is that tells • |
against it. ;
Chapter two w ill set the stage for the debate between realists and anti-realists by ’
making it dependent on a successful account o f how speakers have to be able to use #
language in order for them to conceive o f the sentences in their repertoire as being 1
endowed with truth conditions. Against the backdrop of what she takes to constitute i
such an account, the anti-realist is presented as putting forth an argument to the effect i
that all truths are knowable. This argument rests on the idea that knowledge o f truth i
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conditions is already fu lly manifested in the abilities required for successful 
participation in assertoric practice. M inimalist claims about the objectivity o f truth, 
however, which highlight the contrast between truth and warranted assertibility, already 
raise first doubts about the cogency o f this argument by way o f challenging the account 
o f understanding on which it is based.
In chapter three I discuss the anti-realist's refinement o f her proposal as to how 
assertoric practice may be seen to confer truth conditions on the sentences used. 
According to this proposal, sentences must be assigned truth conditions i f  we are to 
account for the warranted assertibility conditions o f more complex sentences in which 
they occur. An assertibilist semantics which appeals to no more than conditions o f 
warranted assertibility and deniability, however, already satisfies this demand. Provided 
truth contrasts w ith warranted assertibility, knowledge o f truth conditions is accordingly 
not yet manifested in the abilities required for successful participation in assertoric 
practice. The anti-realist's argument to the conclusion that all truths are knowable, as 
presented in chapter two, has therefore to be rejected. Until the assertibilist semantics 
has been shown to be empirically inadequate, realists and anti-realists w ill have to jo in  
forces in their attempt to adduce facts about language use the assertibilist is at a loss to 
explain.
In chapter four I  am concerned with Brandom's recent proposal that our 
engagement in inferential practice suffices to show that we conceive o f the sentences we 
use as being endowed with truth conditions where truth is m inimally objective in the 
sense required. In the present context, the basic idea must be that the assertibilist proves 
unable to account for the ways in which we treat inferences as truth-preserving. I argue 
that the inferential practice which Brandom describes does not yet disclose that we take 
premisses and conclusions to have minimally objective truth conditions. I therefore 
conclude that assertibilism still remains in play. The diagnosis o f this failure, however, 
suggests viewing our practice o f making assumptions, o f engaging in hypothetical 
reasoning, as the key to a rejection o f assertibilist semantics: i t  m aybe that it is rather 
this practice that reveals our concern w ith the objective truth o f (some of) the sentences 
we use.
Chapter five takes up the suggestion made towards the end o f chapter four. I 
argue that hypothetical reasoning may manifest knowledge o f truth conditions provided 
it is given a proper context and purpose. This is done by way o f conceiving o f 
participation in assertoric practice as the pursuit o f knowledge-w/zy: speakers are 
described as seeking to explain why they receive the data that they do by means o f 
sentences apt for objective truth which they take these data to be warrants for. 
Inferences to the best explanation go hand in hand with hypothetical reasoning in that 
the elimination o f alternative hypotheses may, at least to some extent, proceed
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hypothetically: by assuming one hypothesis to be part o f the explanation o f some o f the 
evidence, one assumes that the remainder o f the evidence speaking in favour o f 
competing hypotheses is to be explained by other means, and in doing so, one may 
already find that one lacks the resources to give an explanation o f this kind. There are 
contexts such that making assumptions o f this kind cannot be rendered intelligible i f  all 
we are said to go in for is expressing and communicating conditions o f warranted 
assertion or denial, while it can be rendered intelligible i f  we are said to grasp truth 
conditions. Thus, assertibilism can in the end be overcome. Similarly, I argue that the 
explanatory objective o f the practice described takes us towards a solution to the 
Problem o f Understanding.
In chapter six, I finally draw some conclusions for the realism/anti-realism 
debate. The explanatory role o f sentences apt for objective truth casts doubt on the idea 
that the anti-realist's claim, that all truths are knowable, expresses a conceptual 
necessity. I f  this claim is knowable a p rio ri at all, it would seem to express a 
contingency. The manifestation o f knowledge o f truth conditions in hypothetical 
reasoning, however, simply does not license the conclusion that the truth conditions 
which are assumed to obtain are such that they can be known to obtain whenever they 
do. This suggests that an answer to the question, "How is thinking possible?" w ill not 
yet furnish us with an answer to the question, "What are the limits o f what we can think 
about?" Pending further arguments o f a different kind, I  conclude that realism stands 
unassailed.
Analytical Table o f  Contents
Chapter One
1.1 Innocence and Agnosticism
The innocent differs from the agnostic: she does not claim to know that 
there are no reasons for a given claim. Not only the believer, but also the 
agnostic must persuade the innocent. The anti-realist believes in the 
Epistemic Constraint on truth (EC). The logical revisionist is an agnostic 
about the Law o f Excluded M iddle (LEM). Hence both the anti-realist and 
the logical revisionist must persuade the innocent o f their respective 
position.
1.2 Logical Revisionism and Anti-Realism
EC turns LE M  into the principle o f Completeness (C). The only reason for 
agnosticism about C whose acknowledgement does not already presuppose 
agnosticism about LE M  is that there is no reason to rule out that we may 
neither be able to know P nor be able to know ~P. EC is inconsistent with 
this possibility. Therefore the logical revisionist cannot persuade the 
innocent o f her agnosticism about LEM  by appeal to EC.
1.3 The Paradox o f Knowability
EC in conjunction with classical logic leads to absurdity, so does EC in 
conjunction w ith intuitionistic logic. This is due to the existence o f Moorean 
propositions such as P but we w ill never know. EC must be replaced by 
EC*. EC* does not lead to absurdity, no matter whether it is conjoined with 
classical or intuitionistic logic. Therefore it is not the case that a proponent 
o f EC* is committed to agnosticism about LEM  on pains o f absurdity. It 
follows that neither is a proponent o f LEM  committed to agnosticism about 
EC* on these grounds.
1.4 Anti-Anti-Realism
Anti-realists endorse EC*. Realists do not have to deny EC*: at most they 
are bound to remain agnostic about EC*. Agnostics about EC* do not have 
to believe in LEM. I conclude that the debate between realists and anti­
realists can be conducted independently from the debate between classicists 
and logical revisionists.
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Chapter Two
2.1 The Manifestability Requirement
The Manifestability Requirement demands that the notion of meaning be 
such as to guarantee that the ability to use language correctly is necessary 
and sufficient for knowledge o f meaning. By the Dummettian Criterion, 
realists and anti-realists alike ought to devise a systematic account o f 
knowledge o f meaning that complies w ith the Manifestability Requirement. 
The realism/anti-realism debate is a debate about the nature o f truth 
conditions. I f  the Dummettian Criterion is thought to arbitrate this debate, 
knowledge o f meaning must be equated w ith knowledge o f truth conditions.
2.2 The Manifestation Argument
The anti-realist's Manifestation Argument proceeds from the assumption 
that knowledge o f warranted assertibility conditions is sufficient for 
knowledge o f truth conditions. It concludes that the obtaining o f truth 
conditions is recognisable insofar as the obtaining of warranted assertibility 
conditions is.
2.3 Truth V5. Warranted Assertibility
M inimal constraints on the objectivity o f truth entail that truth and (present) 
warranted assertibility diverge. (O l) entails that the sentence "P &  ~W(P)" 
may be true. (02) entails that the sentence "~P &  W(P)" may be true. Still 
both "P" and "W(P)" share their warranted assertibility conditions. In 
contrast to "P", "W(P)" is true i f f  warrantedly assertible.
2.4 Ought Anti-Realist Semantics to be Systematic, and How Can it Be?
"P &  -W (P)" and "~P &  W(P)" necessarily fail to be warrantedly assertible. 
Unless qualified the Manifestation Argument implies that they necessarily 
fail to be true. Given (01) and (02), its conclusion has to be restricted so as 
to exclude sentences o f this sort. The Dummettian Criterion demands that an 
account o f knowledge o f truth conditions be given for such sentences as 
well. I f  the anti-realist wants to retain her premiss that knowledge of 
assertibility conditions suffices for knowledge of truth conditions, a 
compositional account o f such sentences must be given.
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Chapter Three
3.1 Assertoric Content and Ingredient Sense
The anti-realist is bound to account for the truth conditions o f "P" and 
"W(P)" in terms of the different contribution they make to the determination 
o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f complex sentences in which they 
occur. Although no recursive account o f warranted assertibility conditions is 
to be hoped for, the Inferentiality Constraint (IC) demands that the 
systematic dependence between the warranted assertibility of complex 
sentences and that o f their constituents be explained. The anti-realist holds 
that IC can only be met i f  the constituent sentences are assigned truth 
conditions.
3.2 Wright's 'Inflationary Argument': An Application
The assertibilist holds that as far as knowledge of warranted assertibility 
conditions is concerned, an account o f understanding need not invoke truth 
conditions. The anti-realist claims that the assertibilist violates IC. Wright's 
argument against radical deflationism purports to show that speakers aim for 
m inimally objective truth. Hence i f  successful, it would refute assertibilism. 
Wright's argument proceeds from the observation that "true" and 
"warrantedly assertible" behave differently in contexts o f negation.
3.3 An Assertibilist Account o f Negation
The assertibilist can explain this fact in terms of warranted assertibility and 
deniability conditions alone. Just as warranted assertibility differs from truth 
however, so does warranted deniability differ from falsity: speakers are not 
shown to aim for m inimally objective truth. Hence an account o f negation 
that complies with IC does not require any appeal to truth conditions. The 
assertibilist can furthermore devise a radically deflationist theory o f truth. 
Wright's argument fails.
3.4 An Assertibilist Account o f Conditionals
To the extent that this is feasible at all, the assertibilist can give a systematic 
interpretation o f the indicative conditional that meets IC. This interpretation 
is based on considerations about the role o f conditionals in arguments. It is 
hostage to there being inferential warrants for the assertion o f conditionals 
which are available even i f  both antecedent and consequent are undecided.
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3.5 Inferential Warrants for Conditionals
Conditionals inherit warrants inferentially even when both their 
subsentences are undecided. Three different ways in which they may do so 
are discussed. It is shown that assertibilism can explain all o f them to just 
the same extent to which truth conditional semantics can. This completes the 
assertibilist's account o f indicative conditionals.
3.6 An Assertibilist Account o f the Quantifiers
In her treatment o f inferential warrants for conditionals, the assertibilist had 
to appeal to the quantificational structure o f object language expressions. To 
the extent that devising general rules for the assertibility o f quantified 
sentences is feasible at all, the assertibilist can account for the speakers' use 
o f quantifiers without invoking m inimally objective truth conditions.
3.7 Semantic Theory and Object Language
The assertibilist can give a systematic account o f the warranted assertibility 
conditions o f negated sentences, conditionals and sentences involving 
quantification. There is no reason to suppose that the assertibilist cannot 
handle other complex sentences in an analogous fashion. Hence the anti­
realist's holistic strategy to account for knowledge o f truth conditions fails. 
The idea that the assertibilist cannot meet IC is likely to rest on a confusion 
between statements o f semantic theory and statements formulated in the 
object language.
3.8 The Role o f Truth in Corrections
Our conception o f corrections discloses that it would be mistaken to suggest 
that sentences must be understood to have truth conditions only insofar as 
they occur as constituents o f more complex sentences: even i f  sentences are 
asserted on their own, the significance o f their assertion transcends the 
indication o f their warranted assertibility.
3.9 The Manifestation Argument Reconsidered
However this finding provides no resting place for the theorist o f 
understanding who seeks to comply w ith the Manifestability Requirement: 
assertions qualify as corrections only in virtue o f the minimally objective 
truth conditions that they have, as there is no institution o f making 
corrections over and above the institution o f making assertions. Hence in 
order to vindicate (O l) and (02), we have to turn to aspects o f use other 
than the assertoric. The Manifestation Argument is finally shown to rest on a 
false premiss.
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Chapter Four
4.1 Truth and Inference
Knowledge o f m inimally objective truth conditions cannot be explained in 
terms o f assertoric practice. It is suggested viewing mastery o f inferential 
practice as sufficient for knowledge of truth conditions. An account o f this 
practice must disclose that both inferences, from "P" to "W(P)" and from 
"W(P)" to "P", are treated as deductively invalid. Brandom purports to 
devise a pragmatics that shows this.
4.2 Warrants to Assert
Warrants for asserting "P" are warrants for asserting "W(P)" and vice versa. 
Brandom concedes the point. Some such warrants furthermore mandate the 
assertion o f "P" and mandate the denial o f its negation. Given his account o f 
empirical knowledge, Brandom is bound to concede this too.
4.3 Deductive Valid ity and Commitment-Preserving Inferences
Brandom first proposes to account for deductive validity in terms o f the 
practice o f drawing commitment-preserving inferences. In undertaking an 
assertoric commitment to "P" one commits oneself to the propriety o f 
asserting it, hence its warranted assertibility. "P" and "W(P)" share their 
warranted assertibility conditions. Therefore the inference from "P" to 
"W(P)" is commitment-preserving, and Brandom's first proposal proves 
inadequate.
4.4 Inconsistency and Incompatibility
Brandom suggests that an inference is deductively valid i f  whatever is 
incompatible w ith the conclusion is incompatible with the premiss. Two 
sentences are incompatible just in case commitment to one precludes 
entitlement to the other and vice versa. Commitment to "P" forces 
commitment to "W(P)". Entitlement to "P" requires entitlement to "W(P)". 
Thus commitment to "P" precludes entitlement to "~W(P)" and vice versa. 
Some sentences have warrants that mandate their assertion; "W(P)" is 
incompatible with "W(~P)". So commitment to "W(P)" precludes 
entitlement to "~P" and vice versa. Hence anything incompatible with "P" is 
incompatible with "W(P)" and vice versa. Thus Brandom's second proposal 
fails too.
4.5 Hypothetical Reasoning
Both failures are due to the nature o f assertoric commitments: what one is 
obliged to assert or debarred from asserting as a result o f one's assertoric 
commitment to "P" is not solely a matter o f the content o f "P". What one is 
committed to conclude from a given assumption whenever one makes it, is
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solely a matter o f the content o f this assumption. I suggest viewing the 
practice o f hypothetical reasoning as manifesting our conception o f 
deductive validity.
4.6 Objective Truth as Designated Value
Invalidating both inferences, from "P" to "W(P)" and from "W(P)" to "P", is 
not enough to vindicate (Ol )  and (02); speakers may conceive o f 
"truly assertible" and "warrantedly assertible" as being a p rio r i 
co-extensional. I f  speakers who reason under the assumption o f "P" in states 
in which "W(P)" is false do not engage in counterfactual reasoning, their 
commitment to (O l )  w ill be manifested. I f  speakers who reason under the 
assumption o f "~P" in states in which "W(P)" is true do not engage in 
counterfactual reasoning, their commitment to (02) w ill be manifested. The 
latter is not ruled out: given (02) truth claims are conjectural. I f  speakers 
engage in hypothetical reasoning in order to overcome neutrality or subject 
their conjectures to a test by assuming alternatives, their hypothetical 
reasoning w ill not be counterfactual.
Chapter Five
5.1 The Problem of Rational Belief Change
Whether speakers engage in hypothetical reasoning for these puiposes w ill 
depend on what it is they strive for in pursuing truth and what obligation 
they undertake in committing themselves to truth. Addressing these 
questions we must render intelligible why, i f  truth and warranted 
assertibility diverge, commitment to the former is nonetheless answerable to 
the obtaining o f the latter: why should I drop my belief in the truth o f "P" 
whenever "P" ceases to be warrantedly assertible?
5.2 Entitlement and Explanation
It is suggested that commitment to the objective truth o f "P" is commitment 
to the claim that "P" forms part o f the best explanation o f all available 
evidence including the warrants for asserting "P". I f  more and more 
recalcitrant data become available, there w ill be a point at which we become 
obliged to explain their availability. I f  we continue to fail in our attempt to 
arrive at such an explanation, there w ill be a point at which we lose our 
entitlement to "P".
5.3 Objective Discourse and Causation
This entails that many descriptive sentences are intended as explanations 
and that there is evidence which can be explained by asserting such 
sentences. It neither entails that all descriptive sentences may perform an 
explanatory role nor that the evidence cannot be described at all. The 
proposed account is at odds with the covering law model o f causation and
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causal explanation. This need not count against it because there are well- 
known objections to this model.
5.4 Causal Origin and Evidence
Not all evidence that warrants the assertion o f "P" can be causally explained 
in terms o f the truth o f "P": "P" may be warranted by claims relating to past 
events and by generalisations. It is merely required that "P" be entailed by 
the explanation o f the warrants for it. I f  "P" is apt for objective truth, it w ill 
be entailed by sentences apt for objective truth. Hence claims about past 
events and generalisations should be suited to perform an explanatory role. 
The former w ill be warranted by what are taken to be effects o f such events. 
The latter w ill be warranted by patterns o f evidence: the generalities they 
state may form an irreducible part o f the causal explanation o f such patterns. 
This is rendered plausible by the nature o f theoretical terms: entities referred 
to by such terms may play a causal role, yet their existence entails the 
existence o f generalities.
5.5 Inferences to the Best Explanation, and their Manifestation
Although explanations are assertions, the search for explanations involves 
hypothetical reasoning. Inferences to the best explanation proceed by 
elimination o f alternative hypotheses. Hypotheses may be singled out 
according to their explanatory costs and benefits. These can be weighed by 
assuming the truth o f a hypothesis and concluding whatever could then be 
seen as causally responsible for the remainder o f the available information. 
Thus hypothetical reasoning may help us overcome neutral states o f 
information and likewise serve as a test for our conjectures about the causal 
sources o f the information we receive. The assertibilist cannot account for 
this role o f hypothetical reasoning. Our practice o f hypothetical reasoning 
manifests our conception o f truth as objective in the sense required by (01) 
and (02).
5.6 Assertoric Practice and Knowledge-Wry
This account helps explain why warranted assertibility conditions play a 
content-determining role. "P" and "W(P)" nonetheless differ in content 
because the former but not the latter can be used to express knowledge-vv/ry. 
Our concern with knowledge o f this kind is explained in terms of our desire 
to objectify our epistemic states by relating them to an independent reality.
5.7 A  Solution to the Problem o f Understanding
This account does not entail that inteipretation requires acquaintance with 
truth-makers. It does not conceive o f the contentful ness o f a speaker's 
utterance as fully determined by the causal powers which she is subject to: 
the speaker herself is supposed to tell a causal story. Without this exercise o f 
her intellect she could not be said to express truth conditions. Still this 
exercise can be explained in terms o f her mastery o f rules o f language. We
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thus arrive at a solution to the Problem o f Understanding. It is furthermore 
required that speakers be able to give a theory of meaning for others by 
exercising the very abilities ascribed to themselves. This requirement is met, 
given that in ascribing knowledge o f truth conditions to a speaker, we seek 
to explain this speaker's behaviour.
Chapter Six
6.1 Superassertibility and the Lim its o f Truth
I f  truth claims feature as explanations o f the availability of data that warrant 
their assertion, the notion o f superassertibility is a poor candidate for truth. 
I f  truth and superassertibility are different concepts, it is hard to see how 
they might nonetheless be analytically linked. Knowability is truth plus 
superassertibility. Hence it is just as hai'd to see how EC* might be analytic.
6.2 Theoretical Slack?
The anti-realist who equates truth with superassertibility argues that the 
causalist elements o f the proposed account constitute theoretical slack. 
Accordingly she must give an alternative account of why it  may be rational 
to regard hypothetical reasoning as a means to acquire warrants. To assume 
that a sentence is superassertible is to assume the result which carrying out 
procedures o f warrant-acquisition would have, but not yet to carry out such 
a procedure. Hence equating truth with superassertibility leaves us with no 
explanation o f how hypothetical reasoning may play the role it does.
6.3 Completeness and Superneutrality
Even i f  not conceptually necessary EC* rules out that there is a sentence "P" 
such that in the actual world "P" cannot be decided. The anti-realist cannot 
rule this out on logical grounds without begging the question. That speakers 
would not hypothesize "P" and "~P" in order to overcome neutral states of 
information unless they regarded it  as possible that the truth-value o f "P" 
can be known, does not show that they would not do so unless they had a 
guarantee that it  is ruled out that neither "P" nor "-P" can be known. The 
only possible such guarantee available in neutral states o f information is a 
reason for believing EC*. Neither has such a reason been provided nor has it 
been shown that speakers must take themselves to have such a reason.
6.4 Causes and Best Explanations
The anti-realist argues that i f  truth claims are intended to explain data that 
warrant their assertion, commitments to the truth force commitments to 
there being such data; hence speakers regard truth as epistemically
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constrained. The realist retorts that there may be data we are forever 
debarred from having access to. Hence the realist is a realist about data and 
conceives o f best explanations in terms o f real causes. The anti-realist urges 
the realist to show that speakers are concerned with data and best 
explanations as thus conceived.
6.5 Assumptions and their Conclusions
The manifestation o f knowledge of objective truth conditions was said to lie 
in the speakers' practice o f hypothetical reasoning not in that o f reaching 
verdicts. I f  truth and knowability are different concepts, it is legitimate to 
assume that speakers have different terms for either concept. I f  EC* holds a 
p rio ri, the assumption o f "~OK(P)" should have the same set o f conclusions 
as the assumption o f "OK(~P)" or o f "~P", provided the reasoning is not 
counterfactual. The anti-realist argues that insofar as hypothetical reasoning 
is undertaken for the purpose o f overcoming neutrality or testing 
conjectures, both assumptions ought to have the same conclusions. But not 
all hypothetical reasoning is undertaken for such purposes: sometimes we 
aim to arrive at verdicts about conditionals. I f  reasoning under the 
assumption o f "P &  ~OK(P)" was counterfactual, the speakers ought to 
arrive at the conditional " I f  P &  -OK(P), then ~P". But they may well not do 
so. I  conclude that reasons for anti-realism have to be sought outside the 
semantic arena.
Chapter One*
One lesson to be learnt from the modern realism/anti-realism debate is that agnosticism 
w ith respect to certain principles may give rise to a viable theoretical position. 
Endorsing a claim carries with it the responsibility to vindicate it. A t least, this is true o f 
philosophical claims. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that as agnosticism 
about the validity o f a given claim is less than endorsement o f its negation, agnosticism 
does not carry w ith it any such responsibility. Entitlement to agnosticism must be 
earned, just as entitlement to any other position must. In other words, agnostics are 
bound to give reasons for believing that there are no reasons for believing or 
disbelieving the claim about which they are agnostic. Quite often this requirement w ill 
be met by counterbalancing the reasons brought forth in support o f that claim or its 
negation. Sometimes it  w ill rather be met by showing that these reasons were arrived at 
by dubious methods and therefore carry no conviction. ^
In this chapter, I  shall try to do two things. First, I want to divorce anti-realism 
from logical revisionism, and realism from endorsement o f classical logic. According to 
the line here taken, the anti-realist's conception o f truth as epistemically constrained 
does nothing to vindicate agnosticism about the Law o f Excluded Middle:
(LEM ) P V ~P.
The reasons for the rejection o f classical logic must accordingly lie elsewhere. That 
realism is equally silent on the matter becomes clear once realism is revealed to be a 
form o f anti-anti-realism, viz. the view according to which there is no reason to believe 
that truth is epistemically constrained.
This takes us to the second objective o f this chapter. I  shall argue that it is 
realism rather than anti-realism that is a species o f agnosticism. The anti-realist 
contends that whatever is true is knowably so. The realist, on the other hand, is agnostic 
about this very claim. In other words, the realist denies that the Epistemic Constraint on 
truth can be justified:
(EC) i f  it is true that P, then it is knowable that P.-
* An earlier version o f this chapter was read at the conference on Truth and Knowledge, held at the 
University o f Aarhus, Denmark, in November 1997. I would like to thank Lars Bo Gundersen, the 
organisers as well as the participants for helpful comments.
' On these alternative types o f defeat, see Wright [SDI]: 94-95.
- Here, knowability is not to be conceived o f in terms of what can now be known, but rather in terms of 
what can in principle be known.
In order to assess whether agnosticism about (LEM) is supported by endorsement o f 
(EC)— and, obversely, whether agnosticism about (EC) mandates endorsement o f 
(LEM)— we should command a clearer view o f what agnosticism is. Section (1.1) w ill 
clarify what kinds o f agnosticism there are, and what agnostics o f such kinds have to 
argue for. In section (1.2), I shall describe the dialectic between proponents o f classical 
logic on the one hand, and intuitionists who are agnostic about (LEM ) on the other. I 
shall argue that the intuitionists' endorsement o f (EC) does not support their logical 
revisionism. Section (1.3) addresses the question o f whether proponents o f (EC) are 
nonetheless forced to drop classical logic on pains o f absurdity. This question arises in 
face o f what has come to be called the Paradox o f Knowability. I  shall argue that, unless 
its scope is somehow restricted, (EC) has absurd consequences even i f  intuitionistic 
logic is adopted. This w ill lead to a reformulation o f the anti-realists' position in terms 
o f a weakening o f (EC). In section (1.4) then, I shall be concerned w ith the obverse 
question o f whether realism engenders endorsement of classical logic. Again, my 
answer w ill be negative. Insofar as agnosticism about the restricted version o f (EC) is 
sufficient for a realist conception o f truth, realism can be shown to be consistent with 
agnosticism about (LEM). The realist position which emerges is an epistemological 
thesis about the lim its o f what we can think about, rather than a metaphysical doctrine 
about the determinacy o f reality.
I f  agnosticism must be earned, so must realism. The aim o f the second chapter 
w ill accordingly be to prepare the ground for a successful defence o f realism in 
subsequent chapters, the lead idea being Dummett's suggestion that the dispute between 
realists and anti-realists ought to be decided on the basis o f an account o f understanding.
1.1 Innocence and Agnosticism
Call someone innocent with respect to a given proposition P just in case she lacks an 
answer to the question o f whether she should or should not endorse or deny P. The 
innocent may have taken no interest in attaining, or been deprived o f access to, the 
available information on the basis o f which such an answer can be given— or she may 
just happen never to have entertained the proposition in question. We all are innocent 
w ith respect to many propositions, which o f course is not to say that there are any 
propositions with respect to which all o f us are innocent.
It is clear from the way the term has been introduced that innocence contrasts 
w ith agnosticism. Agnosticism with respect to a given proposition P is the denial o f the 
justifiab ility  o f P or its negation, and hence a position which can only be arrived at with 
the available information borne in mind. Innocence, on the other hand, is a state o f mind 
one may find oneself occupying by merely entertaining the proposition in question. It is
in any case a state in which one cannot reasonably take a stand with respect to that 
proposition precisely because one lacks any information that may provide the rational 
grounds for doing so.^
The agnostic is bound to hold that her attitude towards the proposition she is 
agnostic about can, and indeed ought to, be adopted once the reasons for her position 
have been appreciated. In this regard, the agnostic in no way differs from the believer 
who likewise takes her reasons for believing to mandate adoption o f her stand. This is 
simply part o f what it is to take a stand within a rationally constrained debate.
Debates between agnostics and believers can accordingly be conceived to have 
the innocent as their audience. Ultimately, the opponents must attempt to persuade the 
innocent o f their respective position. The quality o f their arguments w ill thus depend on 
whether they can induce a first rational conviction o f what these arguments are intended 
to be arguments for. In other words, these arguments w ill carry no weight at all i f  the 
innocent can acknowledge their bearing on what she ought to believe only i f  she is 
already convinced o f their conclusion.^
Provided that agnosticism with respect to P amounts to the claim that neither P 
nor its negation is justifiable, we have to distinguish two kinds o f agnosticism that 
correspond to two different readings o f "justifiable". Let us call temporary’ agnosticism 
with respect to P the denial that P or its negation can here and now be justified— where 
it is not ruled out that in future, further information may decide the matter in favour o f 
either P or its negation.^ Agnosticism that is arrived at a posteriori w ill for the most part
3 It might be suggested that, in the state o f information the innocent occupies, neither P nor ~P is 
warrantedly assertible so that anyone occupying that state ought to be agnostic about P. This way o f 
putting it presupposes, however, that the state o f information the innocent occupies is a state in relation to 
which the present warranted assertibility of P is to be assessed. But this is precisely what the self- 
proclaimed innocent is unwilling to say. Rather, she distinguishes between the currently available 
evidence and her grasp of it.
^ I f  the debate concerns the status of a proposition {e.g. a purported logical law) to which, i f  it has this 
status, every rational thinker w ill be committed, one might wonder how the suggested methodology can 
be made to work: for although there may be independent criteria o f rationality in some such cases, it 
would still seem likely that there are propositions P such that any argument for P can only be 
acknowledged i f  P has already been endorsed. Take arguments for the validity o f modus ponens as an 
example: i f  we seek to persuade the innocent of the validity of modus ponens by means o f an argument 
that involves an application o f modus ponens, it would appear that the rational suasiveness o f the 
argument cannot be measured against an independent standard; and there seem to be no arguments for the 
validity o f modus ponens that do not share this feature. Since there is no initial reason to think that 
arguments for and against the justifiability o f those propositions we are going to consider, i.e. (EC) and 
(LEM), necessarily share this feature, the suggested methodology can here be adopted until proven 
inadequate. However, the reasoning that leads to this caution does not seem to be compelling anyway: 
first, it is not at all clear whether all arguments for the logical validity o f a given claim need themselves 
be logically valid; and secondly, even an argument that involves the application o f a rule o f inference 
may be recognised as a good argument quite independently from whether the applied rule is recognised 
as generally valid.
 ^Whereas both the belief that P and temporary agnosticism about P call for warrants, it is only the former 
attitude which is accompanied by the claim that the available warrants w ill not be overturned in future.
be temporary in this sense, for empirical evidence— if  it warrants neither P nor -P — is 
like ly not to warrant either that in future no empirical evidence w ill be forthcoming that 
warrants either P or -P. It may be argued, however, that sometimes we have defeasible 
evidence from which we can infer that an empirical proposition w ill never be decided. 
Thus it may be argued that we have a posteriori grounds for thinking that it w ill never 
be found out whether the number o f coins I had in my pocket last month is even.
In any case, temporary agnosticism is not always arrived at a posteriori. 
Whereas temporary agnosticism a posteriori denies the current justifiability o f an 
empirical proposition, temporary agnosticism a p rio r i denies the present justifiability o f 
a proposition apt for a p rio ri justification. For example, one might adopt agnosticism 
towards a mathematical proposition on the basis that so far, no proof o f it or its negation 
has been given. Again, this is not to rule out that such a proof can eventually be given. 
Thus, even i f  a proof o f P is a conclusive a p rio ri reason to believe P, temporary 
agnosticism about P may be based on the observation that such a proof has never been 
advanced— and at the same time be defeasible in virtue o f the fact that such a proof 
might be advanced in future. Insofar as the agnostic lacks a reason to preclude this 
possibility, her agnosticism is temporary, owing its suasiveness to nothing but all the 
proofs hitherto advanced and all the proofs hitherto wanting. Insofar as the agnostic has 
to evaluate the credentials o f mathematical constructions, her agnosticism w ill 
nonetheless be arrived at a priori.^
In contrast, call principled  agnosticism with respect to a proposition P the denial 
that P or its negation can ever be justified. For obvious reasons, this form o f agnosticism 
cannot solely be based on the observation that all hitherto attained evidence falls short 
o f establishing either P or its negation. Rather, it w ill have to rest on an argument to the 
effect that no evidence w ill ever be had which can establish either P or ~P. I f  meant to 
be conclusive, such an argument w ill be arrived at a priori. For no empirical evidence 
that is itself insufficient to warrant either P or its negation has the force to guarantee that 
no further evidence can be gained which warrants either P or ~P.
It would be mistaken to suggest, however, that for this very reason, principled 
agnosticism can only relate to the a p rio r i justifiab ility  o f a proposition. It has already 
been remarked that, arguably, we may come to possess defeasible evidence from which
^ It might be objected that temporary agnosticism with respect to a proposition P apt for a priori 
justification w ill always be arrived at a posteriori, because it w ill inter alia be based on the observation 
that, besides all the pseudo-proofs hitherto dismissed a priori, the current state of information does not 
include any other attempted proof o f P. On this view, neither can there be an a priori justification for 
believing P that may be trumped in future, for any inconclusive a priori grounds for P w ill have to be 
supplemented by reasons for believing that no trumping evidence is presently available; and such reasons 
are supposed to be a posteriori. I am not at all attracted to this view. However, for the purposes o f this 
essay, it does not matter whether we can be said to arrive at temporary agnosticism about (EC) on purely 
a p rio ri grounds.
we can infer that a given empirical proposition w ill never be decided. Principled 
agnosticism o f this kind w ill be arrived at a posteriori, and the arguments on which it is 
based w ill be less than conclusive: we have no guarantee that we w ill never know 
whether the number o f coins I had in my pocket last month is even.
But it may even be thought that there are empirical propositions for whose 
undecidability we have such an a p r io r i guarantee. For instance, let us stipulate that x  is 
a master crim inal just in case x has committed a deed which is not detectable as a crime 
and the causal history o f which we cannot trace back to anything % did. Then we know a 
p rio r i that the proposition that Maggie was a master criminal cannot be vindicated on 
the basis of any empirical evidence. By the same token however, it would appear that 
we know a p rio ri that neither can its negation be so vindicated, for this would require 
showing that there was no such crime to which Maggie was so related, and this it might 
be argued, cannot be shown on the basis o f any empirical evidence: i f  Maggie can be 
shown to have committed a crime, this does not rule out the possibility that there is 
another crime Maggie has committed but cannot be convicted of, and i f  there is nothing 
Maggie can be shown to have done which qualifies as a crime, this does not rule out that 
something Maggie did is a crime, but cannot be identified as such.^ However, principled 
agnosticism o f this a p rio ri kind can only be maintained at the cost o f embracing 
scepticism about the credentials o f empirical evidence in general.^ For otherwise we 
may after all be credited w ith the capacity to acquire good, albeit defeasible evidence for 
the claim that Maggie is no master criminal, e.g. by following her ai'ound. Principled 
agnosticism a p rio ri is more modest i f  it is directed at the a p rio r i justifiab ility  o f a 
proposition and its negation, for here it is most unlikely to be infectious so as to 
undercut all a pno n  justification.
Both disputes about logic and disputes about the correct conception o f truth 
relate to the question whether certain principles, or rules, can be justified a priori."^ In
 ^ Another example would be "Everything is uniformly increasing in size". There is no way in which we 
could detect the truth of this sentence because our measuring rods would likewise increase in size. By the 
same token, it would appear that we cannot detect the falsity o f this sentence either because our 
measurements w ill yield precisely those results they would yield i f  the sentence was true. Insofar as we 
have reason to believe, however, that space and time are continuous manifolds, we have reason to believe 
that there is no intrinsically defined metric, hence that length is relational. We w ill then have reason to 
regard the claim that everything uniformly increases in size as incoherent, and therefore as false. Cf. 
Griinbaum [PPS]: 42-43. Accordingly, principled agnosticism about this claim could only be retained i f  it 
could be shown that we can have no reason to believe that space and time are continuous manifolds.
 ^ I here take it that a principled agnostic about the claim that Maggie was a master criminal does regard 
this claim as apt for truth and falsity. In other words, she does not deny the justifiability of this claim or 
its negation on the ground that they are devoid of sense.
^ Realists deny that (EC) can be justified a priori just as intuitionists deny that (LEM) can be justified 
a priori. In what follows I shall describe realists as agnostics about (EC) and intuitionists as agnostics 
about (LEM). In doing so I seem to subscribe to the claim that both (EC) and (LEM) can only be justified 
a priori i f  they can be justified at all. For i f  I left room for the possibility that someone might deny that 
(EC) or (LEM) are a pmnv justifiable, yet affirm that they are nonetheless justified, then calling realists
order to see how— with respect to the a p rio r i justifiability o f P— either temporary or 
principled agnosticism about P might be justified, hence how the agnostic might 
succeed in persuading the innocent o f the propriety o f her position, it is instructive to 
ask first on which grounds P could be shown to be valid a priori. There are basically 
two ways in which this might be done: either one offers a proof for P— a demonstration 
o f P from premisses and by means o f rules which are themselves known a p rio ri— or 
one makes a successful case for the claim that P can be known a p rio ri even though it 
does not admit o f such a proof.
In principle, any pui*ported proof o f P is open to two forms of criticism: either 
the agnostic may argue that this purported proof rests on premisses whose a p rio r i 
validity she denies. Alternatively, she may argue that at least one step in the derivation 
o f P relies on the propriety o f a rule o f inference whose a p rio ri validity she again 
denies.
Since every proof— even i f  it does not rest on any undischarged assumptions— at 
least draws on the propriety o f rules o f inference to which a logical law corresponds, it 
would appear that some propositions must be known a p rio ri without proof, i f  anything 
is to be provable at all. Therefore sooner or later, the agnostic is likely to challenge that 
all those propositions can be known a p rio r i which the believer takes to be knowable 
without proof, and on whose validity the purported proof o f P depends. In other words, 
it is likely that there w ill be a point at which both the agnostic and the believer agree 
that a proposition on which the alleged proof o f P depends cannot itself be proved, but 
disagree as to whether it  can be known a p rio r i nonetheless. Indeed, this is precisely the 
shape that the debate between intuitionists and classicists takes.
and intuitionists agnostics would seem to be misguided: by definition, agnosticism rules out belief. But i f  
(EC) and (LEM) were apt for empirical confirmation, it seems they would have to be endorsed on that 
basis, for their known instances are legion. (The only way I can think o f in which (EC) might be said to 
be refuted empirically is in terms o f a well-confirmed scientific theory which entails, for some P, that 
neither P nor ~P is knowable, but rules out that both P and ~P may fail to be true. I owe this idea to Jesper 
Kallestrup. It would then become a matter o f dispute however, whether there can be reasons for believing 
that P is not knowable, which are not yet reasons for believing that ~P is knowable, hence whether the 
notion o f knowability alluded to is the one the proponent o f (EC) has in mind.)
The claim that (EC) and (LEM) are not apt for empirical justification is highly contentious. Although I 
think a lot can be said in its favour {e.g. by appeal to projectibility), I shall not here argue the case. For 
present purposes I need not subscribe to this claim anyway: it is sufficient to point out that the debates are 
concerned with the a priori status o f (EC) and (LEM) respectively and that all parties involved agree that 
in the context o f these debates, empirical evidence for (EC) or (LEM) would not suffice for winning. It is 
important to keep in mind though, that the finding that (EC) or (LEM) cannot be known a priori would 
not yet license the conclusion that (EC) or (LEM) cannot be known at all (see footnote 14). My 
argumentation w ill in any case depend on there being a sense in which (EC) and (LEM) are apt for a 
justification. Chapter two w ill be designed to explain which sense this may be.
1.2 Log ica l Revisionism and Anti-Realism
Dummett has argued that realists are committed to endorsement o f classical logic and 
the bivalent semantics that underpins it, while abstention from such an endorsement is 
essential to anti-realism. In particular, endorsement of the Law o f Excluded Middle:
(LEM) P v ~ P
has been regarded as essential to realism, while the denial o f its a p rion  justifiab ility  has 
accordingly been taken to be essential to anti-realism. In what follows, I want to contest 
this account o f the dialectic between realists and anti-realists. As I shall argue, there is 
no obvious route from anti-realism to revisionism in logic, nor is there any reason to 
suppose that a successful case for realism w ill be a successful case for classical logic. 
But in order not to prejudge the issue, let us confront a proponent o f classical logic with 
a proponent o f intuitionistic logic.
The intuitionist denies that (LEM) can be a p rio ri justified. But neither does she 
commit herself to the falsehood o f any o f its instances. We are therefore prone to 
describing her as an agnostic about (LEM). But recall that agnosticism w ith respect to a 
given P was described as the denial that either P or its negation can be justified; and as it 
is to be expected, proponents o f different logics may have divergent views about what 
counts as the negation o f a given proposition, hence eventually about the identity o f this 
very proposition. In some cases, the point o f view from which we describe someone as 
an agnostic is therefore most like ly to be biased. Indeed, as we shall see, the intuitionist 
does not conceive o f the negation o f (LEM) as involving the claim that (LEM) has false 
instances.*® Still, for the time being, we may assume that it  is sufficient for one's 
agnosticism about a given generalisation or schema i f  one denies that this generalisation 
or schema can be justified and furthermore refuses to claim that it has false instances. 
For, it is still correct to say that, in the sense agnosticism has originally been defined, 
the intuitionist is agnostic about some instances o f (LEM), viz. those for none o f whose 
disjuncts there are warrants or effective procedures for acquiring such warrants; and at 
least intuitively, any reason to move beyond agnosticism about P w ill involve a reason 
for believing that P can be refuted, while there is no intuitive conception o f refuting a 
generalisation or schema that does not amount to producing a counter-example. 
However, any reader who is sceptical about this bias towards intuitive thinking may be 
reassured: we can still run the reasoning about to follow with respect to particular
*® This is owing to the fact that, for the intuitionist, the inference from ‘ -V aOx ’ to ‘— 3a'“ C)a ’ is invalid, 
with the effect that she can, i f  certain other conditions are satisfied, consistently endorse both ‘~VA'd>A'’ 
and ‘~3.v-~0.v’ ; see footnote 14.
instances o f (LEM) rather than (LEM) itself, instances with respect to which the 
intuitionist would describe herself as an agnostic. In the end, it is the idea o f refusing to 
endorse an instance o f (LEM) despite the fact that it is impossible to deny it which 
puzzles the innocent.
Given that even an agnostic must be capable o f convincing the innocent, we have 
to ask how the intuitionist may argue her case against classical logic. As suggested, we 
should start by describing how the classical logician may try to show on a p rio ri 
grounds that (LEM ) is valid. Suppose she offers the following reductio proof:
1 (1) ~(P V -P) Ass.
2 (2) P Ass.
2 (3) P V~P 2, v-I
1,2 (4) 1 1, 3, —E
1 (5) ~ p 2, 4, - I
1 (6) P V -P 5, v-I
1 (7) X 1,6, ~-E
(8) -  ~(P V -P) 1,7, - I
(9) P v~P 8, DNE
Confronted w ith this proof, the intuitionist w ill reply that the step from (8) to (9) relies 
on the propriety o f the rule o f Double Negation Elimination:
(DNE) -  ~P
and hence on the validity o f the Law o f Double Negation:
(LDN) -  -P  P.
Unlike the classicist, the intuitionist claims that this law cannot be shown to be valid a 
prio ri. It might thus appear that we have made some progress by narrowing down what 
the classicist and the intuitionist disagree about, just as troubleshooters isolate the 
source o f trouble. But this is an illusion: both for the intuitionist and the classicist, the 
claim that (LEM) is logically valid is equivalent to the claim that (LDN) is logically 
valid. ’ * Indeed, the classicist may concede that neither (LEM) nor (LDN) can be proved
* * The same goes for the claim that the rule o f Dilemma is logically valid and the claim that the rule o f 
Classical Reductio is logically valid; cf. Tennant [ARLj: 186-87.
without circularity and therefore rather claim that (LEM) and (LDN) can be known a 
p rio r i without proof. The intuitionist w ill accordingly deny that this is so.
The intuitionist cannot rest content with the observation that up to now, this law 
has not been vindicated. For, this would take the innocent towards no more than a 
temporary agnosticism about (LDN). One may ask, however, why should the intuitionist 
go for more than temporary agnosticism about (LDN)? Well, insofar as we do reason in 
accordance w ith this law, the innocent is tempted to think that it is just a matter o f 
overcoming technical difficulties that such a vindication w ill be forthcoming in the end: 
no philosophy o f logic w ill be faithful to our inferential practice unless it accords the 
status o f a valid rule o f inference to (DNE); and the innocent may rightly claim to have 
a coherent understanding o f the logical constants without being able to demonstrate the 
validity o f those rules which have to be valid in order for her to have that 
understanding.*- In other words, the innocent w ill not refrain from using the laws o f 
classical logic as long as she is presented w ith no more than the finding that until now, 
philosophers o f logic have failed to demonstrate our entitlement to these laws.*-"*
True: the mere fact that we actually reason according to the laws of classical 
logic does not yet show that we are justified in doing so. In other words, revisionism is 
still an option. The innocent's temptation to stick to actual practice, however, is not 
completely groundless either. For until now, she is incapable o f understanding in which 
sense a proof to the effect that negating an arbitrary instance o f (LEM ) leads to 
contradiction may fall short o f being a proof o f (LEM). A  proof to the effect that ~P 
leads to contradiction is a proof that, necessarily, ~P fails to be true. I f  such a proof is 
said to be less than a proof o f P, then this seems to be an invitation to think it  possible 
that P may nonetheless fa il to be true. To conceive o f P as failing to be true, however, is 
to think it possible that ~P is true; and this possibility has already been ruled out by the 
reductio o f -P. Accordingly, the intuitionist's abstention from (LEM), i f  it  is to be 
backed up by suasive reasons at all, must be motivated by a train o f thought other than 
this one.
In other words, the innocent is puzzled by the fact that (i) she has been offered a 
reason for more than just not endorsing the negation o f an arbitrary instance o f (LEM) 
but actually for denying it, whereas (ii) she is told that having reason to deny the 
negation o f a proposition is not yet a reason to affirm that proposition. Thus, it would 
appear that the intuitionist is agnostic about (LEM), while not being agnostic about its
*~ This is just one application o f the more general principle according to which one may have knowledge 
without knowing that the enabling conditions for this knowledge are satisfied. Cf. Burge [IS]: 653-55.
*-'* Cf. Dummett [LBM ]: 301-304; and [ILE]: 281-84.
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negation. And it is this combination o f ideas which the innocent is as yet incapable o f 
digesting.
It was conceded that the fact that we do reason according to the laws o f classical 
logic does not yet vindicate these laws. Being a principled agnostic about these laws, the 
intuitionist w ill therefore argue for revisionism by arguing that our actual inferential 
practice is incoherent. Since the intuitionist does not deny (LEM) but only its a p rio ri 
justifiab ility , the incoherence she tries to bring out w ill not amount to any inconsistency 
amongst the laws in accordance with which we reason. Rather this putative incoherence 
is most likely to be thought o f as an inconsistency between the epistemic status we 
assign to such laws and evaluations o f other principles to which we are committed. Thus 
one way o f displaying such an incoherence— without yet offering a diagnosis o f it—  
would consist in proving that i f  (LEM) was accepted as valid, we would be licensed to 
infer statements whose a p rio ri validity we have independent reason to deny.
Dummett has suggested that an anti-realist conception o f truth underpins logical 
revisionism. *5 Indeed, intuitionism is a species o f anti-realism. This alone does not yet
Being a principled agnostic about (LEM) in the context o f the current debate as well as an anti-realist 
about truth, the intuitionist w ill be bound to hold that there is a sense in which the negation of (LEM) can 
be known, i f  she furthermore contends that (LEM) can only be known a p riori i f  it can be known at all. 
For given (EC), i f  A  is not knowable, then ~A, and i f  ~A, then ~A is knowable. The intuitionist may try 
to accommodate this by driving a wedge between (a) and (b);
(a) ~ ~ (for all P; P v ~P)
(b) for all P; ~ ~ (P v ~P).
(Cf. Dummett [E l]: 30.) While the intuitionist is forced to endorse (b) in any case, she can indeed 
consistently deny (a) provided that the range o f "P" is not finite. And to deny (a) is to affirm the negation 
o f the universally quantified version o f (LEM), as in intuitionism triple negation collapses into single 
negation. (For double negation introduction holds so as to allow for contraposition.)
Why is the proviso that the range o f "P" not be finite essential? I f  the range o f "P" is finite, the 
negation o f (a) is accordingly equivalent to the negation of a conjunction o f finitely many instances o f 
(LEM), while (b) is equivalent to the conjunction of the double negations o f these instances. But then the 
conjunction o f (b) and the negation o f (a) yields a contradiction, since in general:
-  ~ P &  ... & ~  ~R 1------- (P &  ... & R ).
For example, suppose that — P &  — Q and that ~(P &  Q). From the latter, we derive that P —> ~Q. and 
so by double negation introduction, that — P —> ~Q. From this together with — P, we derive ~Q, 
contradicting — Q. (This proof was pointed out to me by Crispin Wright, Note that intuitionists do not 
already regard (LEM) as in good standing i f  the range o f "P" is finite: it must furthermore be guaranteed 
both that all predicates involved are decidable and that the domain o f quantification is finite and 
decidable.)
As already mentioned in footnote 9 however, principled agnosticism about (LEM) with respect to the 
current debate does not amount to the claim that (LEM) cannot be known at all: it only amounts to the 
claim that (LEM) cannot be known a priori. But suppose that the intuitionist indeed endorses the bolder 
claim that (LEM) can only be known a priori i f  it can be known at all. Then even i f  the range o f "P" 
cannot be shown to be finite such that no contradiction can be derived either, it seems obvious that the 
anti-realist's prescription to endorse (b) but to deny (a), does not yet relieve the innocent from her 
dyspepsia.
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show, however, that the intuitionist is agnostic about (LEM) because she is an anti­
realist about truth. It is even less clear whether the innocent can be brought to adopt 
agnosticism about (LEM) on the basis o f reasons for anti-realism. It might now be 
argued, however, that once the innocent can independently be convinced o f anti-realism, 
(LEM) would allow her to infer a statement whose a p rio ri validity she has in turn 
independent reason to deny. This would then provide her with a reason to deny the a 
p rio r i validity o f (LEM). In this way, anti-realism might be shown to support logical 
revisionism.
Suppose then that the Epistemic Constraint on truth has been vindicated on 
independent grounds, i.e. that it has been established that
(EC) i f  it is true that P, then it is knowable that P.
Endorsement o f (LEM) would then allow us to infer the following principle o f 
Completeness:
(C) either it is knowable that P or it is knowable that ~P.
And now it would seem that the innocent is offered a suasive reason for dropping 
(LEM)— given she has been persuaded o f the a p rio r i validity o f (EC)— for, clearly, 
there is no a p r io r i reason to believe (C). Or is there? Assume that the innocent is 
intrigued by the following line o f thought: it cannot be established by reflection alone 
that either P is knowable or ~P is knowable, because it is still a possibility that for some 
P, neither w ill there be any evidence available that is sufficient to yield knowledge o f P 
nor w ill there be any evidence available that is sufficient to yield knowledge o f ~P. I f  
(EC) is a valid principle however, then this possibility is ruled out. I f  this was possible, 
it would have to be possible that neither P nor ~P is true. And given the Negation 
Equivalence:
(NE) it is not the case that P is true i f f  it  is the case that ~P is true,
this would mean that it was possible that neither P is true nor P is not true.'®
Dummett [RoP]: 362-64; [FBI]: 224-26.
'® (NE) uncontroversially ibllows from the Equivalence Schema for truth:
(ES) it is true that P if f  P,
which is also uncontroversial with respect to the present debate. Thus the innocent can be taken to have 
been introduced to and convinced o f the following proof:
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But a contradiction is necessarily false, and
~P &  ~ ~P
is a contradiction in both classical and intuitionistic logic. Accordingly, it would appear 
that endorsement o f (EC) on a p rio ri grounds leaves the innocent with no independent 
reason to be agnostic about (C): she would already have to have lost her innocence w ith 
respect to (LEM) in order for her to get into a position to countenance any reason for 
agnosticism about (C). For, given (EC), (C) is equivalent to (LEM); and being able to 
conceive o f a reason for agnosticism about (C) w ill then already require the ability to 
conceive o f a reason for agnosticism that is less than a reason to believe in the 
possibility o f counter-examples—just the kind o f reason the intuitionist sought to 
provide for agnosticism about (LEM). Insofar as agnosticism about (C) was supposed to 
engender agnosticism about the propriety o f (DNE), hence o f (LEM), it would thus 
appear that endorsement o f (EC)— rather than supplying the innocent w ith a reason for 
logical revisionism— bereaves her o f any independent reason she may have been offered 
for abstaining from the very principle which (EC) turns (LEM) into, i.e. (C). When 
Crispin Wright contends that
the thesis of EC, that truth is essentially evidentially constrained, must enjoin a revision of 
classical logic, one way or another, for all discourses where there is no guarantee that 
evidence is available, at least in principle, to decide between each statement o f the 
discourse concerned and its negation,'^
he appears to suggest that there is a reason for thinking that there is no such guarantee 
for (C)— a reason which can be shared by both the intuitionist and the classicist— and 
that, once (EC) is independently established, logical revisionism is forced upon us. 
Quite the contrary: i f  there is a reason to be agnostic about (C), (EC) necessarily would 
turn that reason into a reason for logical revisionism. Accordingly, i f  there is no reason 
for logical revisionism to start with, then neither is there any reason to be agnostic about 
(C) given that there is a reason to believe (EC), for (EC) and (C) are classically 
equivalent.'^ Hence it has still to be shown why the innocent should opt for logical 
revisionism.
(1) it is true that P P (ES)
(2) -P  <-> it is not true that P 1, contraposition
(3) it is true that ~P ~P (ES)
,3 (4) it is not true that P ^  it is true that ~P 2,3
7 Wright [TO]: 43.
 ^We have already indicated that (EC) classically entails (C); but (C) also intuitionistically entails (EC):
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Any a p rio r i warrant for agnosticism about (C) we can be said to have simultaneously 
with an a p rio r i warrant for (EC), cannot furnish us with any a p rio ri warrant for logical 
revisionism we did not already have independently from the argument that leads from 
(EC) and agnosticism about (C) to agnosticism about (LEM). Rather, it is only i f  we are 
already in possession o f an a p r io r i warrant for logical revisionism that we can take 
ourselves to have a p rio r i warrants for both agnosticism about (C) and belief in (EC). In 
other words, any warrant that the innocent may independently be offered for being 
agnostic about (C) is undermined by warrants for (EC), such that i f  she is presented with 
a vindication o f the latter, for her there w ill no longer be any warrant to be had for 
resisting belief in (C) until she has been convinced o f logical revisionism in the first 
place. Accordingly, given (EC), any argument for logical revisionism based on 
agnosticism about (C) w ill not be suasive.
1 ( 1) OK(P) V OK(~P) Ass.
2 (2) P Ass.
(3) OK(~P) ~P knowability is factive
2 (4) -  ~P 2, A —> ~ ~A
2 (5) ~OK(-P) 3, 4, modus tollendo tollens
1,2 (6 ) OK(P) 1, 5, modus tollendo ponens
1 (7) P OK(P) 2, 6 , —>-I.
The importance o f this result lies in the fact that even the innocent can acknowledge that endorsing (C) is 
one way o f endorsing (EC), with the effect that she has a guarantee that her warrants for (EC) w ill not be 
undermined once (C) is accepted. O f course, she is not thereby said to have a reason for thinking that her 
warrants for (EC) are already sufficient to warrant (C), for this would depend on the validity o f (LEM). 
Intuitionists may accordingly suggest that logical laws alone can never license the transformation o f 
warrants for (EC) into warrants for (C) which, for the intuitionists, is a far stronger principle than (EC). 
But again this does not seem convincing: classically, (EC) is just as strong a principle as (EC) because 
both are equivalent; accordingly the intuitionists' worries about the epistemological inertness o f logical 
laws are counter-balanced by the classicists' suggestion that, strictly speaking, no transformation o f 
warrants for (EC) into warrants for (C) is called for because, appearances notwithstanding, (EC) and (C) 
come down to one and the same (highly contentious) claim.
Another way o f expressing that the anti-realist's argument is not suasive, is in terms of begging the 
question. Following a suggestion by Jackson [PPA] we may say that
an argument for a conclusion K begs the question against an audience who has doubts
about K  i f  the evidence adduced in support o f the premisses {Pj , ..., P^ }^ is sufficient only
i f  conjoined with beliefs {R j , ... , R,^ }^ and anyone who has doubts about K ought not to 
share (R; , . . . ,  R,^J independently from being presented with this evidence.
The anti-realist's argument is this:
Pp It is true that P if f  it is knowable that P
P^: There is no reason to claim: it is knowable that P or knowable that ~P
P3: It is true that ~P i f f  it is not true that P
K: There is no reason to claim: it is true that P or not true that P.
Whatever the evidence that is adduced in support o f the premisses, it w ill be sufficient to do the job only 
if  (DNE) is taken to be invalid. For otherwise this evidence would have to be sufficient to vindicate 
demurral from the double negation o f (LEM), which is a logical truth even for the intuitionist. But 
anyone who is not yet convinced o f (K) w ill not yet be convinced that (DNE) is invalid, because (LEM) 
(intuitionistically) entails (LDN) which validates (DNE). Hence the anti-realist's argument begs the 
question.
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None o f this shows that the laws o f classical logic are valid. Until now, the innocent is 
bound to subscribe to temporary agnosticism with respect to the question o f which o f 
the competing logics ought to be adopted. It emerges, however, that the intuitionist’s 
principled agnosticism about (LEM ) w ill not yet be served by the anti-realist's 
vindication o f (EC). Rather, it would appear that a vindication o f (EC) is compatible 
w ith a vindication o f (LEM).-®
L 3  The Paradox o f  Knowability
Timothy Williamson has argued that the position just sketched— endorsement o f (EC) 
plus endorsement o f classical logic, and hence (C)— is bound to collapse into 
absurdity.2* Even i f  this was a correct diagnosis, it would appear that the conclusion 
reached in the last section would stand unassailed. For i f  (EC) and the laws o f classical 
logic together indeed had absurd consequences, then anyone not yet biased towards 
logical revisionism would regard any argument to this effect as a reductio o f (EC). This 
view should definitely be taken, i f  logical revisionism could not prevent endorsement o f 
(EC) from collapsing into an absurd position. However, Williamson is convinced that 
intuitionism is the way out for anyone promoting (EC). I shall argue that this diagnosis 
is mistaken.
The last section revealed that, even i f  there were independent reasons to endorse 
(EC), these reasons would not yet motivate agnosticism about (LEM). The present 
section is intended to show that reasons for anti-realism need not at the same time be 
reasons for logical revisionism. In other words, it is intended to show that there may 
well be independent reasons for the claim that truth is epistemically constrained. O f 
course i f  (EC) leads to absurdity, no matter which logic is adopted, this claim w ill have 
to be modified. As we shall see shortly, (EC) must be restricted in a systematic way.
Williamson's argument for the claim that an anti-realist conception o f truth lends 
itself to intuitionism draws on a proof originally due to Fitch.-- This proof shows that 
(EC) classically entails that every truth w ill at some point be known, and has therefore 
come to be known as presenting the Paradox o f Knowability. Let "K(P)" be short for 
"There is a time at which it w ill be known that P".--  ^The proof then runs as follows:
-® Cf. Posy's discussion o f Kant's view o f the nature o f mathematics in [KMR]: 123-28. Cf. as well 
Blackburn [MR]: 44-45.
“ * Williamson [ID ]; cf. as well his [KC].
-2 Fitch [LA V ]; cf. as well Hart [A I], Edgington [PoK] and Williamson [OPK].
As Williamson has shown, the proof is blocked once "K(P)" is interpreted as "It is known at t that P", 
for some specific time f, see his [ID ]: 204-205.
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1 ( I) P &  ~K(P) Ass.
1 (2) OK(P &  -K(P)) 1, given (EC)
1 (3) -□ ~ K (P  &  ~K(P)) 2, df. 0
4 (4) K(P &  --K:(P)) Ass.
4 (5) K(P) 4, given K(A &  B) —> K(A)
4 (6) ~K(P) 4, given K(A &  B) A &  B, &-E
4 (7) X 5, 6, - E
(8) -.K(P &  -K(P)) 4, 7, - I
(9) □~K(P &  ~K(P)) 8, 0-1
1 (10) X 3,9, - E
(11) ~(P &  -K(P)) 1, 10, - I
(12) P K(P) 11, given ~(A &  ~B) —> (A B).-*^
According to Williamson, (12) is absurd. Indeed, one should be ready to agree: we |
know that we are far too lazy to track every truth that there is, and sometimes |
irreversible changes occur that obstruct any attempt to answer a question which we have I
every reason to believe nonetheless has an answer. |
For instance, consider the following case. Patrick is sitting in his office, door and I
window locked from the outside. Kaufmann has set a time-bomb that w ill blow up |
Patrick's office in three minutes, and Patrick knows this. Patrick goes on to look through |
his lifetime achievements, stored in two-hundred folders. Mixed w ith these, there are IIone-hundred qualitatively identical folders containing copies o f articles on polygamy. |
For convenience' sake, let us suppose that each folder has a unique number printed onto j
it, but otherwise lacks any information about its contents. Now, every statement o f the |
form "Folder number % contains a sheet with the word 'polygamy' on it" is effectively j
decidable (where % is a number between 1 and 300). Only two minutes left. Patrick has I
checked the contents o f no more than twenty folders. Patrick knows that there is a !
number between 1 and 300 such that the folder with that number w ill contain a sheet |
The step from (11) to (12) involves an application o f Double Negation Elimination (DNE):
1 (1) ~(P &  ~K(P)) Ass.
2 (2 ) P Ass.
3 (3) ~K(P) Ass.
2,3 (4) P &  -K(P) 2, 3, & -I
1 ,2,3 (5) X 1,4, ~-E
1, 2 (6) -  -K(P) 3, 5, - I
1, 2 (7) K(P) 6 , DNE
1 (8) P ^  K(P) 2, 7,
1 6
with the word "polygamy" on it, but no one w ill ever know.^® How can anyone ever 
refuse to assert this? Or rather, how can anyone ever claim to be in a position to rule this 
out?
Williamson maintains that, i f  she blocks the step from (11) to (12) by way o f 
dropping (DNE), the anti-realist can avoid the absurd conclusion that all truths w ill at 
some point be known.2® Accordingly, intuitionism is what the anti-realist should opt for. 
In doing so, she would still be bound to deny that there are any truths that w ill never be 
known. But, she would nonetheless be agnostic about (12).2?
Williamson's recommendation that the anti-realist forestall (12) by going in for 
logical revisionism, however, is far from helpful. As Tennant has argued, the step from 
(11) to (12) is intuitionistically acceptable in cases in which the discourse is effectively 
decidable; and i f  "P" is effectively decidable so is "K(P)", contrary to what Williamson 
suggests.28 I f  (12) is absurd for the reasons cited above, it w ill remain to be so in cases 
in which both "P" and "K(P)" are effectively decidable. Accordingly, anti-realism has 
not yet been saved from absurdity, even i f  classical logic is being rejected.
On the other hand, i f  (12) is absurd for the reasons sketched above, so seems 
(11). Indeed, (11) is intuitionistically equivalent to (12*);
(12*) -K (P )-^ -P ,
viz. the claim that all propositions that w ill never be known are false. The idea that it  is 
inconsistent to hold that there is a truth that w ill, as a matter o f fact, never be known—
I f  there are any qualms about Patrick's loss o f memory, just suppose that (Patrick knows that) his 
illiterate friend put the manuscripts into the folders, and (he knows as well that) Kaufmann randomly 
stamped the numbers onto them. There is then no sense to the idea that anyone ever knew o f every 
number between 1 and 300, whether or not the folder with that number contained a sheet with the word 
"polygamy" on it. The present case w ill thus differ from the one discussed by Dummett [T]: 6.
2® See footnote 24.
2? Williamson [ID ]; 206. Here, we see once more that (EC) itself does nothing to help render intelligible 
how the proof that counterexamples to a given claim are ruled out a priori may fall short o f being a proof 
that this claim holds good. Again, it would appear that intuitionism must take care of itself before it can 
so much as back up anti-realism.
Tennant [TT]; 268-69; Williamson [KC]: 428. One might have some qualms about the cogency o f 
Tennant's argument. Tennant argues that in implementing the effective decision procedure for P we either 
establish the truth o f P and thereby come to know P, hence make K(P) true; or we establish the falsity o f 
P and thereby come to know ~P, hence make ~K(P) true. He concludes that therefore this procedure is 
also an effective decision procedure for K(P). This, it might be objected, is just as bad as regarding 
building a castle on this spot as a decision procedure for ‘A  castle w ill one day be built on this spot’ : 
again, implementing the procedure is bringing about the very state o f affairs for which this procedure is 
supposed to be a decision procedure; and this, it might be argued, is not what we take a decision 
procedure to be. However, the crucial difference between these cases is, o f course, that we can tell 
beforehand what result building a castle on this spot would have, while we cannot tell beforehand what 
result implementing the decision procedure for P would have. A lot more needs to be said about this 
issue; but suffice it to say that, even i f  Tennant's argument does not go through, there are other reasons 
for thinking that going intuitionist does not resolve the paradox; see main text.
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and hence likewise inconsistent to hold that there may be such a truth— is indeed hard to 
s w a llo w .29 Thus, even i f  we were not in a position to affirm that there is a true instance 
of
still it would appear that we are neither in a position to deny there are any such true 
instances.^® Even the innocent about (EC) who did not contemplate sentences like (1) 
before may regard any a p rio r i reasoning that leads to this conclusion as overreaching 
the lim its o f what we can know purely by reflection. The same goes for anti-realists 
who, when proposing (EC), were not familiar w ith the paiadox: otherwise it would seem 
surprising why they did not argue for (12*) in the first place. Indeed, (12*) not only 
makes truth dependent on our epistemic powers but on what mankind w ill at some time 
believe: knowledge implies belief; hence i f  a proposition w ill never be believed it w ill 
never be known; (12*) allows us to infer that any such proposition P w ill be false; since 
not both P and -P  can be false, as ‘~P &  ~ ~P’ is contradictory, it cannot be the case 
that -P  w ill never be believed. How can this conclusion be justified on purely a p rio ri 
grounds?
O f course, intuitionistic semantics would commit anyone who held that there 
was such a truth as (1) to presenting an example o f such a truth; and the latter is 
certainly impossible, as everyone is w illing  to concede. But then, this is the cmcial 
point: to be prepared to say on the one hand, that there is a question which has an 
answer that w ill never be known, is not to be prepared to say on the other, what this 
answer is. Compare the present case to the following context much dwelled upon by 
G. E. Moore:
XP(P &  I disbelieve that P).
29 Note that line (11) and hence (12*) can be prefixed by the necessity operator, i f  (EC) is taken to be 
valid.
^® I f  the proof had proceeded from the assumption
ZP(P & ~K(P))
rather than (1) it would have led to a reductio o f this assumption, too. And the step from the negation o f 
this assumption to
nP~(P & ~K(P))
is intuitionistically valid. The point made in the text is that, even i f  the above assumption is controversial 
such that making it would be to beg the question against anti-realism, its negation lacks any justification. 
The proof merely shows that the anti-realist is committed to its negation; it does not show that she is 
entitled to this commitment.
(1) P & -K (P ) ,  I
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Here, again, we are ready to say that this generalised statement is true, since we have 
been mistaken or ignorant in the past, and it  is unlikely that we have changed in this 
respect. Still, we are unwilling to accept, and unable to produce, any instance o f this 
existential claim that renders it true.
Accordingly, a constructivist reading o f the existential quantifier is precisely 
what is at odds with what we intend to convey in affirming that there are truths which 
w ill never be known— to the same extent, that is, to which such a reading is at odds with 
what we intend to convey in affirm ing that, amongst the beliefs we hold, there are some 
which fail to be true. Thus, invoking intuitionism in order to reconcile (EC) w ith our 
concession that we w ill not in general be bothered to get to know the answer to every 
question that has an answer would appear to be the wrong step altogether.
Even i f  it was conceded, however, that necessarily, we have no reason to affirm  
that there is a P that renders (1) true, or that there is some one truth we disbelieve— e.g. 
because every reason to assert an existential claim w ill have to be a reason to assert a 
particular instance— why should that be sufficient to show that we are in a position to 
deny that there is any such P, or any such truth? But this is precisely what anyone 
committed to (EC) is bound to claim.^'
Tennant has therefore suggested to impose a restriction on (EC) so as to exempt 
propositions like (1) from the range o f its propositional v a r i a b l e . ^ 2  The restriction 
Tennant envisages is unnecessarily strong though. Thus he argues that contradictions 
should not be subject to (EC).^^ But contradictions necessarily fail to be true, and 
knowably so, hence there is no reason not to think that they satisfy (EC). Let us 
therefore consider an alternative restriction.
Call P a.Moorean proposition just in case (i) ‘P’ is neither a substitution instance 
of a formal contradiction nor obtainable from such an instance by replacing synonyms 
for synonyms, and (ii) ‘P’ is equivalent to a conjunction A  &  B such that, necessarily, i f  
A  is known B is false, and neither A  nor B is u n kn o w a b le .It follows that Moorean
I f  (EC) holds, then, i f  A is not knowable, then -A , and i f  ~A, then ~A is knowable.
-^ 2 Tennant [TT]; 272-76.
22 Tennant [TT]: 272-74.
2* Ad (i): a formal contradiction is meant to be a schema all of whose instances are known to be false a 
priori, where it is essential that these instances can be generated from one another by uniformly 
substituting all but the logical vocabulary they contain; cf. Quine [TD]: 22-23.
Ad (ii): for the anti-realist, i f  A  is unknowable, ~A w ill be true, hence for any B, A &  B w ill be false; 
the same holds mutaiis mutandis for B; but the problematic cases are not cases in which A &  B is false; 
the requirement that neither A nor B be unknowable highlights the fact.
The problem of vagueness suggests an alternative to (ii): in order to accommodate the existence o f 
unknowable sharp boundaries, we may instead require that, necessarily, knowledge ol A requires 
ignorance o f B, where B may nonetheless be true. This restriction would leave room both for the 
knowability o f A and the knowability o f B, even where A  &  B states the existence of a sharp cut-off 
point. However, it does so at the cost o f rejecting the idea that knowability is closed under conjunction: 
there w ill be no state of information in which both A and B are known.
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propositions are, i f  true, never known to be so. Indeed, they are unknowable in precisely 
this sense: that the knowledge seeking subject destroys in getting to know one conjunct 
the fact that makes the other conjunct true, and in not destroying the latter is bound not 
to get to know the former. I  can neither appreciate the vase behind me and destroy it 
with my back when turning: I can only appreciate it i f  I turn around without destroying 
it, and only destroy it w ith my back when turning without appreciating it.2®
W ith this notion being in place, we may rephrase the Epistemic Constraint on ;
truth as follows:
I
(EC*) for all non-Moorean propositions P, i f  P, then it is knowable that P. -
The anti-realist w ill now be free to admit that there are unknowable truths o f a Moorean j
kind. Would this not bereave anti-realism o f its substance? No. A  realist w ill still be 
opposed to the idea that (EC*) can be shown to hold on a p rio ri grounds.2® Accordingly, 
even after being restricted in the way suggested, the Epistemic Constraint is a 
controversial and substantive doctrine that stands in need o f defence.^?
Does the concession that there are unknowable truths not already undermine any 
such line o f defence however? Not necessarily— it is not at all clear whether, in 
conceding that there are unknowable truths o f a Moorean kind, the anti-realist thereby 
has to grant that there are facts which are in principle unrecognisable. Ever since 
Russell, we seem to have abandoned the idea that there are conjunctive facts in virtue o f 
which a conjunction is true over and above atomic facts which make its conjuncts true.28
In order to keep matters simple I shall henceforth restrict attention to Moorean conjunctions, i.e. the 
conjunctions A &  B to which Moorean propositions are said to be equivalent. Thus I  w ill sometimes 
speak o f the conjuncts o f Moorean propositions although not all Moorean propositions are conjunctions, 
but only equivalent to conjunctions.
22 Note that the claim that there are truths that w ill never be known is itself known, not by investigating, I
but by not investigating. It is known by reflecting on one's natural limits as an investigator (laziness, f
being about to be bombed by Kaufmann, etc.). I
2® One might be tempted to think that (EC*) is trivialized in the following way. Suppose that there is an |
unknowable truth P such that ‘P &  ~OK(P)’ is true. P is equivalent to ‘P &  P’ . I f  P is unknowable 1
‘ □ (K (P ) —> ~P)’ is true. Hence it would seem that P is a Moorean proposition. Accordingly, it would |
appear that each unknowable truth turns out to be Moorean, with the effect that (EC*) should be i
acceptable even to the realist. Now, this thought is already blocked by the definition o f Moorean ;j
propositions; the conjuncts o f the conjunction A &  B to which a Moorean proposition is equivalent are 1
not themselves unknowable; accordingly, i f  P is unknowable then its being equivalent to ‘P &  P’ does not j
yet reveal that P is Moorean. But considering this thought is nonetheless instructive because it rests on a I
conflation o f two different notions o f impossibility. The unknowable truths the realist wishes to leave i
room idr besides those that drive Fitch's paradox are none whose existence would license the conclusion |
that ‘ □ (K (P ) —> ~P)’ is true: clearly, to say that some truths may not be humanly recognisable is not to I
say that there are some truths such that it is logically impossible to know them. ;
27 Tennant [TT]: 275. As has been shown in footnote 18, the refusal to accept (EC) engenders the refusal |
to accept (C). But the latter w ill then no longer amount to a rejection of classical logic. j
28 Russell [PLA]: 185-87. ;
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Thus the anti-realist, though forced to concede that we cannot know the truth o f an 
instance of
(1) P & --K (P ),
may not thereby be forced to admit that there are facts which we cannot recognise: 
either conjunct is recognisably true, although their jo in t obtaining is not. Compare this 
to the follow ing example: even though I cannot go to Aarhus and to Wolverhampton at 
the same time, it is still possible for me to go to Aarhus, and still possible for me to go 
to Wolverhampton. Or take this example: I can face North, and I can face South, even 
though I cannot face North and South at the same time. By the same token, the realist 
who grants that there are unknowable truths o f the form of (1) may not eo ipso be 
committed to the existence o f states o f affairs which it is beyond our epistemic powers 
to recognise. Thus, the assumption o f unknowable truths of the kind in question seems 
metaphysically light-weight.
One might object that talk about the knowability o f truth, or the recognisability 
o f facts, involves only epistemic possibilities, with the actual world held fixed, not 
metaphysical possibilities. However, the world in which one conjunct o f the conjunction 
equivalent to a Moorean proposition is known w ill not be a world in which its other 
conjunct is known. Thus, in saying that either conjunct o f a true Moorean proposition 
can be known, we have smuggled in metaphysical modality where we were not 
supposed to do so. Alternatively, i f  we confine ourselves to epistemic modality, then not 
both conjuncts o f a true Moorean proposition are knowably true.
A t first sight, this seems fair comment. The realisation o f epistemic possibilities, 
however, does have an effect on how the actual world is, i.e. on what facts there are. In 
this sense, the actual world cannot be held fixed when it comes to the actualisation o f 
epistemic possibilities. Still, the actual world is such that it allows for the knowability o f 
either conjunct o f a Moorean proposition, even i f  it does not allow for the knowability 
o f their conjunction. I f  there is a world in which someone comes to know that P, then 
this world w ill not be the actual world i f  it is knowably true in the actual world that 
~K(P). Accordingly, a Moorean proposition w ill be true just in case certain epistemic 
possibilities are never actualised.^?
For all its metaphysical innocence, we shall see in the second chapter that 
restricting the Epistemic Constraint in the way suggested has consequences for the most 
prominent strategy to defend anti-realism. This strategy relates to an account o f the 
meaning o f sentences, including complex ones; and such an account must yield an
29 As I take it, these remarks capture the gist o f Eclgington's solution to the present problem as set out in 
her [PoK].
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explanation o f what it is to understand conjunctions, whether Moorean or not. 
Anti-realism, however, was supposed to be vindicated on the basis o f an account o f 
understanding that represented a speaker's grasp of any one sentence as her ability to 
recognise this sentence as true i f  it is true, and as false i f  it is false. Obviously, this 
account w ill have to be modified i f  there are truths o f a Moorean kind which we 
nonetheless understand.
The Paradox o f Knowability brings to the fore that there are complex sentences 
whose assertibility conditions necessaiily go uninstantiated, yet which are nonetheless 
not internally inconsistent. As we shall see in chapter two, the anti-realist w ill therefore 
have to give an account o f the distinction between (grasp of) the truth conditions and 
(grasp of) the assertibility conditions o f the constituent sentences.
Whatever the exact costs o f restricting (EC) in the way sketched, it  has at least 
become clear that, contrary to what Williamson suggests, endorsement o f the claim that 
truth is epistemically constrained, once properly conceived of, is far from forcing logical 
revisionism.
Nevertheless Tennant argues that endorsement o f (EC*) together w ith adoption 
o f classical logic yields a position which, even i f  not inconsistent, ultimately lacks any 
justification.4o This may well be so. Anyone endorsing (EC*) but objecting to the 
endorsement o f both (EC*) and classical logic, however, w ill not object to the latter 
position for reasons o f epistemological modesty. It would appeal* that the principle o f 
Completeness to which such a position gives rise, i.e.:
(C*) for all non-Moorean propositions P and ~P,
either it is knowable that P or it is knowable that ~P
w ill rather be objected to on metaphysical grounds. Thus no anti-realist w ill aigue 
against the suggestion that for all non-Moorean propositions P and ~P, either it  is 
knowable that P or knowable that ~P on the ground that our epistemic powers may be 
too limited. Rather, it is likely that she w ill ai'gue against this suggestion because it 
relies on the metaphysical contention that reality is determinate in that it settles for 
every proposition P, that either P or ~P is true.""
I f  it can be shown that we are not entitled to this metaphysical claim, however, 
then even someone who refuses to endorse (EC*) w ill be in a position to reject classical 
logic. In other words, any anti-realistically acceptable argument against the endorsement
o f (C*) being based on a metaphysical reservation, is likely to be an argument which a
principled agnostic about (EC*), such as the realist, is free to embrace. As I shall argue
40 Tennant [TT]: 239-40.
41 Tennant [LEM ]: 213.
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in the next section, it would indeed be mistaken to suggest that realism is wedded to 
classical logic.
1,4 Anti-Anti-Realism
I f  it turns out to be inessential to anti-realism that intuitionistic logic be adopted— at 
least to the extent that the combination o f anti-realism and Completeness has not been 
refuted— it still remains to be seen whether or not it is essential to realism that classical 
logic be adopted. Dummett has argued that a commitment to classical logic is indeed 
essential to realism. He says,
[tjhe very minimum that realism can be held to involve is that statements [...] relate to some 
reality that exists independently o f our knowledge of it, in such a way that that reality 
renders each statement [.,.] determinately true or false, again independently o f whether we 
know, or are even able to discover, its truth-value.42
Once the realist is committed to the principle o f Bivalence— i.e. the principle that for all 
sentences "P" stating a proposition, either "P" is true or "P" is false— it is easy to see 
how this may issue in the further commitment to any instance of (LEM), hence to the 
validity o f that la w .42
This quotation betrays a conflation o f two different ideas however; the one a 
metaphysical doctrine, the other an epistemological reservation. According to Dummett, 
realism turns out to be a metaphysical theory professing claims about the nature o f 
reality itself: to endorse the principle o f Bivalence is not just to say something about the 
nature o f our thoughts, but about the extension of the concept o f truth; and this 
extension is supposed to be determined by the way the world is. According to this 
version o f realism, the world is such as to allow our thinking to carve it up in 
determinate ways. Indeed, one may wonder how such a form o f realism can be 
vindicated at all. One should expect that the prospect for doing so on the basis o f an 
account o f truth conditions looks less than bright precisely because realism as thus 
understood lays claim to the determinacy o f reality over and above the determinacy o f 
thought.44
Some years ago, McDowell suggested that a refusal to subscribe to (EC*) should 
be compatible with a refusal to endorse Bivalence. He argued that
42 Dummelt [R/b]: 230. Cf. as well Dummett [ILE]: 274; [R/a]: 146; [RoP]: 358; [FPL]: 466; [PBI]: 228. 
42 Insofar as "P" is false i f f  "~P" is true, (LEM) is equivalent to Bivalence, given the truth-predicate is 
disquotational; see Tennant [LEM ]; 212, 228.
44 Tennant [LEM]: 213.
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[i]n the context o f intuitionistic logic, to say, on the one hand, that the truth condition ol a 
sentence may obtain even i f  we cannot tell that it does, and may not obtain even i f  we
cannot tell that it does not, is not to say, on the other, that the truth condition of any 
sentence either does obtain or does not, even i f  we cannot tell either that it does or that it 
does not. For the position outlined [i.e. agnosticism about (EC*) plus agnosticism about 
Bivalence] combines, coherently i f  intuitionistic logic is coherent, refusing to say the latter 
with continuing to say the f o r m e r . 4 2
Unfortunately, McDowell's reasoning turned out to rely on the mistaken assumption that 
the intuitionist and the classicist agree on the meanings o f the logical constants, but 
disagree about whether certain logical laws hold true o f them— hence that, in dropping 
(LEM), one can retain one's previous interpretation o f "v" and while merely purging 
one's logic from that law/® But, the intuitionistic logician does not conceive o f herself 
as understanding the logical constants in just the way the classicist pretends to. As a 
revisionist, neither w ill she be ready to concede that the classicist has a coherent 
understanding o f the logical constants in the first place. Rather, the intuitionist wishes to 
say that what we grasp in understanding the logical constants does not extend to a 
validation o f certain rules o f inference the classicist takes to be v a lid .47
Dropping (LEM), hence (DNE), must accordingly be accompanied by a 
reassessment o f how the logical constants are to be understood. Insofar as valid rules o f 
inference preserve truth, this reassessment w ill at the same time involve a reassessment 
o f what truth is.48 Now the interpretation which the intuitionist offers happens to 
proceed not only from the assumption that truth fails to be bivalent, but from the 
assumption that truth is epistemically constrained. It is therefore misleading to suggest, 
as McDowell does, that i f  intuitionistic logic is coherent, so is the thought that one 
should be agnostic about both B i valence and (EC*). It is likewise misleading to suggest 
that someone who is a realist about truth can simply help herself to intuitionistic logic.
It is for this reason that philosophers such as Williamson and Tennant can object 
to McDowell's suggestion on the ground that it leaves the interpretation o f the 
intuitionistic calculus— which results from the classical calculus when certain rules o f 
inference are dropped— quite obscure. What McDowell should have said is rather that 
there is no reason to deny offhand that the intuitionistic calculus may be given a 
semantics according to which truth is not epistemically constrained. This possibility is 
not ruled out by Williamson's observation that, without the intuitionistic analysis o f 
proof, the intuitionistic calculus is "but a dead fo rm a lis m " .49 Nor is it ruled out by
42 McDowell [TBV]; 55.
46 McDowell [TBV]: 56-57.
47 Cl. Dummett [LBM ]: 301-302; and [ILE]: 269-89.
48 Cf. Frege [GG/I]: xiv-xviii.
49 Williamson [ID ]: 207.
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Tennant’s argument that if, as "[f]o r the intuitionist, the obtaining o f the truth-condition 
o f [a given statement] consists in the (constructive) existence o f a proof o f [that 
statement]" there w ill then be no statements whose truth-value it may be beyond our 
powers to recognise/® The notion o f proof alluded to clearly belongs to intuitionistic 
semantics rather than the intuitionistic calculus/'
Tennant finally dismisses the combination o f ideas suggested by McDowell 
when he writes that
[t]he [McDowellian realist] [...] has no refuge in the logical space occupied by the 
proponent of intuitionistic logic. The logic itself imposes certain demands on the meanings 
we can take our logical operators to have. One cannot simply give up the classical rules 
and carry on thinking like a realist. McDowell has failed to appreciate just what is 
involved, by way o f semantic and philosophical foundations, in being an intuitionistic 
logician. Intuitionistic logic provides no home for a closet realist who wishes to think of 
himself as logically hobbled but still attuned to the transcendent,^^
This dismissal is premature however. McDowell may have failed to appreciate that 
being an intuitionistic logician involves "by way o f semantic and philosophical 
foundations" promotion o f an anti-realist conception o f truth. He likewise may have 
failed to appreciate that the interpretation o f the logical constants is constrained by the 
rules o f inference that are supposed to govern them. But to conclude from this that 
McDowell thereby failed to appreciate that a realist conception o f tmth as potentially 
evidence-transcendent forces endorsement o f Bivalence is simply fallacious— there may 
be no such fact for McDowell to appreciate. Nothing has as yet been done to show that a 
realist about truth has to be a classicist. To expel the position sketched by McDowell—  
i.e. jo in t agnosticism about (EC*) and B i valence— from the philosophical market place 
solely on the ground that it cannot coherently be described as intuitionism minus (EC*) 
is hardly convincing.
Indeed, there is no straightforward connection between the metaphysical worry 
that reality may not be determinate in all respects and the epistemological idea that we 
are in a position to recognise all the respects in which it is. To refuse to assert (EC*) is 
not yet to claim that there are (non-Moorean) truths we cannot recognise. Accordingly, 
neither w ill this refusal have to flow from the assumption that every statement is
2® Tennant [TT]: 236-39.
21 Indeed, one may wonder how the standard anti-realist semantics for intuitionistic logic can 
accommodate the restriction o f (EC) to (EC*): as logic applies to all truth-apt sentences, its semantics 
should accordingly yield an interpretation o f sentences expressing Moorean propositions. The existence 
o f such sentences rather suggests that another semantics than the standard one is called for. But i f  this is 
so anyway, what reason do we have for believing that the semantics the intuitionistic calculus requires 
w ill underwrite (EC*)?
22 Tennant [TT]: 238-39 (emphasis mine).
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guaranteed to have a determinate truth-value anyway, that is, regardless o f whether or 1
not we are able to figure out which truth-value this is. I
I f  presented with a pro tern, undecidable statement, one may react in one o f two ways: |
either one claims this statement to have a determinate truth-value, even though one does j
not know which, or one refuses to do so.^^ The former reaction may be reasonable only j
i f  one takes oneself to be entitled to the principle o f Bivalence. But it would be mistaken j
to suggest that the latter reaction is reasonable only i f  one takes oneself to be entitled to |
(EC*). Arguably, the claim that a statement has a determinate truth-value can justifiedly 1
be made only i f  there is a method to decide that it has this, rather than that, truth-value.
But, in refusing to claim that the given undecidable has a determinate truth-value, one 
does not rule out the possibility that it has a determinate truth-value even i f  we w ill j
never be able to tell which truth-value this is. In doing so, one merely expresses one's J
reluctance to assume that reality is determinate— an assumption which in the case at j
hand, may only be justifiable by means o f deciding the statement in question. j
Accordingly, i f  the anti-realist potential o f anti-realism lies in the endorsement 1
o f (EC*), then, contra Dummett, there is a more moderate form of realism which I
sustains an epistemological theory rather than a metaphysical one. Moderate realists j
maintain that it does not fo llow  from the truth o f what we think that we can know |
whether it is true. Consequently, moderate realism entails that we have the conceptual j
resources which allow us to distinguish truth from knowability. As thus understood, J
realists— rather than setting a lim it to what we can know— refuse to set a lim it to what j
we can think about. It is this version o f realism which is directly opposed to anti-realism j
— anti-anti-realism, so to speak— and for which I am going to argue. |
Moderate realism is the view that truth cannot be shown to be epistemically |
constrained. Yet to say so is not to deny that whatever is true is knowably so. According j
to the moderate realist, it may well be that, as a matter o f contingent fact, all truths that I
ithere are can be recognised. What she denies is that it can be shown on a p rio ri grounds j
that this is so. In other words, the moderate realist w ill argue for agnosticism about {
(EC*), or at least doing so w ill be sufficient for qualification as an anti-anti-realist. The |
moderate realist is furthermore a principled agnostic: she denies that (EC*) can ever be |
Justified a priori. Thus, she w ill not rest content with the finding that, until now, the |
anti-realist has not succeeded in showing that (EC*) holds a priori, otherwise she would ;
not call herself a realist. Rather, she would leave it open whether she ought or ought not j
to call herself by that name.
The term "pro tempore undecidable" is taken from Tennant [ARL]: i l l .  Pro tern, undecidable 
sentences are sentences "whose truth value we do not know how to determine by any effective means at 
present" (ibid.).
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In this chapter, I have argued that we should regard the question o f whether truth is 
epistemically constrained as independent from the further question o f whether truth is 
bivalent. Although intuitionists give answers to both questions in one go, logical 
revisionism is independent from anti-realism. Whether or not the combination o f anti­
realism and classicism can in the end be motivated, reasons for anti-realism alone w ill 
neither suggest nor rationally compel logical revisionism. Similarly, a realist conception 
o f truth as epistemically unconstrained does not entail that truth is bivalent. 
Metaphysical worries may lead one to demur from the latter, while leaving one's 
endorsement o f the former unaffected. The idea that features o f reality may render our 
statements true, yet undetectably so, is perfectly consistent with the idea that not every 
statement is rendered either true or false by some features o f reality.
So, on which battleground should anti-realists and (moderate) realists fight? 
What is the right choix des armesl The next chapter w ill describe the opponents as 
choosing the Wittgensteinian mace— a very heavy but effective tool. The anti-realist 
w ill open the battle, but it turns out that the particular mace she picks is too heavy for 
her to lift, therefore, she has to revert to another o f a smaller size. In chapter three, we 
shall see that even though she can indeed li f t  that one, it is still too heavy, and so it 
bounces back on her own head.
Chapter Two
The realism/anti-realism debate is a debate between those who think that (EC*) can 
a p r io r i be justified— the anti-realists— and those who deny that this is so— the realists. 
As I  have argued, this debate is independent from the one o f whether or not classical 
logic ought to be adopted: it  is now time to ask how the dispute between realists and 
anti-realists may be resolved.
Throughout his writings, Dummett has argued that disputes o f this kind ought to 
be settled by a systematic account o f understanding— the idea being that whether or not 
a sentence may be true but unknowable is to be decided according to whether competent 
speakers can be said to understand that sentence as having truth conditions whose 
obtaining it may be beyond their epistemic powers to recognise. In other words, 
Dummett proposes to settle which conception o f truth is correct by settling which 
concept o f truth we can legitimately be said to possess. In subsequent chapters, I shall 
fo llow  this line o f thought which I  shall refer to as the Dummettian Criterion. This 
criterion determines the battlegrounds on which the realist and the anti-realist have to 
meet. A t the end o f this thesis, it w ill hopefully have emerged that anti-realism loses the 
battle fought on these grounds.
2.1 The M anifestability Requirement
As M oritz Schlick observed some decades ago, we have not yet demonstrated our 
understanding o f a given expression i f  we offer another expression w ith the same 
meaning as its paraphrase. ' Ultimately, our understanding o f such an expression must be 
anchored in our ability to use it in a certain way. This ability may well comprise the 
ability to use this expression in just the same way as another, but the ability to use it  in 
that way must consist in more than one's readiness to enunciate conceptual 
equivalences. Otherwise, we would display no more than our knowledge that two 
expressions mean the same, knowledge that we may possess without knowing what 
either expression means.-
I f  our ability to use an expression in a certain way is to display that we 
understand this expression, then the way in which we prove able to use it w ill display 
how we understand it: an expression can be used correctly or incorrectly, and it is the 
ability to use it correctly that demonstrates one's understanding o f this expression. Since 
the conditions under which two expressions are used correctly differ according to
‘ Schlick [MVJ: 339-42. Cf. as well Dumnietl [W TM /II]: 44-45; [PBI]: 224. 
- Cf. Davidson [RI]: 129; and Dummelt [WTM/1]: 2-6.
28
whether the ways in which we understand them differ, the ability to distinguish between 
the conditions under which a given expression is correctly used and those under which it 
is not, w ill demonstrate the way in which this expression is being understood.
To understand an expression is to know what it means. I f  what it means is 
determined by the way it is correctly used, then learning how it is used correctly w ill 
result in knowledge of its meaning.^ Since one cannot be said to have that knowledge 
unless one is capable of using the expression correctly, it follows that the ability to use 
an expression correctly w ill be necessary and sufficient for knowledge o f its meaning.^
Any theoi-y o f understanding w ill accordingly have to determine the nature o f the 
meaning o f an expression in such a way that knowledge o f what this expression means 
is fu lly  manifested in the ability to competently use it. Thus, i f  the meaning o f a 
sentence is said to be the condition under which it is true, then it must be possible to 
determine by observation of, or successful participation in, the practice o f using this 
sentence in a norm-governed way which truth condition this is. I f  it is impossible to do 
so, then this w ill prove one’s account o f the nature o f meaning to be flawed. By the same 
token, i f  the meaning o f a sentence is said to consist in truth conditions whose obtaining 
it may be beyond our powers to recognise, then it must be possible to ascribe to 
speakers, and to acquire oneself, on the basis o f their competent use o f this sentence, 
knowledge that this sentence has a specific set o f truth conditions o f such a kind. Again, 
i f  it impossible to do so— say, because the competent use o f this sentence comprises the 
ability to recognise its truth-value— then the nature o f its meaning has not properly 
been identified. Call this constraint on theories o f understanding the 
Manifestability Requirement.^
 ^ This is compatible with the idea that one may merely have a partial understanding o f a word whose 
meaning Is fu lly  known only to select members of the speech community. Thus, i f  I do not know exactly 
what "arthritis" means, say, because I mistakenly think that gout is not a form of arthritis, then neither 
w ill I use "arthritis" correctly on all occasions.
^ This is not to say that someone to whom such knowledge can be ascribed is able to ascribe this 
knowledge to herself. O f course, some allowance must be made for illiterate speakers, mute writers, 
grammatical mistakes, dialects, accents, stammering and mumbling. But the observation that these 
phenomena do exist hardly constitutes an objection to the idea that knowledge how to use an expression 
correctly is necessary for knowledge o f its meaning. It rather suggests that what counts as the correct use 
o f an expression should be specified functionally in such a way as to allow for physical variation in the 
tokenings o f that expression. That such a specification should be possible is already built into the idea 
that use determines what it is that is meant, as two distinct expression-types that are used in the same way 
w ill be said to have the same meaning. The example o f the stroke victim who is from one day to the next 
debarred from participating in any form o f exchange furthermore suggests that we should here allude to 
the distinction, o f considerable importance in other contexts as well, between possession o f an ability and 
the opportunity to exercise it.
 ^Tennant reserves the term "manifestation requirement" for a more specific— and more controversial—  
requirement. According to Tennant, this requirement says that "[g]rasp by a speaker o f the meaning o f a 
sentence should be fully manifestable in observable exercises of recognitional capacities concerning it" 
([AR L]: 111). As we shall see, what is controversial about this constraint is that knowledge o f meaning 
should be fu lly  manifestable in recognitional capacities. Tennant argues that "[t]he mention o f 
recognitional capacities is to alert one to the need to manifest knowledge that is implicit, rather than
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The Manifestability Requirement itself is neutral as to the question o f what the nature o f 
meaning is. Indeed, this question may have many different answers since the notion o f 
meaning is notoriously indeterminate. To identify the meaning o f a sentence with its 
truth conditions is therefore not to say that whatever use-facts determine its truth 
conditions exhaust all aspects o f use that may be o f concern to other theories that do not 
make this identification.^ The notion o f meaning is a determinaZ?/^ that behaves very 
much like the notion o f intelligence in psychological theory: how it is to be understood 
depends to a considerable extent on the very theory which is meant to be a theory o f 
what this notion denotes."  ^ In what follows, I  shall assume, however, that realists and 
anti-realists agree on the nature o f meaning in that both take the meaning o f a sentence 
to consist in its truth conditions.
There is a reason for making this assumption: realists and anti-realists disagree 
which conception o f truth is correct, and hence which kind o f truth conditions sentences 
can be known to have. In particular, the anti-realist claims that only those sentences 
whose truth conditions underwrite (EC*) can be understood. Suppose then that the 
meaning o f a sentence was identified with something other than its truth conditions. It 
could still be the outcome of the debate that only those sentences can be said to have a 
meaning which are true just in case they are knowable. But how could we ever know 
that this was so, unless the truth conditions o f a sentence were determined alongside its 
meaning?
knowledge explicitly formulated in further sentences" {ibid.). But neither does the observation that 
knowledge o f the meaning of an expression cannot in general be manifested in the enunciation of other 
expressions with the same meaning establish that it be manifestable in recognitional skills; nor, i f  a case 
could be made for the latter, would this show that knowledge of meaning be fu lly  manifestable in this 
way. Rather, Tennant's version o f the Manifestability Requirement is already a piece o f substantive anti­
realist thinking that needs to be justified. It is for this reason that I  shall relocate the constraint Tennant 
invokes in the context o f what I call the Manifestation Argument.
 ^ I here depart from Dummett's position that "[a] conception of meaning— that is, a choice of a central 
notion for the theory of meaning— is adequate only i f  there exists a general method o f deriving, from the 
meaning o f a sentence as so given, eveiy feature o f its use"; [W TM /II]: 93 (my emphasis). This criterion 
o f adequacy seems to me to be far too demanding. It would for instance be surprising if, on whatever 
conception of meaning one chooses, there was a general method of deriving from the meaning of 
"London is in England" when it is correct to use this sentence in a political speech. This w ill depend on 
the interplay of various factors such as the purpose o f the speech, the values and expectations o f the 
audience, what is being said before, what is being said afterwards etc. How can one ever hope to 
formulate an algorithm that takes all these situational differences into account? By contrast, a solution to 
the Problem o f Understanding, as it was specified in the introduction, merely requires that there be 
aspects o f use whose mastery is necessary and sufficient for the grasp of thoughts: our concern is 
epistemological rather than psychological or sociological.
7 Cf. Dummett [W TM/I]: 1-2. The relation between a determinable and its determination, as it is 
understood here, is similar to that between an explicandum and its explication in Carnap's sense; 
cf. Carnap [LFP]: 3-8.
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Dummett once suggested identifying the meaning o f a sentence with its assertibility 
conditions, and then defining truth in terms o f the Equivalence Schema:
(ES) It is true that P i f f  P.^
It would have followed that truth is defined only for sentences which have assertibility 
conditions. But in order to show that truth therefore proves to be epistemically 
constrained, it  would have been necessary to say in addition what these sentences can be 
used to state. Given (ES), what they can be used to state are their truth conditions. Thus, 
in order to vindicate anti-realism, it  would have been necessary to show how the facts 
about the correct use o f these sentences determine, not only which assertibility 
conditions, but also which truth conditions they have.^ But then it would have been 
more to the point to identify the meaning o f a sentence with its truth conditions right 
from the start.
 ^Dummett [W TM /II]; cf. as well Dummett [TOE]: xxii.
^ According to Skorupski, to show this w ill not be sufficient to vindicate anti-realism either; [M UV]: 40- 
45.
Dummett agrees; see [TOE]: xxii. Cf. as well Wright [M M M ]: 249, and especially 253 where Wright 
shows some sympathy for the idea that the connection between understanding and knowledge o f truth 
conditions is a mere platitude. To identify the meaning o f a sentence with its truth conditions is neither to 
say that truth cannot further be analysed in terms o f epistemic notions, nor to say that knowledge o f truth 
conditions cannot be so analysed; cf. Dummett [LBM ]: 304. In other words, the claim that knowledge of 
meaning is knowledge o f truth conditions is not the claim that ascriptions o f such knowledge are treated 
as primitive.
It might be suggested that the identification o f the meaning o f a sentence with its truth conditions w ill 
be problematic for the anti-realist, because she w ill typically use the notion of assertibility rather than 
truth in the recursive clauses o f her theory o f meaning; and there is the danger that two sentences may 
share their truth conditions but nonetheless diverge in their assertibility conditions. It is not clear to me 
how this latter idea may be substantiated without begging the question against the envisaged anti-realist: 
i f  one argues that two sentences have the same truth conditions but different assertibility conditions, one 
must appeal to an independent criterion o f sameness o f truth conditions that is inconsistent with the 
criterion proposed by the anti-realist. Anyway, the point made in the text is that even i f  the suggested 
d ifficulty does not arise, there is still a problem with an anti-realist theory of meaning based on 
assertibility conditions; and i f  this problem has been answered, then the suggested difficulty w ill no 
longer arise. Here is why: i f  a theory o f meaning is thought to have implications for the scope o f what a 
sentence can be used to state— where what a sentence can be used to state are its truth conditions— then 
we should be able to recover from that theory not only what it is for a sentence to have the same truth 
conditions as another, but furthermore what these truth conditions are. Even i f  two sentences indeed had 
the same truth conditions just in case they have the same assertibility (or knowability) conditions, it 
would not follow from the correctness o f this criterion that they are true just in case they are assertible 
(knowable): a sentence may be meaningful only i f  it has assertibility (knowability) conditions, and still be 
true without being assertible (knowable). Hence the anti-realist should come up with a criterion o f 
sameness o f truth conditions that allows her to say that a sentence is true i f f  knowable. Therefore she 
should give a theory of meaning that identifies the meaning o f a sentence with its truth conditions. 
Accordingly, i f  the anti-realist does the recursion on ‘a' warrants assertion o f <j)’ , it is indeed conceivable 
that she may fail on two counts: sentences may differ in their assertibility conditions while having the 
same truth conditions (according to some other criterion); or they may not so differ and still nothing 
follows for what has to be the case in order for them to be true. However since it is the latter kind of 
failure that must be foreclosed, any worries about the former kind of failure are quite pointless: a theory
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Indeed, the Manifestability Requirement owes its thrust to the perplexities that arise 
once we try to explain how we can arrive at a representation o f how things are by way 
o f manipulating symbols. This is what I called in the introduction the Problem o f 
Understanding: purporting to represent how things are is a cognitive act which is 
involved in all epistemic endeavours; thus i f  we want to explain this kind o f act in terms 
o f linguistic abilities, then we must show how exercises o f these abilities can terminate 
in a representation o f how things are. But to represent how things are by means o f 
language is precisely to make a true statement. Hence, in order to show that practical 
abilities can be representational in this sense, we should ask how having these abilities 
can result in knowledge o f truth conditions.
Something akin to the Manifestability Requirement looms large in Wittgenstein's 
post-Tractarian philosophy. *1 It would appear, however, that Wittgenstein himself never 
addressed the question o f how, by using a sentence, we can puiport to represent how 
things are. Instead, he was at pains to make clear that language can be used for a variety 
o f other purposes.'- As Brandom succinctly puts it,
not every piece o f a representation contributes to its content by itself representing, and not 
every move in a language game is a representing o f something. But Wittgenstein does not 
explain what one must do to be using an expression to refer, characterize, or claim (the 
features o f use he associates with representational content), nor does he explain what is 
required for something caught up in a language game to express a specifically propositional 
content.'^
I f  the realist/anti-realist debate is to be decided on the basis of the Dummettian Criterion 
at all, then it  seems realists and anti-realist alike must attempt to settle the matters 
Wittgenstein himself left open. And they w ill have to do so in line with his insight that 
our understanding o f words must be explained by the way in which they are correctly 
used.'"'
strong enough to license the conclusion that a sentence is true i f f  knowable w ill be strong enough to yield 
a criterion o f sameness o f truth conditions. Accordingly, i f  an assertibility conditional theory of meaning 
does not license this conclusion, then it is not a theory o f meaning the anti-realist should go for.
"  Especially in [PG] and [PI]. Schlick mentions conversations with Wittgenstein as a source o f his 
considerations in [M V ]: 341.
‘ 2 Wittgenstein [PG]; §§ 19-20; [PI]: §§ 1-27.
'2 Brandom [M IE]: 76. These are the questions one would have expected Wittgenstein to answer, given 
that he took issue with Frege's criticism of formalism; see Wittgenstein [PG]: 2; Waismann [WVC]: 105, 
150; and Frege [GG/II]: §§ 86-137, especially § 95 where Frege complains that "I acknowledge that the 
chess pieces are there, and also that rules for their manipulation have been set up; but I know nothing of 
any content. Surely, it cannot be said that the black king designates something in virtue of these rules".
'4 Wittgenstein [PG]: §§ 10, 23, 44.
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The Manifestability Requirement is furthermore neutral as to the question o f what j
counts as a correct use o f a sentence. In Wittgenstein’s words, |
[ i]t all depends what settles the sense o f a sentence, what we choose to say settles its sense. ■
The use o f the signs must settle it; but what do we count as the use? |
Thus, while the Manifestability Requirement demands that realists and anti-realists |
show how good they are at explaining grasp o f truth conditions in terms o f abilities to î
use language— at wielding the Wittgensteinian mace, as it were— it leaves a variety o f j
maces to choose from depending on one's preferred account o f use. As we shall see in I
the next section, anti-realists tend to focus on the assertoric use o f sentences. !
2.2 The M anifestation Argument \
The Manifestability Requirement provides the backdrop for the anti-realist's master- I
argument, the so-called Manifestation Argument. There has been some controversy I
about the way in which the anti-realist's Manifestation Argument ought to be I
formulated. This is not the least due to the fact that there is still a considerable confusion i
about the proper target o f this argument which, again, springs from a failure to separate I
anti-realism from logical revisionism.'^ Here, I  shall not be concerned w ith the questioii !
o f whether the argument originally so labelled was intended to justify the rejection o f j
classical l o g i c . As we have seen, there is no straightforward connection between a !
rejection o f Bivalence or (LEM ) and a vindication o f (EC*). Accordingly, i f  there is 
an anti-realist master-argument, and i f  this argument is called by the name |
"Manifestation Argument", then the Manifestation Argument should better be suited to |
vindicate (EC*).
The Manifestation Argument centres around a claim about how knowledge o f 
truth conditions is manifested in use which is ultimately intended to establish (EC*) as ]
its conclusion. In searching for the proper formulation o f the Manifestation Argument, I j
Wittgenstein [RFM]: V § 7. Anscombe translates "Satz" as "proposition" instead of "sentence". This is 
misleading because o f the ambiguity o f the term "proposition". Wittgenstein is definitely concerned with 
linguistic items. On a potential confusion between sentences and propositions, see Schlick [M V]: 340.
Recently Tennant has acknowledged that (EC*) and logical revisionism are two different strands o f his 
anti-realism. He seems to betray this insight, however, when he goes on to argue along the following 
lines: (i) classical logic ought to be dropped on the basis o f manifestationism, (ii) McDowell's position is 
flawed because intuitionism entails (EC*), therefore (iii)  manifestationism gives us (EC*); cf. his [TT]: 
195-244. As I have argued in chapter one, this reasoning is fallacious because accepting the intuitionistic 
calculus is not yet tantamount to accepting intuitionistic semantics. Moreover, neither is dropping 
classical logic tantamount to adopting the intuitionistic calculus. Thus, i f  all the Manifestation Argument 
did was to show that we ought to be logical revisionists, it would not give us (EC*). Cf. Blackburn [MR]: 
44-45.
'7 Cf. Tennant [ARL]: 111.
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shall briefly review two suggestions as to how this claim ought to be understood. These j
suggestions are due to McGinn and Tennant respectively. As it turns out, neither o f j
these suggestions provides a convincing starting point for a defence o f (EC*). I shall |
then consider two versions o f the Manifestation Argument, those given by Wright and i
Dummett respectively. While Wright seems to argue for no more than there being no |
reason to suppose that realism can be vindicated, Dummett more decidedly argues that j
there is a reason to suppose that it  cannot be. Even so, both these arguments can be seen j
to rest on the claim that knowledge of truth conditions be fu lly manifestable in the 
exercises o f recognitional abilities. In the end, Wright's anti-realist must also be taken to !
believe that there is a reason to suppose that realism cannot be vindicated. W ith these • |
considerations in place, I  shall present what I take to be the premisses from which the 1
anti-realist’s attempt at a direct vindication o f (EC*) must proceed. i
According to McGinn, the anti-realist contends that insofar as knowledge o f j
meaning consists in knowledge o f truth conditions, knowledge of the meaning o f a |
given sentence must be manifested in the ability to determine in some canonical way j
whether or not this sentence is true.'^ This would imply that we understand only those j
sentences whose truth-value we have an effective means o f deciding. Î
Tennant rightly objects that i f  this was the anti-realist's contention, it would I
backfire and render anti-realism itself absurd.'^ There are sentences whose truth-value j
we have at present no effective means o f deciding. Nevertheless, we claim to understand I
these sentences now. I f  the anti-realist denies that we do at present understand these {
sentences, she w ill give an altogether implausible account o f understanding. On the j
other hand, i f  she denies that there are any pro tern, undecidable sentences, she is plainly j
wrong (unless she presents us w ith a proof or disproof of Goldbach’s conjecture, etc.). |
It would therefore appear to be more adequate to present the anti-realist as ;
contending that understanding a sentence is manifested in the ability to recognise its |
truth-value— where this ability is not to be understood as the possession o f an effective i
means o f deciding which truth-value, i f  any, this is. In the case of pro tern, undecidable i
sentences, this would mean that we are credited with an ability to recognise whether i
these sentences are true or otherwise, whose ascription does not depend for its !
justification on whether we can at present exercise it. |
Tennant goes on to argue, however, that the anti-realist's contention should j
rather be that understanding a sentence is manifested in one’s ability to recognise i
whether a piece o f evidence is a verification or falsification o f that sentence, i f  one is 
presented with this piece o f evidence.20 This ability can be displayed now, even i f  the |
McGinn [TU]: 21.
'9 Tennant [ARL]: 113-17.
20 [ARL]: 111-27; and [TT]: 195-244, especially 202.
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sentence in question is pro tern, undecidable: we can at least check purportedly verifying 
or falsifying evidence and conclude that they fail to do their job; and we can search for 
further evidence on the basis o f our grasp o f what would count as a verification or 
falsification o f that sentence.
It is hard to see, however, how the anti-realist could ever proceed from this 
conception o f the manifestion o f understanding to a vindication o f (EC*). The realist 
may indeed concede that a competent speaker should be able to recognise whether x 
verifies or falsifies S, for any x she is presented w ith and any S she understands.2' What 
the realist denies, and can still consistently deny, is that it can be shown on a p rio r i 
grounds that, i f  S is true, there is an x accessible to the speaker which verifies S, and i f  S 
is false, there is ay accessible to the speaker which falsifies S. In other words, the realist 
has no problem with ascriptions o f the recognitional abilities Tennant invokes; and any 
argument which is apt to show that (EC*) holds would appear not to depend on the truth 
o f such ascriptions. Thus, Tennant has not yet provided an account o f how knowledge o f 
meaning is manifested in use, that serves the anti-realist's purpose.22
As suggested earlier, the anti-realist should therefore better claim that knowledge 
o f truth conditions is knowledge o f conditions whose obtaining the knowing subject is 
able to recognise, and that it is this recognitional ability that manifests this knowledge. 
In other words, what is being ascribed to the subject is not the ability to recognise a 
sentence as true (or false), i f  the subject has verifying (or falsifying) evidence for this 
sentence, but rather the ability to recognise this sentence as true (or as false), i f  the 
sentence is true (or false). In face o f pro tern, undecidable sentences, she should 
accordingly allow for the distinction between the truth o f ascriptions o f this ability and 
the tmth o f statements to the effect that the subject can exercise this ability now. W ith 
respect to pro tern, undecidables, ascriptions o f the former kind must accordingly be 
conceived o f as conjectures whose justification solely rests on the justification o f 
ascriptions o f recognitional abilities that can at present be exercised, as well as on 
systematic constraints on theoiy/. Since the anti-realist is not committed to the claim that 
the undecidables in question lack a truth-value, the fact that the subject cannot now 
recognise that they have a determinate truth-value w ill not be taken to entail that the 
subject has fu lly  exercised the ascribed ability. Since the anti-realist is neither 
committed to the claim that the undecidables in question have a determinate truth-value.
2' In Wright's happy phrase, "[rjealism is a mixture o f modesty and presumption", the former being j
expressed in the refusal to endorse (EC*), the latter in the readiness to grant that we have the ability to I
recognise the truth, i f  only the world cooperates ([RTM j: 1-2). Still, there may be independent reason to 1
deny that Tennant has given the right account o f understanding, for the proof of an arithmetical sentence I
S may require resources, such as set theory, which I may not be able to understand despite the fact that I |
understand S. I owe this example to Crispin Wright. I
22 Tennant himself is quite explicit about the fact that what he calls the Manifestation Requirement must |
be supplemented by (EC*); see [TT]: 202. \
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the fact that they cannot now be decided either way does not even come close to 
undermining the ascription o f this ability either.
In light of this theoretical nature o f anti-realist semantics, Wright has given his 
view o f what the Manifestation Argument is supposed to establish.23 According to 
Wright, it is not designed to show that the realist cannot possibly account for the 
manifestation o f knowledge of truth conditions. Hence, it would appear that neither does 
it have to proceed from a claim about the nature o f the practical abilities in which such 
knowledge must be manifestable. Wright rather presents the Manifestation Argument as 
proceeding directly from the Manifestability Requirement. Wright contends that the 
realist has so far simply failed to comply with this requirement: nothing in the speakers' 
use o f language has as yet been brought to our attention that would justify the ascription 
o f knowledge of potentially recognition-transcendent truth conditions. Thus far, all that 
has been said about language use in the philosophical literature, be it explanatory or 
otherwise, can equally well be said in terms of an epistemically constrained notion o f 
truth. In other words, Wright maintains that the realist's semantic theory is 
underdetermined by data— to the effect that anti-realist semantics proves likewise 
empirically adequate— and that it  is therefore incumbent upon the realist to adduce 
further facts that single out her theory as the correct one. I f  she cannot do so, her theory 
is revealed to contain theoretical slack that has no basis in use.
This line o f reasoning gives a somewhat distorted picture o f the debate though, 
for it  is the anti-realist who advances a claim that stands in need o f a p r io r i justification. 
True: principled agnosticism about a given claim has to be ai'gued for too. The realist 
must therefore be understood to undertake some responsibility. But then, the finding 
that a semantic theory that entails (EC*) and a semantic theory that does not entail 
(EC*) are empirically equivalent, should be seen to tell in favour o f a principled 
agnosticism about (EC*) rather than the belief in its a p rio ri justifiability. Nor is there 
as yet any clear sense in which the former theory is more parsimonious than the latter. It 
would appear that a failure to acknowledge this can only be due to the mistaken idea 
that anti-realism yields something more akin to a description o f use than to a semantic 
theory, while realism imports a theoretical superstructure that is underdetermined by 
that description. I f  for no other reason, anti-realism must also be seen to import such a 
superstructure because of its adherence to (EC*) and its corresponding account o f the 
understanding o f pro tern, undecidable sentences.
Moreover, Wright's reasoning would appear to rest on the idea that anti-realism 
differs from logical revisionism in that it has no revisionist consequences, for i f  it had, 
the rules o f the game which Wright sets up seem to dictate that anti-realist semantics 
would prove inadequate: i f  the debate is to be decided by way o f determining which
23 [RTM]: 13-23; and [M M M ]: 246-56.
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theory o f meaning is empirically adequate, there is no room left for criticising actual 
practice.24 Since we happen to reason in accordance with the rules o f classical logic, this 
would mean that Wright's view o f the matter rests on the idea that the principle o f 
Completeness can be given evidential support:
(C*) for all non-Moorean propositions P and ~P,
either it is knowable that P or it is knowable that ~P.
As I have argued, realism itself is indifferent to the question o f which logic ought to be 
adopted. Thus, it may after all be the case that, although Wright's view o f the matter is
inappropriate as far as the debate between classicists and logical revisionists is
concerned, it is nonetheless correct w ith regard to the realism/anti-realism debate. In 
other words, it may be that our actual inferential practice cannot be said to justify  
classical logic, while it still holds that the way we actually use language settles whether 
or not truth is epistemically constrained. Therefore, I  shall ignore the further worry that, 
even i f  Wright's line o f thought serves the anti-realist's puipose. Completeness w ill have 
to be endorsed.
S till the worry remains that Wright's line o f reasoning does not serve the anti­
realist's purpose in the first place. For argument's sake, let us concede that the fact that 
both realist and anti-realist semantics are supported by the same data gives no comfort 
to the realist. Unless W right thinks that the facts about linguistic usage which have 
hitherto been adduced in writings on this topic somehow speak in favour o f an anti­
realist semantics, he cannot be said to have done more than pointed out a stalemate. And 
unless W right thinks that there are no more facts about linguistic practice to be adduced 
which are essential to the manifestation o f knowledge of truth conditions, he must be 
taken to argue for no more than temporary agnosticism about realism; and such an 
agnosticism fares badly with a belief in the apriority o f (EC*).
Indeed, Wright himself is a temporary agnostic about realism, and hence about 
the apriority o f (E C * ) .2 5  Still, he suggests that knowledge of truth conditions be fu lly  
manifested in recognitional abilities. Although this suggestion can easily be understood 
to rest on a verificationist prejudice, the way Wright conceives o f these recognitional 
abilities makes it look fairly unobjectionable even to the realist. The recognitional 
abilities Wright has in mind are abilities
to recognize whether, and i f  so by what, a particular use of [a given] sentence is rendered
appropriate in a prevailing context.2<^
24 Cf. [M M M ]; 256-57.
2-'^  [M M M ]: 250.
26 [M M M ]: 247.
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The claim that the practical abilities that manifest one's understanding o f a given 
sentence be recognitional in this sense seems merely to reflect the fact that, in order to 
be a competent user o f an expression, one must be able
intentionally to suit one's use o f the expression to the obtaining of factors which can be
appreciated by oneself and others to render one's use apt.22
In Other words, understanding differs from other practical abilities— such as the ability 
to swim— in that it essentially involves the general ability to evaluate one's own 
performances and the performances o f others.
The suggestion that understanding be fu lly manifested in recognitional abilities, 
however, is prone to be misleading. It is only too natural to conceive o f the exercises o f 
recognitional abilities to terminate in recognition-judgements which find their proper 
expression in assertions; and i f  the exercises o f such abilities are supposed to display 
one's understanding o f a given sentence, then it is likewise natural to conceive o f the 
sentence whose understanding is thus displayed as the very sentence which is being 
asserted. But the understanding o f a given sentence may involve the ability to use it in 
speech acts other than assertion, and the judgement that, under the prevailing 
circumstances, it is apt to use that sentence in this way w ill then not be expressed by 
means o f asserting that sentence itself. Take the ability to assume a sentence to be true 
as an example. The conditions that prevail whenever it is appropriate to use a given 
sentence in this way may comprise conditions under which asserting this sentence does 
not so qualify.28 The conditions I  assume to obtain are not typically conditions whose 
obtaining I  take myself to be in a position to ascertain.29
In the same vein, however, the ability to use a sentence in a certain way w ill not 
in general be reducible to the ability to recognise the conditions under which it is 
appropriate to use that sentence in this way. This might go unnoticed i f  attention is 
restricted to the assertoric use o f sentences. Indeed, the ability to assert a sentence and 
the ability to recognise the aptness o f asserting it w ill both be displayed in asserting it; 
and arguably a speaker cannot be said to recognise that certain conditions do obtain, 
unless she can be said to know what the point o f asserting is. By contrast, one cannot
22 [M M M ]: 247.
28 The notion o f assumption and its cognates ought here to be understood in terms o f suppositions, rather 
than in terms o f unargued-for beliefs as the notion of a background assumption. I nonetheless prefer 
"assumption" to "supposition" because the former, but not the latter, is used in order to characterise 
logical proofs such as rediictio ad absurdum. In chapter four I shall argue that assumptions provide the 
key to a proper understanding o f deductive validity.
29 Sometimes I w ill assume P although I (claim to) know P. For instance, I may do so in order to lease 
out the logical consequences of P or to convince someone else who does not (claim to) know P.
An important question to be asked in the present context is: does the ability to correctly assert 
"It is correct to assume S" manifest one’s understanding of S or rather one's understanding of 
"It is correct to assume S'"?
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infer from a subject's recognition that it is apt to assume a sentence under certain 
conditions that she has the ability to assume this sentence by herself. Thus, while a 
subject who makes an assumption thereby displays her ability to recognise that doing so 
is presently apt, the recognitional ability involved is not all that the subject is required to 
possess: she must as well be able to make the assumption.30 Generally, one might know 
that it is at present correct to 0 , without knowing how to 0  oneself, or even what, in 
general, the point o f 0 -ing  is.3' It is for this reason that the suggestion that 
understanding be fu lly  manifested in recognitional abilities is not only misleading, but 
like ly to be false. It all depends on whether it can be shown that the ability to use a 
sentence assertorically already suffices for understanding that sentence.
Having identified understanding with a complex o f recognitional skills, Wright 
then asks
[h]ow can knowing what it is for an unappreciable situation to obtain be constituted by
capacities o f discrimination exercised in response to appreciable ones? 32
Insofar as this question is meant to pose a challenge to the realist, it invites the thought 
that whatever conditions a sentence can be used to communicate, not only the grasp of 
these conditions, but these conditions themselves w ill lie open to the speakers' view .33  I f  
the ability to assume a sentence to be true could after all be described as a 
discriminatory capacity, and i f  this ability could be taken to contribute to a 
manifestation o f understanding, then it would not be hard to see how knowledge o f what 
it is for an unappreciable situation to obtain can be constituted by discriminatory 
capacities. Neither is the ability to make assumptions a discriminatory capacity, 
however, nor are the conditions one assumes to obtain typically the appreciable 
conditions one responds to when making that assumption.
In asserting a sentence, one lays claim to the obtaining o f its truth conditions. To 
do so is to exercise a recognitional ability, i.e. the ability to recognise that it is 
appropriate to assert this sentence under the conditions one does. I f  knowledge o f what 
one asserts by means o f that sentence is already fully manifested in this recognitional 
ability, then it is indeed hard to see how the realist might defend her view that what one
30 It may seem that the ability to make assumptions requires very little. However, this ability is not 
independent from the ability to draw conclusions, and knowing which conclusions may be drawn from a 
given assumption is to have a substantial piece o f semantical knowledge.
31 This echoes Dummett's remarks on what is involved in possessing the concept o f truth; [T]: 2-4. 
Contrary to what I shall argue for in subsequent chapters, Dummett holds that the point o f the concept o f 
truth can already be grasped by grasping the significance of assertions.
32 [M M M ]: 248.
33 I do not suggest that in posing this challenge Wright really endorses this thought. But then, he is not an 
anti-realist either. What we have to track is how a believer in the apriority o f (EC*) must argue, and not 
how a temporary agnostic about realism does.
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asserts may outstrip what one can recognise— that is, without at the same time violating 
the Manifestability Requirement. I f  understanding a sentence is not yet fu lly  manifested 
in the ability to perform assertions by means o f this sentence alone, but in the ability to 
perform assertions by means o f this sentence and others, then again it  is hard to see how 
what one can assert by means o f these sentences can outstrip what one can recognise.
Indeed, Wright's anti-realist contends that, on this basis, we are not licensed to 
attribute to speakers a grasp o f conditions which goes beyond a grasp o f conditions 
whose obtaining they can recognise.34 In other words, we have no reason not to assume 
that (EC*) is valid, therefore we should assume that (EC*) is valid; the data confirm a 
theory which takes knowability as its core concept; and i f  knowability is less 
comprehensive than truth, how does this fact manifest itself? Since it would appear that 
we have no answer to this question, the claim that knowledge of meaning consists in 
knowledge o f truth conditions yields as the only empirically acceptable conclusion that 
truth just is knowability. Thus, while we previously argued that anti-realism must show 
that knowability is as comprehensive a notion as truth, Wright's anti-realist now turns 
the tables and contends that, as far as the theory o f meaning is concerned, knowability 
can play the rule assigned to truth, and any claim that truth is nonetheless more 
comprehensive than knowability must be further justified. Given that the Dummettian 
Criterion is adequate, however, there is then no such further justification to be had. 
According to this criterion, all that matters for deciding the debate between realists and 
anti-realists is which concept o f truth we can legitimately be said to possess in face o f 
what an explanation o f our linguistic understanding requires. The alert reader w ill have 
noticed that this line o f reasoning crucially depends on the claim that knowledge o f truth 
conditions is indeed fu lly  manifested in recognitional abilities— a claim the realist 
should consider as highly controversial.
Dummett has given a more straightfoi'ward argument designed to show that 
realism cannot be v i n d i c a t e d . ^ ^  According to Dummett, the realist leaves altogether 
obscure how knowledge o f potentially recognition-transcendent truth conditions— that 
is, o f conditions whose obtaining we can think o f as independent from there being any 
evidence for it— can ever be connected with the exercises o f our recognitional skills, i.e. 
our assertoric practice. Since a theory o f meaning is designed to give a systematic 
account o f what linguistic competence consists in, it should be suited to explain this 
practice. Thus, i f  such a theory identifies knowledge o f meaning w ith knowledge o f 
truth conditions, then it should accordingly be suited to explain our assertoric practice in 
terms o f our knowledge o f the conditions under which a given sentence is true. But i f  
what we know in knowing the truth conditions o f a given sentence is that this sentence
34 [MMM]: 250-52.
3^  Du m me 11 [LBM]: 306-309.
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is true under conditions the obtaining o f which it is beyond our powers to recognise, 
how could this knowledge render intelligible why we respond to certain data the way we 
do? How could this knowledge ever guide our assertoric moves?
This suggestive line o f thought rests on the idea that i f  truth is taken not to be 
explicable in terms of any epistemic notions, so must the notion o f a sentence having a 
specific truth condition.36 While endorsement o f the antecedent is essential to realism, 
however, endorsement o f the consequent is not. In knowing the truth conditions o f S, I 
know which conditions are such that S is true under these conditions. It may well be that 
in order to know the latter, I  have to know under which conditions S qualifies as 
defeasibly warranted and those under which it does not. I may likewise be required to 
know what would count as a conclusive warrant or as a refutation of S. Still it does not 
fo llow that I have to be able to recognise S whenever it is true, or that i f  I have the 
ability to recognise whether S is true, it is possible for me to exercise this ability 
whenever S is true. But then it is not at all mysterious how, in knowing the potentially 
recognition-transcendent truth conditions o f S, I  can be said to have knowledge that 
guides or informs my assertoric practice. Dummett simply fails to recognise the 
structure o f the knowledge I am said to possess in knowing the truth conditions o f S: to 
know the truth conditions o f S is to know, o f some conditions C, that S is true under 
conditions C; and nothing yet follows from what determines whether S has truth 
conditions C for what determines whether C. Dummett merely highlights the fact that 
we should not take as prim itive (our knowledge) that S is true under C in order to 
explain (our knowledge) that S is warranted under conditions W.3? But, by reversing the 
order o f explanation, we do not in any way bring the truth o f S closer to its warranted 
assertibility, even i f  warrants are understood to be conclusive.38
Matters would be different i f  it  could furthermore be shown that knowledge o f 
truth conditions already flows from or simply consists in knowledge o f the conditions 
under which sentences can correctly be asserted. There would then be no reason to 
suppose that the truth conditions o f a sentence could obtain without the speaker being 
able to get into a position in which that sentence could correctly be asserted. Again we 
have pinpointed the claim on which the anti-realist's case for (EC*) w ill have to depend, 
viz. the claim that knowledge o f truth conditions is fu lly  manifested in recognitional 
skills. The exercises o f such recognitional skills are assertions: assertions as to what is 
justified, assertions as to what justifies what, assertions as to what follows from what—  
and i f  anti-realism is correct, assertions as to what is true whenever it is true.
36 Compare whai Dummett says in [LBM ]: 304 with what he says in [LBM ]: 308.
37 Cf. Dummett [LBM ]: 102, 306-309.
38 Cf. Blackburn [MR]: 36.
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W ith these considerations in place, the anti-realist's Manifestation Argument^^ may be
formulated as follows;
(i) the ability to engage in assertoric practice, i.e. the practice o f expressing 
verdicts or giving answers to questions, solely requires the ability to 
recognise the obtaining o f those conditions under which the assertion o f a 
given sentence qualifies as correct, and those under which it  does not— and, 
we may add, the ability to act upon the recognition o f their obtaining
(ii) knowledge o f truth conditions is already fu lly manifested in the ability to 
engage in assertoric practice— it would, for instance, still be so manifested i f  
we lacked the means to give commands, express wishes, etc. '^^
( iii)  the only conditions the knowledge o f which we fu lly display in assertoric 
practice are conditions whose obtaining we are able to recognise
(iv) hence truth conditions w ill be amongst those conditions whose obtaining we 
are able to recognise— and knowledge o f truth conditions is accordingly 
manifested in the ability to recognise that these conditions obtain, i f  they do 
obtain.41
39 As the preceding discussion has made clear, I do not wish to be understood as claiming that the version 
o f the Manifestation Argument I here present has anywhere explicitly been stated. Anti-realists usually 
infer from the fact that knowledge o f meaning cannot solely consist in explicit, verbalisable knowledge 
that it must be construed as implicit knowledge which is manifested in practical abilities, and move rather 
swiftly to the conclusion that these practical abilities must be recognitional; see Dummett [PBI]: 220-26; 
Wright [M M M ]: 247-48; and Tennant [ARL]: 4-5, 111. Starting from premisses about the centrality o f 
assertion, the version o f the Manifestation Argument to be presented here is intended to make this move 
explicit and thereby a possible matter of dispute.
49 On the anti-realist's preoccupation with the act o f assertion, see e.g. Tennant [ARL]: 33-36; and 
Dummett [PBI]: 220-21.
4' Recall that to say, on the one hand, that understanding a sentence consists in the ability to recognise 
that its truth conditions obtain whenever they do obtain is not to say, on the other, that one cannot be said 
to understand a sentence unless one proves to have this ability by way of determining its truth-value. The 
manifestation o f understanding in a practical ability ought not to be conflated with an exercise o f that 
ability. Since we do not wish to say that sentences which are pro tern, undecidable are neither true nor 
false, the fact that we do not at present possess an effective means o f deciding their truth-value should not 
be regarded by the anti-realist as entailing that we lack the ability to recognise their truth-value. That we 
cannot now exercise this ability does not entail that we cannot exercise it. As Tennant reminds us, the 
Manifestation Argument bears on knowledge o f truth conditions, not on knowledge o f truth-value; 
[ARL]: 115. The Manifestation Argument is designed to vindicate (EC*) by way o f showing that the only 
truth conditions a speaker can be said to manifestly grasp are conditions whose obtaining can be 
acknowledged by that speaker— to the effect that envisaging their obtaining is envisaging a situation in 
which a speaker can acknowledge the fact.
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As has been argued in this section, premiss ( iii)  seems highly plausible, insofar as 
assertoric practice is here understood to comprise no more than the assertoric use o f 
sentences: i f  all the use-facts we can go for consist in speakers' verdicts in response to 
appreciable situations, then it is hard to see what justification there may be for the view 
that the expressions so used nonetheless receive their coherent interpretation in terms o f 
states o f affairs potentially beyond the speakers' ken. Obviously, such states o f affairs, 
even i f  they do obtain, w ill not be what speakers can respond to; at most, speakers can 
be taken to respond to situations that (defeasibly) waiTant the assertion that such states 
o f affairs obtain. But i f  this is the correct guide to the interpretation o f the speakers' 
assertions, and nothing else can be brought to bear that would further control it, then 
how can an interpretation o f these assertions be justified that assigns to the sentences 
used or those constructible from their components truth conditions whose obtaining is 
independent from the feasibility o f acquiring warrants for their assertion? It would 
appear that, given this limited data base, any such interpretation would indeed contain 
theoretical slack that has no basis in use and thus violate the Manifestability 
Requirement.
It w ill be my main contention, which I shall defend in subsequent chapters, that 
not both premisses (i) and (ii) can be true— the idea being that, i f  they were, we could 
not properly distinguish between knowledge of truth conditions and knowledge o f 
warranted assertibility conditions. Once either premiss is rejected however, it seems that 
knowledge of truth conditions cannot fu lly  be manifested in recognitional abilities 
either: the exercises o f recognitional abilities cannot but find their expression in verdicts 
that qualify as warranted. Accordingly, we must ask: how else can we discern (grasp of) 
those conditions under which an assertion is presently warranted and true from (grasp 
of) those under which it is presently warranted but false (and from those under which it 
is true but presently unwarranted)? Once we have an answer to this question, it w ill have 
to be re-examined whether the conditions knowledge of which we display in displaying 
our knowledge of truth conditions indeed are such that we are able to recognise that they 
obtain, i f  they do obtain.
The next section w ill provide the background for the problem which I shall raise 
for the anti-realist in section (2.4). How anti-realists who base their case on the 
Manifestation Argument may try to solve this problem is the topic o f chapter three, and 
by the end o f this, it w ill hopefully have become clear that the proposed solution does 
not work, and that the Manifestation Argument must therefore be rejected.
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2.3 Truth vs. Warranted Assertib ility
In this section I shall be concerned with the contrast between warranted assertibility and |
objective truth. I shall argue that sentences which share their conditions o f warranted |
assertibility may nonetheless diverge in their truth conditions, while there are sentences I
whose truth coincides with their warranted assertibility. In the latter cases, truth is not |
objective in the sense I intend the term "objective" to be understood: truth is objective |
only insofar as it diverges from warranted assertibility. I shall proceed by explicating the j
notion o f warranted assertibility. ;
The warranted assertibility o f a sentence is always relative to a total state o f i
information j .  Warrants for S available in j  may fail to establish the warranted I
assertibility o f S because 7 contains further warrants which either establish the warranted |
assertibility of the negation o f S, or of the claim that S is not warrantedly assertible in j .  \
A  warrant for S may accordingly be understood as part o f a body o f evidence that would j
confer warranted assertibility onto S, i f  no further evidence was available. I
Warrants for claims can be classified according to whether they are mandatory j
or purely permissive.^- Whether a warrant is mandatory at a given time depends on the I
sum total o f evidence available at that time. We may therefore say that a warrant for S is 
mandatory relative to a state o f information / just in case, for all speakers x, i f  x is in j ,  |
x's refusal to assent to S (or her readiness to assent to its negation) in face o f that j
warrant, ought not to be tolerated. Accordingly, no state o f information w ill contain j
both warrants which mandate assent to S and warrants which mandate assent to its 1
negation, for then it would be mandated to hold or express contradictory beliefs. On the 
other hand, a warrant for S is purely permissive relative to 7 just in case, for all speakers |
X ,  i f  X  is in 7 , it is not the case that x’s refusal to assent to S despite the existence o f this i
warrant, ought not to be tolerated. Purely permissive warrants for S can co-exist w ith |
purely permissive warrants for its negation. The thesis that the class of mandatory I
warrants is not empty, w ill be o f some importance in the next section as well as in J
chapter four. '
Even i f  all warrants were mandatory in the sense explained, it would be mistaken j
to suggest that, generally, the conditions under which the assertion o f a sentence is |
warranted are the conditions under which this sentence is tme, or that the conditions i
under which its assertion ought to be withdrawn coincide with those under which it is i
false. Consider the following two examples:
(1) I have a proof o f P
(2) P is provable.
42 Wright [TO]: 95-104.
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The conditions under which an assertion o f (1) counts as warranted are conditions under 
which the speaker who makes this assertion can be shown to be able to produce a proof 
o f P now. I f  she can be shown to be able to do so, though, then (1) w ill indeed be true. 
Similarly, an assertion o f (1) must be withdrawn, i f  the speaker cannot now produce a 
proof o f P. Again, these conditions w ill be conditions under which (1) is indeed false.
Although (1) is not a statement o f mathematics, both (1) and (2) pertain to 
mathematical discourse i f  "P" itself is a mathematical statement. Let us assume that it is 
indeed characteristic o f mathematical discourse that the only evidence participants can 
allude to is conclusive evidence. This feature o f mathematical discourse would have the 
consequence that the conditions under which an assertion o f (2 ) is warranted w ill 
likewise be conditions under which (2) is true. Such an assertion would then be 
acceptable only i f  the speaker can produce a proof o f P or at least knows someone who 
can produce such a proof."'^ I f  she can produce or obtain such a proof, it w ill be provable 
that P— and hence (2) w ill be true. The conditions under which an assertion o f (2) must 
be withheld, however, do not coincide with the conditions under which (2 ) fails to be 
true. The fact that no one can produce a proof o f P now does not entail that it is not 
provable that P— and a fo rtio r i neither that it is provable that -P. We must therefore 
distinguish between the fact that a sentence is warrantedly assertible now and the fact 
that it is possible to acquire a warrant for asserting it.44 Given the contrast between ( I)  
and (2), we may already record that there are sentences S such that
(01) S may (actually) be true, even i f  S fails to be at present warrantedly assertible.
A ll sentences apt for objective truth w ill be taken to satisfy (01).45
43 Arguably such a proof need not be constructive. In any case, the notion o f provability involved is 
meant to be informal; cf. Shapiro [HE]; 613-14.
44 The linguistic confusion in this area is astounding. How else can one explain the existence o f Tennant's 
[NTW ] in which he charges Wright o f a realist prejudice (!) because Wright distinguishes between truth 
and warranted assertibility, see [TO]: 20-21; and [RC]: 917-18. A  similar complaint is made by 
Shapiro/Taschek [IPC]: 81. I here follow Wright in understanding warranted assertibility, not as 
designating the possibility o f a warranted assertion, but as designating the actual warrantedness o f a 
possible assertion. Thus, even in the mathematical case, it would be misleading to identify, or assimilate, 
warranted assertibility with provability, although both are modal notions. Rather, provability is what truth 
becomes, once an anti-realist stance towards mathematics is adopted; and for realists and anti-realists 
alike, the warranted assertibility o f a mathematical sentence w ill consist in one's having a proof for it, cf. 
Williamson [DAS]: 5n. Here, as in the empirical case, a sentence may be true without being warrantedly 
assertible. Hand falls prey to a similar confusion when he argues that intuitionism cannot allow for 
neutral states o f information, because to do so would be to violate the principle o f Tertiiim non datur, and 
therefore ought to be replaced by a gappy theory when it comes to empirical discourse; see his [RAN].
43 Sentences expressing our occurrent cogitationes such as "I am judging that P" or "I am wondering 
whether P" w ill accordingly not be objective in the intended sense. I f  one thinks that it is inappropriate to 
exclude these sentences from aptness for objective truth, then one should be even more inclined to reject 
the idea that "It is now warrantedly assertible that P" is not apt for objective truth. As we shall see in due 
course however, it is hard to make sense o f the suggestion that the latter sentence satisfies (01). There
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But (O l) is not the only constraint that sentences apt for objective truth w ill have to 
meet. Consider (3) and (4);
(3) it is warrantedly assertible that P j
(4) P. I
I
!
I f  we conceive o f (3) and (4) as sentences that belong to empirical discourse, then |
although an assertion o f (3) w ill be acceptable just in case (3) is true, and unacceptable I
just in case (3) is false, an assertion o f (4) may not only be unacceptable when (4) fails |
to be false, but acceptable when (4) fails to be true. In empirical discourse, the evidence |jwhich entitles speakers to assertions o f sentences like (4) is in principle defeasible: it |
may turn out later that this evidence misled us to assert something false. We may j
express this feature o f warrants as follows: there are some sentences S such that I
(02) S may (actually) fa il to be true, even i f  S is at present warrantedly assertible. ^
A ll empirical sentences apt for objective truth w ill be taken to satisfy (02). Although j
some sentences o f mathematics may after all be warranted on the basis o f inconclusive |
evidence, there w ill be mathematical sentences, e.g. sentences o f basic arithmetic, for I
which there is but conclusive evidence i f  any. These sentences w ill therefore fail to I
satisfy (02). S till they w ill satisfy (O l). Thus we face the choice of either restricting the |
term "objective" so as to exclude certain mathematical sentences from aptness for |
objective truth, or demanding that sentences apt for objective truth at least satisfy (O l) |
(and maybe also satisfy (02)). Since our main concern w ill be with empirical discourse |
we need not now make this choice: empirical sentences w ill be apt for objective truth j
only i f  they satisfy both (O l) and (0 2 ). •
Given the Dummettian Criterion, anti-realism turns out to be a global thesis j
about what can and what cannot be understood by speakers. Hence, the realist w ill |
already be on safe ground i f  she can show that there is an area of discourse relative to j
which (EC*) cannot be vindicated. As indicated in the introduction, this essay w ill i
exclusively be concerned w ith empirical discourse. The defeasibility o f warrants as 
captured by (0 2 ), w ill therefore be o f crucial importance. '
Williamson, himself a staunch defender o f realism, objects to (0 2 ) against the I
backdrop o f a distinction between defeasible warrants which one may cease to have in 
virtue o f gaining new evidence, and non-factive warrants which one may have despite i
may well be alternative readings of "objectively true" according to which sentences like 
"I am judging that P" and "It is now warrantedly assertible that P" qualify as apt for objective truth. These 
w ill not comprise the reading the present section seeks to precisify however.
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the falsehood o f what they warrantri^ For Williamson all warrants to assert are factive, 
although he concedes that a belief may be reasonable but false: his argument rests on the 
idea that there is just one constitutive rule for the speech act o f assertion which takes the 
form
One must: assert P only i f  C(P).47
According to Williamson, "C(P)" must be read as "one knows P"; and knowledge is 
obviously fac tive /^ Against the suggestion that "C(P)" might be interpreted in terms of 
reasonable belief, he argues that such an interpretation would not yet capture the fact 
that an assertion o f P is faulty i f  false.49
Williamson's demand that warrants to assert be factive, however, seems to me to 
be far too strong. Even i f  defeasibility does not entail non-factiveness, it  seems that 
sometimes one may cease to have warrants for asserting "P" because o f misleading 
evidence suggesting the contrary. This evidence w ill then consist in non-factive 
warrants to assert "~P". To demand that we should not assert "~P" on that basis is, in 
W illiam  James' words, to live by the maxim "Better go without belief forever than 
believe a lie !". Le. to take the avoidance o f error as paramount and the chase for truth as 
secondary.39 That Williamson takes this view, most clearly emerges when he opposes 
assertions to (the expression of) conjectures.^' By contrast it w ill be part o f the account 
o f understanding, to be developed in chapter five, that in a sense yet to be specified 
some assertions do express conjectures. As for Williamson's complaint that the 
interpretation o f "C(P)" in terms of reasonable (non-factively warranted) belief cannot 
do justice to the fact that an assertion is faulty i f  false, this complaint, rather than 
refuting that interpretation, points to Williamson's unargued-for assumption that an 
account o f assertion ought to be given in terms o f a single rule o f the form he suggests.^2 
It is most likely that there w ill be more than one rule constitutive o f the speech 
act o f assertion, albeit o f a different form than the one Williamson has in mind. For 
instance, asserting P w ill be successful only i f  P. I f  you know P and I do not, then i f  I 
assert "P" on the basis o f misleading evidence, you w ill nonetheless accept my assertion 
as correct, i.e. as true, although it was made for the wrong reasons; and i f  I assert "~P" 
on the basis o f misleading evidence, then you may nonetheless concede that I  was
46 Williamson [K A ]: 518-19.
47 [K A ]: 492-93.
48 [K A ]: 502-12.
49 [K A ]:514.
39 James [W B]: 48-50.
5 '[K A ]:4 9 6 .
32 As I inlerpreL it, this complaint even rests on a conllation between the norms one should follow in 
laying claim to the truth, and the goal one intends to achieve in doing so.
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warranted to make that assertion although I did not achieve my goal. This difference in 
evaluation, which is central to our practice o f making corrections, is neglected once all 
warrants are conceived to be factive.33
Although there are some sentences which satisfy (O l) and (02), these sentences 
w ill share their conditions o f warranted assertibility with sentences which satisfy neither 
(O l)  nor (02). To begin with, consider:
(A l)  "P" is waiTantedly assertible i f f
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible.
This principle is highly plausible: insofar as I am entitled to assert
"It is warrantedly assertible that P", I am entitled to put "P" forward as a sentence whose 
assertion can warrantedly be made. In other words, I am then entitled to issue a license 
to assert "P". How can this be so i f  "P" fails to be warrantedly assertible? Conversely, i f  
in being warranted in asserting "P" I am licensed to put "P" forward as a sentence whose 
assertion can warrantedly be made, then I  am entitled to passing this license on to others 
and thus entitled to assert "It is warrantedly assertible that P".34 This w ill hold good, 
even i f  "P" satisfies (O l) and (02).33 Next consider:
33 This is not to say that it is essential to an assertion that it be performed with the intention o f achieving 
the truth. One may perform an assertion and lie. It is merely to say that it is essential to assertions that 
they be taken to be performed with this intention. Otherwise one could not lie. And it cannot be essential 
to assertions that they be taken to be performed with this intention, unless they are mostly performed with 
this intention. This is why one cannot always lie.
34 We must distinguish two different readings o f (A l):
(i) Va[x warrants "P" 3y(j> warrants "P is warranted")]
(ii) Va'[x warrants "P" 4-» a: warrants "P is warranted"].
Suppose that "P" is warranted in virtue o f certain memories I  have and that there is accordingly no reason 
to doubt that I am pretty reliable in remembering states o f affairs o f the kind "P" expresses. On the first 
reading, (A l)  would require that there is a further warrant that warrants "P is warranted", say information 
about the reliability o f my memory. Yet I may reliably remember that P without having any such 
additional information. Thus on this reading (A l)  would seem implausible. But this reading cannot be 
what is intended anyway, because x  warrants "P" only relative to a total state of information; and i f  y 
warrants "P is warranted" and a A y there w ill be a state o f information containing x but not y. (A 1 ) would 
accordingly say that there is an enlargement o f the state o f information containing a' that w ill contain y. 
But what was meant was that any state o f information in which "P" is warrantedly assertible is itself a 
state o f information in which "P is warranted" is warrantedly assertible, and vice versa. Thus the second 
reading of (A l)  is intended: the very memories that warrant assertion o f "P" likewise warrant assertion o f 
"P is warranted", because they issue a license to put "P" forward as a sentence whose assertion can 
warrantedly be made and they can only do so i f  this license can be passed on, i.e. i f  "P is warranted" is 
warrantedly assertible too. In other words, even if  I lack information confirming the reliability o f my 
memory, my memories w ill warrant assertion o f "P" only i f  taken to be reliable; and i f  I am entitled to 
treat them as such I am a fo rtiori entitled to assert "P is warranted" on their basis.
33 It is not clear whether (A l)  and, in effect, the principles to follow, (A2) to (A5), are available to an 
externalist about warrant, for I may be reliable with respect to a certain class o f statements (telling that 
there is a barn) without being reliable with respect to my reliability (telling that I am not in fake-barn 
county). However, it is not clear either that externalism does not allow for some notion o f warranted
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(A2) "It is warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible i f f  
it is warrantedly assertible that P.
Given (A l) , "It is warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible just in case "P" 
is warrantedly assertible. (A2) follows from (A l)  only i f  "P" is warrantedly assertible 
just in case it is warrantedly assertible that P. But then, how should it be possible that 
"P" is warrantedly assertible, while the claim we express when asserting "P" is not, or 
that "P" is not warrantedly assertible, while the claim we express when asserting "P" 
nonetheless is? This is simply unintelligible. Insofar as (A l)  holds, so does (A2).36
Given (A2), it can easily be shown that for sentences o f the form 
"It is warrantedly asserible that P", truth and wairanted assertibility w ill coincide. (A2) 
and the Disquotational Schema for truth:
(DS) "P" is true i f f  P
jo in tly  entail (A3):
(A3) "It is warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible i f f  
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" is true.
assertion (or reasonable belief) that validates (A l)  to (A5). In any case, Williamson has argued that anti­
realists who base their case on manifestationism are bound to endorse (A l)  to (A3); cf. [DAS]; 4-7 and 
[CH]: 569-73; and as I shall argue below, once (A l)  to (A3) are accepted, the rejection of (A4) to (A5) 
seems hardly motivated. I shall follow Williamson in this respect and presume that i f  anti-realism is 
compatible with externalism, so are (A l)  to (A5). Thus i f  there are externalist arguments against (A l)  to 
(A5), on any conception o f warrant that is admissible, then these arguments w ill also count against anti­
realism. Since my ultimate goal is to show that anti-realism cannot be vindicated, my arguments, resting 
on the acceptability o f (A l)  to (A5), may be regarded as supplementing such externalist arguments ( if  
there are any) to the effect that anti-realists are faced with a dilemma: i f  (A l)  to (A5) do not hold, anti­
realism cannot be justified on the basis o f manifestationism, and i f  they do, anti-realism cannot be 
justified on this basis either.
36 (A2) needs qualification in cases where the sentence mentioned contains indexicals: 
"It is warrantedly assertible that I am Gustav Lauben" is warrantedly assertible by Gustav Lauben even 
though it is not warrantedly assertible by Gustav Lauben that I am Gustav Lauben. For the time being let 
the context of an utterance be the triple composed o f speaker, place and time o f utterance, <s, /, t>. Let 
‘P(a, X, t ) ’ be a sentence involving indexicals for speaker, place and time and no others. Then the 
appropriate version o f (A2) reads:
(A2*) Tt is warrantedly assertible that P(a, 1, x)’ is warrantedly assertible by s in I at t i f f  
it is warrantedly assertible by j- in / at r that P(j, /, t).
This can only be a first step in the right direction, for a sentence may furthermore contain indexicals for 
the audience, for objects previously mentioned etc. But it should be fairly obvious how the suggested 
account may be extended so as to cover these other cases. Notice that the difficulties in specifying truth 
conditions for sentences involving indexicals are precisely the same. Since any further pursuit o f the 
matter w ill take us too far afield, I shall henceforth take the liberty of ignoring these complications.
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I f  (A2) is valid, then (O l) and (02) w ill accordingly fail to hold for sentences of the 
form "It is warrantedly assertible that P". Their truth w ill not be objective in the sense 
laid down.37
It seems rational to maintain that the same applies to the negations o f such 
sentences. In other words, the following should hold as well:
(A4) "It is not warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible i f f  
it  is not warrantedly assertible that P.
I f  one has reason to believe that there are no reasons to believe P, then one has no reason 
to believe P; and i f  there are no reasons to believe P, then that should be reason enough 
to believe that there aren’t any. In other words, the absence of reasons o f a certain kind
57 Again, Williamson objects. He presents an argument designed to show that (A3) leads to absurdity; see 
his [DAS] and [CH]. This argument does not seem compelling however, because it rests on the following 
premiss which is reminiscient of the major premiss o f a Sorites:
(W) I f  it is warrantedly assertible at t that it is warrantedly assertible that P,
then it is warrantedly assertible that P at r-/.
Anyone already convinced o f (A3) w ill read (W) as tantamount to (W*):
(W *) I f  it is warrantedly assertible at t that it is warrantedly assertible that P,
then it is warrantedly assertible at t-1 that it is warrantedly assertible that P.
(W *) w ill yield false instances under any complete sharpening of "warrantedly assertible". Thus, anyone 
already convinced of (A3) w ill reject (W) on the very same grounds.
Williamson motivates (W) by appeal to the idea that in general, speakers must reliably respond to facts 
in order for them to be in a position to warrantedly assert that these facts obtain. He argues that one's 
being equally confident that P a second ago would undermine one's reliability when asserting P a second 
later, unless P was the case a second ago; [CH]: 558. I f  this line o f reasoning depends on the assumption 
that all warrants to assert are factive, we need not consider it here. I f  the motivation for (W) does not 
depend on this assumption, then it w ill at least depend on the assumption that claims about the warranted 
assertibility o f P are subject to a standard o f correctness, viz. truth, such that a speaker's disposition to 
make such claims yields knowledge that they meet this standard only i f  it is reliable with respect to this 
same standard. Why should this be the case? Why shouldn't it be enough that P is subject to such a 
standard reliability with respect to which is necessary for a speaker's knowledge both o f P and its being 
warrantedly assertible that P? In other words, one's possession of a warrant for asserting "P" may imply 
that one's assertion of "P" is the outcome o f a reliable procedure; and one's possession o f a warrant for 
asserting "It is warrantedly assertible that P" may likewise imply that one's assertion of it is the outcome 
o f a reliable procedure; but the reliable procedure may just be the same in both cases: its reliability may 
consist in the tendency to get things right as far as the truth-value o f "P" is concerned. I f  a cognitive 
procedure is reliable in this respect, assertions o f "P" that result from its implementation w ill count as 
warranted. From the point o f view under attack, "P" is warrantedly assertible i f  and only i f  
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" is. Therefore such a procedure w ill ex hypothesi also be a procedure 
by whose means one can arrive at a warranted assertion of the latter sentence. To rejoin that following 
this procedure does not yet imply that one gets things right as far as the truth-value o f 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" is concerned clearly begs the question: it already presupposes that the 
truth o f the latter sentence does not collapse into its warranted assertibility. To rejoin that getting things 
right with respect to the truth o f "It is warrantedly assertible that P" does not yet imply that one gets the 
truth-value o f "P" right is correct, but seems to rest on the mistaken assumption that reliable procedures 
are failsafe. In light o f these remarks I see no reason to endorse (W) that would outweigh the reasons 
brought forth in support o f (A3). But see footnote 55.
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itself constitutes a reason for believing that there are no reasons o f such a kind: i f  there 
aren't any reasons o f this kind, then you won’t find any; and that you don't find any is 
reason to believe that there aren't any.^^
Accordingly, for sentences o f the form "It is not warrantedly assertible that P", 
truth and warranted assertibility w ill come down to one and the same:
(A5) "It is not warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible i f f  
" It is not warrantedly assertible that P" is true.
(A4) implies that warrants for non-objective claims are always mandatory: let ‘W ’ stand for warranted 
assertibility; then all things considered, a warrant for ~WP cannot co-exist with a warrant for WP, as 
W ~W P implies ~WP and W W P implies WP. This is as it should be, for it can hardly be permissible to 
say that something is permissible and also be permissible to say that it is not; cf. Wright [TO]: 97-98.
Consider the following apparent counterexample to the conditional from right to left across (A4): 
suppose that there are no reasons to believe P, while it is nonetheless believed that there are such reasons 
that w ill soon be discovered; then it would seem that it cannot reasonably be believed that there are no 
reasons to believe P. I f  this case is meant to yield a counterexample to (A4), then the belief that there are 
reasons for P that w ill soon be discovered w ill have to consitute a warrant for believing that there are 
reasons for P where this warrant is not trumped by any warrant presently available. For recall that the 
warranted assertibility o f a given claim is always relative to a total state o f information. Let us refer to all 
the other information presently available as w. Now either the warrant for the claim that there are reasons 
for P is trumped by w or it is not. I f  it is then w w ill warrant ~WP, hence the left-hand side o f (A4) w ill 
be satisfied. I f  the warrant for the claim that there are warrants for P is not trumped by w, however, then, 
all things considered, this warrant w ill warrant WP, whence by (A2) WP w ill hold and the right-hand 
side o f (A4) w ill be false. In either case no counterexample to (A4) has been presented. This suggests that 
the meaning postulates governing the notion o f warranted assertibility form a coherent system that can 
accommodate prima facie  counterexamples nicely.
Timothy Williamson has raised the following objection against the conjunction o f (A2) and (A4): (A2) 
and (A4) taken together classically entail W(W P) v W(~WP); but this conflicts with the general principle 
that in a recognised borderline case for <|), ~W(<j)) &  ~W(~(j)) w ill be true; therefore either there are no 
recognised borderline cases for WP or classical logic has to be abandoned. The obvious response is to 
reject Williamson's principle. Thus in what follows I shall assume both that classical logic is correct and 
that there are indeed recognised borderline cases for WP. (O f course, recognised borderline cases w ill not 
be regarded as being defined in terms o f Williamson’s principle.) Notice first that Williamson's principle 
entails that i f  (j) is recognisedly borderline neither W((j)) nor W(~(|)) w ill be recognisedly borderline. But 
why should we endorse this conditional? Why shouldn't we rather claim that i f  <{) is recognisedly 
borderline sometimes W((|)) and W(~(j)) may be borderline too? The reason telling against this latter 
suggestion w ill presumably be the worry that i f  borderline cases for (|) gave rise to borderline cases for 
W((j)) and W(~(|)), could only conceive o f borderline cases for (|) as cases in which we are ignorant o f the 
truth-value o f (j) at the cost o f making what we are ignorant o f a non-objective matter: by overcoming our 
ignorance o f the truth-value o f W(<j>) we would already have to have overcome our ignorance o f the truth- 
value o f ({); thus, in particular, knowing that W((|)) is false would be sufficient for knowing that (j) is false, 
as knowing that (j) is true in any case requires knowing that W({j)) is true. But then it should also be 
noticed that the conflict with Williamson's principle only arose for special <[), viz. those equivalent to some 
WP. Yet, it is precisely with respect to claims like these that the aforementioned worry gets no grip: it 
already follows from (A2) and (A4) that whether WP is true or false is not an objective fact o f the matter. 
Thus it would appear that it is precisely with respect to the problematic cases that we lack a justification 
for Williamson's principle. Hence even i f  it is, for the sake of argument, conceded that i f  (|) is apt for 
objective truth, recognised borderline cases for (j) are cases in which ~W((|)) &  ~W(~c|)) is true, it remains 
to be shown that this conception is adequate for borderline for non-objective (j). I f  (A2) and (A4) hold, an 
alternative account o f such borderline cases must be provided. To give such an account is undoubtedly 
beyond the scope of the present investigation.
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Thus, sentences o f the form "It is not warrantedly assertible that P" fa il to satisfy (O l) {Iand (0 2 ), hence fail to qualify as apt for objective truth.
(O l) and (02) yield a minimalist conception o f objective truth which both j
realists and anti-realists are bound to endorse.^^ No matter what else the notion o f |
objective truth may be invested with— recognition-transcendence, bivalence or what i
have you— any truth conditional account o f speakers' knowledge w ill have to make |
room for the understanding o f sentences whose truth conditions satisfy (0 1 ) and (0 2 ). j
How this may be done w ill be the main theme o f the remainder o f this essay. As already |
indicated towards the end o f the last section, it w ill be my contention, to be 1
substantiated in chapter three, that satisfaction o f (O l) and (02) cannot be accounted for |
on the basis o f assertoric use alone. This is in large part due to the validity o f (A l) ,  and j
it is for this reason that the premisses o f the Manifestation Argument must eventually be 1
rejected. j
In the final section o f this chapter I  shall give an indication o f the tension I
between the Manifestation Argument and our objectivist conception o f truth. I  shall |
argue that compliance w ith the Dummettian Criterion forces the anti-realist to explain a i
speaker's understanding o f sentences which express Moorean propositions. Sentences o f |
this kind have warranted assertibility conditions which necessarily go uninstantiated. !
The Manifestation Argument, i f  sound, establishes that truth conditions are conditions i
whose obtaining speakers can get into a position to waiTantedly assert.^^ It would fo llow  I
that Moorean sentences are necessarily false. This proves to be inconsistent with our I
Iminimalist conception o f objective truth, however. j
The anti-realist merely intends to show that for any non-Moorean sentence S, i f  i
S is true, we can attain a state o f information which w ill furnish us w ith warrants on |
whose basis we may recognise that S is true. She w ill accordingly have to explain the 1
truth conditions o f Moorean sentences in terms of the truth conditions o f their j
constituent sentences. Moorean sentences are necessarily not warrantedly assertible )
because their constituent sentences have exclusive warranted assertibility conditions, but |
are not necessarily false because their constituent sentences do not have exclusive truth j
conditions. {
Recall that we are concerned with empirical discourse. As noted before, sentences o f mathematics 
typically fail to satisfy (0 2 ).
This conclusion would be consistent with (01), for recall that the warranted assertibility of S is always 
relative to a state of information; and S may fail to be warrantedly assertible given the present state of 
information while being warrantedly assertible given an enlargement o f this state. The anti-realist claims 
that the actual world is such that, i f  S is true, we can attain a state of information relative to which S is 
warrantedly assertible. She does not claim that i f  S is true we already are in this stale.
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One o f the conjuncts o f a Moorean sentence, however, w ill share its warranted 
assertibility conditions with a third sentence which is inconsistent with the second 
conjunct.^' How then can it be explained, on the basis o f assertoric practice alone, that 
the first conjunct is not inconsistent w ith the second? It is suggested that the only way 
out o f this impasse is holistic: the anti-realist has to conceive o f the truth conditions o f a 
given sentence as the systematic contribution this sentence makes to the determination 
o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f more complex sentences in which it occurs. 
Sentences which share their warranted assertibility conditions may nonetheless fail to be 
interchangeable salva assertibilitate in some embedding contexts. In chapter three I w ill 
explore whether this construal o f truth conditions already allows the anti-realist to 
reconcile our minimalist conception o f objective truth, as embodied in (0 1 ) and (0 2 ), 
w ith the Manifestability Requirement.
2.4 Ought Anti-Realist Semantics to be Systematic, and How Can it Be?
The Dummettian Criterion forces the anti-realist to devise an account o f understanding. 
Such an account w ill have to yield for every meaningful sentence o f arbitrary 
complexity, a specification o f what it is for a speaker to understand this sentence. 
Accordingly, attention is shifted from concepts to terms and from propositions to 
sentences. Realists and anti-realists w ill agree that to understand a sentence is to know 
its truth conditions. They w ill only disagree about which notion o f truth is a d n i i s s i b l e . ^ ^  
The Manifestation Argument, i f  sound, leads to the conclusion, unacceptable to the 
realist, that knowledge of truth conditions consists in the ability to recognise that these 
conditions obtain whenever they do obtain: i f  a sentence is true then speakers w ill be 
able to attain a state o f information in which this sentence can warrantedly be asserted.
It follows that the anti-realist is bound to explain what it  is to understand 
sentences that express Moorean propositions. However, it w ill not yet do to explain, for 
every Moorean proposition, what it is to understand a sentence expressing it, for it  may 
be that two sentences express the same proposition, i.e. have the same truth conditions, 
and yet mastery o f one is not sufficient for mastery o f the respective other.^^
Jusl as in chapter one I shall speak o f Moorean conjunctions, rather than conjunctions equivalent to 
Moorean sentences, in order to keep matters simple.
Cf. Dummett [TOE]: xxii; [LBM ]: 304.
This does not undermine the identification o f understanding with knowledge of truth conditions, 
though. For, knowledge o f which truth condition a given sentence has is after all knowledge about this 
particular sentence, hence it differs from knowledge that another sentence has that truth condition.
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Unobvious logical equivalences provide one clear example for this— sentences 
containing indexicals may be seen to provide yet another. Arguably, the sentence 
"Paul is in Havana on 4th o f July 1997" expresses the same proposition as 
"Paul is in Havana today" as uttered on 4th o f July 1997; and for any day D, there w ill 
be a matching sentence "Paul is in Havana on D" that expresses the same proposition as 
"Paul is in Havana today" as uttered on But what it is to master the use o f the latter 
sentence w ill not yet be explained by a mastery o f eternal sentences o f the former sort. 
For instance, I  may correctly assert that Paul is in Havana today, even though I have no 
idea what day it  is today. By the same token, I may correctly assert that Paul is in 
Havana on 4th o f July 1997, without being aware that today is the 4th o f July 1997.
It is important to stress this feature o f sentences containing indexicals because it 
may well turn out that the same proposition may be knowably true in the guise o f one 
such sentence, but fail to be so in the guise o f another— in the same sense in which I 
cannot now see that I  am now standing on an earth worm, but can see later that I  was 
standing on one. The Dummettian Criterion entails that even i f  a case could be made for 
the claim that sentences containing indexicals express the same propositions as eternal 
sentences, the anti-realist cannot rest content with the fact that there are circumstances 
under which a sentence o f the latter kind can be known to be true, while there are no 
circumstances under which the corresponding sentence o f the former kind can be known 
to be true.*55
In face o f the Manifestation Argument, the anti-realist would appear to be il l-  
advised to opt for Tennant's strategy o f restricting the Epistemic Constraint so as to 
avert the Paradox o f Knowability. The Manifestation Argument yields the general 
conclusion that whenever a sentence is true there exists a state o f information in which it 
may warrantedly be asserted. Accordingly, the truth conditions o f a Moorean sentence 
could obtain only i f  there was a state o f information relative to which it is warrantedly 
assertible. Since there is no such state because the warranted assertibility conditions o f 
Moorean sentences are necessarily uninstantiated, it would fo llow  that Moorean 
sentences are necessarily false. But then we are back to square one: the anti-realist 
would have to claim that all truths w ill at some point be known, or at least deny that 
there are truths we w ill as a matter o f fact never know.
Cf. Frege [Th]: 10-11; as well as Davidson [RI]: 135-36. Nothing in what follows w ill hinge on this 
view being correct, however.
It is for this reason that I w ill henceforth talk about Moorean sentences rather than Moorean 
propositions. The definition o f Moorean propositions we have given in chapter one, section (1.3), can 
without further ado be transposed into the metalinguistic key.
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Although he himself argues for a restriction o f the Epistemic Constraint, Tennant shows 
some sympathy for this radical version o f anti-realism, when he says that
it is not obvious that it is obviously silly. Therefore it may not be obviously silly. It may 
not be silly either, even i f  ultimately unacceptable.^^
It SO turns out, however, that an anti-realist o f this radical kind w ill be bound to make 
even wilder claims. For instance, she w ill not only have to claim that i f  S is true, S is at 
present warrantedly assertible, but also that i f  there are at present mandatory warrants to 
assert S, then S is true. Or at least, she w ill not only have to concede that there are no 
true sentences S that fail to be warrantedly assertible now, but also that there are no 
sentences S which it is at present mandated to assert yet which fail to be true. Neither is 
the least acceptable i f  the present warranted assertibility o f a sentence is taken to consist 
in the current availability o f defeasible and non-factive warrants for asserting it.
Apart from principle (A4) laid down in the last section all we need to invoke in 
addition in order to prove these unpalatable results are, (i) a consequence o f the 
unrestricted version o f the Epistemic Constraint, (ii) the principle according to which 
one cannot be warranted in believing a contradiction, (iii) the principle that warranted 
assertibility distributes over conjunction, and (iv) a further principle about mandatory 
warrants.
Insofar as knowledge o f matters o f fact is based on warrants, the unrestricted 
metalinguistic version o f the Epistemic Constraint, as established by the Manifestation 
Argument,
(EC) "P" is true "P" is knowable
entails that for any true sentence "P", there is an attainable— i.e. possibly attained— state
o f information relative to which "P" is warrantedly assertible. We may put this formally
as follows:
(W(:) T(P) --><yv/(P).
The claim that contradictions can never count as warrantedly assertible is arguably too 
strong, because some contradictions are not obviously contradictory and can therefore 
reasonably be believed. To this it might perhaps be replied that, once we have figured
66 Tennant [TT]: 246.
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out that what we believed is contradictory, we ought to deny that we were warranted in 
believing it in the first place. However this may be, some contradictions are obviously 
contradictory and should therefore never count as warrantedly assertible, and the 
contradictions we shall be concerned w ith are obviously contradictory. W ith this 
restriction in mind, we may lay down:
(A 6 ) ~W (A &  ~A).
Even i f  it  may not in general be the case that one is warranted in believing A  &  B 
whenever one is warranted in believing A  and warranted in believing B, the converse 
should be unobjectionable: i f  one is warranted in believing a conjunction, then one w ill 
be warranted in believing either conjunct. Hence we get:
(A7) W (A &  B) ->  W (A) &  W(B).
We shall arrive at the last principle we need, (A9), by indirect means. Reflect first that i f  
I  have reason to believe that A  &  B, then not only do I  have reason to believe A  and 
reason to believe B, and reason to believe that I  have these reasons: I  furthermore have 
reason to believe that I have reason to believe A  under conditions B, and have reason to 
believe that I  have reason to believe B under conditions A, Therefore, (A 8 ) w ill hold 
good:
(A 8 ) W (A  &  B) W (W (A) &  B).
Now, the converse o f (A 8 ) does not hold i f  the warrant I  have for A  is purely 
permissive. Insofar as this warrant is mandatory, however, the converse o f (A 8 ) does 
hold. The only reason why I could fa il to have a warrant for A  &  B, although the 
consequent o f (A 8 ) holds, would be that my having a warrant for A  was consistent with 
both B and my having a warrant for B, while A  was not. I f  the warrant I have for A  was 
mandatory however, then I  would thereby be forced to endorse what is either 
inconsistent w ith my having a warrant for B, or inconsistent with B. But in either case, 
the consequent o f (A 8 ) would fail to hold: I would not then be entitled to assert B. Thus 
w ith respect to mandatory warrants, we may lay down:
(A9) W(WM(A) &  B) ^  W (A &  B).
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W ith (WC), (A4), (A 6 ), (A7) and (A9) being in place, we may now give the following 
proofs:
1 (1) P & ~W(P) Ass.
I (2) OW(P &  ~W(P)) 1, given (WC)
1 (3) ~D~W(P & -W(P)) 2 , df. 0
4 (4) W(P & -W (P)) Ass.
4 (5) W(P) 4, given (A7)
4 (6) W(~W(P)) 4, given (A7)
4 (7) ~W(P) 6, given (A4)
4 (8) ± 5, 7, - E
(9) ~W(P &  ~W(P)) 4, 8 ,
(10) □~W (P &  ~W(P)) 9, 0-1
I (11) T 3, 10, ~-E
( 12) ~(P &  ~W(P)) 1,11, —I
(13) P ->  W(P) 12, given ~(A & -B ) (A —> B)
1 (I) W^(P) &  -P Ass.
1 (2) OW(WM(P) &  ~P) 1, given (WC)
1 (3) -0~W(WM(P) &  ~P) 2 , df. 0
4 (4) W(W^(P) &  -P) Ass,
4 (5) W(P &  ~P) 4, given (A9)
6 (6) ~W(P &  ~P) Ass. (A6)
4,6 (7) _L 5, 6 , ~-E
6 (8) ~W(WM(P) &  -P) 4, 7, - I
6 (9) 0-W(WM(P) &  ~P) 8, 0-1
1,6 ( 10) 3, 9, ~-E
6 (11) --(W M (P)&~P) 1, 10, - I
6 ( 12) w ^(P) p 11, given ~(A &  ~B) (A —> B)
Note that the indexicality involved in "W(P)" has the effect that in line (2), (WC) yields 
the claim that it be possible that (1) is warrantedly assertible now. The warrants on 
whose basis the proposition expressed by a sentence containing indexicals may be 
known, must include warrants that are available on the occasion o f the assertion o f this 
sentence. As we have noted, this is a direct consequence o f the Dummettian Criterion: 
the anti-realist has to give an account o f the understanding o f every meaningful 
sentence. But the understanding o f a sentence involving indexicals cannot be accounted 
for in terms o f the ability to recognise the truth-value o f another sentence containing no
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indexicals, even i f  both sentences relate to the same state o f affairs. This ability w ill, i f  jiat all, constitute the understanding o f the latter sentence, not o f the former. |
An intuitionistically minded anti-realist may object to the step from line (12) to |
line (13) in the first proof, and to the step from line (11) to (12) in the second. But line j
( 1 2 ) in the first proof, and line ( 11) in the second already seem unacceptable; and 
arguably the last line o f either proof w ill be in good standing anyway i f  "P" is j
effectively decidable. So, what to do? I
As I have argued in the last section, the anti-realist w ill have to resist the |
identification o f truth with warranted assertibility.^? The proofs given are general; and at I
least in empirical discourse the warrants we may be said to have tend to be non-factive. |
On the other hand, the acquisition o f warrants for empirical claims w ill often be a matter 1
o f much experimental work o f which the results are not presently available. j
We are therefore bound to acknowledge that we have hit on an a p r io r i refutation t
o f the general conclusion o f the Manifestation Argument: Moorean sentences, o f which j
( 1) in either proof is an example, show that knowledge of truth conditions cannot in j
general be taken to consist in the ability to recognise whether or not these conditions do |
6? It would indeed be surprising i f  the anti-realist accepted that we can infer from the current warranted 
assertibility o f a given sentence that this sentence is true, or from its truth that it is at present warrantedly 
assertible, for then it should strike one as unintelligible that anti-realists have gone to great lengths 
arguing for intuitionistic logic. I f  anti-realists equated truth with warranted assertibility, then they should 
rather promote a logic that allows for truth-value gaps. Why so can be shown by appeal to the fact that 
(LEM) holds for sentences o f the form o f "W(P)", and the fact that sentences such as "P" and "~P" may 
both fail to be wan antedly assertible in neutral states o f information. Given that
W(P) V ~W(P)
W(~P) V ~W(~P)
we can prove that the following disjunction holds good,
(W(P) &  ~W(~P)) V (~W(P) &  W(~P)) V (~W(P) &  ~W(~P))
which gives expression to the idea that either "P" is warrantedly assertible or "~P" is warrantedly 
assertible or neither is. Given the envisaged identification of truth with warranted assertibility, this would 
yield the result that either "P" is true or "~P" is true or neither o f them is. Cf. Hand [RAN], Proof:
W(P) V ~W(P) Ass.
W(P) Ass.
~W(~P) 2, W (A )-^~ W (~ A )
W(P) &  ~W(~P) 2, 3, & -I
(W(P) &  ~W(~P)) V (~W(P) &  W(~P)) V (~W(P) &  ~W(~P)) 4, v-I 
~W(P) Ass.
W(~P) V ~W(~P) Ass.
W(~P) Ass.
~W(P) &  W(~P) 6 , 8 , & -I
(W(P) &  ~W(~P)) V (~W(P) &  W(~P)) V (~W(P) & -W (-P )) 9, v-I
~W(~P) Ass.
~W(P) &  ~W(~P) 6 , 11
(W(P) &  -W (-P )) V (~W(P) &  W(~P)) V (~W(P) &  ~W(~P)) 12, v-I
(W(P) &  -W (~P)) V (~W(P) &  W(~P)) V (-W (P) &  ~W(~P)) 7, 8 , 10, 11, 13, v-E
(W(P) &  ~W(~P)) V (~W(P) &  W(~P)) V (~W(P) & ~W(~P)) 1, 2,5, 6 , 14, v-E .
1 ( 1)
2 (2 )
2 (3)
2 (4)
2 (5)
6 (6 )
7 (7)
8 (8)
6,8 (9)
6,8 ( 10)
11 ( 11)
6,11 ( 12)
6,11 (13)
6,7 (14)
1.7 (15)
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obtain. W hile their warranted assertibility conditions necessarily fail to obtain, their 
truth conditions do not. The conclusion o f the Manifestation Argument has therefore to 
be modified so as to exclude Moorean sentences: whether their truth conditions obtain 
w ill not depend on there being a state o f information in which they can warrantedly be 
asserted.
How then does an anti-realist who promotes no more than (EC*)
(EC*) for all non-Moorean sentences "P", i f  "P" is true, then "P" is knowable
account for our understanding o f Moorean sentences?
It has been a standard realist rejoinder to the Manifestation Argument to argue as 
follows: the anti-realist's account o f understanding is in order insofar as effectively 
decidable sentences are concerned. Here, grasp o f truth conditions can indeed be 
conceived o f as the ability to recognise their obtaining. But in mastering these 
sentences, a speaker acquires an understanding o f subsentential expressions which 
enables her to understand novel sentences built up from these, yet whose truth-value it 
may be beyond her powers to recognise.
This appeal to compositionality has been shown to be illegitimate though, as the 
question immediately arises: due to the understanding o f which subsentential 
expressions may a speaker come to grasp potentially evidence-transcendent truth 
conditions, i f  that understanding is said to be exhaustively determined by her ability to 
recognise the truth-value o f effectively decidable sentences in which these expressions 
occur? This question seems to have no answer.^s
I f  this is a successful repudiation o f the realist's attempt to drive her point home 
by appeal to compositionality however, then the same line o f argument seems to be 
available i f  the anti-realist now attempts to account for the understanding o f Moorean 
sentences by appeal to an understanding o f their atomic parts. For how can we come to 
understand a complex sentence as possibly true yet unrecognisably so, i f  our 
understanding of its constituent terms is exhaustively determined by our ability to 
recognise the truth-value o f sentences in which they occur, as the Manifestation 
Argument requires?
Thus, it would now appear that the anti-realist's answer to the realist's il lic it  
appeal to compositionality backfires. I f  the understanding o f a Moorean conjunction 
such as "W(P) &  ~P" or "~W(P) &  P" cannot be taken to consist in the ability to
68 Cf. Tennant [ARL]: 112; and Wright [RMT]: 21-22. In general, merely concatenating meaningful 
expressions according to syntactical rules w ill not already result in an intelligible sentence even i f  it 
results in a grammatically well-formed sentence; vide sentences like "Green Ideas sleep furiously"; there 
is simply no identifiable set o f practical abilities that would constitute the grasp o f a thought this sentence 
expresses.
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recognise il as true, i f  it is true, then how can this be so i f  the understanding o f its 
conjuncts is taken to consist in the ability to recognise them as true, i f  they are true? It 
would seem that the breakdown of the Manifestation Argument in the case o f Moorean 
sentences affects its validity in the case o f sentences from whose combination Moorean 
sentences result. And since "P" may be replaced by any sentence, this w ill be a 
devastating result.
This may however be considered to be a premature conclusion. The 
unknowability o f Moorean truths has a straightforward explanation: although neither 
"W(P) &  ~P" nor "-W (P) &  P" is internally inconsistent, they are nonetheless 
unassertible. The reason seems clear: "W(P)" and "P" share their conditions o f 
warranted assertibility, so do "W(~P)" and "-P "; and insofar as neither "P &  ~P" nor 
”~W(P) &  W(P)" is assertible, "W(P) &  ~P" and "-W (P) &  P" are not assertible either. 
S till "W(P)" and "P" may have different truth conditions.
In order to show then that "W(P) &  ~P" and "-W (P) &  P" are not contradictory, 
it  is incumbent upon realists and anti-realists alike to devise an account o f knowledge o f 
truth conditions which makes room for the idea that speakers conceive o f some 
sentences S in their repertoire as satisfying (O l) and (02):
(01) S may (actually) be true, even i f  S fails to be at present warrantedly assertible;
(02) S may (actually) fail to be true, even i f  S is at present warrantedly assertible.
Here lurks another threat to the cogency o f the Manifestation Argument however, this 
time affecting its premisses rather than the generality o f its conclusion. Recall that (A3) 
holds:
(A3) "It is warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible i f f  
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" is true.
In other words, the truth conditions o f "It is warrantedly assertible that P", i.e. ”W(P)", 
are its warranted assertibility conditions, and those coincide with the warranted 
assertibility conditions o f "P":
(A l)  "P" is warrantedly assertible i f f
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible.
Now, i f  the conditions under which "P" is warrantedly assertible coincide with those 
under which "W(P)" is, then how can the ability to recognise that these conditions do
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obtain when they do, and that they do not obtain i f  they do not, already manifest j
knowledge o f the truth conditions o f "P", where those are, given (O l)  and (02), :|
supposed to differ from the truth conditions o f ”W(P)"? It would appear that, i f  premiss |
(1) o f the Manifestation Argument holds good, premiss (ii) proves wrong: knowledge o f j
truth conditions is not yet manifested in the abilities required for the participation in j
assertoric practice. |
Even so, it may be thought to be possible to give an account o f knowledge o f 
truth conditions without transgressing the limits set by the premisses o f the I
Manifestation Argument. Indeed, Dummett has argued that the difference between trtith !
conditions and conditions o f warranted assertibility emerges once we take the |
compositionality o f language to heart. According to this suggestion, knowledge o f the I
truth conditions o f a given sentence is manifested in the ability to recognise those I
conditions under which not only this sentence but all its (non-Moorean) embeddings are î
warrantedly assertible and those under which they are not. Amongst these embeddings, i
negation and the conditional are the most obvious examples: the warranted assertibility Î
conditions o f "~P" differ from those o f "~W(P)"; and so do the warranted assertibility !
conditions o f "P —> Q" and "W(P) —> Q". The truth conditions o f "P" and "W(P)" are j
accordingly conceived to consist in the systematic contribution either sentence makes to |
the determination o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f more complex sentences in I
which it occurs. I
Thus, the anti-realist w ill argue that even though the conditions under which a ;
sentence w ill be recognised as true are conditions under which it is correct to assert that |
this sentence is warrantedly assertible, s till there is a difference in the way "P" and j
"W(P)" are understood that is fu lly  manifested in the ability to engage in assertoric '
practice. And this, or so Dummett suggests, is sufficient to demonstrate the speakers' I
grasp o f the truth conditions o f "P"— that is, even i f  "P" happens to satisfy (O l)  and {
(02). In the next chapter, however, I intend to prove that Diimmett's suggestion is |
mistaken. I
In this chapter, we have identified the battlegrounds on which the realist/anti- j
realist debate may be fought: given the Dummettian Criterion, the question o f whether |
truth is epistemically constrained w ill have to be decided by way o f showing which j
concept o f truth speakers may legitimately be said to possess. Realists and anti-realists j
alike w ill have to argue their case by devising an account o f understanding. Such |
accounts were shown to be constrained by the Manifestability Requirement, viz. the j
Irequirement that knowledge o f meaning be fu lly manifested in abilities to use language. j
This requirement determined the choix des armes: the opponents must show how j
knowledge o f truth conditions can be constituted by a complex o f practical skills. |
However, it was left to the opponents to identify those features o f language use which j
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f i l l  the b ill. The anti-realist's Manifestation Argument could be seen to rest on the idea 
that mastery o f the assertoric use o f sentences is already necessary and sufficient for 
knowledge o f truth conditions. In spelling out a minimalist conception o f objective 
truth, we distinguished truth from warranted assertibility. It turned out though that 
sentences which differ in their truth conditions nonetheless share their conditions o f 
warranted assertibility, and this finding in turn gave rise to a problem for any anti-realist 
who bases her case on the Manifestation Argument. She w ill have to solve this problem 
by way o f conceiving o f the truth conditions o f a sentence as the systematic contribution 
this sentence makes to the warranted assertibility conditions o f all the sentences o f 
which it is a constituent. The next chapter is designed to show that this attempt to 
salvage the Manifestation Argument fails.
Chapter Three
In this chapter I intend to do two things. First I  shall challenge Dummett's suggestion as 
to why truth conditional semantics is forced upon us, and argue instead that the reasons 
why this is so lie elsewhere: contrary to what Dummett suggests, there is no principled 
reason to deny that, on the basis o f the assertoric use o f sentences alone, an assertibilist 
semantics, which takes the notions o f warranted assertibility and deniability as its core 
concepts, can yield a systematic account o f the contribution sentences make to the 
determination o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f complex sentences in which 
they occur— at least to the extent that, for an anti-realist, such an account is feasible on 
that basis. This w ill be argued for by means o f showing first how a radical deflationist 
who opts for an assertibilist semantics can respond to Wright's 'inflationary argument', 
intended to prove that radical deflationism is at odds with our use o f negation; and 
secondly, how an assertibilist can give a pragmatics for the indicative conditional 
which, though not backed up by a fu lly  compositional semantics, cannot be shown to be 
inferior to an account o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f conditionals that is 
based on anti-realist truth— at least i f  the data base includes no more than speakers' 
assertions and denials. Throughout, I w ill proceed by arguing that i f  there is a problem 
assertibilism cannot at present or in principle overcome, there w ill be a corresponding 
problem besetting anti-realist truth conditional semantics: as I suggest, these problems 
rather reveal that the systematicity any account o f warranted assertibility conditions for 
compounds can achieve is limited in principled ways.
Nevertheless, assertibilism w ill be seen to be wrong in that it misconstrues the 
assertoric content we take some o f our sentences to have. That this is so is already 
disclosed by our conception o f what we do when asserting or denying atomic sentences. 
Far from indicating how this conception is manifested however, this observation rather 
suggests that we should look for use-facts other than assertions and denials.
Thus, secondly, I shall argue that once the reasons why assertibilism fails have 
been acknowledged, the realism/anti-realism debate— insofar as it  centres around the 
question o f which concept o f truth should feature as the core concept o f a theory o f 
meaning— has to be seen in a different light: it turns out that the anti-realist's 
Manifestation Argument systematically misconstrues the way in which a grasp o f truth 
conditions is manifested in use, by focusing exclusively on the speakers' practice o f 
reaching verdicts.
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3.1 Assertoric Content and Ingredient Sense
Throughout his writings, Dummett asks us to distinguish between the assertoric content 
o f a sentence and its ingredient sense. ^ According to Dummett, the assertoric content o f 
a sentence is determined by the conditions under which an assertion o f this sentence 
qualifies as warranted and those under which such an assertion does not so qualify, 
hence ought to be withdrawn; the ingredient sense of a sentence, on the other hand, is 
the systematic contribution this sentence makes to the determination o f the assertoric 
content o f complex sentences o f which it is a constituent^
Dummett argues that the ingredient sense o f a sentence is not yet determined by 
the conditions under which an assertion o f this sentence is warranted and those under 
which such an assertion ought to be withheld, hence that assertoric content and 
ingredient sense come apart.^ Rather he contends that we are bound to conceive o f the 
ingredient sense o f a sentence as given by its truth conditions as soon as we attempt to 
explain how the warranted assertibility conditions of a complex sentence depend on the 
semantic features o f its p a rtsH e re  Dummett goes wrong, or so I shall argue. I f  all we 
intend to do is give a systematic account o f the conditions under which assertions o f 
complex sentences are acceptable, and those under which they are not, and i f  this 
account is based on no more than assertoric usage, then, to the extent that systematicity 
can be achieved at all, we can do well without any appeal to the truth conditions o f the 
sentences these complex sentences take as their constituents (sections 3.2 to 3.7).
Nevertheless, the ingredient sense o f a sentence must be taken to be given by its 
truth conditions. This is due to the fact that contrary to what Dummett suggeststhe 
assertoric content o f a sentence must already be seen to be determined by its truth 
conditions (3.8). In other words, given Dummett's conception o f assertoric content, the 
observation that the warranted assertibility conditions o f a complex sentence 
systematically depend on the semantic features o f its constituents w ill not yet force an 
account o f ingredient sense in terms o f truth conditions; and once assertoric content is 
properly conceived o f in terms o f truth conditions, the distinction between assertoric 
content and ingredient sense collapses.
Dummett furthermore argues that in the absence o f complex sentence-forming 
devices, we have no means to distinguish between speech communities who go in for 
asserting what is true and speech communities who go in for asserting what is
1 Dummett [FPL]: 446-47; [LBM ]; 47-50; [SCT]; 188-201.
2 [LBM ]; 48.
7 [LBM ]; 48; [SCT]; 192.
 ^ [SCT]; 192-93. Brandom follows Dummett in this respect; see his [TA]. 
5 [SCT]; 191.
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warranted.6 But i f  Dummett's conception o f assertoric content was correct, then it would 
appear that this alleged indeterminacy would not be resolved by an appeal to the notion 
o f ingredient sense either. How could the fact that embedded sentences must be assigned 
truth conditions have any bearing on what speakers lay claim to when asserting the 
embedding sentences? In particular how can this be so i f  such assignments do no more 
than help determine under which conditions asserting the embedding sentences is 
acceptable, and under which conditions it is not??
This complaint seems illic it though, given the anti-realist's present programme. 
The anti-realist wishes to conceive of the truth conditions o f a non-Moorean sentence as 
conditions whose obtaining guarantees the accessibility o f a state o f information in 
which this sentence can warrantedly be asserted.^ She intends to do so on the basis o f an 
account o f the systematic contribution such a sentence makes to the determination o f the 
warranted assertibility conditions o f complex sentences in which it occurs— such that 
the truth conditions o f these complex sentences can again be conceived of as conditions 
whose obtaining guarantees the availability in principle o f warrants for their assertion. 
What these truth conditions are w ill in turn depend on an account o f the ingredient sense 
o f the complex sentences themselves.^ As the last chapter revealed, the complex 
sentences to be considered must exclude Moorean sentences as well as sentences and 
equivalents thereof which essentially involve Moorean sentences as one o f their 
constituents. ‘ 6
6 [SCT]: 191, 199; cf. as well [FPL]: 451, and the postscript to [T] in [TOE]: 21-22.
? Cf. Williamson [ADC]: 313. After having argued that the ingredient sense o f a sentence is to be given 
in terms o f its truth conditions, Dummett writes: "[t]he adoption of the concept o f truth does not, o f 
course, render that o f justifiability [i.e. warranted assertibility] otiose; but, in an obvious manner, it makes 
the latter dependent on the former: an assertion w ill now be regarded as justifiable [i.e. warrantedly 
assertible] provided the speaker was in a position to know, or had good grounds for believing, that the 
statement asserted was true"; [SCT]: 198. How can this be more than a purely verbal issue, unless 
speakers can be seen to commit themselves to the truth of what they assert rather than merely to its 
warranted assertibility? It would then appear that by asserting a given sentence, a speaker already effects 
a distinction between those conditions under which what she asserts is true and those under which it is 
other than true. Accordingly, the assertoric content o f such a sentence must be understood to be 
determined, not by its conditions o f warranted assertibility, but by its truth conditions. The crucial 
question would then turn out to be whether we can, on the basis o f a speaker's assertoric use alone, arrive 
at the conclusion that she effects this distinction.
8 Dummett [LBM ]: 338. Recall that the warranted assertibility of a given sentence is always relative to a 
state o f information. Hence, it is not inconsistent to hold, on the one hand, that S may be true but fail to 
be at present warrantedly assertible and, on the other, that the truth conditions o f S are conditions whose 
obtaining implies the possibility that S may warrantedly be asserted: to say the latter is to say that i f  S is 
true there is a state o f information relative to which we may recognise that S is true.
^ Dummett has even argued that the dispute about whether conditionals are truth-apt arises because we 
have no use for conditionals with conditionals as antecedents; see [SCT]: 196-97. Cf. as well Edginglon 
[OC]: 280-84.
The second half o f this restriction is necessary because if  "P" is Moorean and "Q" is non-Moorean, 
then "P V Q" w ill not be Moorean; but since "P v Q" w ill be true i f  "P" is true and "Q" is false, "P v Q" 
may be true under conditions under which one cannot know that it is. Thanks to Timothy Williamson for 
drawing my attention to this point.
* * In his discussion o f the principle o f Tertium non datur, Dummett suggests that the correctness o f an 
assertion can be equated with its truth; see his preface to [TOE]; xvii-xviii. In his postscript to [T] in the 
same volume, he first distinguishes between correctness and warranted assertibility and then goes on to 
contrast warranted assertibility with truth, again suggesting that correctness and truth coincide; [TOE]: 
21. In both places, he is commenting on what he said in [T]. However, in [T] he was concerned with the 
distinction between correctness and truth. The postscript contains an acknowledgement o f this tension; he 
writes: "I should maintain that [the] distinction [between correctness and warranted assertibility] also 
derives its significance from the behaviour o f sentences as constituents o f more complex ones. [...] I f  we 
are concerned with an assertoric sentence which cannot appear as a constituent o f a more complex 
sentence, we have no need o f a distinction between cases in which an assertion made by means o f it 
would be warranted and those in which it would be correct"; [TOE]: 21-22. In light o f this remark, it 
becomes clear that according to Dummett, the assertoric content o f a sentence is already determined by 
its conditions o f warranted assertibility.
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However this may be, since it w ill be shown that an account of ingredient sense, i f  based 
on no more than speakers' verdicts, does not force the conclusion that speakers grasp 
truth conditions, the distinction between truth claims and claims as to what is 
warrantedly assertible w ill have to be drawn by other means anyway. I  shall argue that 
Dummett's contention that there would be no reason to draw this distinction, i f  all the 
sentences we use were atomic, rests on a rather limited conception o f how knowledge of 
meaning is manifested in use, which stands in the way o f a proper solution to this |
problem (3.9). j
As I have argued in section (2.3) o f chapter two, it would indeed be mistaken to j
1suggest that, generally, the conditions under which the assertion o f a sentence is i
warranted are the conditions under which this sentence is true, or that the conditions j
under which its assertion ought to be withdrawn coincide with those under which it is |Ifalse. Thus i f  the assertoric content o f a given sentence is taken to be jo in tly  determined 
by the conditions under which its assertion counts as warranted and those under which it 
does not, then the assertoric content o f a sentence cannot in general be taken to be j
determined by the conditions under which it is true and those under which it  is not.* • By |
the same token, i f  Dummett argues that the ingredient sense o f a given sentence consists I
in the systematic contribution this sentence makes to the determination o f the assertoric i
content o f complex sentences in which it occurs, he must not be taken as suggesting that *
the ingredient sense o f a sentence consists in the systematic contribution this sentence j
makes to the determination o f the conditions under which its embeddings qualify as !
true, and those under which they do not. i
What should we make o f the idea that the warranted assertibility conditions o f a - I
complex sentence systematically depend on the semantic features o f its constituent i
sentences? Why should this be so? One way to conceive o f this idea is to suggest that an :
account o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f complex sentences must be fu lly  :
compositional, that is, must yield an algorithm that allows us to determine the warranted j
assertibility conditions o f a complex sentence solely in terms o f the semantic features o f i
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its constituents. *2 Such an account would show mastery o f the warranted assertibility 
conditions o f complex sentences already to flow from knowledge o f the meaning o f 
their constituents. Since the number o f complex sentences we can produce or encounter 
in conversation is indefinitely large, while the vocabulary from which they are 
constructed is most likely to be finite, this would allow us to model our understanding 
o f an indefinite number o f expressions in terms o f our understanding o f a finite number 
o f expressions. And this, it may be suggested, is precisely what we need to do in order 
to explain engagement in assertoric practice as the exercise o f a competence that can be 
acquired in a finite amount o f time.'-"*
An account o f such a kind is likely to be an unattainable ideal however. As we 
shall see in sections (3.4) and (3.5), there are conditions under which a complex 
sentence may be warrantedly assertible, but which are not yet determined by the truth 
conditions o f its constituent sentences in conjunction with their warranted assertibility 
conditions. And although we can make some headway in the attempt to account for such 
cases by appeal to further rules, there is no guarantee that a ll cases o f this kind can be 
catered for by means o f a finite stock o f such rules. It therefore seems that our mastery 
o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f sentences may not just flow  from our 
linguistic competence, but be informed and shaped by our experience.
We could try to keep the influence o f experience out o f the picture, i f  we were 
allowed to isolate semantics from pragmatics and could help ourselves to a truth 
conditional conception o f semantics. For then we would conceive o f what the semantic 
features o f the constituent sentences do determine as the truth conditions o f the 
sentences whose constituents they are; and giving an account o f assertoric content, in 
Dummett's sense o f the term, would no longer be part o f our business as semanticists. 
Indeed a lot o f work has been done in the past, notably by Davidson, to make the 
prospects for a fu lly  compositional account o f truth conditions look brighter than ever.*"* 
But Dummett's quest for a systematic account o f warranted assertibility 
conditions is based on the idea that isolating semantics from pragmatics is illegitimate, 
and that it is only through its pragmatic anchorage that we become entitled to a truth 
conditional conception o f semantics. The following quote reads like a manifesto for 
manifestationism:
[i]t is a natural reaction to regard the requirement [that we incorporate into our theory of 
[meaning] an account o f the tiasis on which we judge the truth-values of our sentences] as 
excessive, as asking the theory o f meaning to take over the functions o f a theory o f
*2 This is suggested by Brandom [TA]: 141-42.
12 Cf. Davidson [TM L]: 3; [TM]: 17; and [SNLj: 55.
•'I Cf. Davidson's accounts of quotation in [Q], o f indirect discourse in [OST], and o f adverbial modifiers 
in [LFA]. Note though that in some logical systems whose semantics is truth conditional, truth 
functionality nonetheless breaks down; see van Fraassen [STF].
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knowledge. I f  we were convinced that we understood in principle how the [meaning] ol a 
sentence determined what we took as being evidence for its truth, and that the problems in 
this area, however intricate, were ones o f detail, then it might be satisfactory to relegate 
them to a different philosophical discipline: but the difficulty is that we have no right to be 
satisfied with this. A conception of meaning— that is, a choice of a central notion for the 
theory o f meaning— is adequate only i f  there exists a general method o f deriving, from the 
meaning o f a sentence as so given, every feature o f its use, that is, everything that must be 
known by a speaker i f  he is to be able to use that sentence correctly; unquestionably, 
among the things that he must know is what counts as a ground for the truth of a sentence.
Most o f us serenely assume that a theory o f meaning in terms of truth-conditions is capable 
o f fu lfilling  this role, without stopping to scrutinize the difficulties o f devising a workable 
theory o f this type. [...] But until we have, for some one choice o f a central notion for the 
theory o f meaning, a convincing outline o f the manner in which every feature of the use of 
a sentence can be given in terms o f its meaning as specified by a recursive stipulation of the 
application to it o f that central notion, we remain unprovided with a firm foundation for a 
claim to know what meaning essentially is.^^
As already indicated, the requirement that the warranted assertibility conditions o f a 
sentence themselves be recursively specified seems excessive. However, this finding 
does not diminish the persuasiveness o f Dummett's demand that, where possible, a 
theory o f meaning— be it based on truth conditions or something else— ought to yield 
an account o f warranted assertibility conditions. The question is: in which sense can 
such an account be systematic?
A  fu lly  compositional, hence recursive account of warranted assertibility 
conditions is too much to be hoped for, even i f  this account makes appeal to the notion 
o f truth . '6 I f  we are asked to give an account o f how the semantic features o f embedded 
sentences contribute to the determination o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f 
their embedding sentences, this should not be conceived o f as the request that we give 
an account that is fu lly  compositional in the sense explained. Even i f  we cannot be 
asked to present the warranted assertibility conditions o f complex sentences as already 
fu lly  determined by the semantic features o f their constituents, we should at least 
present them as being systematically dependent on these features. Here one might be 
tempted to reply: i f  we give up on the idea that engagement in assertoric practice can be 
explained in terms o f a finite body o f knowledge, why should we bother to show that 
there is any such dependence?
The answer relates to the role complex sentences play in our cognitive economy: 
complex sentences feature as premisses o f inferences or are made available as such by 
inferences, deductive or inductive, as whose conclusions they feature. Our inferential
'2 Dummett [W TM /II]: 92-93; cf. as well his [LBM ]: 308. Recall though that, for the purposes o f the 
present enquiry, we should not subscribe to Dummett's highly contentious claim that a "conception of 
meaning— that is, a choice of a central notion for the theory o f meaning— is adequate only i f  there exists 
a general method o f deriving, from the meaning o f a sentence as so given, every feature of its use"; ibid. 
(my emphasis). As argued in the introduction as well as chapter two, we are here merely concerned with 
those features o f use that bear on the representational dimension o f speech.
'6 Contrary to what Brandom suggests; [TA]: 142.
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practice would not be what it is without them. To the same extent however, they could 
not play the role they do unless their warranted assertibility, in conjunction w ith the 
warranted assertibility o f sentences involving some o f their constituents, established the 
warranted assertibility o f yet other sentences. Nor could they do so unless their 
warranted assertibility was in turn established by the warranted assertibility o f sentences 
involving some of their constituents. In order to account for our inferential practice, we 
must accordingly represent linguistic competence as an articulate body o f knowledge 
reflecting the inferential liaisons between complex sentences and those sentences that 
feature as their constituents. Call this for want o f a better name the 
Infet^entialiiy Constraint, or (IC) for short.
I f  Dummett's contention is right— that meeting (IC) forces a distinction between 
assertoric content and ingredient sense— then some sentences that share their conditions 
o f warranted assertibility must nonetheless diverge in the contribution they make to the 
determination o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f complex sentences in which 
they occur. Hence, there must be complex sentences with divergent warranted 
assertibility conditions which can be obtained from one another by substituting 
constituent sentences which shai'e their warranted assertibility conditions. For example:
(c l)  A - ^ B
(c2 ) W (A ) B.
Once we have identified such complex sentences, we must then enquire whether 
Dummett is furthermore right in maintaining that an account o f the warranted 
assertibility conditions o f sentences like (c l) and (c2) cannot meet (IC) unless it assigns 
truth conditions to their constituent sentences.
3.2 Wright's ’Infla tionary’ Argument': An Application
Crispin W right has devised an argument intended to show that truth and warranted 
assertibility record different norms.'? Initially, one may find the idea that truth records a 
norm puzzling because it seems that, i f  at all, truth would have to be an epistemic norm 
and epistemic norms are usually understood as norms compliance with which is 
conducive to preserving or attaining truth. But given the way Wright conceives o f 
norms, it is clear that he argues for no more than that truth is a goal o f enquiry other 
than warranted assertibility. '8 Viewed in this way, his claim that a difference in
I? [TO]: 12-24.
*8 See [TO]: 15-16, and e.specially 19.
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extension between truth and warranted assertibility makes for a difference in the norms 
either records may seem intuitively compelling, for goals differ i f  the conditions under 
which they are reached differ.
However, this claim rests on the further assumption that (objective) truth can be 
shown to be a goal o f enquiry in the first place. Whether truth can be shown to be a goal 
o f enquiry at all w ill depend on whether speakers can be seen to set themselves this 
goal; and whether this is so w ill in turn depend on whether they can be seen to commit 
themselves to the obtaining o f truth conditions where these diverge from conditions o f 
warranted assertibility. Indeed this is what anyone committed to the minimalist 
conception o f objective truth is bound to show: anyone who thinks that there are 
sentences S such that
(01) S may (actually) be true, even i f  S fails to be at present warrantedly assertible
(02) S may (actually) fail to be true, even i f  S is at present warrantedly assertible
is bound to hold that facts about the use o f S determine that speakers conceive o f S as 
being endowed w ith truth conditions that underwrite (O l) and (02). In the end, W right’s 
argument falls short o f redeeming this assumption.
W right presents his argument as an argument against deflationism. Le. the view 
that all that can be said about truth is exhausted by a suitably generalised version o f the 
Disquotational Schema:
(DS) "P" is true P.
A fo rt io r i Wright's argument is directed against radical deflationism according to which 
all instances o f (DS) are partial definitions of truth and hence conceptually necessary 
equivalences.'^ Indeed, as Field has argued, it is hard to see how a genuinely deflationist 
position could fall short o f being radical in this sense.20 For the radical deflationist, the 
following generalised versions o f (DS) are equivalent definitions o f truth:
(1) Va'[x is true ZP(% says that P &  P)]
(2) V a'[a  is true ^  Z P (a  = "P" &  P)].2'
The term "radical deflationism" as well as the characterisation of the position to which it applies are 
taken from Field [D VM ]; cf. as well his [DCT] and [PHTj.
26 See Field [PHT]; passim.
21 Cf. Field [D VM ]: 251-52, 255n., 267n.
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On the other hand, i f  (1) and (2) were taken to be non-equivalent— on the grounds that 
"P" has its syntactic properties essentially but might not have had the truth conditions it 
actually has— then truth would after all be a substantial notion: that "P" has the truth 
conditions it has w ill be contingent on how "P" is being used in relation to what it is 
about (on what else?); and it w ill then merely be a matter o f theoretical objective 
whether that use is explained in terms o f the speakers' knowledge of truth conditions. In 
other words, there can then be no further question as to whether, in asserting "P", 
speakers commit themselves to the obtaining o f conditions that, i f  they did obtain, 
would make "P " true and whose obtaining depends on how matters stand with respect to 
what "P" is about— where its aboutness in turn depends on relations, inter alia causal 
ones, between language users and reality. On such a view, truth can hardly be 
considered as being 'deflated'.?^ Thus, for the sake o f argument, I shall henceforth 
consider radical deflationism as Wright's proper target.
As Dummett has famously argued, deflationists o f this ilk  are bound to deny that 
truth is the core concept o f a theory o f meaning.22 I f  (2) is a definition o f truth, then an 
understanding o f the sentences to which truth can be ascribed must always be 
presupposed: we cannot learn anything about the semantic features o f sentences we do 
not yet understand by being told under which conditions they are true, for that piece o f 
information can only be conveyed by using the sentences in question.^^ By the same 
token, we cannot in turn explain what it  is to understand such sentences in terms o f 
knowledge o f truth conditions— even i f  anyone familiar w ith (DS) w ill have this 
knowledge just in case she understands these sentences— for such knowledge w ill be as 
insubstantial as knowledge that P i f f  P.^  ^ It is therefore natural to conceive o f Wright's 
argument as directed against the view that truth has no role to play in a theory o f 
meaning.26
Let us call assertibilism the view that our minimalist conception o f objective 
truth has no basis in use, in that all that speakers can be said to manifest is their 
knowledge of warranted assertibility conditions. I  do not wish to imply that anyone ever
22 See Field [PHT]. As Field observes, it would therefore be a mistake to characterise Ramsey as a 
deflationist about truth; Field [DCT]: 60-61; cf. Ramsey [FPj: 158-161.
22 See Dummett's preface to [TOE]: xxi; [W TM /II]: 42-43; and [LBM ]: 67-69, 71. Cf. as well Field 
[D VM ]: 249-50, 253-56.
24 Notice that this differs from saying that in order to understand an instance o f (DS) we must be able to 
understand its right-hand side. This is indeed trivial. What is not trivial is that in order to understand a 
truth-ascription we must first come to understand the sentence to which truth is being ascribed. It is this 
feature o f the radical deflationist's account that is in tension with the idea that truth may play a role in 
theories o f meaning; as Dummett puts it, "the meaning-lheory itself must make no appeal to our prior 
understanding o f the object-language; it would not, for example, impair its adequacy as a meaning-theory 
i f  it were translated"; [LBM ]: 68.
22 Indeed, Field considers the hallmark of deflationism to be that truth has no explanatory role to play in 
semantics or the theory o f mind; [DVM ]: 249-52, 255.
26 This is precisely the role a forerunner o f Wright's 'inflationary argument' plays in his [CDM]: 409-25.
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held this view, although much o f what Quine says suggests that he sympathises with 
assertibilism.2? Nor do I myself wish to be understood as endorsing it: it w ill be 
particularly important to keep this in mind since, in this chapter, I shall try to give 
assertibilism the best run for its money. Assertibilism is used here as a mere fo il in order 
to bring out more clearly what a manifestation o f our minimalist conception o f objective 
truth requires. Insofar as the anti-realist shares this conception, she is not an assertibilist. 
In other words, both realists and anti-realists have to prove assertibilism wrong.
In defending her position, the assertibilist exploits principle (A l) :
(A l)  "P" is warrantedly assertible i f f
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible.
This principle, uncontested by her opponent, serves as the central plank o f her theory o f 
meaning.
Assertibilism is radically deflationist. It denies the notion o f truth, hence the 
notion o f sameness o f truth conditions, any role to play in an explanation o f what 
speakers do, or in a specification o f what speakers have to know in order to be able to 
do what they do. Thus i f  Wright's argument is directed against radical deflationists, then 
it is directed against assertibilists.
Wright's anti-deflationist argument proceeds from a combination o f three 
independently plausible assumptions. First he assumes that all instances o f (DS) hold 
good. Secondly he takes it that all sentences to which the truth predicate may be applied 
admit o f significant negation— to the effect that their negations do themselves fall 
w ith in the range o f sentences to which "is true" can significantly be applied. Thirdly he 
regards the negation operator as governed by the following introduction rule:
A ^ B
-A  <-> ~B
From (DS) together with the second assumption, Wright infers (i):
(i) "~P" is true ~P.
Applying the above introduction rule for negation to an instance o f (DS), he infers (ii):
(ii) ~("P" is true) ~P.
2? Combine Quine's slimulus-response-semantics as set out in chapter two o f [WO], with what he has to 
say about truth in [PoLj: 10-13.
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Finally, from (i) and (ii), he infers the Negation Equivalence:
(NE) ~("P" is true) "~P" is true.
W right correctly points out that in (NE) "is warrantedly assertible" cannot be substituted 
for "is true" given there are neutral states o f information in which neither "P" nor "~P" 
is warrantedly assertible, for then the conditional from left to right across (NE) would 
fail. Insofar as the possibility o f such neutral states is genuine, both predicates 
potentially differ in extension.?^
From this W right concludes that truth and warranted assertibility are distinct 
goals o f enquiry. Is this conclusion justified? To reiterate: whether truth can be shown to 
be a goal o f enquiry w ill ultimately depend on whether speakers can be shown to 
commit themselves to the obtaining o f truth conditions where these diverge from 
conditions o f warranted assertibility; and whether this is so would require a theory o f 
meaning to elucidate.?^
28 Whether or not such states o f informational neutrality present a genuine possibility crucially depends 
on the concept o f negation employed. I f  negation was understood as follows:
—iP s  Not: it is warrantedly assertible that P,
then there would be no states in which neither "P" nor its negation was warrantedly assertible. For as we 
have seen, (A l) , (A2) and (A4) hold:
(A l)  "P" is warrantedly assertible i f f
" It is warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible
(A2) "It is warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible if f
it is warrantedly assertible that P
(A4) "It is not warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible if f
it is not warrantedly assertible that P.
I f  we apply the rule
A ^ B
Not: A <-> Not: B
to (A l)  and (A2), then, by the transitivity o f the biconditional, we w ill get:
(A4*) "-iP" is warrantedly assertible if f
"P" is not warrantedly assertible.
Cf. Shapiro/Taschek [IPC]: 79-80. However, I shall assume that we can discern a negation operator that 
leaves room for states o f (present) informational neutrality.
29 Wright seems to suggest that in order to show that truth is a goal of enquiry, it is sufficient to point out 
that truth and warranted assertibility coincide in what he terms positive normative force; see [TO]: 18. 
But given the Disquotational Schema for truth, this comes down to pointing out that (A l)  holds; and (A l ) 
itself does nothing to establish that in asserting a given sentence, speakers commit themselves to more 
than that those conditions do obtain under which that sentence is warrantedly assertible. Indeed, i f  
Wright's suggestion were apt, then appearances notwithstanding, ".v is an electron" and 
"x is a negatively charged subatomic particle" would turn out to be normatively charged predicates— be it 
in virtue o f the fact that their applications are co-asseriible or the fact that these applications are assertible 
just in case applications o f "it is warrantedly assertible that .v is an electron" are. O f course, there is a
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We have already seen that the position attacked by Wright gives rise to a theory o f 
meaning that leaves no room for the idea that speakers commit themselves to the 
obtaining o f truth conditions where these do not coincide with conditions o f warranted 
assertibility. For i f  they did, truth would after all play a crucial role in an account o f 
understanding— and this was already ruled out by radical deflationism. Indeed, (NE) has 
been exempted from playing any part in such an account to the same extent to which 
(DS) has. Accordingly, the assertibilist w ill have to accommodate the fact that "is true" 
cannot be substituted for by "is warrantedly assertible" in contexts o f negation— and 
hence that it is not the case that "~P" is warrantedly assertible i f  "P" is not— and this in 
such a way that Wright's conclusion w ill not follow.
The assertibilist who endorses (DS) w ill indeed have to concede that 
"~("P" is true)" and "~P" share their conditions o f warranted assertibility, while these 
conditions do not coincide with the conditions under which "P" and ""P" is true" fail to 
be warrantedly assertible.20 she cannot however just confine herself to saying this much 
and appeal to (A l)  in order to specify the content of "~P". In truth conditional 
semantics, (NE) is taken to yield a compositional account o f negation in that'it explains, 
for any sentence S, what the truth conditions o f the negation o f S are. In an assertibilist 
semantics however, (NE) cannot be put to this use.2' But given (IC), an account o f 
negation is nonetheless needed in order for it to be made explicit how the warranted 
assertibility conditions o f negated sentences depend on the warranted assertibility 
conditions o f the sentences negated. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the assertibilist to 
give a semantics for negation that reflects this dependency. Dummett and Wright both
sense in which any predicate has a normative dimension in that there are conditions under which it is 
correctly applied. The assertibilist can agree that in this sense the truth predicate has a normative 
dimension as well. But as long as nothing is being said about the distinctive way in which the application 
o f a given predicate— be it the truth predicate itself—can qualify as true, the finding that applications of 
"is true" to an arbitrary sentence "P" and applications o f "is warrantedly assertible" to that same sentence 
share their conditions of warranted assertibility— as (A l)  contends— does nothing to vindicate the claim 
that the use o f this sentence or, for that matter, the use o f the truth predicate is governed by a distinct 
norm o f truth— in particular, since it has not been shown that "is not true" is invested with normative 
features that would allow us to infer the existence o f a single norm associated with both predicates,
26 Notice that the conditional from left to right across (NE) takes us from the correctness conditions o f an 
application of "-(— is true)" to the sentence "P" to the correctness conditions of an application of 
"— is true" to the sentence "~P". I f  the latter are determined according to whether or not "”~P" is true" 
qualifies as warrantedly assertible, then all Wright has shown is that "~("P" is true)" and 
"~("P" is warrantedly assertible)" do not share their conditions of warranted assertibility. Rather, (NE) 
ensures that the warranted assertibility conditions o f "~("P" is true)" coincide with those o f ""~P" is true". 
A notion of correctness distinct from warranted assertibility need not be invoked in order to say this much 
though.
2' See Price [SAD]: 162-6.3.
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seem to think that the assertibilist is bound to fail: they contend that our use o f negation 
reveals that we take the sentences in our repertoire as being endowed with objective 
truth conditions.22 As I shall argue in the next section, however, both Dummett and 
W right are wrong.
3.3 An Assertib ilis t Account o f  Negation
Let us distinguish between the refusal to assert a given sentence and the readiness to 
deny this sentence— or rather, between such refusals to assert a given sentence which 
are and those which are not accompanied by the readiness to deny it. Either attitude has 
its distinctive behavioural manifestations. A  refusal to assert "P" that is accompanied by 
one's willingness to deny it may be displayed by way o f shaking one's head i f  
confronted with the question "P?" On the other hand, a refusal to assert a sentence "P" 
that is not accompanied by the willingness to deny it may be displayed by way o f 
shrugging one's shoulders when confronted w ith the question "P?" Both responses are to 
be conceived o f as being answerable to quests for justification. In other words, no matter 
which response a speaker shows, she w ill be held responsible for displaying her 
entitlement to this response. In this sense, denials have to be warranted in order to be 
acceptable to the same extent assertions do. There is no reason why the assertibilist 
should be debarred from availing herself o f the notion o f warranted deniability .22
22 In an earlier paper, Wright also contends that a compositional account o f negation mandates the 
transition from a purely assertibilist semantics to a truth conditional semantics; [CDM]: 409-18. The fact 
that Wright construes truth in terms o f superassertibility— in effect, an assertibilist simulacrum o f truth—  
ought not to mislead us into thinking that this transition does not, in Dummett's phrase, involve a major 
"conceptual leap" ([SCT]: 200-201). After all, the existential quantification involved in the notion o f 
superassertibility is timeless.
22 See Price [SAD]: 169; and Williamson [ADC]: 307-308. Indeed, Wright himself seems to leave room 
for this when he distinguishes positive from negative norms; he writes: "[...] negative descriptive norms 
would be characteristics such that participants in a practice treat a move's having such a characteristic as a 
reason for avoiding, condemning, discouraging or prohibiting it"; [TO]: 15. Unfortunately however, he 
does not make anything out of this idea.
In conversation, John Skorupski has put the following objection to me: in order to be able to conceive 
o f what one does as denying something, one must be able to conceive o f what one denies as not being the 
case— where its not being the case does not reduce to its not being warrantedly assertible. Therefore, 
mastery o f the practice of denial requires grasp of objective truth conditions. I f  this objection were 
cogent, then the notion of denial would prove far too inflated to be available to the assertibilist. Even so, 
the assertibilist's opponent w ill have to agree that there is a kind o f behaviour characteristic of denials in 
order to give substance to her recursive clause for negation, i.e. (NE); and the assertibilist is free to refer 
to this behaviour in terms of what her opponent would call an expression o f denial.
In his [M U V]: 47, Skorupski himself invokes the notion o f denial in order to explain negation, but 
then goes on to treat denial just like negation, viz. as an operator rather than an attitude. It is for this 
reason that I cannot quite see how his assertibilist account o f negation can get o ff the ground.
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W ith these considerations in place, the assertibilist may define negation in terms of the 
following two clauses:
(N l)  "-P " is warrantedly assertible i f f  "P" is warrantedly deniable
(N2) "~P" is warrantedly deniable i f f  "P" is warrantedly assertible.^^
Indeed, this account o f negation is perfectly in line with the idea that all that speakers 
can be said to communicate is that those conditions do obtain under which a given 
sentence is warrantedly assertible: i f  a speaker asserts "~P", she claims that those 
conditions do obtain under which "~P" is warrantedly assertible; and i f  she denies "~P", 
she claims that those conditions do obtain under which "P" is warrantedly assertible.^^
Once she has learnt how to use "~P" in these ways, the speaker w ill be able to 
introduce a truth predicate into her language which satisfies both (DS) and (NE):
(T l)  ""P" is true" is warrantedly assertible i f f  "P" is warrantedly assertible
(T2) ""P" is true" is warrantedly deniable i f f  "P" is wairantedly deniable.^*^
34 Price [SAD]: 167.
35 Here we must distinguish between what someone has to learn in order to become able to communicate 
by means o f negated sentences, and what it is she communicates by these means once she is so able. The 
idea that mastery o f negation requires mastery o f deniability conditions is not in tension with the idea that 
what one conveys by means o f negated sentences are their warranted assertibility conditions.
3  ^ Rumfitt who too invokes the notion o f warranted deniability in order to salvage deflationism from 
Wright's argument contends that just as applications of "is true" can be replaced by applications of 
"is warrantedly assertible", applications o f "is not true" can be replaced by applications o f 
"is warrantedly deniable"; see his [TW], This suggestion has prompted the following objection by Wright 
[TDRj. I f  we apply the rule
A <-> B
~A <-> ~B
to (NE), then we get;
"P" is not not true w  "~P" is not true.
I f  we now replace "is not true" by "is warrantedly deniable", then this yields;
"P" is not warrantedly deniable <-> "~P" is warrantedly deniable.
Again, the conditional from left to right across this biconditional fails in neutral states o f information.
This objection is seen to be misplaced though once we realise that, contrary to what Rumfitt suggests, 
it is not part o f the assertibilist account o f negation that "is not true" can be replaced by 
"is warrantedly deniable" in contexts of negation—just as it is not part o f this account that "is true" can be 
replaced by "is warrantedly assertible" in such contexts. As a deflationist, the assertibilist claims that 
applications o f the truth-predicale play no role in semantic theory. As an assertibilist, she claims that 
these applications can nonetheless receive their proper interpretation in terms o f conditions o f warranted 
assertibility and deniability alone. More on the difference between object language and semantic theory 
in section (3.7) below.
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(T l)  and (T2) in conjunction w ith (N l)  and (N2) yield;
(T3) ""~ P " is true" is warrantedly assertible i f f
" '("P" is true)" is warrantedly assertible
(T4) ” "~ P " is true" is warrantedly deniable i f f
"~("P" is true)" is warrantedly deniable.
We may say that (T3) and (T4) together constitute the assertibilist's version o f the 
Negation Equivalence. From the assertibilist’s standpoint, Wright's argument has been 
blocked: it has proved to rest on the unargued-for assumption that (DS) and (NE) can be 
conceived o f as statements o f semantic theory, rather than the object language^?
It is as much part o f our minimalist conception o f objective truth that there are 
sentences "P" and "~P" such that (03) and (04) hold:
(03) "-P " may (actually) be true, even i f  "P" is at present warrantedly assertible
(and "P" a fo rtio ri fails to be at present warrantedly deniable)
(04) "~P" may (actually) fa il to be true, even i f  "P" is at present warrantedly deniable
(and "P" a fo rtio r i fails to be at present warrantedly assertible).
Still, even for a truth conditional semanticist, (N l)  and (N2) may be fairly 
unobjectionable.38 Indeed, insofar as theories o f meaning have to give a systematic 
account o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f negated sentences, the truth 
conditional semanticist w ill have to invoke something akin to (N l)  and (N2) alongside 
(NE). I f  she nonetheless objects to the assertibilist's treatment o f negation, the truth 
conditional semanticist w ill accordingly have to find some fault with the idea that (N l)  
and (N2) capture all semantic features o f negation. But the additional features she has in 
mind w ill not then consist in the warranted assertibility conditions o f negated sentences.
(N l)  and (N2) explain the use o f sentences whose principle operator is negation. 
Negated sentences occur as constituents o f more complex sentences however, e.g, as 
antecedents o f conditionals; and just as asserting a conditional does not involve 
asserting its antecedent, asserting a conditional whose antecedent is governed by 
negation does not involve the denial o f the sentence negated in the antecedent.3^ 
Whether the assertibilist has captured all the semantic features o f negation relevant to
37 See section (3.7) below.
38 The assertibilist's account o f negation, as given by (N l)  and (N2), is o f course at odds with 
intuilionism as Berger rightly points out; [QAL]: 275; cf. as well. Price [SAD]: 167-68.
39 Cf. Frege [IL ]: 185; Brandom [PPT]: 83-85.
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assertoric practice w ill therefore depend on whether she can, on the basis of (N l)  and 
(N2) alone, explain the role negated sentences play when embedded in more complex 
sentences. To explore whether the assertibilist can give an account o f a ll complex 
sentence-forming devices is no doubt beyond the scope o f this essay.40 It w ill be 
instructive, though, to see how the assertibilist might handle conditionals, for 
notoriously here she is said to fail.4>
3A  An Assertib ilis t Account o f  Conditionals
Dummett argued that in our attempt to give an account o f how the assertoric content o f 
complex sentences is being determined, we are forced to conclude that there are 
sentences that otherwise share their assertoric content but nonetheless differ in their role 
as constituents o f other sentences; it was his further contention that we are thereby 
bound to assign truth conditions to these sentences. According to Dummett, there w ill 
be sentences A  and B such that the following four conditionals differ in assertoric
content:
(c l) A - ^ B
(c2 ) W (A ) B
(c3) B ^  A
(c4) B ^  W (A).
Granted that this is so, the assertibilist w ill not only have to explain how the warranted 
assertibility conditions o f conditionals depend on the warranted assertibility conditions 
o f their constituents, but must furthermore show how, with this account being in place, 
the warranted assertibility conditions o f (c l)  and (c2), and o f (c3) and (c4), might 
diverge.
I f  the warranted assertibility o f the conditional A  B was assessed according to 
the warranted assertibility o f the material conditional A  =) B, then it  would seem, at first 
sight, that the assertibilist could simply appeal to Kleene's table for the conditional with 
the values true, false and indeterminate replaced by the values yes (warrantedly
40 In particular, I w ill not address the question o f how the assertibilist might account for propositional 
attitude locutions. For an assertibilist treatment o f tense, see Wright [CDMj: 404-409.
4> Cf. Dummett [SCT]: 195-96.
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assertible), no (warrantedly deniable) and undecided (neither warrantedly assertible nor 
warrantedly deniable), respectively: 42
B A - ^ B
A  y II n
y y u n
u y u u
» y
However, even i f  the warranted assertibility conditions o f indicative conditionals 
matched those o f the material conditional, Kleene’s table would not yet do, for clearly i f  
A  and B are identical, A  z> B should not receive the value undecided i f  A  and B do.
But there is good reason to believe that the warranted assertibility conditions o f 
the indicative conditional A  —> B do not match those o f the material conditional A  Z) B  
anyway, for as has been noted in the literature, the warranted deniability o f A  alone w ill 
not, in general, suffice for the warranted assertibility o f A  —> B: on the contrary, 
asserting A  B solely on the grounds that A  must be denied would violate norms
governing assertoric practice.
To this it might be objected that we should not conflate conversational 
appropriateness with warranted assertibility which is, after all, an epistemological 
notion. However, the reasons for this way o f distinguishing the indicative conditional 
from the material conditional are not merely a matter o f conversational appropriateness, 
but o f epistemic rationality: in the context o f rational enquiry, to assert a conditional 
typically is not only to present oneself as being in possession o f evidence for asserting 
it, but as offering this evidence for borrowing when the conditional is summoned for use 
as a premiss in inferences, o f which modus ponens and modus tollens are the most 
prominent exam ples .43  Asserting a conditional simply on the ground that its antecedent 
ought to be denied is to undermine this epistemic division o f labour and thus more than 
just a conversational misdeed. In what follows, I shall assume that this view o f the 
matter is correct and offer some further considerations to support it.
W hile Jackson has maintained that A  —> B nonetheless shares its truth conditions 
w ith A  Z) B, Edgington has argued that A  B has no truth conditions at a l l .44 For 
present purposes though, it does not matter who is right in this respect. A ll that matters 
is whether any systematic account o f the assertibility and deniability conditions o f 
A  B must regard A  and B as being endowed with objective truth conditions; and both
42 Cf. Kleene [IM ]: § 64.
43 Cf. Jackson [PPAj: 29-31.
44 Jackson [A IC ]; Edgington [DCH] and [OCj.
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Jackson and Edgington would seem to take this for granted. Jackson and Edgington both 
appeal to conditional probabilities: according to them, A  —> B is assertible only i f  
P(B/A) is high. Conditional probabilities are a tricky business for the assertibilist, 
because it is not clear whether a speaker can be said to calculate these probabilities 
without grasp o f the concept o f objective truth. Nor is it clear, however, whether a 
speaker's probability assignments can already be discerned from his assertoric use o f 
sentences alone.45 In any case, the assertibilist w ill have to show that an account o f the 
assertibility and deniability conditions o f A  —> B is possible without ascribing objective 
truth conditions to either A  or B.
It is agreed on all sides that A  B w ill have to be denied, i f  A  receives the 
value yes and B receives the value no. It should likewise be regarded as uncontroversial 
that A  B w ill be undecided, i f  either A  receives the value yes and B receives the 
value undecided, or A  receives the value undecided and B receives the value no\ for to 
deny A  —» B, rather than merely to refuse asserting it, is, on almost all views, to assert 
A  &  ~B; and how can one be in a position to assert this conjunction i f  either A  or B is 
undecided? Thus, corresponding to (1) to (3), we have (T) to (3') respectively:
(1) y(A), «(B)
(2) y(A), «(B)
(3) «(A), «(B)
( ! ') y(A), «(B); ergo «(A —> B)
(23 y(A), «(B); ergo «(A B)
(33 «(A), «(B); ergo «(A —> B).46
While Jackson rejects the idea that the deniability o f the antecedent is sufficient for the 
assertibility o f the conditional, he still holds that in some cases the assertibility o f B is
45 Although Edgington has argued that conditionals do not have truth conditions, she nonetheless 
considers their antecedents as having truth conditions; [DCH]: 200-201. Her analysis o f conditionals in 
terms o f conditional probabilities cannot get o ff the ground, however, unless we consider the use that is 
made o f sentences in the context o f assumptions (suppositions); [DCH]: 177-78, 200.1 shall return to this 
issue towards the end o f section (3.5). We would accordingly have to abandon some o f the premisses on 
which the Manifestation Argument rests. Indeed, it w ill be essential to the account suggested in chapter 
four and developed in chapter five that speakers' knowledge o f truth conditions is inter a lia  manifested in 
their practice of making assumptions. Assertibilism runs into difficulties when it comes to explaining this 
practice.
4<^ Here "ergo" indicates a warrant-preserving inference.
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sufficient for the assertibility o f A  B. Such cases are highlighted by the use o f 
ordinary language constructions like "Even i f — , still ..."A  Here the assertibility o f the 
conditional solely rests on the assertibility o f the consequent; and it  is suggested that 
whichever value the antecedent receives has no bearing at all on the assertibility o f the 
consequent. O f course, not all cases in which A  —> B is assertible w ill be o f this kind.
In what follows, I shall accordingly distinguish between cases in which A  B 
owes its assertibility exclusively to the assertibility o f B, and cases in which it does not. 
The possible assignments o f values to A  and B which we still have to consider, are the
following:
(4) «(A), y(B)
(5) «(A), y(B)
(6) y(A), y(B)
(7) «(A), w(B)
(8) «(A), «(B)
(9) «(A), «(B).
The only cases in which the assertibility o f A  —> B may solely rest on the assertibility 
o f B are (4), (5) and (6). Consider assignments (4) and (5) first. Insofar as 
"Even i f — , still ..." has application, the warrants available for B w ill be such that they 
warrant the following claim:
(R l)  even i f  A  were to become warrantedly assertible,
B would remain warrantedly assertible.48
47 Jackson [AIC]; 578.
48 There are conditionals whose assertibility solely depends on the assertibility o f their consequents 
although the relevant instances o f (R l) are not assertible. For example, the conditional 
"Even i f  Richard I II  was innocent, we shall never know that he was" may be assertible because it is 
warrantedly assertible that all the relevant historical evidence has been destroyed; yet, it w ill not be 
warrantedly assertible on these grounds that i f  unexpected evidence for King Richard's innocence became 
available, there would still be reason to believe that we shall never know that he was innocent. (I owe this 
nice example to Timothy Williamson.)
But recall that we have explicitly excluded from our present discussion all Moorean sentences as well 
as all compounds and equivalents thereof that essentially involve a Moorean sentence as one of their 
constituents; see section (3,1). Otherwise, the anti-realist programme of explaining the truth conditions of 
Moorean sentences in terms of the truth conditions o f their constituents, and o f explaining the latter in 
terms o f their systematic contribution to the assertibility conditions o f compounds in which they occur.
As Jackson has pointed out, asserting A  —> B under these circumstances is not to put it 
forward for use in a modus tollens step— quite the contrary.49 For i f  the assertibility o f A  
is taken to have no bearing on the assertibility o f B, then i f  B were to become deniable, 
the conclusion that A  was deniable too would so far be unjustified. Insofar as the 
warranted assertion o f conditionals is typically understood as issuing the license to use 
these conditionals in inferences, it is indeed mandated to indicate i f  one's assertion is not 
to be understood in this way, e.g. by using "Even i f — , s t i l l ...".
Insofar as (6) obtains and A  —> B owes its assertibility exclusively to the 
assertibility o f B, the warrants for B should be such as to warrant (R2):
(R2) even i f  A  were to become other than wairantedly assertible,
B would remain warrantedly assertible.
Asserting A  —> B under these circumstances cannot be regarded as putting it forward for 
use in a modus ponens step: the verdict that B is assertible w ill not be aiiived at by first 
determining that A  is assertible and then deriving B from both A  and A  B, as the 
assertibility o f A  —> B is established on the basis o f one’s recognition o f the assertibility 
o f B in the first place. Again, this should be highlighted {e.g. by the use o f 
" I f — , anyway ..." or by furthermore asserting ~A -> B).
From this we may conclude that insofar as the warrants for B already suffice for 
the warranted assertibility o f A  —> B, these warrants are o f such a kind that they are 
taken to be available no matter whether it is (4) or (5) or (6) that obtains.
W ith (R l)  and (R2) being in place, we get:
(4') «(A), y(B), y (R l); ergo y(A ->  B)
(5') «(A), y(B), y (R l); ergo y(A  B)
(6') y(A), y(B), y(R2); ergo y(A B).
The assertibilist has still to explain what it  is for (R l) or (R2) to be warranted however. 
(Notice that (R l)  and (R2) need not be warrantedly assertible come what may.) It is 
important to note though, that even theorists like Jackson and Edgington owe us an 
account o f when P(B/A) is high: i f  conditional probabilities are to tell us anything about
could not get o ff the ground. The conditional in question w ill, however, be true i f  the Moorean sentence 
"Richard II I  was innocent and we shall never know that he was" is true; hence we can and should ignore 
it.
49 Jackson [A IC ]: 578.
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the warranted assertibility conditions o f A  —> B, then the value for P(B/A) cannot solely 
be a matter o f the subjective probability assignments o f individual speakers. Instead, j
there must be reasons why a subject ought to ascribe this rather than that conditional I
probability to B given A.^o j
IBefore addressing the question o f how (R l)  and (R2) may be warranted, let us |
consider those cases in which the assertibility o f A —> B is not due to the assertibility o f |
B (alone). Consider (7) first. Le. the case where both A and B are undecided. I f  both A i
and B are undecided, the warrants for A —> B w ill be available independently from the |
warrantedness o f A and ought not to be lost i f  A were to become warrantedly assertible |
— provided, o f course, there would then be no independent reasons for denying the {
warranted assertibility o f B. Otherwise either (T) or (2') would apply and A —> B would |
cease to be warrantedly assertible. A t the same time, i f  both A and B are undecided, the Î
warrants for A —> B w ill be available independently from the deniability o f B and ought ;
to be regarded as not being lost i f  B were to become warrantedly deniable— provided, 
that is, A would not then fail to be deniable on independent grounds. Otherwise either j
(1') or (3') would apply and A —> B would cease to be warrantedly assertible anyway. I
Thus, i f  both A and B are undecided, A —> B w ill nonetheless be assertible i f  there are I
warrants for both (R3) and (R4): i
(R3) i f  A  were to become warrantedly assertible, j
then B would become warrantedly assertible, too i
I
1(R4) i f  B were to become warrantedly deniable, j
then A  would become warrantedly deniable, too. i
I
However, Timothy Williamson has suggested to me the following example that seems !
to show that both A  and B may be undecided and (R3) and (R4) may be assertible while j
A  —> B nonetheless fails to be assertible: consider two historical documents whose i
pedigree is presently in doubt; the first document states that two otherwise unconnected |
historical claims A  and B are true; the second document states that both A  and B are j
false. Suppose that we are about to subject both documents to a scientific test that w ill ]
settle whether they are forgeries. Williamson suggests that our present state o f '
information warrants both that i f  A  would become assertible so would B and that i f  B j
Iwould become deniable so would A. S till, it would seem that the conditional A  B is j
not assertible, as ex hypothesi both A  and B relate to independent states o f affairs. i
50 Contrary to what is suggested by Lewis [PCPJ: 133, subjective probabilities are too dependent on the 
subject; cf. Williamson [V]: 221.1 shall come back to this issue in section (3.5).
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On the face o f it, this case seems to present an obvious counter-example to what has 
been said above. It is not clear, though, whether in cases like the one described, A  —> B 
indeed fails to be assertible— at least, this is unclear as long as anti-realism has the 
chance o f being correct. In this respect, it is important to recall that, for the purposes o f 
this chapter, we should not rest our case against assertibilism on a rejection o f anti­
realism: since we are presently concerned with the question o f whether the anti-realist 
can substantiate her claim that knowledge o f objective truth conditions already surfaces 
in the assertoric use o f conditionals— in the sense that the former is indispensable for a 
systematic explanation of the latter— it w ill suffice for rejecting this claim i f  we can 
establish a parity between assertibilism and anti-realism. For strategic purposes, we 
should therefore set aside any genuinely realist intuitions an assertibilist account o f the 
conditional might violate.
Thus suppose that we know that one o f the documents is genuine but do not 
know which. For example, we may be in possession o f a third document whose 
reliability is not in doubt and which reports no more than that the first two documents 
have been subjected to the very same scientific test before and that this procedure 
decided between them. Then we have a reason both to assert - (A  &  B) —> ~A &  ~B and 
to assert ~(~A &  ~B) A  &  B, hence a reason to assert (A &  B) v (~A &  -B ). But this 
reason should be enough to warrant the assertion o f A  B, contrary to what has been 
assumed. Thus suppose instead that we have no reason to believe that one o f the 
documents is genuine. Now, unless we have reason to believe that the only warrant for 
or against A  and B that we may come across w ill consist in a confirmation o f the 
genuineness o f one o f the documents, we seem to lack any reason to assert (R3) or (R4): 
A  may become warranted independently from B; and -B  may become warranted 
independently from -A . After all, A  and B are supposed to lack any internal connections 
other than those established by the two documents; and ex hypothesi we have no reason 
to believe that the scientific test to which these documents are about to be subjected w ill 
yield any positive result. Ex hypothesi though, we have a reason for asserting (R3) and 
(R4). But i f  we have a reason to believe that the only way in which we might come in a 
position to know B is by coming to know A, and that the only way in which we might 
come in a position to know -A  is by coming to know ~B, then, at least from an anti­
realist perspective, we should not fall short o f having a reason, however defeasible, to 
assert A  —> B or, for that matter, to consider P(B/A) as high. Accordingly, it is not clear 
whether, in the presence of anti-realism, Williamson's alleged counter-example does not 
destabilise.
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For the sake o f argument, we may therefore conclude that i f  A  and B are undecided and 
(R3) and (R4) are assertible, so is A  —> B. Thus, we get:
(73 «(A), «(B), y(R3), y(R4); ergo y(A  B).
The warrants for A  —> B are available although both A  and B are undecided, not 
because A  and B are undecided: otherwise A  —> B cannot be understood as being 
offered as a premiss for future modus ponens or modus tollens steps; and it is the 
raison d'etre o f conditionals in our language that we may use them in inferences o f 
these kinds.5> Accordingly, the warrants for A  B should be available no matter which 
case out o f (6), (7) or (8) it is that obtains. On the other hand, it is already clear from 
(F), (2') and (33 that these warrants w ill not be available in cases (1), (2) and (3). But i f  
these warrants are available although A  and B are undecided, then as long (1) to (3) do 
not obtain, they should also be available no matter which case out o f (4) to (9) it  is that 
obtains: in order for A  —> B to be available as a premiss for inferences, it  must be taken 
to be warranted independently both from the warrants that may become available for A  
and those which may become available for ~B; and since neither in (4) nor in (5) nor in 
(9) such warrants for A  B w ill already be refuted, they should survive changes in 
informational state that take us from (6), (7) or (8) to (4), (5) or (9).
Next consider (8), i.e. the case where both A  and B are deniable. I f  Jackson's 
diagnosis is right that a conditional w ill not yet be assertible i f  its antecedent is deniable, 
then in case (8), the assertibility o f A  —> B w ill not just rest on the deniability o f A. 
Instead, we may suggest that the assertibility o f A  -> B is due to the fact that both A  and 
B are deniable. But this is not satisfactory either. For why should we not then say that in 
case (5), the assertibility o f A  B is due to the fact that A  is deniable and B is 
assertible? What we should rather claim is that A  —> B is assertible insofar as it is 
assertible that the assignments o f values to A  and B are systematically linked, and this 
again in such a way that (1) to (3) are ruled out. Thus, in case (8), we should again add 
that there have to be warrants for (R3) and (R4). Therefore:
(83 «(A), «(B), y(R3), y(R4); ergo y(A B).52
51 Jackson stresses the utility ot modus ponens, but underrates the utility oi' modus tollens', [AIC]; 577-78, 
578n. Once those cases in which the assertibility o f the conditional is solely due to the assertibility o f the 
consequent ("Even i f  P, still Q") are distinguished from those in which it is not, the failure o f 
modus tollens in cases o f the first kind {vide Jackson's example) ought not to lead us to underrate its 
utility in cases o f the second kind.
52 Strictly speaking, v(R4) already follows from n{A) and /i(B). We should therefore rephrase (R4) 
throughout as follows:
(R4*) i f  B were to become or remain warrantedly deniable,
then A would become or remain warrantedly deniable, too.
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Again, (8') seems to be threatened by a variation o f Williamson's example: this time, the 
second historical document is supposed to seem genuine. But again, either there w ill be 
a reason both to assert ~(A &  B) ~A &  ~B and to assert ~(~A &  ~B) —> A  &  B; or 
the assumption that (R3) is warranted w ill be hostage to the idea that there is a reason to 
believe that the only way in which A  may become warranted is by B becoming 
warranted too, viz. by the first document proving to be genuine after all. I f  there are 
reasons o f either kind however, then, at least for the anti-realist, there is a reason to 
assert A  —> B For the sake o f argument, (8') may therefore be considered as in good 
standing.
The warrants for A  B are again taken to be available no matter which case out 
o f (4) to (9) it is that obtains. By the same token, it  is suggested that A  —> B may now be 
used in a modus tollens step because the warrants for A  —> B are considered to be such 
as to have been available before B became warrantedly deniable.
Next consider (9), i.e. where A  is deniable and B is undecided. Just as in case
(8), the assertibility of A  B w ill not solely be due to the deniability o f A , nor w ill it 
be due to the fact that A  is deniable and B is undecided: rather it w ill be due to the 
systematic link between assignments o f values to A  and B which rule out (1) to (3). This 
means that there are warrants to believe that even i f  A  were to become warrantedly 
assertible, A  —> B would remain to be so— provided, that is, B would not then fail to be 
warrantedly assertible. Otherwise either ( ! ')  or (2‘) would apply; and A  B would 
cease to be warrantedly assertible anyway. By the same token, there w ill be warrants to 
believe that even i f  B were to become deniable, A  —> B would remain assertible—  
provided, that is, A  would then be deniable too. Otherwise, either (1’) or (3') would 
apply; and A  —> B would cease to be assertible. Thus:
(9') «(A), «(B), j(R3), y(R4); ergo y(A B).
Again, A  B is taken to be assertible on the basis o f warrants which are considered to 
be available no matter which case out o f (4) to (9) it is that obtains. What goes for (7) to
(9) goes for (4) to (6):
(4") «(A), y(B), y(R3), y(R4); ergo y(A ->  B)
(5") «(A), y(B), y(R3), y(R4); ergo y(A  B)
(6") y(A), y(B), y(R3), y(R4); ergo y(A B).53
53 Strictly speaking, y(R3) already follows from y(A) and y(B). Again, we should replace (R3) by (R3*) 
throughout so as to avoid trivialisation:
8 6
In contrast to (6'), the applicability o f (6") w ill be such as to allow for the use o f A  —> B 
in a modus ponens step.
As before, the question arises o f what it is for (R3) and (R4) to be warranted. Yet 
here we have at least a rough idea o f what an answer might look like. Sometimes 
conditionals inherit their warrants inferentially, where these warrants are available no 
matter which values antecedent and consequent take as long as they do not take the 
values assigned in (1), (2) or (3).54
Once we have explained what such inferential warrants may consist in, we are in 
a position to account for the warrantedness o f (R l) and (R2) in terms o f the absence o f 
such inferential warrants for any o f the following conditionals:
A  —> —B B —> A
W (A) -A ~B W (B) A
A ~W(B) B W (A)
W (A) -> ~W(B) W (B) -A W(A).55
Before I shall discuss what such inferential warrants may be, let us briefly pause so as to 
reflect on how the assertibilist may prove able to account for the difference in 
assertibility and deniability conditions between instances o f (c l)  and (c2), and between 
instances of (c3) and (c4), respectively:
(c l)  A - a B
(c2) W (A) B
(c3) B A
(c4) B ^  W (A).
(R3*) i f  A were to become or remain warrantedly assertible,
then B would become or remain warrantedly assertible, too.
54 Price points to the related difficulty of accounting for the deniability conditions o f conjunctions and 
the assertibility conditions of disjunctions, when he writes; "there may be inferential grounds for asserting 
'S or T' (or denying 'S and T'), which are not grounds for asserting either 'S' or 'T' (or denying either 'S' or 
'T')"; [SAD]; 168-69.
55 Recall that the absence of reasons for a claim constitutes a reason for the claim that there are no such 
reasons. For, (A4) holds;
(A4) "It is not warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible if f  
it is not warrantedly assertible that P.
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The differences w ill most clearly emerge i f  we restrict attention to those cases in which 
A receives the value undecided and W (A) accordingly receives the value no. Instances 
o f (c3) and (c4) w ill differ i f  B receives the value yes\ B —> A  w ill then be undecided 
while B —> W (A ) w ill be deniable. I f  both B and A  are undecided, B W (A ) w ill be Îundecided too, whereas B A  may be assertible. In the same vein: i f  B is deniable and j
A  is undecided, instances o f (c l)  w ill be undecided, whereas instances o f (c2) may not 1
be. Whether the assertibility conditions o f instances o f (c l)  and (c2) and instances o f j
(c3) and (c4) differ in all other cases, w ill accordingly depend on whether there are |
inferential warrants for W (A ) B whenever there are inferential warrants for A  B, jIand whether there are such warrants for B W (A) whenever there ai'e such warrants i#for B —> A. In the remainder o f this section and towards the end o f the next I  shall argue I
that this w ill not in general be the case. I
Since the following rules o f inference are warrant-preserving, the assertibilist j
w ill have to treat them as deductively valid: 1
W (A)
W (A)
It would now seem that the assertibilist is bound to treat both (c5) and (c6 ) as valid 
schemata:
(c5) A  -A W (A )
(c6 ) W (A ) —> A
whence by the transitivity o f the conditional any inferential warrant for (c l)  could 
automatically be transformed into a warrant for (c2) and any inferential warrant for (c3) 
could automatically be transformed into one for (c4).
We have already seen though that (c5) w ill be undecided i f  A  is undecided. This
means that according to assertibilism, the so-called Deduction Theorem w ill fail:
(DT) I f  [F, A ; ergo B] then [F ; ergo A  B].
(DT) states that a conditional follows from other premisses i f  its consequent follows 
from those other premisses in conjunction with its antecedent. The standard
demonstration o f (DT) relies on a transformation that prefixes every line in the original 
derivation with "A  — From an assertibilist standpoint this transformation ought to do 
justice to the fact that the premisses are taken to be available, hence ought to yield 
A  —> W (A) when applied to premiss A. I f  W (A) is substituted for B however, then (DT) 
can be proved only i f  A  ^  W (A) is already taken to be established— which, from the 
assertibilist's standpoint, it is not.56 There is accordingly no route from the validity o f 
the first rule to the general assertibility o f instances of (c5).
But won't instances o f (c5) nonetheless have to count as assertible whenever 
their antecedent is other than undecided? The answer to this question w ill lead to an 
important addition to the account canvassed so far that mainly dealt in sufficient 
conditions for the assertibility o f conditionals. This addition w ill at the same time 
furnish us with a reason why it is not the case that instances o f (c6 ) are automatically 
assertible.
As already indicated, the raison d'être o f conditionals in our language relates to 
their use in certain inferences effected by means o f modus ponens and modus tollens. It 
is this feature o f conditionals— their u tility  in inferences o f these kinds— that gives rise 
to two requirements which w ill ultimately render intelligible why neither (c6 ) nor, i f  A  
is other than undecided, (c5) is automatically assertible. O f course they may, on 
occasions, still be assertible; but their assertibility w ill then be a matter of the 
availability o f inferential warrants for them.57
We sometimes establish the assertibility of an atomic sentence or its negation 
indirectly, that is we sometimes employ inferences in order to do so. As far as 
conditionals are concerned, we may for example establish B by means o f modus ponens:
A  —^ B A
B
5  ^ On the other hand, the assertibilist has no problem at all with the following principle of 
conditionalisation:
(DT*) I f  [F, A; ergo B] then [T ; ergo W (A) ->  W(B)],
(DT*) renders the assertibilist's reading o f "ergo" explicit; it indicates a warrant-preserving inference. 
Thanks to Patrick Greenough for helpful discussions on this point.
57 Note, though, that the material conditional W (A) 3  A w ill always be assertible, even i f  A is taken to 
have objective truth conditions; i f  A  is warrantedly assertible, then there are warrants for asserting its 
consequent which, ex hypothesi, is sufficient to warrant its assertion; i f  A is not warrantedly assertible, 
then there are warrants for denying its antecedent which, ex hypothesi, is sufficient to warrant its 
assertion; but either A is warrantedly assertible or it is not; hence W (A) 3  A w ill always be warrantedly 
assertible. This is another indication that W (A) 3  A and W(A) —> A have different assertibility 
conditions.
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Or we may establish ~A by means o f modus tollens:
A —> B ~B
A t least i f  A  and B are empirical claims, the viability o f indirect vindications o f this 
kind imposes two constraints: first, such vindications w ill work only i f  both premisses 
can be warranted independently from each other; secondly, in order for vindications o f 
this kind to be o f any use, it must furthermore be possible that the premisses can be 
warranted independently from each other in the specific sense that there may be states o f 
information which warrant one but not the other and do not warrant the conclusion 
either. In other words, insofar as it is an essential feature o f our use o f conditionals 
A  B that they may be employed in modus ponens or modus tollens steps, then, i f  it  is 
both logically possible that ~A may be vindicated and logically possible that B may be 
vindicated, it should also be logically possible that A  B is warranted in states o f 
information that do as yet neither prejudge the outcome that an application o f modus 
ponens would establish, nor prejudge the outcome that an application o f modus tollens 
would establish.58 I f  every possible state o f information fails to satisfy one o f these 
requirements, the conditional is not, typically, assertible: in such a case, one should 
instead assert the outcome of what an application o f either rule o f inference would yield 
— or i f  this is undecided then say so.59 These considerations may, however, be
58 Since we are here concerned with empirical discourse, the condition that it is logically possible that ~A 
may be vindicated and logically possible that B may be vindicated, w ill virtually always be met. By 
contrast, i f  either both vindications o f A  and vindications o f B are logically impossible or both 
vindications o f ~A and vindications o f ~B are logically impossible, then A —> B w ill both be assertible 
and o f use in a priori reasoning, e.g. in a reductio ad absurdum. For example, both 
(C &  ~C) (C &  ~C) and ~(C &  ~C) ~(C &  ~C) are assertible. Such conditionals w ill be warranted 
inferentially on purely logical grounds; for a discussion of such inferential warrants see section (3.5). The 
assertibilist w ill accordingly have to deny that there are any such logical grounds for (c5) or (c6 ); all she 
undertakes here is to show that no such grounds can be squeezed out o f the account o f conditionals given 
thus far. (Recall that, throughout this chapter, Moorean sentences have to be ignored.)
However, since a conditional with a logically necessary antecedent is equivalent to its consequent and 
since a conditional with a logically impossible consequent is equivalent to the negation o f its antecedent, 
the restriction to empirical discourse w ill not yet do. Therefore, we should furthermore require that, i f  it is 
logically possible that ~A may be vindicated but logically impossible that B may be vindicated, then 
unless it is also logically impossible that A may be vindicated, A -»  B w ill not be assertible: otherwise the 
outcome o f a modus tollens step with an empirical conclusion w ill always be prejudged. Similarly, i f  it is 
logically impossible that ~A may be vindicated but logically possible that B may be vindicated, then 
unless it is also logically impossible that ~B may be vindicated. A —> B w ill not be assertible: otherwise 
the outcome o f a modus ponens step with an empirical conclusion w ill always be prejudged.
59 Again, someone might object that such considerations merely bear on the conversational 
appropriateness o f an assertion rather than its warrantedness. It should be clear by now that there is a 
plausible rejoinder to this objection: rational enquiry is a social enterprise; and insofar as 'conversations' 
between rational enquirers serve the purpose o f passing on warranted claims that may subsequently be 
used in inference so as to make epistemic gain, it would be a violation o f epistemic norms to assert a
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overridden by additional inferential warrants o f sufficient s t r e n g t h . ^ ®  But recall that all 
the assertibilist has to forestall is the conclusion that just because the inferences from A  
to W (A ) and from W (A) to A  are, on her view, deductively valid, both (c6 ) and, i f  A  is 
other than undecided, (c5) are automatically assertible.
As we are here concerned with empirical discourse, let us assume that it is 
possible for the denial o f the antecedent to become warranted and also possible for the 
assertion o f the consequent to become warranted. We now see why both instances o f 
(c5) and instances o f (c6 ) are not automatically assertible. We have already noted that 
A  —> W (A ) is not assertible i f  A  is undecided. As regards (c5), there are thus only two 
cases left to consider: A  is assertible or A  is deniable. I f  A  is assertible, then according 
to the first requirement, A  W (A ) w ill only be assertible i f  there are possible states o f 
information in which A  is not assertible while A  —> W (A) nonetheless is. For, any state 
o f information that warrants A  and A  —> W (A) w ill be one in which the premisses o f an 
application o f modus ponens w ill both be warranted— to the effect that the outcome o f 
this application is. Since A  —> W (A ) is not assertible i f  A  is undecided, it must 
accordingly be possible that A  ->  W (A) is assertible i f  A  is deniable. But then, any state 
o f information that warrants A  —> W (A ) and -A  w ill do so only to the extent that it 
likewise warrants the outcome o f a potential modus tollens step. Since these cases 
exhaust all possibilities both requirements can never be met together. Therefore, 
A  W (A ) is not automatically assertible— one should rather assert either ~W (A) or A  
or ~A.
Next consider (c6 ), i.e. W (A) —> A. There are three possibilities: both A  and 
W (A ) are assertible, both A  and W (A) are deniable, or A  is undecided and W (A ) is 
again deniable. I f  a state o f information warrants W (A ) then the outcome that an 
application o f modus ponens would establish, already is established. I f  a state o f 
information warrants -W (A ) then the outcome that an application o f modus tollens 
would establish, already is established. Since -W (A ) is warranted i f  A  is deniable or 
undecided, all possible states o f information w ill fail to satisfy the second requirement. 
Hence, typically, W (A ) A  w ill not be assertible either: one should rather assert either 
~W (A) or A  or ~A.
Again, it might be objected that these constraints are motivated by 
considerations bearing on the conversational appropriateness o f an assertion rather than 
its epistemic status. But as I have urged, the role o f conditionals in the acquisition o f 
inferential knowledge already suggests that the distinction between norms o f warranted
conditional when no such gain can be made. However, see the qualifications made in the previous 
footnote.
For example, both W (A) —> W W (A) and W W (A) —> W (A) w ill be assertible nonetheless because 
W (A) <-> W W (A) is a meaning postulate for W(— ). It was the lesson to be learnt from Wright's 
argument that A W (A) is not analytic, not even according to the assertibilist.
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assertion and those norms of conversational appropriateness that would be relevant here 
becomes blurred, once it is acknowledged that rational enquiry essentially involves an 
epistemic division o f labour: making an assertion is to present oneself as being in 
possession o f warrants for doing so, hence to present oneself as someone on whose 
testimony others can rely; but the way in which others rely on such testimonies is inter 
alia  by using the asserted sentence as a premiss in inferences intended to increase their 
knowledge. Thus i f  the assertion is obviously based on considerations that would render 
such inferences either pointless or unjustified, without it being indicated, however, what 
in particular these considerations are, it w ill not only be a case of withholding valuable 
information, it w ill sometimes positively mislead the audience into thinking that there 
are warrants strong enough to render this assertion, rather than any more informative 
one, nonetheless worthwhile. This is clearly so in the case o f (c5): asserting A  —> W (A) 
instead o f either A  or ~W (A) suggests that there are warrants for (R4), viz. a license to 
believe that A  would be deniable rather than undecided i f  W (A) became (or remained) 
deniable. Admittedly, it is not so clear whether asserting (instances of) (c6 ) is prone to 
be misleading in analogous ways, as it would be i f  it suggested that there is an a p rio r i 
warrant for a set o f meaning postulates from which (c6 ) can be derived. It seems that, at 
most, someone who asserted W (A) —> A, instead o f either A  or ~W(A), would withhold 
valuable information and thus fail to cooperate.
Even so it is far from clear whether this concession already proves the 
assertibilist's account o f the unassertibility o f W (A) A  empirically inadequate. As a 
matter o f fact, speakers typically comply with conversational norms such as 
informativeness; thus in giving an account o f assertibility conditions on the basis o f 
actual linguistic usage we may take speakers to conceive o f such norms either as 
informing what counts as a warranted assertion or, alternatively, as additional norms 
w ith which they comply. The possibility to identify an assertion as being rejected as 
inappropriate although warranted, or just as being rejected as unwarranted, would turn 
on whether it  is both appropriate and warranted to assert that this assertion is warranted 
even i f  inappropriate. Now, even i f  there was room for such a possibility o f manifesting 
the difference between norms o f conversational appropriateness and norms of warranted 
assertion on the basis o f assertoric practice alone, both the assertibilist and the truth 
conditional semanticist w ill agree that W (A ) —> A  w ill not be considered as warranted. 
O f course, the truth conditional semanticist who conceives o f the assertibility conditions 
for conditionals in terms o f conditional probabilities wishes to say that the speakers' 
refusal to assert instances o f W (A) - 4  A  is a function o f the objective content o f A. The 
assertibilist, on the other hand, w ill regard this refusal as confirming her claim that 
informativeness is sometimes necessary for warranted assertibility. There would appear
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to be no principled way o f adjudicating between these different accounts on the basis o f 
the speakers' assertoric practice alone.
A t this point one might object that we ought to distinguish between warranted 
assertibility and warranted acceptability: asserting a given claim may be improper for 
all sorts o f reasons, including those that derive from the epistemic division o f labour; 
but one may nonetheless be warranted in accepting this claim— asserting it to oneself 
silently, as it were. Thus it might be suggested that, from the very beginning, we have 
worked with the wrong notion o f warrantedness: instead o f asking for a systematic 
account o f assertibility conditions we should have asked for a systematic account o f 
acceptability conditions.^* However, it  is doubtful whether we can here appeal to this 
distinction without, at the same time, relinquishing the methodology which we adopted 
right from the start, viz. that o f explaining content on the basis o f publicly observable 
features o f language use. A t the very least, the question would then have to be addressed 
what kind o f use-facts, i f  not assertions, must be accounted for and serve as evidence for 
theories o f meaning. In particular, the anti-realist's Manifestation Argument would have 
to be reformulated, as it proceeds from the assumption that the speakers' participation in 
assertoric practice discloses their grasp o f objective truth conditions. For these reasons, I 
won't pursue the present suggestion any further.
W ith the proposed constraints on the assertibility o f conditionals being in place, 
the assertibilist at least proves able to block the immediate objection that her semantics 
cannot account for the speakers' unwillingness to assert conditionals which would have 
to be assertible i f  (c5) and (c6 ) were valid. In the next section I  shall address the hitherto 
unresolved problem o f how conditionals can inherit warrants inferentially, even i f  both 
their antecedents and consequents are undecided, i.e. the problem o f how warrants for 
conditionals can underwrite (R3) and (R4). Towards the end of the next section it w ill 
become clear in which sense there may be such inferential wairants for A  —> B and 
B —> A  without there being inferential warrants for W (A) —> B or B —> W (A).
3.5 In ferentia l Warrants fo r  Conditionals
In discussing inferential warrants for A  —> B whose availability justifies (R3) and (R4), 
I shall concentrate on cases in which both A  and B receive the value undecided. This 
w ill ensure that we do not smuggle in any considerations that essentially rely on either 
the assertibility o f B or the deniability o f A.
There are (at least) three kinds o f cases in which A  —> B w ill come out as 
warrantedly assertible, although both A  and B are neither warrantedly assertible nor
I f  the notion o f acceptability is thought to rehabilitate the interpretation o f A —> B in terms o f A 3  B, 
then it would appear that W (A) —> A turns out to be acceptable after all; see footnote 57.
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warrantedly deniable. These different cases are illustrated by the following three 
examples:
(a) i f  Martha is drunk, then Martha is drunk or George is tired
(P) i f  this is a swan, then this is white
(7 ) i f  Jones did not murdered Cresswell, then Smith did.
Even i f  both subsentences o f (a) happen to be undecided, (a) w ill still be warrantedly 
assertible: this is supposed to be known by anyone who has mastered the use o f the 
conditional and disjunction. Insofar as in sufficiently many cases, conditions under 
which "This is a swan" was warrantedly assertible proved to be conditions under which 
"This is white" was too, and there are so far no cases in which "This is a swan" proved 
to be warrantedly assertible while "This is white" did not, (p) w ill be at present 
warrantedly assertible despite the fact that both o f its subsentences are presently 
undecided. Given a body o f evidence that warrants the assertion o f 
"Jones and Smith are the only suspects", (7 ) may be warrantedly assertible although 
both o f its subsentences are undecided.
Prima facie, these cases present a challenge to the assertibilist because the 
warranted assertibility o f (a), (P) and (7 ) is not yet determined by the values their 
respective subsentences take.^2 Accordingly, whatever account the assertibilist w ill be 
able to offer, this account w ill not be fu lly  compositional. But then for the assertibilist 
this is a feature o f the language she seeks to model. Even a proponent o f truth 
conditional semantics must be able to explain— or at least agree that it  must be possible 
to explain— how speakers can rationally arrive at the endorsement o f conditionals such 
as (a), (P) or (7 ) despite the fact that they refuse to assert or deny any o f their 
s u b s e n t e n c e s . * ^ 3  ^s  already indicated, a recursive specification o f the truth conditions o f 
conditionals w ill not yet deliver the desired result; and there w ill be no recursive 
specification of their warranted assertibility conditions on that basis either. In this
^2 The conditional is thus not 'assertibility-explicable' in Brandom's sense; [TA]: 141. Price, who is aware 
o f this breakdown o f compositionality (see footnote 54 above), does nothing to meet the challenge. It is 
not even clear whether he is aware o f this posing a challenge, for nowhere does he address the question o f 
what the inferential grounds are on the basis o f which a compound may be other than undecided despite 
that fact that all o f its subsentences are. Therefore, it is hard to see on which grounds he can take himself 
to have defended a recursive theory o f sense in terms o f assertibility and deniability conditions; see 
[SAD]: 162.
This merely echoes Dummett's remark (quoted earlier) that a proponent o f truth conditional semantics 
must account for the connection between knowledge of truth conditions and knowledge o f assertion 
conditions; see [W TM /II]: 92-93; cf. as well [LBM ]: 307-308; and [TOE]: xxi.
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respect, assertibilists and truth conditional semanticists would appear to be in the same
boat.*^4
The characterisation o f the three deviant cases mentioned already suggests ways 
in which the assertibilist might meet the present challenge. Consider (a) first:
(a) i f  Martha is drunk, then Martha is drunk or George is tired.
The conditional (a) is an instance o f the axiom schema:
A  A V B.
A ll instances o f an axiom schema must count as a p rio ri warranted. More generally, the 
assertibilist may say that any sentence that can be derived from instances o f axiom 
schemata by means o f warrant-preserving rules o f inferences w ill have to count as
a p r io r i w a r r a n t e d . ^ 5  Mow consider (p):
(p) i f  this is a swan, then this is white.
The conditional (P) is an instance o f an empirical generalisation which is confirmed by 
a sufficiently large number o f other instances that form its inductive basis. The 
confirming instances however, w ill be instances whose antecedents and consequents are 
both warrantedly assertible. I f  a given universally quantified conditional is warrantedly 
assertible on the basis o f sufficiently many warranted instances, then the instances that 
form this inductive basis w ill confer wairanted assertibility onto those instances whose 
antecedents and consequents are both undecided. Thus (P) may be warrantedly 
assertible although both o f its subsentences are undecided, given that there is a 
sufficiently large number o f conditionals o f the form " If  x is a swan, then x is white" that 
are warrantedly assertible with both subsentences being assertible too. We can represent 
this as an inductive warrant-preserving inference from particulars to particulars, leaving 
the generalisation out o f the picture
*^ 4 Thus when Brandom argues that since English is not assertibility-explicable, "some auxiliary notion 
must be introduced to generate the assertibility conditions of compound sentences", he fails to see that, 
even after such an auxiliary notion— viz. truth— has been introduced, it may not be possible either "to 
generate in a uniform way the assertibility conditions o f compound sentences" by means o f the 
assertibility conditions and the truth conditions o f the embedded sentences; [TA]; 142-43.
^5 Warrant-preserving inference rules correspond to conditionals stating that i f  the premisses are 
warrantedly assertible, so is the conclusion. Since the antecedents of such conditionals never take the 
value undecided, while in the cases under consideration both antecedent and consequent take this value, 
the speakers' grasp o f warranted-preserving inference rules poses no further problem.
The problem of giving an account o f universally quantified statements w ill be addressed in section 
(T6).
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i f  a, is a swan, then a, is white 
i f  a2 is a swan, then ag is white
i f  a„ is a swan, then a„ is white
i f  a^+i is a swan, then a^ +, is white
Here, for ail a,- with 1 < / < n both "a,- is a swan" and "a,- is white" aie decided. The 
conditionals which form the set o f premisses w ill themselves be arrived at as f o l l o w s ; ^ ^
a I is a swan a^  is white 
is a swan a-, is white
a„ is a swan a^  is white
i f  aj is a swan, then a^  is white 
i f  a^  is a swan, then a? is white
i f  a„ is a swan, then a„ is white
What counts as a sufficiently large number o f such confirming instances w ill be a matter 
o f discourse and institutionalised practice. Roughly speaking, a number o f confirming 
instances is sufficiently large i f  it is treated as sufficiently large by the speech 
community; and this w ill vary according to the area o f discourse. In other words, what a 
speaker is represented as having to grasp in order to fu lly  master the use o f the 
conditional includes abilities to recognise and manipulate syntactical patterns as well as 
an appropriate training in inductive inference.
The proposed account o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f (a) and (P) 
reflects the inferential liaisons between these conditionals and sentences involving some 
o f their constituents. Thus even though fu ll compositionality could not be achieved, i.e. 
no recursive specification o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f (a) and (p) was 
possible, still (IC) has been met. This leaves the assertibilist with the task to account for 
(7):
(7 ) i f  Jones did not murder Cresswell, then Smith did.
^7 This accounls for the fact that " i f  a, is a swan, then a^  is while" is not yet assertible i f  both
"a,- is a swan" and "a^  is white" are assertible.
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The envisaged situation is one in which speakers aie in a state o f information that
warrants at least the following three sentences: |
I
(7 1) Cresswell was murdered |
(7 2 ) Jones is a suspect j
(7 3 ) Smith is a suspect. i
But it  would appear that this w ill not yet do; and whatever else is needed it w ill not i
consist in inductive grounds for a generalisation o f which (7 ) is an instance, for there are i
no such grounds. Nor is it  likely to consist in inductive grounds for a generalisation |
involving descriptions that Cresswell, Jones and Smith happen to satisfy. Such a |
generalisation would have to be something like: " I f  the one without alib i did not murder |
the victim , then the one with a criminal past did". Not only may there be more than one 
person without an alibi or with a criminal past besides Jones and Smith, but there may 
be so many defeaters o f this generalisation that it can hardly count as well-confirmed.
Detectives are more likely to engage in hypothetical induction than in enumerative 
induction.
It would appear that the state o f information that warrants (7 ), while leaving both 
subsentences undecided, w ill furthermore have to waiTant something like (7 4 ):
(7 4 ) Jones and Smith are the only suspects.
(7 4 ) is a concealed quantified sentence involving a further occurrence o f the conditional.
The question accordingly arises how (7 4 ) may be warranted; and here we seem to face a 
difficu lty: the claim that Cresswell's murderer is either Jones or Smith cannot but be 
thought to be established by facts about Jones and Smith; but i f  these facts fa ll short o f 
singling out one rather than the other as Cresswell's murderer, how can these facts 
themselves so much as preclude that neither o f them murdered Cresswell? It would 
appear that we must, as Russell urged, know in addition that no one non-identical w ith 
either Jones or Smith murdered Cresswell. But how could we ever know, o f every other 
person, that this person did not murder Cresswell, unless we had reason to assert a 
universally quantified sentence some o f whose instances have undecided antecedents 
and consequents just like (7 )? There seems to be no single such sentence, or set o f 
sentences, which may feature as an inductively confirmed generalisation about 
murderers.
Even so, the assertibilist has resources to avoid any appeal to further conditionals 
w ith undecided constituents. Call a predicate 0  epistemicised i f  and only if, for all x,
‘O x’ is not warrantedly assertible just in case ‘Ox’ is warrantedly deniable. The
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assertibilist argues, quite plausibly, that "is a suspect" is an epistemicised predicate in 
this sense. I f  in a given state o f information it is not warrantedly assertible that Paul is a 
suspect, then in this state it is warrantedly assertible that he is not: in order for Paul to 
qualify as a suspect he must be suspec ted .If this is so, the assertibilist may invoke the 
following warrant-preserving rule o f inference linking the use o f "is a suspect" to the 
use o f "is a culprit"; let ‘W(t)’ be short for ‘it is now warranted that (j)’ , then:
a, is a suspect
a„.j is a suspect 
a„ is a suspect 
W(x is a suspect) —> [W(x = a,) or ... or W(x = aJ]
~(a, is a culprit or ... or a„_i is a culprit) —> a„ is a culprit
It might be objected that, as experience teaches, the culprit w ill not always be one o f the 
current suspects; so why should we always be warranted in asserting that (s)he is? On 
behalf o f the assertibilist we may reply that this objection is misguided: the warrants 
that lead us to select individuals as current suspects are o f course defeasible, just as 
more individuals may be suspected in future states of information; and whoever is 
eventually identified as a culprit w ill a fo rtio r i be suspected.
The assertibilist w ill accordingly contend that, insofar as the above rule is 
recognised as valid, a state o f information which warrants (7 I) and no other (atomic) 
ascriptions o f "is a suspect" than (7 2 ) and (7 3 ) w ill likewise warrant (7 ).^9 The 
assertibilist may thus succeed in accounting for cases such as (7 ) by means o f rules like 
the one mentioned.
However, there is no guarantee that the number of rules o f such a kind is finite i f  
the vocabulary is. Nor is there any guarantee that the examples considered so far, i.e. 
(a), (p) and (7 ), exhaust all problematic cases: there may be others that cannot be dealt 
with in just the same ways. S till as far as these examples are concerned, the assertibilist 
has done what she was expected to do. There is accordingly no compelling reason to 
deny that she can comply with (IC) in other cases. The cases we discussed were such 
that neither the antecedent nor the consequent nor their respective negations were
^8 Notice that the present warranted assertibility or deniability o f a given claim depends on the sum total 
o f information presently available and not just on personal shares. I may be ignorant o f whether I am on 
the current list o f suspects; but insofar as there is a current list of suspects, where this list has been 
compiled in accordance with norms o f warrantability, I w ill either be on this list or not; i f  not then, 
relative to the current state of information, I am not a suspect.
*^ 9 O f course, (y l) and (y3) have to be related to the murder case under consideration, i.e. to the one 
reported by (7 I), in appropriate ways.
98
available as premisses; and in all such cases in which the warranted assertibility o f a 
conditional could be seen to rest on inferential relations to other sentences involving 
some o f its constituents— that is (a) and (p)— the recognition o f their obtaining could be 
explained in terms o f abilities that can be learnt in a finite amount o f time: the ability to 
recognise and manipulate syntactic patterns and the ability to engage in inductive 
reasoning.70 The case presented by (7) was not o f this kind. We had to invoke a warrant- 
preserving rule o f inference linking (7 ) to vocabulary not contained in (7).
The fact that the number o f rules o f such a kind cannot be guaranteed to be 
finite, hence that there is no guarantee either that grasp o f warranted assertibility 
conditions can be represented as a finite body o f knowledge from which mastery o f 
these conditions may be seen to flow, should give no comfort to the assertibilist's 
opponent. For as I shall argue in the next two paragraphs, even the truth conditional 
semanticist— if  she is to give an account o f warranted assertibility conditions in order to 
anchor her recursive theory o f truth conditions in pragmatics— w ill be at a loss to give 
such a guarantee. This observation is crucial since all we have to do in order to 
substantiate the assertibilist's challenge is to show that, as far as meeting (IC) is 
concerned, truth conditional semantics does not fare any better than assertibilism.
Thus suppose that the truth conditional semanticist takes A  B to be assertible 
i f  P(B/A) is high. The first thing to ask is whose probability assignment does matter so 
as to determine the assertibility o f A  B. It cannot be just anyone's: for example, we 
should not regard the innocent as having any say on the matter.7* But suppose that the 
assertibility o f A  ->  B is determined by the conditional probability assigned by an 
expert on matters to which A  and B relate. As the holistic nature o f empirical 
justification suggests, it is highly likely that this expert's calculation o f P(B/A) w ill 
presuppose that certain conditionals other than A  B are warrantedly assertible, with 
respect to some of which, however, she herself lacks the required expertise. 
Accordingly, her expertise, hence the assertibility o f A  —> B, is like ly to depend on that 
o f others. But unless all these experts can be shown to follow certain specifiable rules in 
reaching their verdicts, there is no guarantee that this collectively shared candidate 
knowledge w ill not just collapse into the total set o f empirically confirmed beliefs 
hitherto acquired by the scientific community; and there w ill then be no guarantee either 
that linguistic competence can be represented as a finite stock o f knowledge as whose 
exercise the assertion o f warranted conditionals can be conceived. This problem besets 
any attempt to explain norms o f warranted assertibility in terms o f speakers' actual 
verdicts: the competence/performance-distinction w ill be lost and w ith it the idea that 
our verdicts are the result o f two interlocking factors, our conceptual abilities and our
79 Quine even argues thal the propensity to generalise from some to all is innate; [NK]; 123-28. 
7> Cf. Williamson [V ]; 221.
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receptivity to empirical input. On the other hand, i f  experts are thought to follow certain 
warrant-preserving rules in reaching their verdicts, then what guarantee is there that 
grasp o f these rules can be represented as a finite body o f knowledge? I f  such a 
guarantee can be given after all, however, then it would seem that the assertibilist is 
likewise entitled to it.
What is equally important is that it has not been made clear how, i f  the 
assertibility o f conditionals is determined by the conditional probability assigned to 
them by experts, one expert may rationally rely on the expertise o f another i f  all she has 
to go for are this other expert's verdicts. It should at least in principle be possible for her 
to come in a position to certify that the speaker on whose expertise she relies actually 
has this expertise; and in order to do so she must not only be able to ascertain that this 
speaker is reliable but also to fo llow  the rational procedures by which this speaker 
arrives at his verdicts. This is all the more so i f  these verdicts involve assertions o f 
logically complex sentences such as conditionals. In other words, then, it should be 
possible for one speaker to recognise whether and how another speaker calculates 
conditional probabilities. However, it is highly likely that, in order to leave room for 
this possibility, we already have to countenance linguistic performances that are not 
assertions, viz. assumptions: it is by assuming A  and then concluding how likely B 
would be that the value o f P(B/A) is arrived at.72
But this is already to change the rules o f the game in which the assertibilist was 
ready to engage: the assertibilist's challenge was that insofar as we bring to bear no 
more than the assertoric performances o f speakers, an account o f warranted assertibility 
conditions for compounds w ill be available that makes no mention o f objective truth 
conditions, yet meets (IC) to just the same extent as an account based on (01) and (02). 
The Manifestation Argument rested on the claim that this is incorrect, viz. that assertoric 
use alone w ill display the speakers' grasp o f objective truth conditions. O f course, it may 
now turn out that knowledge o f objective truth conditions is after all necessary for 
giving a sufficiently systematic account o f the assertibility conditions for conditionals in 
regions where assertibilism has nothing to say. But i f  this account needs further backing 
by appeal to the non-assertoric use o f sentences, then it is no longer straightforward to 
conclude that what is thus manifested is knowledge of conditions whose obtaining we 
must be able to come in a position to recognise: no reason has as yet been given for 
thinking that speakers cannot intellig ib ly assume sentences to be true whose truth it may 
lie beyond their ken to ascertain. Indeed, it w ill be my main contention, to be developed 
in chapters four to six, that acknowledging the role sentences play in assumptions 
provides the starting point both for a successful defence o f our minimalist conception o f 
objective truth and a justification for demurring from the anti-realist's conclusion. In
72 Cl. Edgington [DCH]: 177-78, 200.
100
section (3.8) of the present chapter I shall furthermore ai'gue that our minimalist 
conception o f objective truth should already be recoverable from the use o f atomic 
sentences and thereby suggest that Dummett's attempt to locate the pragmatic basis for 
this conception in the assertoric use o f compounds does not get to the heart o f the 
matter.
For the sake of argument, let us therefore assume that, given the restriction to the 
assertoric use of language, the assertibilist has done all she could be expected to do in 
devising an account of the warranted assertibility conditions o f conditionals. A t least, 
the truth conditional semanticist has not been shown to fare any better. Thus it would 
appear that the assertibilist's challenge still stands.
Once we have an account o f the warranted assertibility o f conditionals whose 
antecedents and consequents are both undecided, we are in a position to account for the 
assertibility and deniability conditions o f sentences formed by means o f other sentential 
connectives. For example: the assertibility and deniability conditions o f conjunctions 
A  &  B pose no problem apart from those cases in which both A  and B are undecided, 
but A  &  B ought nonetheless to be denied:
B A & B
A  y u n
y u n
II II u/n n
n n n n
The deniability conditions o f disjunctions A  v B can be thought to be determined by the 
assertibility conditions of ~A &  ~B, Insofar as disjunctions are essentially used in 
applications o f modus wllendo ponens, their assertibility conditions can accordingly be 
thought to be determined by those o f ~A —> B and ~B —> A.'^^
The assertibilist may now explain why there may in general be inferential 
warrants for (c l)  and (c3) without there being any warrants for (c2) or (c4):
(c l)  A ^ B
(c2) W (A ) -> B
(c3) B —> A
(c4) B ^  W (A).
73 cr. Dummcll [SCT]: 194.
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Consider inductive inferences like the ones appealed to in our discussion o f (P). An 
inductive inference from n instances o f a generalisation to the n+ ls t instance w ill be 
undermined by a deniable instance whose antecedent is warranted, but whose 
consequent is deniable. However, it w ill not yet be undermined by an instance whose 
antecedent is warranted and whose consequent is undecided. Given the way our 
scientific reasoning actually proceeds, instances o f the latter kind w ill not in general be 
considered as mandating revisions o f theory. Therefore, it is to be expected that there is 
typically no place for conditionals like (c4) w ithin scientific discourse; conditionals like 
(c4) w ill not be used for modus tollens steps, yet conditionals like (c3) w ill feature in 
such inferences. O f course, this is not to say that there may not after all be conditionals 
like (c4) that have their place even in scientific discourse: for example, conditionals o f 
this kind may feature in psychology. But recall that, in the present context, all the 
assertibilist has to show is that inferential warrants for conditionals like (c3) w ill not 
always be transformable into inferential warrants for conditionals like (c4) and vice 
versa.
Scientific theories are intended to yield an interlocking account o f generalities. 
Thus where possible, the antecedent condition o f one generalisation w ill form the 
consequent condition o f another. Therefore, where we aim at such an interlocking 
account or wish to leave room for it, we usually do not have use for conditionals like 
(c2 ) either: any generalisation satisfaction o f whose consequent condition is formulated 
in the antecedent o f (c2) w ill already be refuted i f  B is assertible and A  is undecided; 
and as already remarked, we typically have no use for such generalisations in scientific 
discourse. Again, we have to keep in mind that the assertibilist is not bound to rule out 
that there may be inferential warrants for (c2 ), but only that all inferential warrants for 
(c l)  are eo ipso inferential wanants for (c2 ).
In order to assess, amongst other things, whether the assertibilist proves able to 
explain the role o f negation within compound sentences on the basis o f (N l)  and (N2), 
we were led to a consideration o f her account o f the indicative conditional. Contrary to 
what Dummett and Wright suggested, it was possible to explain the warranted 
assertibility conditions o f sentences built up from less complex ones by means o f 
sentential connectives, without yet taking recourse to objective truth conditions. In 
meeting (IC) however, the assertibilist had to appeal to the quantificational structure o f 
sentences as well as a rule o f substitution applied to schemata. We must therefore 
demand that the assertibilist give an account o f quantification. This account is the topic 
o f the next section which w ill bring our discussion o f assertibilism and its resources to a 
close. By then it ought to have become clear that assertibilism is much more powerful 
than expected when it comes to an account o f complex sentence-forming devices. 
Section (3.7) w ill give a diagnosis o f why both Dummett and Wright have
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underestimated its strength. In section (3.8) I shall try to clarify why assertibilism is 
nonetheless unacceptable. Finally in section (3.9), I shall argue that in order to prove the 
assertibilist wrong, we should move beyond a consideration o f the assertoric use o f 
sentences, thereby rejecting the premisses on which the anti-realist's Manifestation 
Argument rests.
3.6 An A ssertib ilis t Account o f the Quantifiers
In a first bold step, the assertibilist might try to account for the speakers’ use o f 
quantifiers in the following way:
(V) is warrantedly assertible ri/z(‘On’ is warrantedly assertible)
‘VjcOx ’ is warrantedly deniable ‘3x~Ox’ is warrantedly assertible
(3) ‘3xOa' ’ is warrantedly assertible «-> Z/î ( ‘0 / î ’ is warrantedly assertible)
‘3a<I>a ’ is warrantedly deniable <-> ‘Vx-O a ’ is warrantedly assertible.
However, there are several objections to (V) and (3) that come to mind. For example, 
the conditional from left to right across the first clause o f (V) might be objected to on 
the grounds that in inductive reasoning, we do not establish the validity o f 
generalisations by way o f showing first, o f each instance o f such a generalisation, that it 
is warrantedly assertible. This objection has no force however: treating a universally 
quantified sentence as warrantedly assertible implies treating any one instance o f that 
generalisation as warrantedly assertible. It is no objection to the assertibilist account that 
we tend to treat each instance o f such a generalisation as warrantedly assertible on the 
basis o f the warranted assertibility o f some. On the assertibilist account, this is just what 
distinguishes the warranted assertibility conditions o f the universally quantified 
sentence from the warranted assertibility conditions o f the specific conjunction which 
serves as its inductive basis: to generalise is to generalise from some to all; and since 
different sets o f instances may serve as the basis from which such generalisations 
proceed, the warranted assertibility conditions o f generalisations can at no point be 
identified w ith those o f a given set o f instances. Any form of scepticism with respect to 
the validity o f inductive reasoning threatens the assertibilist account, i f  at all, to the very 
same extent to which it threatens truth conditional semantics. For the assertibilist, the 
speakers' ability to conceive o f the warranted assertibility o f each instance on the basis 
o f the warranted assertibility o f some, plays exactly the role which the speakers' ability 
to conceive o f the truth o f all instances on that same basis plays for a proponent o f truth 
conditional semantics.
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The question o f when a universally quantified statement ought to be treated as 
warrantedly assertible w ill be answered by appeal to warrant-preserving rules o f 
induction, this time leading from particular to universal:
Oai
0 8 %
0 a.
Va0A
What does count as a sufficiently large number o f confirming instances w ill again be 
settled, relative to the area o f discourse at hand, by what is instituted as being such a 
sufficiently large n u m b e r . 7 4
Another prima facie  more powerful objection that can be levelled against (V) 
concerns the conditional from right to le ft across the first clause: in mathematics, 
warrants to assert ‘0 ; r ’ for each n w ill not normally suffice for warranting ‘V x 0 x ’ . But 
it would appear that in order to find fault with this conditional, we do not have to resort 
to mathematics in which, arguably, all warrants are conclusive such that (0 2 ) fails:
(02) S may (actually) fa il to be true, even i f  S is at present warrantedly assertible.
Firstly, even in empirical discourse we frequently quantify over a domain o f objects 
whose number may exceed the number o f singular terms currently in use; and often we 
do not regard it as appropriate to assert ‘V x0 x ’ on the basis o f the assertibility 
o f all instances that we can, at present, formulate. For example, 
‘Vx(x is not an extraterrestrial)’ w ill not already be assertible just because, for each 7z’ 
having an established usage, is not an extraterrestrial’ is assertible.75 Secondly, even 
i f  there is an ‘n ’ for each object in the domain and we have warrants to assert ‘0 n’ for 
each such ‘n’ , we may still lack warrants for ‘V x0 x ’ because we have no warrants to 
assert that each object in the domain has been considered. Thus, it might well be that we 
have reason to assert, o f every object in the domain, that it is not an extraterrestrial, 
again without having reason to assert ‘Vx(x is not an extraterrestrial)’ .
74 Note that in accounting for the case presented by ((3) we did not have to rely on (V) being already 
understood. For the warranted assertibility o f (P) could be seen to be derived, by virtue o f principles o f 
induction, from the warranted assertibility o f other conditionals o f the same logical form. In order for this 
to be so, we did not need to rely on the warranted assertibility o f the empirical generalisation which (P) 
was said to be an instance of.
73 I owe this nice example to Timothy Williamson.
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In response to the first part o f the objection, the assertibilist should argue that the 
substitutional quantifier is meant to range not only over those ‘n’ that are actually in 
use, but also those that may come into use, being constructible out o f whatever 
linguistic material the object language provides. In response to the second part o f the 
objection, she should suggest interpreting (V) in accordance w ith her account o f the 
conditional: the conditional from right to left across the first clause o f (V) is assertible 
insofar as we are warranted in believing that we would be warranted to assert ‘Vx0 x ’ i f  
our state o f information was augmented by no more information than is necessary to 
warrant 'II/% ('0n’ is warrantedly assertible)’ . The assertibilist should then adapt the 
intuitionist's rule for V-introduction and claim that T ln ( '0 n ’ is warrantedly assertible)’ 
is warrantedly assertible only in such states o f information o f which it can warrantedly
be said that they would warrant ‘0 n’ , for an arbitrary n, i f  augmented by no more
information than is necessary to warrant the assertion that there is this Taken 
together these lines o f response should then allow her to explain why 
‘Vx(x is not an extraterrestrial)’ is not assertible: it cannot warrantedly be said o f our 
present state o f information that it would warrant ‘/r is not an extraterrestrial’ , for an 
arbitrary n, i f  augmented by no more information than is necessary to warrant the 
assertion that there is this n. Pending further argument, there is accordingly no 
compelling reason for her to abandon the first biconditional o f (V) in favour o f the 
conditional going from left to right.
Let us now turn to (3). Whereas the conditional from right to left across the first 
clause o f (3 ) is uncontroversial, the converse conditional is plainly wrong: we may be 
warranted in asserting A  v B without being warranted in asserting A  or being warranted 
in asserting B; and since existentially quantified statements are equivalent to potentially 
infinite disjunctions, ‘3 x0 x ’ may be warrantedly assertible while there is no n such that 
‘0 ; i ’ is warrantedly assertible. In the last section, we have already seen how the 
assertibility o f disjunctions with finitely many disjuncts can be accounted for. Thus, the 
conjunction o f the following conditionals:
i f  Jones did not stab Cresswell, then Smith did
i f  Smith did not stab Cresswell, then Jones did
is equivalent to
either Smith stabbed Cresswell or Jones did.77
76 Cf. Dummett [E l]: 12-13.
77 This equivalence w ill depend on the assertibility of principles of classical logic, hence is at odds with 
intuitionism; cf. footnote 38.
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However, sometimes we have no means o f delimiting the number o f disjuncts. For 
example, I may be warranted in asserting that there is a victim  of the recent earthquake 
without being warranted in asserting o f any individual that it is a victim  o f this 
earthquake or, for that matter, o f any given collection o f individuals that at least one o f 
these individuals is a victim  o f this earthquake.
Therefore the first biconditional o f (3) should rather be replaced by the following 
conditional:
E/î(‘0 /t’ is warrantedly assertible) ‘3 x0x ’ is warrantedly assertible.
And (3) should accordingly give way to (3*):
(3*) is warrantedly assertible) ‘3 x0x ’ is warrantedly assertible
‘3xOx’ is warrantedly deniable ‘V x-O x ’ is warrantedly assertible.
Thus it would appear that the assertibilist can specify a sufficient condition for the 
warranted assertibility o f ‘3 x0x ’ , but fails to give a systematic account o f cases in 
which ‘3 x 0 x ’ is assertible despite the fact that this condition is not met. However, this 
seems to be a premature conclusion: given that assertibilism is conservative in that it 
preserves the a p rio r i assertibility o f classical principles, ‘3xOx’ may be warrantedly 
assertible in virtue o f the fact that ‘V x~0x ’ is warrantedly deniable.^s Now, ‘Vx~Ox’ 
may be deniable because it has deniable consequences, even i f  the warranted deniability 
o f these consequences does not yet furnish us with a warrant to assert ‘0 « ’ for some 
specific 71.79 To further substantiate this suggestion we would o f course need to list 
assertibilist reconstructions o f classical rules o f proof; however, I  shall not here 
undertake to do so. The question o f whether assertibilism is after all at odds with our 
practice o f drawing deductively valid inferences w ill be discussed in chapter four.
Pending further argument to the contrary, we may thus conclude that the 
assertibilist has not been shown not to meet (IC) in cases in which her anti-realist 
opponent nonetheless can. Again, it would appear that her challenge still s t a n d s . ^ ^
78 Given the a p riori assertibility of double negation elimination, as licensed by the assertibilist's account 
o f negation, the inference from the deniability o f ‘V x-O x’ to the assertibility o f ‘3x4>x’ is already ensured 
by the second clause o f (V).
79 This indirect validation o f ‘3x<t>x’ is for instance exemplified by the classical solution to the Sorites.
80 Let me add a final note on the assertibilist's use of substitutional quantification. Her treatment o f the 
disquotational truth-predicate as well as o f logically valid sentences like (a) required that the speakers 
themselves be able to employ substitutional quantification. A standard objection to the employment o f 
substitutional quantification in deflationists' accounts o f truth runs as follows: in order to explain what a 
substitutionally quantified sentence conveys, one is bound to say that it conveys that all its instances are 
true— or i f  the quantifier is existential, that it has at least one true instance. We thereby have to appeal to 
a notion o f truth that has not yet been accounted for by the radical deflationist, who explains truth in
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3.7 Semantic Theory and Object Language
To the extent that it proved feasible at all, assertibilism managed to explain how the 
warranted assertibility conditions o f complex sentences systematically depend on the 
warranted assertibility and deniability conditions o f their constituents—just as (IC) 
required. It therefore proved unnecessary to invoke objective truth conditions in order to 
explain this dependence, hence in order to meet (IC). Why then was it ever thought to be 
necessary to do so? The assumption underlying Dummett's as well as Wright's reasoning 
seems to be that, given (DS);
(DS) "P" is true i f f  P
— or, for that matter, the Equivalence Schema:
(ES) It is true that P i f f  P,
sentences o f the object language are equivalent to sentences o f semantic theory that 
ascribe to the former a semantic value. I f  this were the case however, then (DS) and 
(ES) would indeed force a theory o f understanding that incorporated a tiuth conditional 
semantics, for in asserting sentences o f their repertoire, speakers would then have to be 
seen as claiming these sentences to have the semantic value true\ and in using them as 
antecedents o f conditionals, speakers would have to be seen as predicting the 
consequent on condition o f their having that value.81 But it makes all the difference 
whether speakers can be said to use the left-hand side o f (DS) or (ES) in just the same 
way they use their right-hand side and given (NE), use both in a way other than they use
terms o f a substitutionaljy quantified version o f (DS); of. Horwich [Tr]: 26-28. It might now be thought 
that the same objection can be levelled against the assertibilist who credits speakers with the grasp o f a 
disquotational truth predicate. This objection is misguided however— the assertibilist can account for the 
speakers' employment of substitutional quantification without crediting them with a grasp o f objective 
truth. The assertibilist w ill explain the import o f substitutionally quantified sentences o f the object 
language, such as
riP (if Paul said that P, then P),
in terms o f warranted assertibility and deniability; the above sentence is treated as warrantedly assertible 
only i f  all its instances are, and it is treated as warrantedly deniable i f  it has a warrantedly deniable 
instance.
81 I f  it was a datum that sentences are understood to be apt for taking a certain kind of semantic value, 
then any semantic theory that subserves a theory designed to account for that understanding must 
interpret those sentences as taking values of this kind; this just is what it is for a semantic theory to 
subserve a theory o f understanding.
As already argued in section (2.1) o f chapter two, the theory of understanding we are after does not 
claim to account for all aspects of meaning, where "meaning" is taken in the loose sense it has in ordinary 
language.
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"It is warrantedly assertible that P", or whether they can be said to ascribe to the 
sentences they use the value true. As the semantic paradoxes already show, the language 
o f semantic theory and the language this theory takes as its object language have to be 
kept apart. And the radical deflationist, on whose behalf the assertibilist semantics was 
being devised, precisely denied that "is true" could be used to ascribe a semantic value, 
w ith the effect that the left-hand side o f (DS) could no longer be regarded as a statement 
o f semantic theory. This is perfectly coherent as long as we keep in mind that in using 
their language, speakers do not themselves already engage in a theory about their use o f
that language.82
Violations o f this principle can be found in Wright’s chaiacterisation o f radical 
deflationism as well as in Dummett's argument as to why the content o f antecedents o f 
certain conditionals must be construed in terms o f truth conditions. Thus when Wright 
talks about "the explanatory biconditional link effected by the Disquotational Schema 
between the claim that a sentence is [true] and its proper assertoric use", he not only 
begs the question against the radical deflationist by conceiving of the left-hand side o f 
(DS) as pertaining to the level o f semantic theory, but furthermore misconceives the 
right-hand side as containing information about how it is properly used.83 And when in 
discussing certain conditionals, Dummett remarks that "the event stated in the 
consequent is predicted on condition o f the truth of the antecedent [...], not its 
justifiab ility", he either regards the fact that conditionals like A  —> B and W (A) —> B 
differ in assertoric content as already establishing that their antecedents not only may 
take different semantic values, but take values o f a certain kind, i.e. truth values; or else 
he goes beyond the task he set himself, i.e. to give an account o f how the assertoric 
content o f conditionals is being determined.84 Thus it would appear that Dummett 
merely appeals to our willingness as competent speakers to substitute 
‘ It is true that A ’ for A in A  —> B, thereby conflating the level o f semantic theory w ith 
the object language level.
The same kind o f mistake seems to be at work when Dummett argues that (ES) 
is at odds with the assumption o f tmth value gaps.83 Dummett simply assumes that the 
left-hand side o f (ES) ascribes a semantic value to a given sentence such that, i f  this 
sentence is neither true nor false, the right-hand side comes out neither true nor false,
82 Cf. Price [SADj: 163-64.
83 Wright [TO]; 17. According to the assertibilist, "P" is never used in the semantic theory to state its own 
meaning; cf. Price [SAD]: 163-65. For instance, i f  the content of a sentence was understood to consist in 
its conceptual role, then i f  we had a canonical way of describing this role, the statement 
""P" has the conceptual role m i f f  P" would not be part of the semantic theory in question. As already 
noted in footnote 36 above, the failure to realise that according to deflationism truth has no role to play in 
semantic theory underlies both Rumfitt's reply to Wright's 'inllationary argument' and Wright's answer.
84 Dummett [SCT]; 193.
83 See Dummett [T] 4-5; and [PBI]; 233.
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while the left-hand side comes out false. But someone who endorses a semantic theory 
according to which sentences o f the object language may lack a semantic value, can 
reconcile her theory with both (DS) and (ES) by regarding them as principles which 
belong to the object language rather than the language of semantic theoty, and which 
allow for an expansion of that object language/rom within^^ Insofar as a proponent o f 
such a view takes it that in the language o f semantic theory the principle o f Tertiurn non 
datur nonetheless holds good, she can likewise agree that (DS) and (ES) are valid 
principles o f that theory. But then she w ill refuse to regard either principle as allowing 
for a substitution o f "P" by sentences o f the very object language for which her theory is 
intended to be a semantic theory.87
In the context o f the present enquiry into the manifestability o f understanding the 
distinction between object language and language of semantic theory is o f crucial 
importance: since, we aim to show that semantic principles hold in virtue o f the 
representational content we understand our sentences to have and that this 
understanding is manifested in our use o f these sentences, we must resist any tendency 
to regard the endorsement o f such principles as a way o f using the sentences to which 
they apply that would already provide us with evidence for their validity.
When we discussed the difference between objective truth and warranted 
assertibility in section (2.3) o f chapter two, we presupposed an understanding o f the 
object language. It might now be objected that, by the standards demanded here, this 
procedure proves illegitimate. But this objection misconceives the nature o f our enquiry: 
we know that objective truth differs from warranted assertibility and that these 
differences are reflections o f the representational content we understand our sentences to 
have. It is only on the basis o f this knowledge that we can perceive assertibilism as a 
position that must be overcome. Our discussion in section (2.3) was meant to bring out 
what the differences between objective truth and warranted assertibility are; but it did 
not yet indicate how they are manifested in the use o f the sentences to which these 
notions apply. The assertibilist concedes that "is true" and "is warrantedly assertible" are 
used differently, yet denies that this is a reflection of the representational dimension o f 
the sentences we use; thus merely laying down principles such as (O l) and (0 2 ) w ill not 
do in order to answer the assertibilist's challenge.88
86 Interestingly, this way o f putting it stems from Dummett himself; see [LBM ]; 67-69.
87 A proponent o f this view may nonetheless give a homophonie semantics for the very language in 
which her theory is couched; but this semantics w ill then differ from the one devised for the object 
language previously considered. No justification for this view has been offered here.
88 In getting her challenge o ff the ground, the assertibilist did not have to presuppose a prior 
understanding o f the object language whose use we consider: for this purpose, it was sufficient to identify 
pairs o f sentences S and R such that (i) S is assertible if f  R is assertible, (ii) S is deniable i f f  S is not 
assertible, and (iii) S is not assertible i f f  R is either deniable or undecided.
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According to the assertibilist, both the assertoric content o f a sentence and its ingredient 
sense are jo in tly  determined by the conditions under which this sentence is warrantedly 
assertible, and those under which it ought to be denied. Since there may be conditions 
under which such a sentence is neither warrantedly assertible nor warrantedly deniable, 
any identification o f warranted assertibility with truth and warranted deniability with 
falsity w ill give rise to truth value gaps. Insofar as the assertibilist is a radical 
deflationist who denies the concept o f truth any role to play in semantics, she w ill resist 
any such identification.^^ As we have seen however, her endorsement o f (DS) does not 
force an explanation o f ingredient sense in terms of truth conditions. Indeed radical 
deflationism is inconsistent w ith such an explanation. For example, on the radically 
deflationist view, the standard recursive clause for disjunction, the disjunction 
equivalence:
(DE) "P or Q" is true i f f  "P" is true or "Q" is true
w ill not be conceived o f as registering a significant fact about our use o f "or", but 
merely as being derivable from the following three instances of (DS) that are considered 
to be conceptually necessary equivalences governing our use o f the truth predicate:
"P or Q" is true i f f  P or Q 
"P" is true i f fP  
"Q" is true i f f  Q.
As already stressed, insofar as instances o f (DS) are partial stipulations determining the 
use o f the truth predicate, they cannot, at the same time, function as principles that enlist 
contingent semantic features o f truth-apt sentences in our repertoire and in terms o f 
which our use o f these sentences or their compounds can then be explained.^o
The assertibilist proved able to devise a semantics for negation and the 
conditional that reflected all the inferential liaisons between complex sentences and
89 Recall that the radical dehationist w ill not tolerate the introduction o f a higher level truth predicate that 
does not satisfy (DS). As Patrick Greenough has pointed out to me, the assumption o f truth value gaps 
can be reconciled with the gist o f (DS) by replacing (DS) by a set o f inference rules. These rules do not 
license the conditional from left to right across (NE), hence allow for a distinction between a sentence not 
being true and the truth of its negation. The same line o f thought underlies Wright’s proposal to weaken 
the biconditional link effected by (DS) so as to allow for truth value gaps; see [TO]: 63-64. This merely 
shows that the assertibilist need not opt for radical deflationism in Field's sense. I f  she does not, then she 
may well identify truth with warranted assertibility and falsity with warranted deniability. I here assume 
that whatever Field has to say about the biconditional, it w ill be in accordance with the validity o f the 
negation introduction rule Wright invokes, i.e. the rule that allows us to infer ~A w  from A B.
99 Field [DVM ]: 256-60.
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their constituents which an account o f ingredient sense was supposed to capture 9• She 
not only opposed Dummett's conception o f ingredient sense, but also his conception o f 
assertoric content. For Dummett, the assertoric content o f a sentence is already 
determined by the conditions under which it is acceptable to assert this sentence, hence 
under which it counts as warrantedly assertible. The distinction between those 
conditions under which a sentence ought not to be asserted and those under which it 
ought to be denied played no part at all in Dummett's characterisation o f assertoric 
content. Rather, Dummett conceived o f the latter as those conditions under which its 
negation is warrantedly assertible, thereby appealing to a prior grasp o f negation; 
negation had accordingly to be explained by other means. It is therefore not at all 
surprising that Dummett was driven towards endorsement of the doctrine that a 
compositional account o f the operators required an appeal to truth conditions, for 
otherwise the relation between the conditions under which a given sentence ought not to 
be asserted and those under which its negation ought to be asserted would have been left 
unexplained: it  was precisely the task to explain this relation that forced the assertibilist 
to reverse the order of explanation and invoke the notion o f warranted deniability.92 
Since Dummett is bound to concede that once the speaker has grasped the concept o f 
negation, she w ill be able to distinguish between those conditions under which a 
sentence ought not to be asserted and those under which it ought to be denied, it is then 
not open to Dummett to object that the notion o f warranted deniability has no basis in 
use. Indeed, it would appear that Dummett and the assertibilist agree on what constitutes 
the facts o f language use on whose basis a theory o f meaning is to be devised. Their 
conceptions o f assertoric content, though different, are in mutual harmony.
Nevertheless, Dummett intended to account for our grasp o f truth conditions on 
that same basis— by means o f drawing the distinction between assertoric content and 
ingredient sense. But here the assertibilist proved Dummett wrong.93 The distinction 
between the assertoric content o f a sentence and the contribution this sentence makes to 
the determination o f the assertoric content o f complex sentences in which it occurs, is 
simply no help in showing that sentences have truth conditions. Whether they do or do 
not have truth conditions is thus far purely a matter of whether a disquotational truth 
predicate has been introduced into the language under study. This is not the sense in
91 Recall that the ingredient sense of a sentence was supposed to be the systematic contribution this 
sentence makes to the determination of the warranted assertibility conditions o f complexes in which it 
occurs.
92 Williamson makes essentially the same point; see [ADC]; 307-308.
93 Williamson writes; "[a] claim often made [...] is that the truth-condition of a sentence is determined by 
its compositional structure as well as by its assertibility- and deniability-conditions; that may be so, but as 
a bare claim it hardly comes to grips with the problem for it does not explain what determines the effect 
o f a compositional device other than the conditions for the assertion and denial o f the sentences which 
serve as its arguments and values"; [ADC]: 313. We can now see that this pessimism is, after all, well- 
motivated.
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which Dummett intended to be understood th o u g h .9 4  As the next section w ill show 
however, there are independent grounds to hold that both Dummett and the assertibilist 
misconstrue the assertoric content we take some sentences to have.
3.8 The Role o f  Truth in Corrections
The history o f our epistemic endeavours reveals that veiy often, what we have been 
warranted in asserting at some point in time ceases to be so assertible at another. From 
our present standpoint, our ancestors or past selves got some things right and others 
wrong. But in saying that they got things wrong, we do not generally wish to blame 
them as irrational for having asserted what they did. Rather, given the information they 
had access to at that time, we often think it perfectly rational for them to have asserted 
what they did on the basis o f that information. Thus we concede that what they asserted 
at that time was warrantedly assertible at that time, but hold that it  is no longer so 
assertible today.95 Still we want to say that they got things wrong, but what are our 
grounds for saying so? No doubt they are based on the information we now possess, yet 
which they had no access to. But then in what sense does this information provide us 
w ith grounds for attributing to them a shortcoming i f  at the same time we do not wish to 
blame them for not having taken into account the very information they had no access 
to? That is; why does the information we possess today license more than our refusal to 
assert what they asserted in the past, viz. the diagnosis that they got things wrong?
No answer to this question w ill be forthcoming as long as we conceive o f our 
ancestors as having laid claim in asserting what they did, to no more than that what they 
asserted was wanantedly assertible at the time they asserted it— there would then be 
nothing for them to have been wrong about. For example, i f  they dated an ancient 
document back to 2000 BC on the basis o f the historical information they possessed at 
that time, then their claim that it is warrantedly assertible on the basis o f this 
information alone that the document dates back to 2000 BC, cannot be wronged by the 
fact that on the basis o f the historical information we now possess, this is no longer 
warrantedly assertible. Accordingly, i f  sense can be made o f our practice o f 
retrospectively attributing cognitive failures while still granting the blamelessness o f
94 Thus in discussing (DS), Dummett writes: "[...] the meaning-theory itself must make no appeal to our 
prior understanding o f the object-language; it would not, for example, impair its adequacy as a meaning- 
theory i f  it were translated"; [LBM ]; 68.
93 In [K A ], Williamson has argued that reasonable belief ought to be distinguished from what is 
expressed by a warranted assertion. He claims that all warrants for the assertion o f a given sentence are 
factive— to the effect that warranted assertibility entails truth. As I argued in section (2.3) o f chapter two, 
this constraint on assertoric practice is too restrictive and blurs the distinction between the goal we intend 
to attain in laying claim to the truth and the norms compliance with which is conducive to the attainment 
o f this goal. Williamson's argument has furthermore been shown to rest on the so far unjustified 
assumption that an account of the rules constitutive o f assertion be simple.
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those we attribute these failures to, then this must be due to the fact that we take our 
ancestors to have laid claim to more than just that what they asserted was warrantedly 
assertible at the time they asserted it, while we nonetheless regard them as having been 
warranted in doing so. What more can be involved?
It might be suggested that what they must be said to have laid claim to is that the 
reasons they had would bear them out in future. This suggestion is misleading however. 
For sometimes what has been warrantedly assertible in the past becomes warrantedly 
deniable at some point, only to be reinstated as warrantedly assertible at a later stage. In 
such cases, we want to say that our fathers got things wrong which our grandfathers got 
right. But in saying so we do not necessarily commit ourselves to the further claim that 
the reasons our grandfathers had for asserting what they did, survive closer scrutiny. 
Thus, we may still want to say that although our grandfathers got things right, they got it 
right for the wrong reasons, for these reasons may have been undermined once and for 
all by the reasons our fathers brought to bear. From our present standpoint, neither did 
our grandfathers' reasons bear our grandfathers out, nor did our fathers' reasons bear our 
fathers out. Hence, the sense in which our grandfathers got things right, which our 
fathers got wrong, has not yet been identified.
It might be replied that what our grandfathers must be said to have laid claim to 
is not that the very reasons they had for asserting what they did would bear them out, 
but rather that there were some reasons, not necessarily the ones they had, that would so 
bear them out. Indeed, i f  this was what they laid claim to, then there is a clear sense in 
which from our present standpoint, they got things right, which again from our present 
standpoint, our fathers got wrong, for we are right now in possession o f reasons that 
bear our grandfathers out, but not our fathers. However, it is hard to see how anyone 
could ever be said to have a reason to believe that there are other reasons to be had that 
survive future assessment, which the very reason one presently has may not do. Rather, 
it would appear that one can only claim to have a reason for believing that there is a 
reason which w ill never be defeated i f  one takes the very reason which one claims to 
possess to be o f such a kind. But then we must be able to distinguish what they laid 
claim to from this further assumption— and we must be able to do so on the basis o f a 
manifest difference between their making that claim and their making this assumption. 
Unless we prove capable o f doing so, we are back to our original question, viz. in which 
sense our grandfathers got things right, although their reasons did not bear them out, as 
all that had then been identified would be a sense in which they got things wrong: they 
were mistaken in thinking that their reasons would never be defeated.
The answer we seek to give relates to a goal we set ourselves to attain: truth. As 
far as our example is concerned, we want to say that our fathers did not attain this goal, 
while our grandfathers did. An account o f what it takes to comply with norms of
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warranted assertion w ill not yet provide us with an insight into the nature o f this goal. 
A ll that norms o f warranted assertion impose is that one ought to strive not to make 
unwarranted assertions: they do not impose that one ought to arrive at assertions which 
are warranted.96 Thus they remain silent as to why one ought to make warranted 
assertions at all. It is our pursuit o f truth that renders intelligible why we strive to make 
warranted assertions.
I f  it is truth we lay claim to in making assertoric moves, then what we lay claim 
to in every single case w ill be determined by the conditions under which the move we 
make qualifies as true, and those w ill o f course differ depending on the particular move 
we make; otherwise there would be no reason to make this move rather than another. I f  
we intend to do justice to our conception o f what we do in assessing our epistemic past, 
as has been outlined above, then we must hold that the content o f our assertoric moves 
is not only determined by their truth conditions, but in such a way that those conditions 
do neither coincide with nor are wholly determined by the multifarious conditions under 
which these moves qualify as defeasibly warranted. Otherwise corrections o f past moves 
would be pointless i f  accompanied by the concession that these moves could then 
warrantedly be made. The rationale underlying such corrections is that what our 
ancestors laid claim to is something whose obtaining we at present deny, or conversely, 
that the obtaining o f what we lay claim to today was something they then denied. In 
other words, in correcting them we take it that they related to something we relate to; 
and in nonetheless conceding the reasonableness o f the moves they made, we conceive 
o f what they related to as independent from the epistemic predicament they happened to 
be in. The fact that every now and then, claims are reinstated that had in between been 
abandoned, reveals that we want to be understood as laying claim to something that is 
likewise independent from our present epistemic state. Otherwise we could not sensibly 
hold that our ancestors believed what we now believe, even though they had no idea o f 
what our present epistemic state would be like.
We thereby arrive at a conception o f truth conditional content that is objective: 
in making truth claims, we seek to latch onto an objective reality whose nature can be 
assessed from different points o f view and is conceived to be independent from any 
particular point o f view, in the sense that whether or not it is assessed correctly w ill be 
settled, i f  at all, across the board.97 It is for this reason that the assertibilist must be 
considered to do no more than record patterns o f the use we make o f sentences in our
96 This holds good even 11' warrants are mandatory. Norms of warranted assertion dictate that one make 
assertions, i f  there are mandatory warrants for them— in the sense that the refusal to make them in the 
presence of such warrants would be unwarranted. But the intention to comply with these norms never 
provides for an incentive to arrive at a position in which there are such warrants.
97 This is not to say that the correctness of such assessments cannot be settled from any particular point o f 
view, nor to say that the nature of reality is independent from the fact that we can attain a point o f view 
from which wo may assess it correctly. Thus, anti-realism is still with us.
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repertoire. How we conceive o f what we do— our understanding o f what we say— has 
not yet been addressed: it is to this conception that tmth conditional semantics answers. 
But once this concern is taken to heart, then both the assertoric content and the 
ingredient sense o f a sentence must be conceived o f in terms o f its truth conditions, and 
the distinction between assertoric content and ingredient sense collapses.
3.9 The M anifestation Argument Reconsidered
The question o f what it  is for a sentence to have the meaning that it does, may be 
answered in (at least) two systematically different ways. Either it is understood as a 
question about what the meaning o f a sentence consists in. Here it may be appropriate to 
answer that for a sentence to have the meaning that it does is for this sentence to have a 
specific set o f truth conditions, or a specific conceptual role, or a contrast class. There 
are doubtless just as many answers to this question as thus understood, as there are 
theories o f meaning. Alternatively, the question may be regarded as arising only after 
such an answer has been given. Thus, once we have identified the meaning o f a sentence 
with its truth conditions, we may still want to know what it is for a sentence to have the 
truth conditions it d o e s . ^8 in  other words, we may agree on what the nature o f meaning 
is, and yet be at a loss to say which facts determine whether a given sentence has this 
rather than that meaning. Theories o f meaning attempt to give answers to both these 
questions. Just as the question w ith which we began oscillates between these two 
readings, so does the term "meaning" itself: the meaning o f a sentence may either be 
understood as what it is this sentence means, or as consisting in the fact that this 
sentence means what it does.
Following Wittgenstein, Dummett has famously argued that meaning— in the 
sense o f having a specific meaning— is determined by facts o f how language is being 
used.99 It is only on the basis o f observable features o f use that we can come to know 
what a given sentence means, and insofar as communication is possible, there must be 
such features o f use on whose basis we can attain this knowledge. The justification we 
have for ascribing a certain meaning to a given sentence w ill accordingly consist in our 
ability to adduce facts about how this sentence is being used. Once we know these facts, 
we know how to use this sentence ourselves in such a way that others thereby become
98 This question again differs from the question of which truth conditions a given sentence actually has. 
Although it must be possible to answer the latter on the basis of an answer to the former, theories o f 
meaning do not attempt to give an answer to the latter question. I f  at all, this w ill be the task o f a linguist, 
and not a philosopher of language.
99 I f  Dummett had in mind that meaning— in the sense of what it is that a sentence means— was so 
determined, then the following quote would be rather puzzling: "since meaning depends, ultimately and 
exhaustively, on use, what [is] required [is] a uniform means of characterising the use o f a sentence, given 
its truth conditions"; [TOE]: xxi (my emphases).
115
entitled to ascribe to us knowledge o f its meaning. Accordingly, we may say that 
knowledge of the meaning o f a sentence resides or is manifested in a practical ability to 
use that sentence.
I f  no answer can be given to the question of which facts about its use determine 
which meaning a given sentence has, in particular none that yields a criterion for 
sameness o f meaning, then this w ill backfire and call into question whether we have 
properly identified the nature o f meaning in the first place. Accordingly, i f  we identify 
the assertoric content of a sentence with its truth conditions, then there must be aspects 
o f the use o f that sentence which determine that it has a specific set o f truth conditions 
which are such that any sentence used in the same way can be shown to have the same 
set o f truth conditions. Otherwise the assertoric content o f a sentence cannot be 
identified with its truth conditions. We called this constraint on theories o f meaning the 
Manifestability Requirement.
The Manifestability Requirement is to be distinguished from the anti-realist's 
Manifestation Argument. The Manifestation Argument is intended to show that 
knowledge o f truth conditions whose obtaining is potentially recognition-transcendent 
cannot be manifested in use. In other words, it infers verificationism about matters o f 
fact from verificationism about meaning. Let us recall, the argument runs as follows:
(i) the ability to engage in assertoric practice, i.e. the practice o f expressing 
verdicts or giving answers to questions, solely requires the ability to 
recognise the obtaining o f those conditions under which the assertion o f a 
given sentence qualifies as correct, and o f those under which it does not—  
and the ability to act upon the recognition o f their obtaining
(ii) knowledge o f truth conditions is already fu lly manifested in the ability to 
engage in assertoric practice
(iii)  the only conditions knowledge o f which we fu lly display in assertoric 
practice are conditions whose obtaining we are able to recognise
(iv) hence, truth conditions w ill be amongst those conditions whose obtaining 
we are able to recognise— and knowledge of truth conditions is accordingly 
manifested in the ability to recognise that they obtain, i f  they do obtain.
Leaving Moorean sentences to one side, we have received further unexpected support 
for (iii). On the same grounds, we have to acknowledge that the conjunction o f (i) and 
(ii) is untenable: the ability to recognise the obtaining of assertibility conditions does
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not yet license the ascription o f knowledge o f truth conditions, unless knowledge of 
truth conditions is explained in terms o f a grasp o f (DS). But knowledge o f truth 
conditions can then no longer be regarded as explanatory o f what it is to understand 
one's language. On the other hand, our practice o f making corrections already seemed to 
undermine any attempt to deflate knowledge o f truth conditions in this way. Thus, it 
would appear that either (i) or (ii)  has to go.
The anti-realist might try to adjust her argument accordingly, replacing (ii) by
(ii*):
( ii* )  knowledge o f truth conditions is already fu lly manifested in the ability to 
engage in the practice o f making corrections.
She might then draw attention to the fact that the conditions under which it is acceptable 
to correct what others have claimed are essentially conditions we can recognise to 
obtain, and replace (i) by (i*):
(i* ) the ability to engage in the practice o f making corrections solely requires the 
ability to recognise the obtaining o f those conditions under which such a 
correction qualifies as correct, and o f those under which it does not.
The trouble is that assertions qualify as corrections (in the intended sense) only in virtue 
o f the content that they have. It is only i f  a sentence can be assigned truth conditions 
that diverge from the conditions under which it is warrantedly assertible, that we are 
able to identify an assertion o f this sentence as a correction, which is not the ascription 
o f a failure to meet standards o f warranted assertion. There is, in other words, no 
institution o f making corrections over and above the institution o f making assertions. In 
particular, i f  what a speaker has stated is in the process o f being corrected, while the 
concession is nonetheless made that she was warranted in stating what she did, then this 
speaker w ill not be sanctioned for what she did. The failures we highlight by making 
corrections o f the intended kind are essentially blameless.
I f  all we had to go for was our own conception as competent speakers, o f what 
we do in correcting each other, then assertibilism would prove us guilty o f not meeting 
the Manifestability Requirement. We would then leave it entirely open how someone 
might learn, by observing what we do, that some o f our assertions are corrections while 
others are not: whether sentences have objective truth conditions and, i f  so, which these 
are, cannot be discerned from their warranted assertibility conditions.
The constraint that a theory o f meaning give a semantics for logical operators 
was supposed to rule out the rival o f truth conditional semantics. Le. assertibilism. It
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was then thought to be a matter o f whether our assertoric practice— the use we make o f 
sentences in making assertions— could or could not license ascriptions o f realistically 
conceived truth conditions. Since assertibilism could provide for an account o f logical 
operators which reflected the inferential dependencies between sentences that contain 
these operators and sentences that do not however, we are now bound to conclude either
(a) that knowledge o f objective truth conditions must be manifested other than by the 
ability to recognise those conditions under which the assertion o f a given sentence is 
acceptable and those under which it is not, or (b) that our conception o f corrections is 
after all ill-founded. As long as we deny (b)— as it is incumbent upon us to do— the 
Manifestation Argument proves to rest on crumbling f o u n d a t i o n s . 9^0 p o r  i f  (ü) has to be 
dropped as long as (i) is retained— and i f  (i) and (ii) cannot be replaced by (i*) and ( ii* )  
either— the anti-realist w ill not then establish what she sought to establish on the basis 
o f these premisses.
The realist may well concede that in knowing that a given sentence has specific 
truth conditions, a speaker has to know the conditions under which this sentence is 
warrantedly assertible and those under which, given the evidence, it  ought to be denied. 
These conditions may be thought to partially determine which truth condition this 
sentence has. Both the realist and the anti-realist, however, w ill have to claim that to 
know no more than this is not yet sufficient for knowledge o f truth conditions. 
Whatever else is needed though, it w ill not— or at least not necessarily— consist in the 
recognitional abilities the anti-realist is after, for the attribution o f recognitional abilities 
would appear to be licensed only by our practice of reaching verdicts which are 
warranted. Accordingly, it is thus far an open question whether knowledge of 
realistically conceived truth conditions can be manifested in use: the Manifestation 
Argument fails.
*99 As I have argued at the end of chapter two and the beginning o f the present chapter, anti-realism does 
not collapse into assertibilism; cf. as well Dummett [TOE]: xxii. Even i f  this assumption proved wrong 
however, the subsequent chapters w ill show how assertibilism can be overcome without violating the 
Manifestability Requirement.
*9* Thus, when Wright argues that it seems quite unclear how knowledge o f warranted assertibility 
conditions might "provide the basis for forming an understanding of the truth-condition itse lf just as 
"confrontation with camels is not a good route to grasp o f the concept o f an antelope", he overlooks the 
possibility that to know the warranted assertibility conditions o f a given sentence may be to know part o f 
what determines which truth condition that sentence has; [RMT]: 14. Insofar as Dummett's circularity 
objection against a realist account of knowledge o f truth conditions is not already hostage to the validity 
o f (EC*), it is subject to essentially the same complaint; see [LBM]: 307-16. In [W TM /II]: 88-93, 
Dummett correctly remarks that insofar as a realist theory o f meaning has trouble to explain how 
knowledge o f the truth conditions of a given sentence relates to or yields knowledge o f what constitutes a 
defeasible ground for asserting this sentence, then so has an anti-realist theory o f meaning that takes 
verification or falsification as its core concept. I f  knowledge o f the latter forms an integral part o f the 
former however— in the sense that the warranted assertibility conditions o f a sentence are known to 
determine which truth conditions this sentence has— then this problem disappears not only for the anti- 
realist, but for the realist as well.
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O f course, this is not to say that there is no alternative argument to be had that is suited 
to vindicate (EC*). But whether or not there is such an argument is a question which 
w ill have to wait to be answered, until we are in a position to say how a grasp o f truth 
conditions which diverge from conditions o f warranted assertibility is manifested in use. 
Indeed, it w ill not be until the final chapter that we return to the question o f whether 
(EC*) can be shown to hold a p rio ri. In the meantime, we shall instead be concerned 
with the task o f meeting the assertibilist’s challenge.
The anti-realist intended to explain the unrecognisability o f Moorean sentences 
in terms of the difference between the truth and the warranted assertibility conditions o f 
their constituents, while retaining the idea that for any non-Moorean sentence S, i f  S is 
true, then there is a state o f information which we may attain and which w ill furnish us 
with warrants on whose basis we may recognise that S is true. She accordingly had to 
render intelligible how the understanding o f sentences apt for objective truth can be 
manifested in the mastery of their assertoric use, although they share their warranted 
assertibility conditions with other sentences whose truth coincides w ith their warranted 
assertibility. Dummett suggested that this could be done by way o f identifying the truth 
conditions o f a sentence with the systematic contribution this sentence makes to the 
determination o f the warranted assertibility conditions o f sentences in which it occurs as 
a constituent. I f  this construal o f truth conditions had been successful, we would now be 
in a position to account for the difference in truth conditions between "P" and 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P", without at the same time undermining the thought 
that mastery of warranted assertibility conditions is sufficient for knowledge o f truth 
conditions. In the same vein, it  would then have been utterly mysterious how we could 
ever be justified in ascribing knowledge o f potentially recognition-transcendent truth 
conditions: even i f  it is not the case that a sentence is true whenever assertible, all the 
conditions o f use whose grasp is displayed in assertoric practice are by their very nature 
recognisable. Rather, it would then be more adequate to view the use we make o f 
sentences as constituents o f other more complex ones, as effecting a division between 
those assertibility-conferring states which render these sentences true and those which 
do not.
But it turned out that to the extent that a systematic account o f warranted 
assertibility conditions is possible at all, ascribing knowledge of objective truth 
conditions is unfounded as long as we restrict attention to assertoric use— however 
holistic in nature. Assertibilism could account for this aspect o f language use, paying 
due weight to the inferential links between complex sentences and their constituents, 
without yet invoking objective truth conditions. A ll that could be established was that 
speakers use "is warrantedly assertible" and "is true" differently in certain contexts. But 
this in itself is no significant fact that takes us anywhere near a vindication o f our
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object!vist conception o f truth, unless it can be shown in addition that speakers conceive 
o f their assertions as representing how things are independently from how matters stand 
with respect to the current and defeasible propriety o f making them.
Assertibilism remains in play as long as we are concerned with no more than 
what is manifested in assertoric practice. I f  we are to display how knowledge of 
objective truth conditions is manifested in use, we must accordingly go beyond the 
merely assertoric. In meeting the Inferentiality Constraint (IC), the assertibilist not only 
availed herself o f warrants for asserting, but also o f warrant-preserving rules o f 
inference. It might now be suggested that there is more to our inferential practice than 
the application o f such rules. Rather, this practice may be said to disclose what the 
assertibilist cannot account for, viz. that the rules we apply preserve objective truth 
rather than warranted assertibility. We aie thus invited to shift attention from grounds 
for assertions to their consequences: it may be our practice o f drawing conclusions that 
ultimately manifests in which sense the assertibilist misconstrues the content o f our 
assertions.
In the next chapter I  shall fo llow  this line o f thought and discuss Brandom's 
recent proposal as to how mastery o f inferential practice may be shown to issue in 
knowledge of objective truth conditions. M y conclusion w ill again be negative: 
Brandom fails to invalidate certain inference rules which take us from the truth o f a 
sentence to its current assertibility or vice versa. This is ultimately due to the fact that he 
is solely concerned with the pragmatic consequences which asserting the premisses o f a 
valid inference is bound to have.
I do not intend to leave matters there however. Rather, I  shall suggest how we 
may eventually arrive at a manifestation o f our minimalist conception o f objective truth 
by way o f combining Brandom's overall strategy with the outcome o f the present 
chapter: instead of giving the pragmatics o f valid inference in terms o f the consequences 
o f assertions, we should conceive o f inferential processes as proceeding from the 
assumption o f the premisses, and not their endorsement. This procedure w ill pave the 
way to a reconciliation o f our objectivism about truth with the constraints imposed by 
the Manifestability Requirement— or so I  shall suggest in the final section o f the 
following chapter. The penultimate chapter w ill accordingly be designed to put this idea 
to work.
Chapter Four
In the last chapter we were concerned w ith a semantic theory— assertibilism— according 
to which the designated semantic value o f a sentence consists in its being warrantedly 
assertible. I f  we conceive o f deductive validity in terms o f the preservation o f 
designated value from the set o f premisses to the conclusion, then according to this 
theory the following inferences come out as deductively valid:
It is warrantedly assertible that P 
It is warrantedly assertible that P
Although assertibilism was revealed to be at odds with our conception o f corrections 
without sanctions, it was not shown to be empirically inadequate, for corrections o f the 
intended kind are assertions which qualify as such only in virtue o f the content that they 
have. Calling an assertion a correction o f this kind is therefore to imply that it does have 
objective truth conditions. But we wanted to know how the latter claim might be 
justified in the first place— where such a justification was supposed to be based on facts 
about language use. As should be clear by now, the observation that sentences with 
objective truth conditions can be used so as to make assertions by their means is o f no 
help here because such sentences share their assertibility conditions with sentences not 
apt for objective truth.
Accordingly, the assertibilist's challenge is: how can it be vindicated by appeal 
to the use we make o f the sentences in our repertoire that, in general, their designated 
value ought rather to be taken to consist in their being objectively true? What we 
ultimately have to show is that given the way speakers use their language, they conceive 
o f some o f the sentences S in their repertoire as satisfying the following objectivity 
constraints:
(01) S may (actually) be true, even i f  S fails to be at present warrantedly assertible
(02) S may (actually) fail to be true, even i f  S is at present warrantedly assertible.
It would indeed be a first step in this direction i f  we proved able to identify publicly 
observable features o f use which demonstrate that it would be inadequate to ascribe to
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speakers a conception o f deductive validity according to which the aforementioned 
inferences turned out deductively valid. To vindicate a semantic theory according to 
which the designated value o f a sentence does not consist in its being warrantedly 
assertible— to the effect that the aforementioned inferences turn out deductively 
invalid— is only a first step in this direction however: even i f  "P" and 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" can be said to entail different sentences, this much 
does not yet demonstrate that (O l) and (0 2 ) hold, for even i f  (O l) and (0 2 ) cannot be 
wronged on purely conceptual grounds, it may nonetheless be ruled out a p r io r i that 
they are satisfied.
In this chapter I intend to do three things. First, I  shall review and ultimately 
dismiss two recent proposals o f how the notion o f truth-preserving inference may be 
recovered from an account o f language use (sections 4.2 to 4.4). Both proposals are due 
to Robert Brandom.' He suggests two alternative accounts o f deductive validity or 
entailment.2 According to the first o f these, deductively valid inferences ought to be 
explained in terms of the norm-governed practice o f drawing commitment-preserving 
inferences. According to the second proposal, deductively valid inferences ought rather 
to be understood in terms o f the pragmatic notion o f incompatibility. I  shall argue that 
both proposals fa il and offer a diagnosis as to why they are bound to do so.
Secondly, I  shall give a first sketch o f how the highlighted problems may be 
circumvented (section 4.5). I shall suggest that deductive validity may be seen to be 
manifested in what speakers who engage in hypothetical reasoning are committed to. 
This construal as yet falls short of demonstrating however, that speakers who follow 
these rules conceive o f the assertoric content o f some of the sentences in their repertoire 
as licensing (O l) and (0 2 ).
Thirdly, I  shall therefore be concerned with the question o f what else is needed 
in order to connect the practice o f hypothetical reasoning with the manifestation o f (O l) 
and (02) (section 4.6). Here my main contention w ill be that in certain contexts 
hypothetical reasoning may already be seen to manifest an objectivist conception o f
' Brandom [MIE].
2 Brandom opposes the view according to which all deductively good inferences are formally valid 
inferences, or formally valid inferences with suppressed premisses; [M IE]: 97-105. Thus, he intends to 
include materially good inferences such as
.V  is a bachelor
X is male
and treat them as primitive(ly good). For his account of formal validity, see for instance [M IE]: 135. My 
own proposal— as sketched in section (4.5)— w ill likewise be concerned with the broader notion o f 
analytic consequence or entailment rather than logical consequence. Nevertheless, I shall continue to use 
the term "deductive validity" (rather than "goodness") in order to characterise the inferences both 
Brandom and I seek to account for.
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truth, provided we can render intelligible why it  occurs in these contexts at all. In order 
to do so we must reassess what it is to strive for objective truth and what it is to commit 
oneself to its obtaining. This w ill be the topic o f the next chapter.
4.1 T ru th  a n d  In fe rence
The position developed and defended by Brandom belongs to a family o f views which 
try to ground semantics in a theory o f linguistic practice. According to these views 
semantic facts are ultimately determined by, or just consist of, facts about the proper use 
o f language. This general claim is based on the observation that what we say by means 
o f a sentence depends on how we actually use this sentence. On the other hand, this 
claim is answerable to the fact that the use we make of a given sentence is constrained 
by norms which we may now and then fail to satisfy, hence its appeal to the proper use 
o f language. S till such norms are not conceived to be independent from our actual 
practice either, for we cannot be said to be bound by norms no one ever tries to satisfy. 
In other words, Brandom unconditionally accepts the Manifestability Requirement.
A t the same time however, Brandom's theory o f meaning is meant to mark a 
departure from the traditional picture o f how semantics and pragmatics are related to 
each other. The orthodox set-theoretic view of semantics takes truth (or satisfaction) as 
its fundamental notion and defines others in its terms. The task o f pragmatics 
accordingly becomes to devise an account o f how speakers may use a given sentence in 
such a way that this sentence is being endowed with a specific set o f truth conditions. 
Brandom's position on the other hand, rests on an inferentialist conception o f semantics 
in which the notion o f goodness o f inference plays the key role: it is ultimately by 
appeal to this notion that other semantic concepts such as truth are to be explained. His 
pragmatics is correspondingly designed to ground this notion in inferential practice.
Just as a proponent o f the traditional view is bound to give an account o f 
goodness o f inference, so too is a proponent o f inferentialist semantics bound to give an 
account o f truth (or satisfaction) conditions. Consequently, Brandom sets himself the 
task to devise an account o f propositional content— or what Frege temied 
'judgeable content'— without yet invoking the concept o f truth.3 According to his 
proposal, such contents ought rather to be conceived o f in terms o f the inferential roles 
those sentences play which are supposed to express them.^
Inferential roles are in turn understood in terms o f proprieties o f inference. 
Roughly speaking, two sentences have the same inferential role only i f  substituting one 
for the other in a given inference never turns that inference from a good one into a bad
3 [M IE]; 93-94, 202. 
^ [M IE]: chapter two.
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one.3 Here the notion o f goodness o f inference serves as a primitive of semantic theory 
which receives its interpretation within pragmatics. Ultimately, proprieties o f inferences 
are supposed to be explained in terms o f the practice o f assessing such inferences as 
correct or incorrect. In Brandom's own words:
[e]xpressions come to mean what they mean by being used as they are in practice [...]. 
Content is understood in terms of proprieties o f inference, and those are understood in 
terms o f the norm-instituting attitudes o f taking or treating moves as appropriate or 
inappropriate in practice. A  theoretical route is accordingly made available from what 
people do to what they mean, from their practice to the contents o f their states and 
expressions. In this way a suitable pragmatic theory can ground an inferentialist semantic 
theory; its explanations o f what it is in practice to treat inferences as correct are what 
ultimately license appeal to material proprieties o f inference, which can then function as 
semantic primitives.^
The basic idea underlying this proposal seems to be that the goodness o f inferences can 
be assessed by speakers quite independently from an assessment o f either their 
premisses or conclusions. This would appear to have the following advantage: i f  
propositional content can be explained independently o f truth, then truth can be defined 
in terms o f sameness o f propositional content along familiar lines:
VS[S is true o  XP(S says that P &  P)].7
A t the same time however, proprieties o f inference— hence ultimately propositional 
contents— may well be determined by the speakers' treatment o f inferences as correct, 
while tmth can nonetheless remain objective and independent from any such 
assessment.8 In fact Brandom intends to show
how, starting with the sort o f norms [...] about which the community's all-inclusive 
practical assessment cannot be mistaken [...] genuine, and therefore objective, conceptual 
norms can be elaborated. These bind the community of concept-users in such a way that it 
is possible not only for individuals but for the whole community to be mistaken in its 
assessments o f what they require in particular case s.9
3 See Brandom [M IE]: 347. A  more accurate formulation o f this inferentialist account o f sameness of 
content w ill be discussed in section (4.4) below.
6 [M IE]: 134.
7 [M IE]: 299-305; cf. as well Brandom [PPT]: 84-92. The definition presented here differs however from 
Brandom's adaptation of the prosentenlial theory of truth in several respects. Most notably, "true" is here 
used as a proper predicate. Still this definition is minimalist in spirit, and the syntactic classification o f 
"true" a minor issue. Note that the use of substitutional quantification allows us to construe 
"S says that P” as "S has the same content as "P"". Accordingly, the former locution can be explained in 
terms o f sameness o f inferential role without any recourse to truth conditions.
8 [M IE]: 62-64, 136-40.
9 [M IE ]: 54.
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This passage indeed suggests that Brandom conceives o f proprieties o f inference as 
something about which the speech community's "all-inclusive practical assessment 
cannot be mistaken".'9 Brandom argues however, that
[a] semantically adequate notion o f correct inference must generate an acceptable notion o f 
conceptual content. But such a notion must fund the idea of objective truth conditions and 
so of objectively correct inferences. Such proprieties o f judgment and inference outrun 
actual attitudes of taking or treating judgments and inferences as correct. [...]
"This means that although the inferentialist order o f explanation may start with inferences 
that are correct in the sense that they are accepted in the practice o f a community, it cannot 
end there. It must somehow move beyond this sense of correctness [...]. Pursuing the 
inferentialist order o f explanation [...] accordingly requires explaining how— if  actual 
practical attitudes of taking or treating as correct institute the normative statuses of 
materially correct inferences, and these material proprieties of inference in turn confer 
conceptual content— that content nonetheless involves objective proprieties to which the 
practical attitudes underlying the meanings themselves answer."
Thus Brandom contends that in order to make room for the objectivity o f truth, we have 
to invoke a notion o f correctness o f inference that is likewise objective. But why should 
the idea that we cannot all be mistaken about what follows from a given set o f premisses 
be in tension with the idea that we may all be mistaken about whether these premisses 
are true? By the same token: why should the fact that the correctness o f inferences is 
determined by our taking them to be correct leave no room for the fact that our taking 
the premisses to be true does not determine their truth? '2 In raising these questions I  do 
not wish to suggest that deductive validity, say, is indeed determined by what we 
actually take to be deductively valid. I do wish to call attention however to the fact that 
whether or not this is so is not yet settled by the aptness o f premisses and conclusions 
for objective truth.'3
'9 Cf. as well [M IE]: 133-34; and Brandom [A ]: 640-41, 644-45.
"  [M IE]: 137.
'2 These questions may be seen to provide the starting point for Wittgenstein's renunciation o f Frege's 
view o f logical reasoning. In [GG/I]: xiv-xix, Frege described logical laws as a means to attain the truth, 
rather than as a means to preserve it once recognised. Logical reasoning would then have to be regarded 
as an exercise of our noiis: its model is the recognition o f logical truths, rather than the application o f a 
technique operating on the objects o f recognition. Given Frege's conception o f truth as objective— hence 
independent from any such exercise— our logical reasoning would thus be liable to error or cognitive 
shortcoming, in just the same sense in which our recognition o f the truth of the premisses o f an inference 
is. Obverse]}’, what we ought to infer would be determined by the way things are to the same extent to 
which what we ought to hold true is so determined. Wittgenstein on the other hand, conceived o f our 
logical reasoning as the application o f a technique for whose evaluation the notion of objectivity seems to 
be just as inappropriate as for the evaluation o f exercises of other practical skills (such as driving a car or 
dancing the Tango); cf. e.g. [RFM]: III § 5, IV  §§ 18, 50, V  §§ 1-5, 14-15, 23-24, 36, 45-46.
'3 Note that only the first paragraph quoted speaks to the idea that the objective truth o f premisses and 
conclusions calls for a sense in which inferences are objectively correct. The second paragraph merely 
states that an inferentialist notion of judgeable content must leave room for the idea that premisses and 
conclusions of an inference may be objectively true.
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The obligation to leave room for a standard o f objective correctness which inferences 
have to meet may indeed cast some doubt on the prospects o f Brandom's overall 
pragmatist programme according to which norms are to be conceived o f as instituted by 
attitudes But for present purposes we can leave these worries to one side. Even i f  a 
distinction can somehow be drawn between what speakers ought to treat as a correct 
inference and what they actually treat as such, Brandom still owes us an account o f what 
it is to treat an inference as correct which does not appeal to a prior notion o f objectively 
correct, viz. deductively valid, inference. Otherwise he would not have shown how 
semantic facts are determined by facts about proper use.‘  ^As I shall argue however, on 
both his accounts o f what it is to treat an inference as deductively valid, it follows that 
speakers ought to treat inferences as deductively valid which are not in fact so.
According to Brandom, a conceptual norm is objective only i f  we may all be 
mistaken about whether or not a given object falls under the concept which records that 
norm. Concepts essentially form part o f judgeable contents which may be true or false. 
Given the Equivalence Schema:
(ES) it is true that P i f f  P,
we may accordingly say that the concept o f truth itself records an objective norm 
provided there are claims about whose truth-value we may all be mistaken.
This independence o f truth from our actual attitudes towards it— what Brandom 
calls its 'attitude-transcendence' — is surely not all there is to truth's objectivity. A t 
least w ith respect to discourses in which warrants to assert tend to be non-factive, we 
wish to hold that there are some sentences, notably empirical ones, which satisfy (O l)
'4 [M IE ]: 133-34.
On the orthodox view o f the relation between semantics and pragmatics, the Manifestability 
Requirement does not necessarily force an account of truth in terms o f what speakers ought to hold true, 
where the latter notion is independently available. On this view, what has to be explained in pragmatic 
terms is that a given sentence has a specific set o f truth conditions, not that it has a particular truth-value. 
Still it seems likely that such an explanation w ill be forthcoming only i f  we have an independent grasp o f 
what it is to strive for, and commit oneself to, the truth.
In saying so, I am well aware o f the fact that Brandom denies that "true" denotes a property; [M IE]; 
325-27. His reason for this denial is ultimately that in the version o f deflationism he favours, "true" does 
not even function as a predicate. Whatever the merits o f these syntactic considerations, it is nonetheless 
clear that one cannot on the one hand talk about conceptual norms (sharing the property of) being 
objective, and deny on the other that it makes sense to speak o f truth conditions whose obtaining we may 
all be mistaken about, have no reason to believe in, etc. It is in this more or less formal sense that I intend 
my use o f "objective truth" to be understood. I f  this is in tension with deflationism as Wright has argued 
in chapter one o f his [TO], then so much the worse for Brandom.
Brandom [ONR]; 6-7; cf. as well [M IE]: 78.
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and (02). Even an anti-realist w ill concede that there are such sentences. Given that this 
is a conception o f objectivity Brandom shares— and the way he sets things up strongly 
suggests that he does — it is incumbent upon him to show, by appeal to the way 
speakers behave or ought to behave, that they can be said to conceive o f the content 
expressed by a sentence in such a way that both (O l) and (02) hold good. In particular 
then Brandom must show on the basis o f his account o f what it is to treat an inference as 
deductively valid, that speakers ought not to treat either o f the aforementioned 
inferences as deductively valid (or even ought to treat them as deductively mvalid):
It is warrantedly assertible that P 
It is warrantedly assertible that P
I  shall argue however that Brandom lacks the resources to invalidate either inference in 
that on both o f his accounts o f what it is to treat an inference as deductively valid, 
speakers are rationally compelled to treat both inferences as deductively valid.
4.2 Warrants to Assert
The ai'guments to be presented in sections (4.3) and (4.4) rest on two principles which 
have already been introduced and motivated in chapter two. Before I embark on 
showing that Brandom lacks the resources to invalidate either o f the aforementioned 
inferences, it w ill therefore be necessary to say which principles these are, and to briefly 
show that Brandom himself is prepared or even compelled to endorse them.
The objection I shall raise against Brandom's first proposal, as to how deductive 
validity may be construed in purely pragmatic terms, rests on principle (A l)  w ith which 
we are by now only too familiar:
(A l)  "P" is warrantedly assertible i f f
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible.
Brandom [TA]: 138; [M IE]: 121; and [ONR]: 17-25.
127
Brandom explicitly endorses (A l)  when he contrasts truth conditions w ith conditions o f 
warranted assertibility. He writes:
[wjhenever
I ) 'The [watch] is red’
is appropriately assertible, it is equally appropriate to assert
2) 'The claim that the [watch] is red is properly assertible by me now.'
For the latter just makes explicit, as part o f the content that is asserted, what is implicit in 
[...] what one is doing in [...] asserting [the former]. And yet, we want to say that the 
contents are different. Though the two claims have the same assertibility conditions, they 
have different truth conditions.
Thus it  w ill not be inappropriate to appeal to (A l)  in assessing Brandom's theory o f 
meaning because this theory does not presuppose that (A l)  fails.
Let us now turn to the second principle on whose acceptance I  shall rely. As
already mentioned in section (2.3) o f chapter two, warrants for claims can be classified
according to whether they are mandatory or purely permissive. Whether a warrant is 
mandatory at a given time depends on the sum total o f warrants available at that time. 
We may therefore say that a warrant mandates endorsement o f "P" relative to a state o f 
information y just in case, for all speakers x, i f  % is in j ,  x's refusal to endorse "P " (or her 
readiness to endorse "~P") in face o f that warrant, ought not to be tolerated. No state o f 
information w ill contain mandatory warrants for both "P" and its negation. Otherwise, it 
would be mandated to hold contradictory beliefs. By contrast, a warrant is a purely 
permissive warrant for "P" relative toy just in case, for all speakers x, i f  x  is iny, it  is not 
the case that x's refusal to endorse "P", despite the existence o f this warrant, ought not to 
be tolerated. Purely peimissive warrants for "P" can co-exist w ith purely permissive 
warrants for its negation.
One part o f the objection I  shall raise against Brandom's second proposal 
proceeds from the assumption that there is a class o f sentences the warrants for whose 
assertion are mandatory in the sense explained. Even so, rejecting this assumption as 
incorrect does not salvage this second proposal from succumbing to the other part o f the 
objection, but merely makes its failure less dramatic.
If, in general, the warranted assertibility o f a sentence was solely a matter o f 
whether it can consistently be asserted, then this assumption could not be made.“  ^ For 
either "P" is consistent with what else one believes and so is its negation, or only "P" is
‘ 9 [ONR]: 18; cf. as well [M IE]: 121, 604; and [TA]: 139-49.
In some places Brandom does indeed suggest this reading of what he terms "entitlement", where 
entitlement to P is meant to imply the warranted assertibility o f P; [M IE]: 160, 606.
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consistent with what else one believes, but the warranted assertibility o f its negation 
could always be established by fiddling with what else one believes: ex hypothesis one's 
background beliefs have no privileged status, but must merely cohere w ith what else one 
believes, e.g. the negation o f "P".
The idea that warranted assertibility is solely a matter o f consistency however, is 
anyway a bad one. Consider the case in which someone gathered overwhelming 
inductive evidence for the claim that all crows are black— say she has observed a 
m illion black crows, but not a single non-black crow. It would still be consistent with 
this evidence that there was a thus far* unobserved non-black crow. But surely this alone 
w ill never entitle the speaker to a commitment to the claim that there was such a crow. It 
is o f no use here to reply that given the evidence, commitment to certain principles o f 
rational belief formation precluded entitlement to the claim that there was such a crow. 
Nor are these principles inconsistent with the conjunction o f both this claim and the 
given evidence, nor is there ex hypothesi anything in virtue o f which the speaker ought 
to commit herself to these principles.
What goes for the suggestion that entitlement is solely a matter o f consistency, 
goes for the more general idea that warrants are never mandatory, but always purely 
permissive. A  warrant is purely permissive just in case it does not rationally compel 
endorsement o f what it warrants— this just means that this warrant would permit 
endorsement o f the negation o f what it is a warrant for, or at least the suspension o f 
judgement on the matter. I f  all warrants were purely permissive however, the notions o f 
rational disagreement and correction would be empty.
Indeed, Brandom himself concedes that some claims such as observation reports 
have the status o f being justified by default, and that any challenge o f this status must 
itself be backed up by warrants.-- He says o f such claims:
[tjhey are not immune to doubt in the form of questions about entitlement, but such 
questions themselves stand in need o f some sort o f warrant or justification.-^
Brandom argues that quite generally the responsibility to demonstrate one's entitlement 
to an assertoric commitment
is conditional on the commitment's being subject to a challenge that itself has, either by 
default or by demonstration, the status o f an entitled performance. Indeed, the simplest way 
to implement such a feature o f the model o f asserting is to require that the performances 
that have the significance o f challenging entitlements to assertional commitments
On the unintelligibility o f a purely permissive discourse, see Wright [TO]: 97-99; on the presumptive 
acceptability o f observation reports, see [TO]: 161-68.
22 [M IE]: 176-80, 204-206, 213-29.
22 [M IE]: 177.
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themselves be assertions. [...] Then challenges have no privileged status: their entitlement is 
on the table along with that o f what they challenge.2"^
It follows that in the absence o f defeating warrants, the refusal to endorse what enjoys 
the status o f being justified by default w ill be liable to penalty. For instance, as long as 
there are warrants for observation reports these warrants w ill mandate endorsement o f 
what is being reported, and i f  they do not, the reports w ill no longer qualify as 
warrantedly assertible because they have been defeated.
I shall therefore assume that Brandom not only subscribes to (A l) ,  but 
furthermore concedes that the class o f mandatory warrants is not empty. W ith these two 
theses being in place, let me now turn to his first proposal o f how deductive validity 
may be construed in purely pragmatic terms.
4.3 Deductive Valid ity and Commitment-Preserving Inferences
In Brandom's view, deductive validity is to be conceived o f in terms of what speakers 
ought to treat as a deductively valid inference where the notion o f treating an inference 
as deductively valid is independently a v a ila b le .2 5  I f  it  turns out that given Brandom's 
account of this notion, speakers are rationally compelled to treat an inference as 
deductively valid although it is deductively invalid, deductive validity cannot then be 
determined by what speakers ought to treat in this way.
According to Brandom's first proposal speakers treat an inference as deductively 
valid i f  and only i f  they take anyone committed to its premisses as being committed to 
its conclusions. In other words, deductive validity is explained in terms o f the propriety 
o f commitment-preserving inferences which is in turn determined by what speakers 
ought to do who attribute such commitments (to themselves or to others).26
In Brandom's view, assertoric commitments just as commitments in general have 
to be conceived along two normative dimensions: authority and responsibility. Thus, an 
agent incurs a commitment just in case (i) others are authorised to attribute this 
commitment to her, and (ii) others are authorised to rely on her future performance and 
to sanction non-performance. Indeed, (ii) explains what it means for someone to be 
authorised to attribute a commitment to others— i.e. (ii) explains the practical 
significance o f (i). Responsibility enters in the following way: in authorising others to 
attribute a commitment to oneself, one authorises them to hold one responsible for 
performing in a certain way, hence undertakes the responsibility to perform in that
24 [M IE ] :  178.
26 [M IE ]: xvi, 83-84, 132-34, 143-45. 
26 [M IE]: 168, 189.
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w a y . 22 For instance, i f  I promise to do x, then I authorise others to treat me as having 
promised to do x. Thereby I authorise them to rely on my actually doing x, hence to 
impose sanctions in case I do not. In this way I undertake the responsibility to do x since 
I  authorise others to hold me responsible for doing x.
The kind o f performance associated w ith a given commitment varies depending 
on the kind o f commitment undertaken. Brandom argues that in the case o f assertoric 
commitments, i.e. commitments to claims, these performances include (a) undertaking 
commitments to further claims which others ought to treat one as being committed to in 
treating one as being committed to the original claim, (b) showing one's readiness to 
offer, or accept, the original claim as a reason for other claims and finally, (c) 
demonstrating one's entitlement to the original claim i f  c h a lle n g e d .2 8
I  shall now argue that it can be shown, on the basis o f Brandom's conception o f 
assertoric commitments alone, that the following inference must be treated as 
commitment-preserving:
It is warrantedly assertible that P
In order to assess whether this inference indeed comes out as deductively valid on 
Brandom's view, we merely have to check whether anyone who is treated as being 
committed to the premiss ought to be treated as being committed to all claims entailed 
by the conclusion. In other words, we have to check whether anyone asserting "P" 
must be considered as being committed to the analytic consequences o f 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P".29
To begin with, i f  in committing myself to the claim that P I  authorise others to 
sanction my inability to demonstrate my entitlement to this commitment, I thereby 
authorise them to sanction my inability to demonstrate my entitlement to the claim that 
it is warrantedly assertible that P. For i f  I fa il in my attempt to display that I have a 
warrant for the latter, I thereby fa il in my attempt to display that I  have a warrant for the 
former and vice versa. According to (A l) ,  the warrants for either claim are the same.
But not only is a vindication o f the premiss a vindication of the conclusion. The 
conclusion states that such a vindication is possible. Now, i f  others are at all to rely on
27 [M IE]; 159-75.
28 [M IE]; 168-80, 188, 196.
29 The analytic consequences o f a sentence S comprise more than those sentences which S entails already 
by virtue o f its logical form, i.e. its logical consequences. For instance, "Paul is unmarried” is an analytic 
consequence of "Paul is a bachelor": the latter entails the former, albeit not solely by virtue of its logical 
form. The discussion w ill proceed in terms o f analytic rather than logical consequence, because Brandom 
has the broader notion in mind when he speaks o f the propriety o f deductive inferences. See footnote 2.
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my ability to demonstrate my entitlement to P— say in endorsing P on the basis o f my 
testimony— then they must take me as being committed to there being a warrant for P. 
In other words, they must take me as being committed to the claim that it is warrantedly 
assertible that P. I f  I were not so committed, I would lack the authority to make others 
rely on my ability to vindicate P. Thus, i f  I left it entirely open whether it was 
warrantedly assertible that P or even denied that it was, then no one would ever give 
anything on my undertaking the obligation to vindicate P, hence neither on my 
commitment to P.20
Since ex hypothesi in committing oneself to a given claim one commits oneself 
to all its analytic consequences, anyone who is treated as being committed to the claim 
that P ought therefore to be treated as likewise being committed to every analytic 
consequence o f the claim that it is warrantedly assertible that P. Accordingly, the above 
inference proves to be commitment-preserving.
Let us now have a look at whether the following inference comes out as 
deductively valid too, i f  deductive validity is taken to consist in the propriety o f 
commitment-preserving inferences;
It is warrantedly assertible that P
In committing oneself to its premiss one commits oneself to the existence of a warrant 
for it. According to (A l) ,  this warrant w ill likewise be a warrant for the conclusion. 
Whether commitment to there being such a warrant for the conclusion already 
engenders commitment to the conclusion itself depends on the nature o f that warrant. I f  
P is a claim, warrants for which mandate its endorsement, the above inference must be 
treated as commitment-preserving: i f  one treats someone as being committed to there 
being a mandatory warrant for the claim that P, then one ought to treat her as thereby 
being committed to the claim that P.^'
Even i f  the class o f claims, warrants for which are mandatory, was empty 
however, the proof that the first inference ought to be treated as commitment-preserving 
is already enough to undermine Brandom's suggestion that the propriety o f 
commitment-preserving inferences captures deductive validity. Clearly this inference is 
not deductively valid, hence ought neither to be treated as such. This finding, rather than 
dealing a death blow to Brandom's whole project, suggests how one might try to amend
20 Brandom [A ]: 641.
21 Note that Brandom himself distinguishes between the commitments undertaken by a speaker and the 
commitments this speaker acknowledges as having undertaken; [MIE]: 194. Thus, a speaker who is in 
state j  may be committed to there being a mandatory warrant for P in }— hence to P— without herself 
acknowledging the fact.
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it; given that Brandom proves able to give an adequate account o f inconsistency, he has 
the resources to define deductive validity in terms o f inconsistency.
4.4 Inconsistency and Incom patib ility
As already pointed out, Brandom rejects the orthodox account o f deductive validity in 
terms o f preservation o f truth. Rather, he reverses the order o f explanation and defines 
truth along deflationist lines thereby drawing on a notion o f sameness o f content which 
is to be understood in terms o f preservation o f goodness o f inference under 
intersubstitution.22 Deductive validity is here treated as a primitive o f semantic theory.
By the same token, Brandom inverts the strategy o f defining inconsistency in 
terms o f deductive validity and negation. Rather, he defines the negation o f a given 
sentence (j) to be that sentence (p for which it holds that for any sentence v inconsistent 
w ith (|), there is a deductively valid step from v to (p.22 Accordingly, he is bound to treat 
inconsistency as another prim itive notion o f his semantic theory.24
As soon as the notion o f inconsistency is available however, we no longer have 
any reason to treat deductive validity as primitive. We can then define the deductive 
validity o f a given inference
(1) Q
as follows: ( 1) is deductively valid just in case, for any sentence (p inconsistent with 
"Q", (p is likewise inconsistent w ith "P". Indeed according to Brandom's second 
proposal, this is the way to go.25
Brandom explains inconsistency in terms of incompatibility: two sentences ({) and 
(p are incompatible just in case commitment to (the claim effected by the assertion of) (j) 
precludes entitlement to (a commitment to the claim effected by the assertion of) cp and 
vice versa.^^ We may therefore say with Brandom that (j) and (p are mutually inconsistent
22 [M IE]: 347-48.
22 [M IE]: 115, 160.
24 [M IE]: 132-34.
26 Since Brandom conceives o f inconsistency as yielding an account o f strict implication, one may 
wonder why he advertises the propriety o f commitment-preserving inferences as capturing deductive 
validity in the first place; [M IE]: 132.
26 [M IE]: 160, 196.
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just in case speakers ought to treat anyone committed to (j) as not being entitled to cp and 
ought to treat anyone committed to (p as not being entitled to (j).
By the same token, it would appear that the notion o f analytic consequence can 
now be defined in terms o f incompatibility-entailment where ^  incompatibility-entails cp 
i f  and only i f  any sentence incompatible with cp is incompatible with (j).27 Thus (p is an 
analytic consequence o f ({) just in case for any sentence v for which it holds that speakers 
ought to treat anyone committed to v as not being entitled to <p and vice versa, speakers 
likewise ought to treat anyone committed to v as not being entitled to (j) and vice versa. 
In the same vein, (j) can be said to be logically equivalent to (p just in case ({) 
incompatibility-entails (p and (p incompatibility-entails (|). The negation o f (]) can be 
defined as that sentence which is incompatibility-entailed by any sentence incompatible 
w ith (|).28 Brandom even suggests defining sameness o f content in terms o f sameness o f 
incompatibles.29
Brandom's account o f inconsistency rests on the idea that commitment to a given 
claim precludes entitlement to others. However, it is hard to see how, apart from very 
special cases, this might be so. Such special cases may include avowals like 
"I am in pain", or observation reports made by an appropriately situated cognitively 
unimpaired and reliable perceiver. Thus the very fact that someone asserts 
" I am in pain" may be taken to undermine any entitlement to the claim that she is not. 
But generally the fact that someone asserts that P or is committed to the claim that P, 
does not in itself bereave any claim to the contrary o f its warranted a s s e r t i b i l i t y .40 In 
order to give sense to Brandom's idea o f a preclusion o f entitlements by commitments, 
we must accordingly seek an appropriate notion o f entitlement that may after all f i l l  the 
b ill.
To begin with, entitlement to a given claim understood as a status o f speakers, 
w ill not solely consist in the existence o f wairants for the assertion o f that claim.^i 
Rather it w ill furthermore depend on whether the speaker can avail herself o f such 
warrants. For instance: even i f  it  is warrantedly assertible that Paul is in pain, because 
Paul has sincerely asserted " I am in pain", still someone who held that Paul is 
completely neurotic would be debarred from justifying her claim that Paul is in pain by 
means o f referring to his avowal. In this sense commitments might be said to preclude 
entitlements.
27 [M IE ]: 132, 160.
28 [M IE]: 114-15.
29 [M IE ]: 160.
40 Cf. Wright [CoB]: 7-8.
41 [M IE]: 190-91.
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Obviously the case at hand yields no example o f two inconsistent sentences; 
"Paul is a complete neurotic" and "Paul is in pain" are perfectly consistent. The 
incompatibility o f two sentences ^  and cp does not just require that commitment to (|) 
precludes entitlement to (p, but also that commitment to (p precludes entitlement to (|). 
Accordingly, what we would have to show in order to present a counterexample to 
Brandom's analysis of inconsistency is that commitment to "Paul is in pain" precludes 
entitlement to "Paul is a complete neurotic".
So far this has not been our intention however. A ll we tried to do was give sense 
to the idea that commitments might preclude entitlements. Until now, we could give 
sense to this idea only by appeal to pairs o f sentences, one o f which related to the 
pedigree o f the evidence that could be adduced in support o f the other. It might 
accordingly be objected that generally, inconsistent sentences do not stand in this 
relation to each other. This objection to Brandom's account o f inconsistency is certainly 
misguided, for the following inferences are deductively valid:
Any evidence suggesting that ~P is misleading
42
Any evidence suggesting that P is misleading
Still there is a general d ifficulty with Brandom's analysis o f inconsistency that bears on 
the way in which a preclusion o f entitlement can be manifested in the practice o f 
treating each other's moves as correct or incorrect. Any argument to the effect that for 
some (j) and <p not entailing each other and any v inconsistent with (|), rational speakers 
cannot help but treat anyone committed to (p as not being entitled to v and cannot help 
but treat anyone committed to v as not being entitled to cp either, w ill eventually 
undermine Brandom's account o f inconsistency. And such arguments can be given.
As we have seen in section (4.3), anyone committed to (the claim effected by the 
assertion of) ({) is bound to undertake a commitment to there being warrants for asserting 
<|). Let ‘W(])’ abbreviate ‘(|) is warrantedly assertible’ and let ‘C(|)’ be short for
42 Cf. Cargile [JMD]: 218. Here, "misleading" merely means "pointing away from the truth". The 
evidence quantified over in the conclusions is evidence that can actually be attained: "P" would not entail 
the subjunctive conditional " I f  there was evidence suggesting that -P, it would nevertheless be true that 
P". For, the nearest possible worlds in which evidence for ~P is available may be worlds in which P fails 
to be true.
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‘an assertoric commitment to (j) is undertaken’ ; then we can express this feature o f 
assertoric commitments by saying that the following principle should hold:
(CO ) C(|)->CW (|).
By the same token however, one can only be said to be entitled to one's commitment to 
the truth o f (|) i f  one is also entitled to one's commitment to there being warrants for ^  43 
Let ‘E(p’ be short for ‘one is entitled to asserting cp’ ; then we can express this by saying 
that the following principle should hold:
(EN) E(j) EW(j).
Let us assume that there are some (j) warrants for whose assertion are mandatory: they 
w ill cease to warrant (j) as soon as becomes warranted. In these cases the following 
principles should also hold:
(M l)  EW(|) E~W -(|)
(M 2) EW-4) E~W(|).
Whatever Brandom has in mind when he suggests that commitment to <j) precludes
entitlement to ‘-(j)’ and vice versa, it seems fair to interpret him in such a way that,
according to him, the following principles come out true:
(B i)  - (€ ( ) )&  E-(|))
(B 2) -(C~(|) &  E(|)).
However, even i f  one might reasonably argue that Brandom is not committed to (B i) 
and (B2)— say, because neither ‘C(j) &  E~(|)’ nor ‘C~(j) &  E(j)’ is contradictory— it must be 
acknowledged that he is at least committed to the claim that both ‘C(j) &  E-cj)’ and 
‘C~(j) &  E(j)’ describe states o f affairs which, in some sense o f "ought", ought not to be 
tolerated. Whatever this sense o f "ought" is ultimately thought to be, it w ill be shown 
that there are mutually consistent sentences (|) and (p such that, in the very same sense, 
both ‘C(|) &  E(p’ and ‘C(p &  E(j)’ describe states o f affairs which ought not to be 
tolerated. For expository purposes, I shall nonetheless assume that (B j) and (B2 ) hold:
42 cr. Brandom [TA]: 139-49; [M IE]: 121, 604; Wright [TO]: 18-19.
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the results we are going to arrive at may then be reinterpreted accordingly without yet 
losing their force.
W ith (CO), (EN), (M l), (M 2), (B j) and (B2) being in place, we can prove that, 
for any sentence ^  warrants for whose assertion are mandatory, (j) and ‘W(j)’ 
incompatibility-entail each other— with the undesirable effect that, according to 
Brandom's account o f entailment in terms of incompatibility-entailment, <() and ‘W(|)’ 
turn out to properly entail each other. Thus, it can be shown that instead o f refuting the 
assertibilist, Brandom rather works into her hands.
In order to prove that (|) and ‘W({)’ incompatibility-entail each other, we have to 
show that any sentence incompatible with ^  is incompatible with ‘W(j)’ and that any 
sentence incompatible w ith ‘W(|)’ is incompatible with Accordingly, we have to show 
that
(i) commitment to (j) precludes entitlement to anything incompatible w ith ‘W(j)’
(ii) commitment to anything incompatible with ‘W(j)’ precludes entitlement to <j)
(hi) commitment to ‘W(j)’ precludes entitlement to anything incompatible (j)
(iv) commitment to anything incompatible with (j) precludes entitlement to ‘W(j)’ .
Recall that Brandom defines the negation o f a given sentence (p as that sentence which 
is incompatibility-entailed by any sentence incompatible with (p. Thus, in order to prove
(i) to (iv) it w ill suffice to show that the following four possibilities are ruled out:
(a) C(|) &  E~W(1)
(b) C~W(^ &  E(|)
(c) CW(|) & E~(()
(d) C~(|) &  EW(^.
We can show that (a) to (d) are ruled out on the basis o f the following four proofs. Let p 
be an arbitrary sentence warrants for whose assertion are mandatory; then:
(1) C p  &  E - W p Ass. (a)
(2) Cp 1,&-E
(3) CWp 2, CO, modus ponens
(4) L & -E
(5) C W p  &  E~Wp 3,4, & -I
(6) X 5 ,B i,~ -E
(7) ~(Cp &  E-W p) 1, 6, —I
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(1) C~Wp &  Ep Ass. (b)
(2) Ep 1,&-E
(3) EWp 2, EN, modus ponens
(4) C-W p 1,&-E
(5) C~Wp &  EWp 3,4, & -I
(6) X 5, Bg, - E
(7) -(C -W p &  Ep) 1, 6, - I
( 1) CWp &  E~p Ass. (c)
(2 ) E~p 1,&-E
(3) EW -p 2, EN, modus ponens
(4) E-W p 3, M 2, modus ponens
(5) CWp 1,&-E
(6) CWp &  E~Wp 4, 5, & -I
(7) X 6, B |, —E
(8 ) -(CW p &  E-p) 1,7, - I
(I) C~p &  EWp Ass. (d)
(2 ) C-p 1,&-E
(3) CW~p 2, CO, modus ponens
(4) EWp 1,&-E
(5) E~W~p 4, M }, modus ponens
(6 ) CW -p & E -W -p 3, 5, &-I
(7) X 6, B |, ~-E
(8 ) ~(C~p & EWp) 1, 7, - I .
Hence, p  and ‘W p’ incompatibility-entail each other and, according to Brandom, thus 
properly entail each other.
Now, even i f  it  is not assumed that the warrants for p  are mandatory— say, 
because there are no mandatory warrants at all 44— the first two proofs w ill still go 
through, w ith the effect that p incompatibility-entails ‘W p’ and, according to Brandom, 
p properly entails ‘W p’ . Thus, in any case, Brandom is forced to deny that there are 
sentences (j) that are apt for objective truth; hence Brandom's pragmatic account o f 
inconsistency, entailment and negation ought to be rejected.
44 This is indeed suggested by Brandom [MIE]: 160, 606.
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4.5 Hypothetical Reasoning
Brandom's normative pragmatics failed because it could not tell apart the pragmatic 
consequences o f commitments to claims which are due to the analytic consequences o f 
these claims, from those which are not.45 The basic idea underlying Brandom's 
semantics was that a substantive account o f what it is for the premisses o f an inference 
to be objectively true might be avoided by way o f shifting attention to the proprieties o f 
such inferences. The implementation o f inferential role semantics into a normative 
pragmatics however, seemed to force an account o f such proprieties that undermined 
this very idea: the propriety o f a deductive inference had to be assessed on condition o f 
a speaker's commitment to its premisses.46 But the claims that follow from the objective 
truth o f P do not coincide with those claims, commitment to which is a consequence o f 
one's commitment to P. Nor do the claims inconsistent with the objective truth o f P 
coincide w ith those claims, lack o f entitlement to which is a consequence of one's 
commitment to P.
Brandom's lack o f awareness o f this d ifficu lty may be due to his belief that 
logical operators such as the conditional make explicit what is im plic it in inferential 
practice.47 I f  the conditional made explicit what is im plicit in inferential practice, then 
" I f  P, then it  is warrantedly assertible that P" would have to count as correct just in case 
the inference from "P" to "It is warrantedly assertible that P" was treated as good. Since 
this conditional does not count as correct, Brandom concludes that neither can the 
inference be treated as good/8 But i f  the conditional is merely a device to express the 
propriety o f inferences, then the propriety o f inferences must be explained without 
recourse to our prior grasp o f the conditional. Brandom's account o f what counts as a 
good inference however, validated the inference in question. But then either there is 
more to our understanding o f the conditional than what is embodied in our inferential 
practice— the Deduction Theorem fails— or else Brandom has misidentified the practice 
engagement in which is sufficient for a grasp o f the conditional. Either way Brandom's 
account is defective.
Whereas in asserting a conditional, a speaker does not yet commit herself to the 
antecedent o f this conditional, the application o f a rule o f inference w ill always require a 
commitment to its premisses. Accordingly, i f  others assess whether such an application 
is good or bad, their assessment w ill bear on what the speaker is allowed or forced to do
46 Contrary to what Brandom insists on; see for instance his appeal to the distinction between pragmatic 
and semantic equivalences in [M IE]: 604.
46 [M IE]: 186.
47 [M IE]: xviii-xx, 105-16, 381.
48 [M IE]: 121-22.
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given her commitment to the p r e m i s s e s / 9  I f  we want to give an account o f the propriety 
o f inference rules in terms of their being treated as good or bad by participants in 
inferential practice, then we must accordingly explain how they can be so assessed 
independently from an assessment o f their applications. But then neither the notion o f 
commitment-preserving inferences nor the notion o f preclusion o f entitlement by 
commitments w ill be o f any help. This challenge may be met by shifting attention to 
inferences drawn given the assumption rather than the endorsement o f their premisses. 
In other words, I suggest that the practice o f hypothetical reasoning may provide the 
basis on which a pragmatic account o f deductive validity can be given: it may rather be ' 
this practice which is made explicit by the use o f conditionals.
I  here presume that reasoning under an assumption is not yet the assertion o f a 
conditional. In other words, I take it that there is a distinctive speech act or cognitive 
state o f assuming that P. Consider the case in which the assumption made is a working 
assumption, a heuristic which guides our investigations. It is only by dint o f an 
excessive logicism that we can deny that a working assumption effected by the use o f a 
sentence qualifies as a freestanding use o f that sentence. We can only do so by way o f 
stretching the arrow as it were: it requires a long breath to begin by uttering " I f  P...", to ' 
subsequently conduct an investigation however long it may take, and finally to complete 
one's assertoric performance by uttering "...then Q". Indeed i f  this was correct and 
assertions were all we had to go for in hypothetical reasoning, then we could not be said 
to have made any linguistic move at all before uttering "...then Q ", hence before our 
investigation had come to an end. This would leave us with no explanation o f why the 
investigation takes the route it does— in fact, not even o f why it is undertaken at all. Nor 
could we account for the use o f "P" as a working assumption i f  the investigation turned 
out to lead nowhere and was therefore cancelled: an incomplete utterance such as 
" I f  P..." accomplishes nothing but rather counts as ill-formed. Hence I  conclude that 
there is no reason to deny that assumptions need not be made by asserting conditionals, 
but can rather be effected by making a freestanding use o f sentences which are assumed 
to be true. I take it that assumptions can ultimately be identified in terms o f the speaker's 
systematic use o f speech act indicators such as "I assume", "I suppose", or nonverbal 
analogues thereof.^o
Assumptions initiate inferential thought processes which terminate in 
conclusions. Conclusions are understood to be just that: the end-points o f inferential 
processes set o ff by assumptions. In particular then, conclusions do not have the status 
o f assertoric commitments, hence do not engender the obligation to demonstrate 
entitlement to what is being concluded. Nor are assumptions subject to norms of
49 Brandom [A ]: 645.
60 Cf. Duinmell [FPL]: 308-10.
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warranted assertion: the assumption o f P w ill be permitted even i f  one lacks a warrant 
sufficient for asserting P, indeed it w ill be pointless otherwise. Rather, what can be a 
matter o f dispute is the result one ought to arrive at by reasoning under such an 
assumption, i.e. which conclusions one ought to draw. But whether a particular' 
conclusion is permitted or not w ill not in turn depend on the warrantedness o f the 
corresponding assertion either.
Assumptions are very basic attitudes. For instance, they are essential to the most 
prim itive o f logical reasoning. Therefore a reductive account o f assumptions is most 
likely not to be had. Here it seems we are in precisely the same predicament we are in as 
soon as we attempt to explain what an assertion or judgement is. Nevertheless there are 
certain platitudes that make plain what an assumption does and does not involve.
For instance, in assuming P one does not envisage a situation in which oneself is 
in a position to warrantedly assert it— which is o f course not yet to deny that one 
thereby envisages a situation in which one may get into that position.^* In the same vein, 
nor does the assumption o f P involve the assumption that P is being assumed: I may 
assume that mankind is extinct. Nor are assumptions anything like fictitious assertions, 
as they are performed on stage: in assuming P I do not pretend to be able to satisfy 
whatever an assertion o f P commits me to. Nor does one's assumption o f P necessarily 
lead to one's acting as i f  P was true: i f  I  suppose that I  can speak Italian, I  do not as a 
consequence behave as i f  I  spoke Italian. Sometimes however, this is the case: i f  the 
assumption o f P is a working assumption, then the thought process it initiates may be 
accompanied by experimental set-ups which are likely to deliver results only i f  P.
In assuming P I  am committed to draw some conclusions and not others. But that 
I am so committed w ill not itself be amongst the things which I am committed to 
conclude. I may be committed to believe that I  am bound to draw certain conclusions, 
but I w ill not in general be committed to conclude this. This thought generalises to all 
assertoric commitments I  may be bound to undertake whenever I  make an assumption, 
e.g. that I am making this assumption, that my doing so is not pointless, hence that what 
I assume fails to be warrantedly assertible now. Similarly, none of these claims are such 
that I must be taken to assume them in virtue o f the fact that I  assume P— that is, unless 
they are entailed by P.
These features o f hypothetical reasoning render it likely that a problem of the 
kind which beset Brandom's account w ill not arise once we conceive o f analytic 
consequence in terms o f what a speaker is committed to conclude from a given 
assumption. It was essential to Brandom's pragmatist programme that semantic relations
6  ^ The anli-realisl should agree: to assume that it is knowable that P is not yet to assume that we possess 
warrants which allow us to assert P. Rather, it is to assume that we may attain such warrants. Recall that 
the warranted assertibility o f P w ill consist in our actually having warrants for a potential assertion o f P 
and not in the mere possibility o f having warrants for asserting P.
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between contents be captured by normative relations between relations speakers bear to 
these contents. In his attempt to cash out analytic consequence as well as inconsistency 
Brandom identified at least one o f the relevant relations between speakers and contents 
as assertoric commitments. The problem arose because one could tell from the nature o f 
assertoric commitments alone that i f  a speaker undertakes an assertoric commitment to 
P, she ought to bear the respective other relation to a specific content Q which is neither 
logically entailed by nor inconsistent with P.
In contrast, all the relations which, in virtue o f the nature o f assumptions alone, a 
speaker who assumes P ought to bear to a specific content Q, w ill neither be 
assumptions nor conclusions. In other words, it cannot be established by the nature o f 
assumptions alone what a speaker who assumes P is bound to conclude. Nor can it be 
determined in this way what else she must be taken to assume in assuming P. Rather, 
this w ill have to be determined by the very content o f that assumption. Since the present 
suggestion is precisely to conceive o f analytic consequence in terms o f what a speaker is 
bound to conclude from a given assumption, there is accordingly no reason to expect 
that the resulting account w ill be undermined in the way Brandom's account is.
What remains to be shown however, is that whatever a speaker ought to 
conclude from the assumption o f P w ill indeed comprise no more than the analytic 
consequences o f P. Here we face a difficulty: usually hypothetical reasoning is 
undertaken for a purpose that goes beyond the purpose o f arriving at all the analytic 
consequences o f what is being assumed, thus we engage in hypothetical reasoning in 
order to arrive at the best explanation o f witnessed phenomena. We may for instance 
assume that it was Jones rather than Smith who killed Cresswell, and then enquire how 
best to explain the clues that nonetheless make Smith a suspect. Accordingly, in some 
contexts the conclusions which one is permitted to draw from the assumption o f P w ill 
comprise more than what P entails. Likewise however, there is no guarantee either that 
in a given context the conclusions one is obliged to draw from the assumption of P w ill 
not comprise more than the analytic consequences o f P. It would therefore be premature 
to identify the two.
In order to avoid the present difficulty, we may define the analytic consequences 
o f P as the conclusions that one is committed to draw from the assumption o f P in any 
context. Contexts can here be identified with informational states. Since one may engage 
in hypothetical reasoning even i f  there are no witnessed phenomena which stand in need 
o f explanation, the aforementioned problem does not arise. This is how it should be 
since drawing deductively valid inferences is not answerable to any empirical evidence, 
but is rather an a p rio ri matter.
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4.6 Objective Truth as Designated Value
Deductively valid inferences preserve the designated value from their premisses to their 
conclusions. Accordingly, i f  the proposed account o f analytic consequence is to 
subserve a semantic theory according to which the designated value o f a sentence 
consists in its being objectively true— where this is understood in terms o f (01) and
(02)— then this account should be shown to be in line with the idea that what is being 
preserved in an inference from this sentence to its analytic consequences is objective 
truth.
This does at least require that what is being assumed in hypothetical reasoning 
may be apt for objective truth as thus understood, and that i f  it is, it is being assumed to 
be objectively true. Otherwise the proposed account of deductively valid inference, even 
i f  correct, w ill not be shown to capture preservation o f objective truth, for there would 
then be no objective truth to be preserved. A t the same time we must ensure that in 
those contexts in which it is manifest that what is being assumed is assumed to be 
objectively true, there w ill be no claim amongst its conclusions that is not apt for 
objective truth. Otherwise what is considered to manifest a grasp o f conditions o f 
objective truth controverts the adequacy o f the proposed account o f analytic 
consequence.
On the other hand, the assumption's aptness for objective truth cannot yet be 
demonstrated by way o f showing that it has no analytic consequences which fail to be so 
apt. For even i f  (O l) and (02) cannot be wronged on purely conceptual grounds, it  may 
nonetheless be ruled out a p rio r i that there are sentences S such that
(01) S may (actually) be true, even i f  S fails to be at present warrantedly assertible
(02) S may (actually) fail to be true, even i f  S is at present warrantedly assertible.
In other words, "P" and "It is warrantedly assertible that P" may not entail each other 
and s till neither may actually be true without the other being so.
A ll this seems to make the prospects o f the idea that grasp o f conditions o f 
objective truth is manifested in hypothetical reasoning, look dim. As I shall argue in the 
remainder o f this chapter as well as in chapter five however, all we need to do is give 
hypothetical reasoning a proper context and purpose. There are contexts for which it 
holds that i f  we can provide an answer to the question why and to which end such 
reasoning is undertaken in these contexts, then its occurrence as well as its pragmatic 
consequences w ill become intelligible only insofar as the sentence being assumed is 
taken to satisfy (01) and (02). The prospects of this enterprise can best be appreciated
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if, for the time being, we restrict attention to (O l). This objectivity constraint says that 
there are sentences S such that
(O l)  S may (actually) be true, even i f  S fails to be at present warrantedly assertible.
Counterfactual reasoning is reasoning under an assumption that is regarded as known to 
be false.62 Thus insofar as S allows for neutral states o f information, reasoning under the 
assumption o f the truth o f S in such states w ill not be counterfactual.
The intent to comply with norms o f warranted assertion w ill do nothing to 
motivate the attempt to overcome states o f informational neutrality. In other words, i f  all 
we went in for was claiming what is and what is not warrantedly assertible, our feat 
would be accomplished once we acknowledged the fact that neither S nor its negation is 
warrantedly assertible. We may express this by saying that compliance with norms o f 
warranted assertion merely requires that we do not make assertions unless they are 
warranted; it does not require however that we arrive at warranted assertions. As I  shall 
suggest, it  is the striving for truth— where the truth o f a given sentence is not yet ruled 
out by the current lack o f any warrants for its assertion— which fuels our attempt to 
move from a state o f informational neutrality to a state in which either S or its negation 
is warrantedly assertible.
I f  hypothetical reasoning under an assumption that is presently undecided can be 
identified as something we undertake in order to overcome states o f informational 
neutrality, then this assumption cannot be regarded as being ruled out and reasoning 
under this assumption w ill be revealed not to be counterfactual. Whether a piece o f 
hypothetical reasoning is undertaken with this purpose in mind w ill depend on whether 
it  can be regarded as a rational response to a dissatisfaction with the present epistemic 
situation and whether it  may, in favourable circumstances, be regarded as part o f a 
rational deliberation process leading up to the assertion of the sentence by the use o f 
which the assumption was effected. I f  it can be regarded as the latter, then it  is hard to 
see how the subject might have conceived o f her reasoning as counterfactual. Both 
intellectual dissatisfaction and the assertion o f sentences are publicly observable 
phenomena and their causal links to the piece o f reasoning a matter that is open to 
empirical investigation.
It would appear that the assertibilist cannot render intelligible why such 
hypothetical reasoning may play this causal role, without, at the same time, 
compromising its rationale. I f  she interpreted the assumption o f S as the assumption that 
S is presently undecided, she would represent the subject's reasoning as utterly futile 
unless she regarded it as the teasing out o f the assumption's analytic consequences:
67 The imended notion o f counterfactual reasoning w ill be further specified below; cf. footnote 58.
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given the intended interpretation however, these consequences should be the same as 
those follow ing from the assumption effected by the use o f ‘-S ’ ; but they clearly are 
not. On the other hand, i f  the assertibilist interpreted the assumption of S as the 
assumption that S can at present be asserted or denied, she would construe the 
hypothetical reasoning as counterfactual. But i f  the reasoning was counterfactual it 
could neither be a rational response to one's dissatisfaction with the present epistemic 
state nor could it be both rationally and causally relevant for the subsequent 
endorsement of
Alternatively, the assertibilist may interpret assumptions o f S as assumptions 
that S becomes warrantedly assertible— to the effect that reasoning under this 
assumption would no longer be counterfactual i f  undertaken in neutral states o f 
information. She would then construe the hypothetical reasoning, not as undertaken in 
order to overcome neutrality, but as undertaken in order to anticipate potential changes 
in informational state. By the same token however, it would seem mysterious how, in 
general, such an anticipation could bring about an endorsement o f S. The reasoning 
would typically be doxastically inert, as it  were, because it could itself never yield a 
warrant for asserting S: the assertibility o f the conclusions would be presented as being 
hostage to an enlargement o f the present state o f information to which the reasoning 
itself would make no contribution.^^
O f course this amounts to a rejection o f assertibilism only i f  we can furthermore 
show that in taking S to be apt for objective truth, we can explain why the piece o f 
hypothetical reasoning effected by its means plays the causal role it does. The present 
view o f the matter rests on the idea that hypothetical reasoning may have a pay-off for
62 O f course, counterfactual reasoning plays an important role in testing causal claims about the actual 
world and thus may lead to their endorsement: assume that a given event E had not occurred; then 
consider what else would not have happened in consequence, e.g. E*; given that both E and E* have 
occurred, you may arrive at the claim that E is a cause o f E*. Obviously, in such cases the causal claims 
w ill not themselves feature as assumptions from which the reasoning proceeds: insofar as it is meant to be 
counterfactual, what is being assumed in the course o f this reasoning w ill not be something it may lead 
one to endorse.
64 Arguably, anticipations o f this kind may sometimes make such a contribution. Thus, Timothy 
Williamson has suggested to me the following example: i f  I had reason to believe that i f  it becomes 
warrantedly assertible who got the job there w ill be a commotion, I may arrive at the warranted 
conclusion that John got the job by reasoning under the assumption that it becomes warrantedly assertible 
that he got the job— say, because I have reason to believe that no other candidate's appointment would 
give rise to a commotion i f  it was announced. The force o f this example of course depends on my having 
a reason to believe that i f  it w ill be announced who got the job there w ill be a commotion; and it is not 
clear how I might acquire such a reason i f  not through the testimony o f the better informed who is 
already warranted in believing that John got the job. However, the cases of neutrality spoken to in the text 
are supposed to result, not from the ignorance o f individual enquirers, but from the ignorance of there 
collective that prevails even after all presently available information has been pooled. The case envisaged 
is not o f this kind. This may be a feature o f the particular example chosen. It suffices to point out, 
however, that in cases where S does not relate to human responses to changes in informational state, 
reasoning under the assumption that S becomes warrantedly assertible w ill be doxastically inert in the 
sense adumbrated. This alone should cast doubt on the cogency o f the assertibilist's proposal.
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the question o f what ought to be asserted or believed. It w ill be the subject o f the next 
chapter to explain what this pay-off might be. Part o f this explanation w ill consist in a j
reassessment o f what it is one strives for in striving for objective truth. ‘ j
Thus far we have exclusively been concerned with the prospects o f a vindication j
o f (O l). Matters seem more intractable with regard to (02) though. For here we cannot j
by any chance exploit anything analogous to the way in which neutral states I
o f information allow for a difference in semantic value between "P" and Î
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" which is reflected in the speakers' verdicts. I
According to this second objectivity constraint, there are sentences S such that |
(02) S may (actually) fail to be true, even i f  S is at present warrantedly assertible. !
In any state o f information in which S is warrantedly assertible however, S - w ill be j
presented as actually true, and a fo rtio r i not as potentially failing to be actually true.6 6  j
I f  hypothetical reasoning is supposed to manifest (02) then the idea must be that !
reasoning under the assumption o f the negation o f S is called for and serves the pursuit I
o f objective truth, even in states o f information that warrant the assertion o f S. Once it is i
conceded that hypothetical reasoning may effect the endorsement o f a claim not |
previously warranted, then it would appear to be likewise intelligible that hypothetical i
reasoning may effect a change o f mind. But how can it do so i f  it  is considered to be :
counterfactual? And how can it be called for i f  there is no dissatisfaction with the j
present epistemic situation vis-à-vis our intention to arrive at warranted claims? j
The fact, i f  it is a fact, that reasoning under the assumption o f the negation o f S j
may be called for in a given state o f information although S is warrantedly assertible in j
this state, can only be explained in terms o f the commitment one undertakes in •
committing oneself to the objective truth o f S. It is because in committing oneself to the |
objective truth o f S, one commits oneself to more than its warranted assertibility, that i
one is bound to be ready to conceive o f the truth o f its negation as a possibility that j
stands in constant need o f being ruled out. Why hypothetical reasoning o f the intended i
kind may qualify as something one is bound to do in having incurred this obligation j
must still be rendered intelligible in terms of the nature o f this obligation. But i
antecedently it must be explained how this kind o f reasoning can possibly play this role, |
for it would appear that i f  it is counterfactual, then it cannot possibly do so. ;
I f  (01) and (02) are to hold, a subject's commitments to objective truth even ;
when undertaken in states which warrant them, must be regarded by her as, in a certain i
sense, 'adventurous' in that the content o f these commitments exceeds what is given by j
the evidence: from the subject's perspective, the falsehood of the claims to which she I
66 This is most obviously so if  the available warrants mandate the assertion of S.
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has committed herself is consistent with all the warrants she may, at present, have for 
them. This does not mean that she is bound to take a sceptical attitude towards these 
commitments: all it means is that insofar as she acknowledges the fa llib ility  o f her 
claims, she is bound to concede that it is an epistemic possibility, however unlikely to 
be actualised, that despite their present confirmation these claims may turn out to be 
false. It is for this reason that I  prefer to conceive o f commitments to objective truth as 
conjectures.^^ In contrast, commitments to warranted assertibility— hence to the truth o f 
sentences such as "It is (at present) warrantedly assertible that P"— are not conjectures: 
i f  undertaken their falsity is considered as inconsistent with the sum total o f the 
presently available information on which they are based. Commitments to non-objective 
truth should rather be regarded as reports. Reports can be understood in broadly 
response-dispositional terms: i f  cognitively unimpaired properly situated and attentive 
speakers make these reports, then there is no further question as to whether what they 
report is in fact true. Conjectures on the other hand lack this feature: by their very nature 
the content o f conjectures goes beyond what can here and now conclusively be 
established. S till it holds that the report that it  is warrantedly assertible that P ought to 
be made just in case it ought to be conjectured that P. This is just the complement to the 
thought that assertions or beliefs whose content is determined by the conditions under 
which they qualify as objectively true, are based on evidence that is defeasible and non- 
factive.67
I f  the assertion o f a sentence apt for objective truth is the expression o f a 
conjecture in the sense laid down, then even i f  making this conjecture is mandated by 
the presently available evidence, reasoning under the assumption that what is being 
conjectured fails to be true w ill not be regarded as counterfactual, in the sense that it  can 
be ruled out, merely by reflecting on this evidence, that it is epistemically possible for 
the assumption to be actually false. By contrast, reasoning under the assumption that S 
was not now warrantedly assertible would have to be taken to be counterfactual in this 
sense.68 To argue that hypothetical reasoning under the assumption o f the negation o f S 
must be conceived to be counterfactual whenever S can at present warrantedly be 
asserted is just to deny that speakers are capable o f drawing the very distinction between 
the tmth o f S and its warranted assertibility which (02) encapsulates. Once 
commitments to the objective truth o f S are understood as conjectures and not as 
reports, there is accordingly no reason to deny that reasoning under the assumption that
66 As I  intend to use the term here, "conjecture" does not refer to mere hunches or guesses for which . |
there are no rational grounds at all. Insofar as this is in tension with the resonance this term has in j
common usage, I am happy to concede that it is here employed as a theoretical term. ■
67 Recall that throughout we are concerned with empirical discourse. i
68 In what follows I shall continue to use "counterfactual" in this epistemic sense, for it is ultimately this 1
sense that is relevant for the contrast between counterfactual reasoning and rational deliberation processes I
whose end consists in re-evaluating the epistemic status o f the assumption being made. i
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S fails to be objectively true can be part o f a deliberating process that leads to a change 
o f mind.
What remains to be done though is to show why reasoning under the assumption 
that S fails to be true may be called for in states which warrant the assertion o f S. This 
cannot be explained in terms o f striving for truth, i.e. the intention to overcome 
neutrality. Rather it w ill have to be explained in terms of the obligation one undertakes 
in committing oneself to the objective truth o f what one asserts. I f  these ideas can be 
made to work, then again we have hit on possible causal chains o f observable 
phenomena whose occurrence cannot be rendered intelligible along assertibilist lines, 
but can be rendered intelligible once (02) is taken to hold: neither the assumption that S 
is not at present warrantedly assertible nor the assumption that its negation w ill become 
warrantedly assertible can be regarded as a starting-point for inferential thought 
processes which may lead to the refusal to assert S or the endorsement o f its negation. 
The next chapter w ill accordingly be concerned with an explanation o f how reasoning 
under the assumption that S fails to be true may be a rational consequence o f one's 
commitment to the objective truth o f S, and how such reasoning may rationally lead to 
one's endorsement o f ‘-S ’ . This explanation w ill comprise a reassessment o f what it  is 
to commit oneself to objective truth, in particular of the obligation one undertakes in 
doing so.
What these preliminary reflections at least show is that in trying to vindicate our 
objectivist conception o f truth we do not only ha\'e to increase the data base for our 
semantic theory so as to include features o f use assertibilism cannot explain, but must at 
the same time reassess our theory in order to show how it might rationalise these 
features. As already stated, the next chapter is designed to provide this theoretical 
framework.
In this chapter we have been concerned with the question o f whether • the 
assertibilist's challenge can be met by shifting attention from assertoric to inferential 
practice— the idea being that facts about this practice disclose that we treat inferences as 
deductively valid only i f  we take them to preserve objective truth. I have argued that 
Brandom's account o f this practice falls short o f adducing such facts. The diagnosis o f 
this failure led us to a consideration o f hypothetical reasoning which was conceived o f 
in terms of inferential thought processes relating assumptions to conclusions. It was 
suggested that our practice o f hypothetical reasoning may ultimately show that we 
regard inferences as deductively valid only insofar as they preserve objective truth from 
assumptions to conclusions. In order for this idea to work, a context had to be provided 
in which such reasoning may occur so as to be intelligible only i f  (0 1 ) and (0 2 ) hold.
The assertibilist's challenge has to be met by realists and anti-realists alike, for at 
least with respect to empirical discourse (O l) and (0 2 ) record the absolute minimum of
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what the objectivity o f truth requires. The present suggestion to account for the 
manifestation o f (O l) and (0 2 ) in terms o f hypothetical reasoning is as yet neutral with 
respect to the question o f whether objective truth is furthermore epistemically 
constrained. Accordingly we may view this idea, to be developed and refined in the next 
chapter, as being pursued by both realists and anti-realists in their attempt to overcome 
assertibilism. Only then w ill it emerge whether on that common ground objective truth 
can be shown to be limited by what we are able to know.
Chapter Five
In chapter three it was argued that identifying the assertoric content o f all the sentences 
in our repertoire with their warranted assertibility conditions is at odds with our 
conception o f corrections. Since the assertoric content o f a sentence is determined by the 
conditions under which it has and those under which it lacks the designated value, this 
comes down to saying that i f  we are to make sense of this conception, we must not in 
general identify the designated value o f a sentence with its warranted assertibility. 
Indeed, our conception o f corrections requires, i f  it is to be coherent, that there be 
sentences S in our repertoire whose assertoric content is determined by their truth 
conditions where
(02) S may (actually) fa il to be true, even i f  S is at present warrantedly assertible.
For i f  what one asserts by asserting S cannot fail to obtain i f  S is at present warrantedly 
assertible, then one's warranted assertion o f S cannot subsequently be corrected by 
means o f an assertion o f its negation as soon as S becomes warrantedly deniable.
Corrections presuppose that someone got something wrong. The refusal to do 
something may still be seen to be something that one does. The refusal to assert either S 
or its negation however, is undertaken w ith the intention not to get things wrong at the 
expense o f not getting them right either. It would therefore be inappropriate to conceive 
o f warranted assertions o f S as corrections o f what someone did who remained agnostic 
about the truth-value o f S, when neither were there any warrants for S nor were there 
any warrants for its negation. S till insofar as we strive for objective truth, not to endorse 
such a truth w ill at least have to be considered as a shortcoming. The idea that one may 
attribute such a shortcoming by means o f an assertion o f S is just as much part o f our 
conception o f assertoric practice as is the idea that one may thereby correct someone 
who asserted its negation. Both to be corrected and to be convicted o f the shortcoming 
not to have endorsed what is objectively true w ill be to incur no blame i f  one's epistemic 
rationality is not in question: the failure to endorse a truth in states in which one is not 
warranted to do so is an understandable failure just as the mistake to endorse a 
falsehood in states in which one is warranted to do so is an understandable mistake.
But i f  what one asserts in asserting S cannot obtain whenever S fails to be at 
present warrantedly assertible, then one's warranted refusal to assert S cannot 
subsequently be epitomised as a shortcoming by means o f asserting S as soon as S
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becomes warrantedly assertible. Accordingly, i f  the latter is a possibility then there must 
be sentences S such that
(O l)  S may (actually) be true, even i f  S fails to be at present warrantedly assertible.
To speak o f a failure to attain truth makes sense only in the presence o f a conception o f 
truth as a desirable goal. Since to endorse a falsehood is eo ipso a failure to attain truth, 
corrections too make sense only in the presence o f such a conception. By the same token 
however, corrections only make sense in the presence o f a conception o f what it is to 
commit oneself to the truth. For, to say that someone endorsed a falsehood is to say that 
she committed herself to the truth o f what is actually false, not that she committed 
herself to a falsehood as being just that. I f  we follow Brandom and conceive o f 
commitments as involving the undertaking o f a certain responsibility or obligation, then 
we have to conclude that our conception o f assertoric practice must be backed up by an 
account o f both what it is one strives for in striving for truth and what the obligation is 
that one undertakes in committing oneself to the truth.
In chapter four it was suggested that (01) and (02) may be manifested in 
hypothetical reasoning provided that it can be rendered intelligible
(i) why reasoning under the assumption effected by the use o f S (or its negation) 
may be called for in informational states which are neutral w ith respect to both S 
and its negation, and
(ii) how the outcome o f such reasoning may provide a reason to assert S (or its 
negation)
( iii)  why reasoning under the assumption effected by the negation o f S may be called 
for in informational states that license the assertion o f S, and
(iv) how the outcome o f such reasoning may provide a reason to assert the negation 
o f S (or to refuse to assert S).
For, i f  this can be done and i f  hypothetical reasoning does occur in these contexts, there 
are facts about the use o f language which can be rendered intelligible on the basis o f our 
objectivist conception o f truth and assertoric content, but cannot be rendered intelligible 
i f  assertibilism is true.
In order to rationalise (i) and (ii), we must say more about what one strives for in 
striving for the objective truth o f such a sentence. It is only i f  one strives for more than
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compliance with norms o f warranted assertion that in states o f informational neutrality ' 
one may be driven to engage in hypothetical reasoning with the chance to attain a state 
that is no longer neutral; and it is only in light o f what more one pursues that it  becomes 
intelligible how hypothetical reasoning may be conducive to the satisfaction o f this 
intentionJ In order to rationalise ( iii)  and (iv) on the other hand, we must say more 
about the obligation one undertakes in committing oneself to the objective truth o f a 
given sentence. It is only i f  one is answerable to norms that go beyond norms of 
warranted assertion that one may be bound to engage in reasoning under the assumption 
o f the negation o f a claim even in cases where that claim can warrantedly be made; and 
such reasoning can effect a change o f attitude towards that claim only i f  it may show 
that these norms cannot be met.
The present chapter is intended to yield an account o f both the nature o f 
objective truth as a goal o f enquiry and the specific obligation that one undertakes in 
committing oneself to the objective truth o f what one asserts— to the effect that (i) to
(iv) can be rendered intelligible on its basis. I f  such an account can be given then we are 
in a position to claim that i f  speakers do engage in hypothetical reasoning in the 
contexts in question, (0 1 ) and (0 2 ) w ill be grounded in the way these speakers use their 
language. I f  this account can furthermore be motivated by reflections upon what we 
actually do, we are justified to conclude that in these contexts speakers ought to display 
the kind o f behaviour that grounds (0 1 ) and (0 2 ).
The strategy pursued in this chapter is an indirect one though. In the beginning 
we w ill simply assume that truth is a goal o f enquiry distinct from warranted 
assertibility and that (O l) and (02) hold good. We w ill then have to address the 
problem to explain why, i f  this is so, one should nonetheless make truth claims 
according to whether they qualify as warrantedly assertible. This problem w ill be called 
the Problem o f Rational Belief Change and is the topic o f section (5.1).
In an attempt to solve this problem I shall reassess in section (5.2) what one is 
obliged to do in committing oneself to the objective truth o f what one asserts. I  shall 
argue that this obligation is the obligation to causally explain the available evidence. A t 
the same time this w ill furnish us with an account o f what we strive for in striving for
* One might be tempted to say that in trying to overcome neutral states o f information, one merely strives 
for warranted assertibility. But, in such states, there w ill be sentences o f the form "~WP" and "~W~P" 
which are warrantedly assertible. Why, then, should one strive for the warranted assertibility o f "P" and 
"WP" at the expense o f the warranted assertibility o f "~WP"? It might be suggested that i f  one's interest is 
in warranted assertibility one w ill want the class o f assertible sentences to be as large as possible, hence 
prefer being in a state in which three sentences are assertible {i.e. "P", "WP" and "~W~P") to being in a 
state in which, by comparison, only two sentences are assertible {i.e. "~WP" and "~W~P"). However, this 
is at best misleading because, on the assertibilist's view, assertions of "P" and "WP" express the very 
same state o f affairs; and i f  one's interest was really in increasing the number o f decided sentences, 
regardless of whether they have the same assertoric content, then one way in which one could get 
satisfaction would be by learning foreign languages. This is obviously not what was intended.
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objective truth: in pursuing objective truth we do inter alia aim to give best explanations 
o f all available data. Sentences apt for objective truth, but not their non-objective co- 
assertibles, are apt to feature as best explanations o f the data that license their assertion.
In section (5.3) the proposed account w ill be defended against the objection that 
it conflates description with explanation. In section (5.4) I  shall attempt to reconcile this 
account w ith the observation that generally the objective truth o f a claim cannot itself be 
taken to causally explain the evidence on whose basis it may be asserted. Sometimes we 
arrive at warranted claims by getting to know facts which relate to something that 
occurred before these claims were made tme; and sometimes we arrive at warranted 
claims on the basis o f evidence for generalisations o f which these claims are instances. I 
intend to account for these cases by way o f saying more about the nature o f empirical 
knowledge and the role which generalisations play in causal explanations.
After these objections have been answered I shall then in section (5.5). address 
the question o f how an understanding o f sentences which are apt for objective truth in 
this sense may be manifested in linguistic practice. There I  shall argue that inferences to 
the best explanation go hand in hand w ith heuristic reasoning, i.e. reasoning under 
working assumptions. This paves the way to a vindication o f (O l) and (02) as needed.
In section (5.6) I shall attempt to motivate the proposed account according to 
which we engage in assertoric practice with the aim to attain knowledge-w/ry. I  shall do 
so on the basis o f two considerations: first I  argue that the content-determining role o f 
warranted assertibility conditions can only be rendered intelligible i f  assertions are 
conceived o f as expressions o f knowledge claims; secondly I  argue that viewing such 
claims as claims to know why certain data are available is faithful to our attempt to 
objectify our epistemic states by means o f statements that are objectively true.
Finally in section (5.7) I  shall address what we referred to in the introduction as 
the Problem o f Understanding and show that the proposed account offers a solution. 
The chapter closes with an explanation o f how speakers, by exercising the very abilities 
ascribed to them in the course o f this account, can arrive at this account themselves.
The final chapter w ill then be concerned with the question o f whether on the 
basis o f the proposed account (EC*) can or cannot be vindicated. I f  it cannot be 
vindicated on this basis, then— pending a proof that this account is incoherent and 
pending an alternative to the Dummettian Criterion— this much w ill suffice for driving 
the moderate realist's point home: i f  it can be explained how communicating objectively 
true thoughts is possible without the conclusion being forced that truth is epistemically 
constrained, then any account that entails, or otherwise gives rise to, (EC*) would 
appear to unduly restrict our intellectual powers.
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5.1 The Problem o f Rational B e lie f Change
Corrections o f assertions that fail to be true as well as attributions o f the shortcoming 
not to have asserted what is true, provide the best model we have yet for the pattern 
objective truth must make. For the time being let us take it for granted that contents are 
objective in the sense required in order to get clearer about what is involved in our 
objectivist conception of truth. Only then w ill we be in a position to address the 
question o f how this conception is manifested in practice.
Corrections as they have been described in chapter three, are more than changes 
in doxastic states. Quite generally, i f  one corrects one's course, one does not just go in 
another direction however reasonable it may be to do so. One furthermore regards the 
course taken t i l l  the change occurred as having been leading in the wrong direction. In 
the zig-zag o f rational enquiry as it were, there is at most one direction which is.taken to 
be what the enquirer's belief must be in line with in order to be 'in line w ith the facts':
figure 1
Here the line segments represent rationally mandated commitments either to P or to ~P 
depending on their direction, the points represent changes o f belief or states o f neutral 
information, and the directions represent truth-values.
This picture does not yet speak to the idea o f truth as the final destination o f 
rational enquiry, but rather to the idea that there is at most one way o f getting things 
right. I f  fixed at all the direction o f f it w ill be fixed for all courses taken whether past, 
present or future. For the time being, we can be agnostic about whether such a direction 
is fixed w ith regard to any pair o f contents P and ~P independently o f our capacity. to 
tell how it is fixed; or whether there are more than two possible yet mutually exclusive 
directions in which the truth may lie. A ll that matters is that it is taken to be fixed in this 
way rather than another by anyone who lays claim to the truth. In doing so one lays 
claim to stability: i f  true, then true once and for all— and hence independently o f the fact 
that different turns may be or may have been mandated at different stages o f enquiry. It 
is ultimately this feature which highlights in which sense corrections involve
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retrospective ascriptions o f failure. In correcting one's beliefs one intends to say: even i f  
mandated then, what I previously held to be true was not true, i.e. was not so at that time 
already and did not become false once its negation became mandated today.
How can the fact that one subjects oneself to a stable truth norm whose 
satisfaction is supposed to cut across all possible routes o f rational enquiry be 
manifested in use? That in correcting one's beliefs one considers the course previously 
taken to have been leading in the wrong direction, cannot reasonably be manifested in 
the readiness to blame oneself for having taken it. Insofar as it was rational to endorse 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" on the basis o f the previously available information, 
blaming oneself for having endorsed "P" on that same basis w ill just be irrational since 
both sentences share their conditions o f warranted assertibility.
What we are looking for then is a certain retrospectively ascribable failure whose 
ascription is less than the accusation o f lack o f warrant, hence o f irrationality or 
inattentiveness on the part o f the claimant. The present d ifficulty is that we have as yet 
no clear grasp o f what such a failure might consist in: we need to be clear about this 
before we can address the question o f how ascriptions o f such failures can be manifested 
in use.
Even though corrections are to be distinguished from mere changes in doxastic 
states, they clearly involve the possibility o f such changes. But i f  in making an assertion 
one lays claim to this assertion's being in line w ith the facts— and i f  one is at some stage 
entitled to make such an assertion— then one is entitled to consider every course 
deviating from that line whether past, present or future, as wrong-headed:
figure 2
Thus i f  one tries to give an account o f how assertoric practice can be seen to be 
governed by a distinctive truth norm that complies with the idea that truth is objective 
and stable, one faces the difficu lty o f explaining how one can ever rationally come to 
change one's beliefs. For once it is conceded that the contestant cannot accuse the 
claimant o f irrationality or inattentiveness— but has rather to agree that the claimant was 
entitled to undertake her commitment when doing so— then how can the claimant
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subsequently be convicted o f a shortcoming i f  she refuses to take the contest seriously? 
This suggestive thought needs elaboration.
Suppose someone argued as follows: i f  I am in a state o f information j  in which I 
am entitled to believe that it is true that P, then— by closure— I am entitled to believe in 
j  whatever is entailed by P. In particular I  am entitled to believe that for all states o f 
information /c, i f  "~P" is warrantedly assertible in k, then still P. Now assume that I enter 
a state o f information j+  in which "~P" becomes warrantedly assertible. By modus 
ponens I can conclude that P holds nonetheless. Thus once entitled to believe that P, I 
am entitled not to change my mind irrespective o f whether there is overwhelming 
evidence suggesting that ~P.
This line o f reasoning which has come to be known as the 
Paradox o f Dogmatism., is certainly fallacious.^ For once the subject enters 7 +, she loses 
her entitlement to believe that P is true, hence her entitlement to believe that for all 
states o f information /c, i f  it is warrantedly assertible in k that ~P, then still P. For i f  j+  
confers warranted assertibility onto "~P", then in j+  it is no longer warrantedly 
assertible that P. But i f  the subject loses her entitlement to the universally quantified 
conditional, she can no longer avail herself o f it as a premiss in a modus ponens step 
either. Hence, neither is she entitled to conclude in j+  that P.^
Despite the obviousness o f this reply, there is a residual problem to which our 
interlocutor has given only poor expression: how may she come to recognise 7 + as 
conferring warranted assertibility onto "~P" so as to mandate the withdrawal o f her 
commitment to the truth o f "P"? Setting aside areas o f discourse which allow for purely 
permissive warrants, we may say that it  is essential to norms o f warranted assertion that 
for all states o f information k, i f  "~P" is warrantedly assertible in k, then in k one ought 
to assert "~P" rather than "P". In the case at hand however, the subject sets out to be in a 
state o f information in which she is entitled to believe as well that for all states o f 
information k, i f  "~P" is warrantedly assertible in k, "P" w ill still hold. Now to the 
extent that she conceives o f norms o f warranted assertion to be o f such a kind that 
complying with them is conducive to one's pursuit o f truth, she cannot but take herself 
to be entitled to hold in j  that there are no enlargements o f j  which contain information 
mandating the assertion o f "~P".
It would be misleading to suggest that this attitude, even i f  not illegitimate in j ,  is 
already being undermined by the additional information becoming available in j+ .  For
- It first occurred in print in Harman’s [TH]: 148. Both Harman and Lewis attribute it to Kripke; see 
Lewis [EK]: 564. It was commented upon by Ginet [K LM ]: 151-61; and by Sorell [HP]: 557-75. 
Recently Sorensen [DJC] has sought to dissolve the paradox by means of Jackson's notion of robust 
conditionals. Jackson's account o f robust conditionals can be found in his [AIC]. Cargile [JMD] has given 
yet another diagnosis o f the problem.
3 Cf. Ginet [K LM ]: 156-57.
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this information— insofar as available to the subject at all— consists ultimately in 
potentials to alter the physical condition o f the subject, which, though causally 
efficacious, do not by themselves exert a rational constraint on the subject's doxastic 
states. Rather, their bearing on rational belief formation is a matter determined by how 
they are responded to, and in the case at hand, the subject seems entitled not to show 
any response crediting the additional information with any such significance.
A t this point it  might be replied that it is simply pait o f the subject's linguistic 
competence that she responds to the information available in j+  by asserting "~P" rather 
than "P". In other words, i f  the subject refuses to respond in this way, she betrays a lack 
o f understanding her language, hence w ill be corrected by her fellow speakers. But i f  
this answer is at all satisfactory one may wonder why it was not given in the first place. 
The trouble is that we cannot rest content with an account o f assertoric practice which 
leaves the rationale o f engaging in that practice to one side. Thus even i f  a subject was 
trained to respond to the information available in j+  by asserting "~P"— in that such a 
response is what compliance w ith rules o f warranted assertion requires— she may still 
be incapable o f seeing why playing by these rules is at all conducive to her pursuit o f 
truth. In particular the subject may still concede that for all states o f information k, i f  
"~P" is warrantedly assertible in  k, then in k one ought to assert "~P" rather than "P", 
and yet be at a loss to understand why acting on this rule in j+  is what she ought to do 
insofar as she strives for truth. In other words, she lacks a reason to retain the very 
conception o f norms o f warranted assertion which made her hesitant to view as 
mandating endorsement o f "-P " in the first place. What we need then is an explanation 
o f how the pursuit o f truth can be coordinated with rules o f warranted assertion in such a 
way that following the latter proves conducive to the former, despite the fact that what 
one strives for in striving for truth is something other than warranted assertibility.
We ought not to be misled by the fact that it is a platitude that in general 
warrants to assert a sentence issue in mandates to believe that sentence to be true. For 
the question is precisely: on which basis can the subject remain confident that the rules 
o f correctness she was trained to comply with when learning her language are rules that 
deserve to be called rules o f warranted assertion in this sense? And as assertibilism 
revealed, to assert may be no more than to present as warrantedly assertible without 
there being any link to objective truth. Indeed when pressed to assert "~P" in j+  by her 
fellow speakers, the subject may well do so and yet conceive o f what she henceforth 
does as engaging in the practice which assertibilism so aptly describes. As regards the 
pursuit o f objective truth, she considers the continuation o f this practice as engagement 
in a mere game o f actmg-as-if. Call this the Problem o f Rational Belief Change,
The Problem o f Rational Belief Change can be put more succinctly as follows: i f  
the subject is in a state o f information j  in which she is not only entitled to present "P"
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as warrantedly assertible but to believe that it is true that P, then j  entitles her to believe 
that for all states o f information k,
i f  "~P" is warrantedly assertible in k, then it is true in k that P.
By her grasp o f norms o f warranted assertion, she also knows that
i f  "~P" is warrantedly assertible in k, then in k anyone who follows norms o f 
warranted assertion ought to deny "P".
Thus in j  she is in a position to conclude that
i f  "~P" is warrantedly assertible in k, then in k anyone who follows norms .of 
warranted assertion ought to deny "P" although it is true in k that P.
From this she infers the following disjunction:
either there is no such k, or there is such a k and following norms of 
warranted assertion in k is not conducive to one's pursuit o f tru th /
When pressed to acknowledge that in j+  "~P" is warrantedly assertible, she does so only 
at the expense o f no longer regarding her compliance with norms o f warranted assertion 
as being conducive to her pursuit o f truth. In drawing this pessimistic conclusion she 
avails herself o f the above disjunction despite her transition from j  to j+ .  Yet this can 
only be recognised by her as illegitimate i f  she can come to acknowledge that the 
additional information that has become available in j+  has any bearing— not only on 
what one ought to present as currently warranted— but on what one ought to believe to 
be true. In other words, she must come to acknowledge that in admitting "~P" to be 
warrantedly assertible she ought no longer to believe that P. But on the basis o f which 
reasons should she come to acknowledge this given her epistemic history? The 
information available in j+  w ill not itself provide her with any reasons to this effect: it is 
only by already dropping her belief in the disjunction that she can come to see that in j+  
she ought no longer to believe this disjunction. It seems that she is stuck.^
 ^ This inference is not intuilionistically valid. It is unobjectionable to the intuitionist however, i f  the 
discourse is effectively decidable. Suppose then that the discourse is effectively decidable.
5 Criticising Harman's solution to the Paradox of Dogmatism, Cargile correctly remarks that "what needs 
explaining is why the [subject] has to respect the [recalcitrant] evidence [...] when he started out knowing 
he was right. Harman's line is to get knowledge away from the [subject] so that then he has to [respect the 
evidence]. But it is [respecting the evidence] that undoes his knowledge claim"; [JMD]: 218.
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In our attempt to overcome assertibilism, it w ill accordingly not yet do to adduce 
hitherto unaccounted-for aspects o f linguistic practice which allow us to distinguish the 
assertoric contents o f "P" and "It is (at present) warrantedly assertible that P", without at 
the same time showing how these contents are related. For it is only i f  we know how 
they are related that we have the chance o f arriving at an explanation o f why one ought, 
to believe that "P" is true under conditions under which it is mandated to assert 
"It is (at present) warrantedly assertible that P"— and ought to stop believing "P" to be 
true under conditions under which it is no longer mandated to assert 
"It is (at present) warrantedly assertible that P"— despite the fact that to assert either 
sentence is to lay claim to the obtaining o f different kinds o f conditions. This means that 
we must show in which sense commitment to the truth o f "P" is answerable to the 
obtaining o f those conditions under which "P" counts as warrantedly assertible—  
without though describing these conditions in such a way that we already presuppose 
that their obtaining mandates commitment to the truth o f "P". By the same token, we 
must show why these conditions— out o f a wide range o f conditions under which 
asserting "P" qualifies as conversationally appropriate— deserve to be described in this 
way.
5.2 Entitlement and Explanation
The Problem o f Rational Belief Change considered in the last section made clear that 
while anyone committed to the truth o f "P" has the obligation to withdraw this 
commitment once "P" ceases to be warrantedly assertible, this obligation must be 
rendered intelligible to the speaker in terms o f what she has committed herself to. On 
the other hand, our objectivist conception o f truth entailed that while this obligation 
clearly is undertaken by committing oneself to the truth o f "P", still what one has 
committed oneself to in doing so does not rule out that "P" fails to be warrantedly 
assertible— contrary to what assertibilism requires. How can these insights be reconciled 
w ith each other?
Let us introduce a bit o f terminology: call warrants for a sentence "P" those data 
which are positively relevant to the evaluation o f the warranted assertibility o f "P", and 
call counter-warrants against "P" those which are negatively so relevant. It is clear that 
all warrants for "~P" aie counter-warrants against "P". But given the way in which I 
intend the notion o f a counter-warrant to be understood the converse does not hold.^ For 
instance, evidence suggesting that an instrument has malfunctioned in the past may
 ^Thus I do not wish counter-warrants to be understood in terms of what Rumfitt calls "anti-warrants"; 
[TW ]: 103.
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undermine entitlement to claims that are based on measurements executed by means o f 
this instrument.
The warranted assertibility o f a given sentence, or lack thereof, is very often no 
clear-cut affair but rather determined by the aggregation o f diverse data which, 
considered on their own, suggest competing claims. Thus "P" may be warrantedly 
assertible despite the fact that there are counter-warrants against it— including warrants 
for "~P" as the case may be— which are however, overruled by the warrants for it. In 
other words, the claim that "P" is warrantedly assertible is a verdict to be reached after 
all warrants for and all counter-warrants against "P" have been aggregated, and the 
warrants for "P" prevail.^
It is important to recall that even i f  wary as to their bearing on what she ought to 
believe, the subject could not deny that in j+  counter-warrants against "P" became 
available. Insofar as she is not perceptually or cognitively deprived, she must 
acknowledge that the amount o f available information has increased, and insofar as she 
is a fellow speaker, she must acknowledge that the additional pieces o f information can 
be identified in terms o f what they are counter-warrants against, i.e. assertions o f "P". 
What she as yet lacks is an insight into why their presence can mandate withdrawal of 
her belief that it is tme that P.
As I  suggest then— and intend to explicate and defend in detail below—  
commitments to the objective truth o f "P" engender the obligation to explain in terms of 
one's total belief set why counter-warrants against "P" become available. The point at 
which "P" ceases to be warrantedly assertible marks the point at which this obligation 
can no longer be met. That this obligation is undertaken in the course o f one's 
commitment to the truth o f "P" is rendered intelligible on the basis o f the further claim 
that assertoric commitments w ith objective contents are themselves inferences to the 
best explanation. According to this view participating in assertoric practice is essentially 
engaging in the business o f giving causal explanations. As we shall see later on, this 
conception o f assertoric commitments and their contents w ill provide us with the means 
to vindicate (O l) and (0 2 ).
While sentences such as "It is warrantedly assertible that P " are used to report 
that even i f  the present state o f information contains counter-warrants against "P ", the 
warrants for "P" nonetheless prevail, sentences o f this kind are themselves ill-suited to 
contribute to an explanation o f why there are counter-warrants against "P": the fact that 
a claim remains warranted relative to an enlarged body o f information— even though 
this body o f information contains recalcitrant data— does never help explain why any o f
 ^ For example, we may have warrants that entitle us to ignore the past malfunctioning o f an instrument 
we take to be reliable in the present case. These failures may be explained by the peculiarities o f the 
quantities previously measured; their high temperature caused the instrument to expand, etc.
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these data become available in the first place. Accordingly I w ill argue that the 
difference in assertoric content between "P" and "It is warrantedly assertible that P", 
hence in the kind o f designated value they might take, is ultimately due to a difference 
in what one can use them for, what one can do with them: one but not the other can 
feature in explanations o f a certain kind.
The subject who being in state J subsequently enters j+  cannot ignore that 
counter-warrants against "P" have become available. Insofar as she is committed to the 
objective truth o f "P" she is obliged to meet the charge to explain away these counter­
warrants in terms o f what else she is committed to. I f  she cannot fu lf il this obligation, 
she must drop her belief that "P" is true.
The proposed account— intended as a jo in t solution to the Problem o f Rational
Belief Change as well as our original problem to tell apart the assertoric content o f "P"
and "It is warrantedly assertible that P" in accordance with (O l) and (02)— is open to at 
least four immediate objections which bring out that it is thus fai' insufficient:
(1) Even i f  speakers give explanations o f available data, it is hard to see why the 
obligation to give such explanations should be a rational consequence o f 
their commitment to the truth.
(2) It is certainly too strong a demand to require that one be able to explain
away any recalcitrant datum in order to be entitled to a certain claim. For,
this would have the discomforting effect that one was bound to remain 
agnostic, although the overwhelming majority o f data spoke in favour o f 
"P", unless one proved able to account for the remaining data which would 
— as the case may be— confer warranted assertibility onto "~P" had the 
other ones been absent.
(3) Insofar as the claimant's willingness to explain away recalcitrant data is 
supposed to reveal that "P" and "It is warrantedly assertible that P " differ in 
assertoric content— in that the former but not the latter can feature in 
explanations o f the intended kind— the explanation the claimant offers must 
essentially involve "P". But there is thus far no reason to believe that this is 
so: how can one ever explain the availability o f warrants telling against "P" 
in terms o /"P " ‘? It would appear that "P" fails to serve this explanatory role 
to the same extent to which "It is warrantedly assertible that P" does even i f  
possibly for different reasons.
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(4) It is at least intuitively clear that there are better and worse explanations.
Unless we have some quality control on explanations it would appear that a 
claimant might well meet the requirement by just invoking ad hoc 
explanations. To demand, as it seems reasonable to do, that whatever 
functions as the explanans must independently be warranted is most likely 
to lead into a circle or a regress; into a circle i f  "P" is said to be the 
explanans and into a regress i f  another sentence is supposed to do the work 
whose warranted assertibility must in turn be guaranteed.
These objections have some force; let us therefore draw some conclusions. Objection 
( 1) calls attention to the fact that the claimant must already be in the business o f 
explaining something before she attempts to explain away recalcitrant data. In 
particular, that "P" is at all suited to serve an explanatory purpose must be rendered 
intelligible even i f  those data cannot be explained away. Objection (2) reveals that not 
every counter-warrant must be said to stand in need of explanation, otherwise rational 
belief formation would be too severely constrained. Accordingly, we must be more 
explicit about which recalcitrant data can be said to undermine entitlement to "P" i f  they 
cannot be accommodated. Objection (3) points out that while "P" cannot itself explain 
away those data, the proposed explanation must not be wholly independent o f it either. 
Objection (4) makes plain that we need criteria for the acceptability o f such 
explanations where these cannot, it would appear, simply be laid down in terms o f their 
warranted assertibility conditions.
Here now is the bold answer; in the absence of entitlement preempting evidence 
"P" itself must be taken to be part o f— to be entailed by— the best explanation o f all the 
data in face o f which it is warrantedly assertible. This answers (1).
I f  more and more counter-warrants against "P" become available and cannot be 
explained in terms o f anything else, say "Q", which is itself warrantedly assertible and 
co-assertible with "P", endorsement o f "P" must be dropped. It is not required though 
that every recalcitrant datum be explained away. A ll that is required is that as the 
number o f counter-warrants against "P" increases, there is a point at which it becomes 
obligatory to search for an explanation o f why these counter-warrants become available, 
and that there is a point at which endorsement o f "P" must be dropped i f  this search 
proves unsuccessful. This answers (2).
Since "Q" is part o f the best explanation o f such counter-warrants only i f  "~P" is 
not, "Q" w ill be assigned this role only i f  "P" is taken to be warrantedly assertible on the 
basis o f the available evidence, for i f  neither "P" nor "~P" is taken to be warrantedly 
assertible on that basis, then nothing w ill as yet have been assigned this role: in neutral
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states neither "~P" nor "Q" is taken to explain why there are counter-warrants against 
"P". This answers (3).
As any such candidate other than "~P" w ill be more comprehensive, its 
warranted assertibility w ill naturally be conditional on its explanatory power with 
respect to further data. These data may simultaneously be warrants for yet another less 
comprehensive claim "R" which— in the absence o f entitlement preempting evidence—  
already serves as their best explanation. The explanatory pay-off o f the more 
comprehensive claim "Q" w ill therefore lie in unification by generalisation: "Q" w ill 
explain the jo in t availability o f the data that warrant "R" and the data that are counter­
warrants against "P".^ In this sense the warranted assertibility o f "Q" w ill depend on the 
warranted assertibility o f "R".^ This answers (4).
The picture which emerges is accordingly this: suppose the claimant receives 
various data identified in terms o f what they suggest, i.e. what they aie warrants.for. For 
argument's sake assume that all warrants are such that they carry equal justificatory 
weight. *0 Say the claimant receives ten warrants for "P" and only three warrants for 
"~P", and accordingly regards "P" as warrantedly assertible relative to all information 
currently available. In endorsing "P" she thereby considers the sum total o f warrants for 
"P" to be available inter alia  in virtue o f its being the case that P. In the most basic cases 
she w ill identify the fact that P as their causal source. Now assume that the number o f 
warrants for "~P" gradually increases. There w ill then be a point at which the claimant 
is obliged to search for an explanation o f why this is so, say when the number o f 
warrants for "~P" is seven. Suppose then that the claimant cannot accommodate these 
further data by appeal to another statement "Q" which she can independently be shown 
to be entitled to. There w ill then be a point at which she loses her entitlement to "P". 
Ex hypothesis this point w ill be reached when three more warrants for "~P" have become 
available. “  Since her present informational state yields a stand-off between "P" and 
"~P"— given that her explanatory resources are not sufficient for privileging "P"— she is 
bound to remain agnostic with respect to "P" and "~P". I f  yet another warrant for "~P" 
becomes available she w ill again be entitled to a claim, viz. "~P", conditional on her
8 Cf. Liplon [ITB]; 119.
^ I shall come back to this suggestion in section (5.4).
This is usually not the case. Some warrants carry more weight because they have become available by 
what are considered to be more trustworthy or reliable means. See footnote 11 below.
) 1 Although we have made this simplifying assumption, it should not be taken to suggest that the 
justificatory force o f the incoming data is in some sense fixed independently o f the deliberating process 
being described. In other words, the bearing these data have on whether one ought to regard "P" as true or 
remain agnostic about it is not independent from the success of one’s search for an explanation. What 
counts as a stand-off between the warrants for "P" and the warrants for "-P " i f  this search proves 
unsuccessful, may not count as such i f  this search is successful. In the present case, it is therefore 
essential that the claimant fails in her attempt to explain why counter-warrants against "P" become 
available.
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ability to explain away the relatively strong evidence for "P". As the number o f warrants 
for "-P" increases however, the ten warrants for "P" become negligible. The claimant 
accordingly becomes entitled to endorse "-P" even i f  she has as yet no explanation o f 
why these ten warrants are available. In endorsing "~P" she now regards "~P" as being 
part o f the explanation o f why the warrants for it are available. In the most basic cases 
she w ill consider these warrants to be effects o f its being the case that -P.^^
The retrospective ascription o f failure undertaken in correcting one's assertoric 
move accordingly comes down to the claim that what one asserted was after all not part 
o f the best explanation o f the data identified as warrants for it. This ascription can be 
made, even i f  one lacks an alternative explanation of these data: with the number o f 
warrants for the negation increasing, the pressure to explain away the warrants for the 
original claim decreases. Once one endorses the negation o f what one previously 
asserted, one takes this negation to be part o f the best explanation o f the data on which 
one bases one's endorsement o f it. And since the negation and the claim it negates 
cannot be co-assertible, one thereby rules out that the claim it negates is part o f the best 
explanation o f the data on which its previous endorsement was based.
The problem that one might fail in this respect because none o f the data on 
which one based one's assertion turn out to stem from the state o f affairs that one 
asserted to obtain, whilst that state o f affairs nonetheless does obtain, needs careful 
consideration here. In such a case, it turns out that one believed the truth albeit for the 
wrong reasons. I f  this conclusion is reached after what one claimed has been rejected in 
between— i.e. in cases in which what one claimed is being reinstated— then the 
ascription o f failure undertaken in the course o f that intermediate rejection w ill likewise 
be considered to be correct albeit for the wrong reasons: it was based on the claim that 
the negation o f what one previously asserted did serve as part o f the best explanation o f 
some data to the effect that what one previously asserted was ruled out as false.
The moral to be drawn from this is that the objective truth o f a claim cannot be 
equated w ith that claim itself best explaining evei7  set of data in terms o f which it may 
at some point be regarded as warranted. Nor can it be a p rio ri that a claim is true only
It should be obvious that negated claims can feature in such explanations: "Why did he remain seated 
in the lounge although the dinner was served?" "Because he did not intend to join in"; "Why did she fall 
o ff the roof?" "Because there was no railing". More generally, we may follow a suggestion by Demos and 
argue that "~P" is true in virtue o f a fact inconsistent with the truth of "P"; Demos [DNPj. Thus, it may be 
said to be true that I am not now sitting in the lounge in virtue o f the fact that I am standing there or 
sitting in the dining room', cf. as well Dretske [CS]. We could then say that it is the fact in virtue o f which 
"~P" is true that can serve as an explanans: his indifference explains why he remains seated although the 
dinner is being served; and there being air where there was expected to be a railing made her fall o ff the 
roof when she leaned over.
Recall that a claim is apt for objective truth only i f  its being true does not just consist in its 
being warrantedly assertible. Thus the kind o f claim alluded to is not o f the form o f 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P". A  sentence o f the latter sort is true if  and only i f  warrantedly 
assertible.
164
i f  it contributes to the best explanation o f such data. But we may say that it  is 
nonetheless an a p rio ri constraint on truth that a claim is objectively true only i f  it is an 
essential part o f that belief set in terms o f which all data ever available can best be 
exp la ined .As  we shall see in chapter six, realists and anti-realists disagree about when 
an explanation counts as best: unlike anti-realists, realists hold that an explanation is 
best only i f  it states the causes o f its explanandum regardless o f whether its doing so can 
in the end be detected.The issue o f whether it is ruled out a p rio r i that speakers are 
debarred from telling whether a given belief set qualifies as such w ill also be raised in 
chapter six.
We thereby arrive at a reassessment o f the goal we intend to attain in striving for 
objective truth: in doing so we intend to arrive at the best explanation o f all data the 
existence of which we may, as we go along, correctly report by means o f sentences such 
as "It is warrantedly assertible that P". When we commit ourselves to the objective truth 
o f "P" we conjecture that "P" w ill be part o f this explanation. Accordingly, such 
commitments are not without costs. They engender the obligation to search for 
alternative explanations o f why recalcitrant data crop up.
5.3 Objective Discourse and Causation
It would appear* that the proposed account puts heavy constraints on assertoric practice. 
Four challenges w ill subsequently be discussed which suggest (a) that these constraints 
cannot even be so much as rendered intelligible; (b) that even i f  they can somehow be 
rendered intelligible, they cannot in general be met; (c) that even i f  they can be met, 
they w ill fall short o f providing the means to overcome assertibilism; and (d) that even 
to the extent that all this can be achieved, the constraints are nonetheless inadequate in 
that assertoric practice as we know it is after all not constrained in this way.
(a) To say that "P" can explain its warrants seems to imply that all descriptive
discourse is— even i f  only im plicitly— essentially explanatory; and to say 
this is utterly absurd. I f  we do not want to fall back into the myth o f the 
ineffable Given, then we must concede that the explanandum allows for a
Recall that throughout this essay we are concerned with the role o f truth in empirical discourse.
The realism to be defended in chapter six is thus opposed to metaphysical realism: in contrast to the 
latter, it has no use for the suggestion that there are facts, representable by us, which are causally 
insulated in the sense o f essentially not being the kind of facts that would have appreciable effects on us 
i f  only we were spatio-temporally close or had the opportunity o f applying our best possible scientific 
methodology. As we shall see in chapter six, the envisaged form of realism nonetheless allows for 
recognition-transcendent truths by driving a wedge between a subject's recognitional abilities and the 
possibility that this subject may come in a position in which she can exercise these abilities. In other 
words, recognition-transcendence is thought to result from limitations of epistemic opportunity rather 
than a layer of reality radically different in kind from anything we might in principle come to know.
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description to the same extent the explanans does— and i f  so, how can every 
description be an explanation?
(b) Not all claims are, i f  warranted, warranted by data that can be regarded as 
being available because these claims are true: warrants to assert "P" quite 
often relate to states o f affairs whose obtaining is either believed to precede 
or even to cause whatever makes "P" true, or to be altogether independent 
from the truth o f "P". How can these evident facts about our belief formation 
be reconciled with the idea that all claims apt for objective truth are taken to - 
be part o f the explanation o f their warrants?
(c) Even i f  an explanation o f the intended kind was already effected by the 
descriptive use o f "P", how could we ever account for the difference -in 
assertoric content between "P" and "It is warrantedly assertible that P"?
Since the use o f the latter is undoubtedly descriptive, it  would now appear 
that calling the descriptive use o f the former an act o f explaining is itself 
signally unexplanatory and provides as yet nothing to meet the 
Manifestability Requirement. How then can (01) and (02) be vindicated?
(d) Even if, as Wittgenstein has argued, rules are not answerable to anything, 
the question can still be raised whether the rules that have been set up are 
the rules o f the game we actually play when engaging in assertoric practice.
Since games differ according to whether their rules differ, this amounts to 
asking first whether there is a game which we play and whose rules we have 
set up, and second whether that game is what we refer to as assertoric 
practice. Even i f  we can answer the former in the affirmative, a negative 
answer to the latter w ill reveal that the rules we have set up cannot be 
responsible for the difference in assertoric content between "P" and 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" that we aim to reveal. For this difference 
ought already to be recoverable from the rules constitutive o f assertoric 
practice. But we have reason to doubt that the assertoric practice we actually 
engage in is constrained by the rules that have been set up.
In the remainder o f this section I shall answer challenge (a). Challenges (b), (c) and (d)
w ill be discussed in sections (5.4), (5.5) and (5.6) respectively.
1 6 6
To begin with, let me stress that it would o f course be lethal to the present account i f  it 
could be shown to rest on the conception o f data as the ineffable G i v e n . A s  far as I can 
see however, there is no reason to suppose that it does. Indeed, data are not here 
conceived o f as elusive sense data; in particular, visual data are not supposed to be 
images on a mental screen. Rather they are— in the most basic cases in which we are 
properly situated, cognitively unimpaired and attentive observers— alterations o f the 
state o f our perceptual apparatus. However, these data aie identified in terms of what 
they are warrants for. Thus they can be described even i f  not in categorical te rm s .Th is  
does not rule out though that, on any particular occasion, the fact in which the having o f 
such data consists can be categorically described. Once such a description is 
forthcoming however, it w ill be part o f objective discourse, hence in turn require 
conditions o f warranted assertibility. For this very reason, it is ruled out that 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" can ever be reduced to categorical descriptions, for 
"~W(WP) &  ~W(~WP)" is contradictory whence "WP" cannot be equivalent to any 
sentence apt for objective truth. Accordingly, the account presently proposed is at odds 
w ith a version o f reductive materialism. But then, reductive materialists o f this kind still 
owe us an account o f understanding. ^ 8
The so-called Myth o f the Given is a combination o f two ideas: that the content o f experience is 
inexpressible (incommunicable)— e.g. because it is private and absolutely subjective— and that all 
empirical knowledge is based on experience as thus understood; cf. McDowell [MW]: 7. One of the most 
passionate defences o f this view can be found in Schlick [FC]: 163-70, 208. Cf. Friedman [CN] for a 
discussion of Schlick's views.
I f  I here agree with those who deny that the content o f experience cannot be communicated, I do not 
wish to be understood as suggesting, as they often do, that this content ought to be communicable 
by what I shall call categorical descriptions— that is by sentences o f a form other than 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" or variants o f it (see footnote 17). Nevertheless, nothing I have said so 
far, or I am going to say, controverts Sellars' claim that we cannot learn how to use sentences like 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" without at the same time learning how to use sentences like "P"; 
Sellars [EPM]: 274. One can only conceive o f one's epistemic state as suggesting that P i f  one has a 
conception o f what it is that is being suggested, viz- what it is for it to be the case that P.
By "categorical descriptions" I mean indicative declarative sentences which ascribe properties and 
relations to objects outright, i.e. without qualification by means of epistemic operators such as 
"It seems to me as if...", "It appears to be the case that...", "This is a confirmation of the claim that...", 
"Prima facie...", "It is warrantedly assertible that...", and the like. A ll purely objective discourse 
essentially involves the use o f categorical sentences. Cf. Carl [OR]: 181.
In this context it is important to recall that statements effected by means o f non-categorical 
descriptions do not yet demand the introduction o f a notion of truth over and above warranted 
assertibility:
(A3) "It is warrantedly assertible that P" is warrantedly assertible if f  
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" is true.
Hence nor do they call for an account o f their content in terms o f objective truth conditions.
’8 In other words, I here argue no more than that in the most basic cases, i.e. in cases in which we are 
properly situated, cognitively unimpaired and attentive observers of the scene, empirical warrants 
supervene on alterations of the slate o f our perceptual apparatus. This supervenience does and ought 
better leave room for a token-token identity linking individual uses o f categorical descriptions to 
individual uses of non-categorical descriptions. For in explaining away warrants for ~P in terms o f a
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That interpretation can get o ff the ground does not depend on there being categorical 
descriptions o f the data. A ll that is required is that the interpreter can discern conditions 
under which the interpretee's assertoric use o f a given sentence is considered to be 
warranted; and she may well identify them as conditions under which the assertoric use 
o f a sentence o f her own repertoire is warranted. In other words, the principle o f charity 
which deserves to be regarded as a methodological principle without which 
interpretation cannot even begin is the principle according to which one ought to regard 
one's vis-à-vis as making assertions only i f  they are warranted.*^ To extend this principle 
in order to cover conditions under which individual warrants are being recognised— and 
not just those under which a given sentence counts as warrantedly assertible relative to 
all data currently available— seems pretty straightforward once we reflect on how 
conditions o f the latter kind are discerned; the interpretee moves around, has a look 
here, a look there-7-ponders— and only then makes up her mind.
To speak o f data in terms o f what they suggest is not meant to foster the view 
that the world around us presents us with propositions and in favourable circumstances, 
forces an opinion down our throats. Such a McDowellian conception o f experience is 
utterly mysterious and anyway not part o f the present account.^o Rather, the differential 
response to causal clues which terminates in the endorsement o f claims according to 
whether these claims are warranted, is supposed to be learnt as a social, normatively 
constrained practice. Which causal clues count as warrants for "P" accordingly depends 
on how we act upon them— in other words, on what we take them to be.^i
belief set entailing P, these warrants must allow for however defeasible an identification other than in 
terms o f what they suggest.
It  might nonetheless be suggested that this supervenience thesis is at odds with the externalist 
arguments advanced in Putnam [M LR] and Burge [IN M ]. Insofar as these arguments were merely 
designed to ensure the possibility o f scientific progress and to account for the social dimension o f 
knowledge-gathering, there should be no reason for concern: as we shall see in the remainder o f this 
section, the account given here satisfies these desiderata. In particular, room is left for the possibility that 
the discovery of identities such as water being H2O w ill alter the warranted assertibility conditions of, 
say, "This is water". On the other hand, i f  these arguments were meant to show that an account of 
empirical knowledge can be complete without any mention o f mental states that fall short o f being states 
o f knowing, viz. states o f being warranted in the sense mooted here, then it is far from clear whether these 
arguments have succeeded: even i f  we hand it over to our experts to determine what counts as a sufficient 
warrant for believing that something is water, it simply does not follow that our experts can acquire 
knowledge that something is H^O without having warrants that supervene on alterations o f their 
perceptual apparatus. The latter claim would need further argument, for although the methods of telling 
truths may become ever more refined, they do not stop being methods we employ: science is not an 
oracle but knowledge achieved through human practice.
This idealisation makes sense to the extent that in the context of interpretation, speakers intend to be 
understood, hence w ill eventually point to features in their environment which provide reasons for what 
they say. As we shall see in sections (5.5) to (5.7), they may, in doing so, achieve what they so intend 
even i f  what they intend to communicate are objective truth conditions.
Cf. McDowell's [MW ]: lectures I and II.
As already argued at the end o f chapter four, claims as to the warranted assertibility o f a given 
sentence can be accounted for in broadly response-dispositional terms: i f  cognitively unimpaired.
1 6 8
Given that the data can be described in terms o f what they suggest, there is then no way 
o f saying that the present account is hostile to the idea that explanations can be effected 
by linking certain descriptive sentences. To say so does of course require that one must 
not conceive o f all descriptive sentences as serving an explanatory role. But this is not 
part o f the present account anyway. What it rather entails is that descriptive sentences 
w ith a certain content serve that role: those sentences whose content can rightly be 
regarded as objective in that it  does not relate to the speaker's present epistemic 
situation. However, neither does the present account entail that the only way 
explanations can be given is by using complex sentences formed by means o f a 
connective such as "because". On the contrary, it w ill be part o f the answer to challenge
(c) that this need not be the case.
What has been said so far may not suffice to diffuse the worry underlying 
challenge (a): why should we conceive o f what philosophers have commonly regarded 
as purely descriptive discourse— say observation reports— as being in the business o f 
explaining anything? To begin with, it would be altogether wrong to suggest that 
according to the present account, what is being described is what is being explained: it 
is not the fact stated that is explained by stating it, rather the fact stated is intended to 
explain why certain data become available. The resistance to accepting such 
explanations even so may ultimately rest on the idea that all causal explanations are 
deductions from lawlike generalisations, hence that (i) all explananda do themselves 
pertain to objective discourse insofar as all lawlike generalisations do, and (ii) every 
explanans is o f a higher logical order than the explanandum. But what is the argument 
for this?
Both Seri veil and Davidson have argued that even i f  the truth o f a singular causal 
statement depends on the truth o f a causal law, singular causal statements need not 
contain the very terms which figure in the respective causal law on which their truth 
depends, in order for them to have explanatory p o w e r .22 I f  this is correct however, then 
even i f  they did contain those terms, explanations could already be given by their means 
without it ever being mentioned that they did. Accordingly, what serves as stating the 
explanans is, i f  at all, a statement to the effect that the antecedent condition o f a law is 
satisfied, hence is o f the same logical order as the sentence stating the explanandum in 
the sense that both are singular statements.-^
Admittedly, i f  the truth o f singular causal statements did depend on the truth o f 
causal laws— as the covering law model o f causal explanation requires 24— a categorical
properly situaled and attentive speakers report that a given sentence is warrantedly assertible, then there is 
no further question o f whether that sentence really is warrantedly assertible.
22 Scriven [EPL]: 193-99; Davidson [ARC]: 16-17.
2-'^  Scriven [EPL]: 204.
24 Cf. Davidson [CR]: 159-60.
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description o f the explanandum would have to be possible in order for singular causal 
statements to be true. For its non-categorical description— say in terms o f what it is a 
warrant for— is hardly suited to occur in a causal l a w . 25 This in itself would appear to be 
no objection to the present account though, since this account does not rule out that 
there are categorical descriptions o f the data which are to be e x p l a i n e d . 2 ^  However, such 
categorically descriptive sentences w ill have warranted assertibility conditions in turn 
which are— as is to be expected— more fine-grained. In fact, this is where science leads 
us. Thus on the present account, it would just be a mistake to suppose that at any stage 
o f scientific development, all discourse could be objective without allowing for the 
introduction o f non-categorical sentences which are not already reducible to categorical 
ones.22 There is therefore no guarantee either that for every non-categorically described 
effect, it is possible to describe this effect in categorical terms. Accordingly, i f  we do 
not wish to hold that there may be true yet unstatable causal laws, the covering law 
model o f causal explanation w ill have to be regarded as in the end incompatible w ith the 
account here proposed; i f  it was built into the notion o f causality that there was such a 
guarantee, then a subject who explains why "WP" is true in terms o f "P" would have to 
commit herself to the conceivability o f an infinitely fine-grained, yet humanly 
understandable science; and such a requirement is clearly absurd. The covering law 
model faces serious difficulties o f its own however, and is no longer regarded as the 
only viable conception around. Therefore I here allow myself to defer to the work o f 
those philosophers who have argued, to my mind convincingly, that this model should 
be abandoned a n y w a y . 2 8
5,4 Causal O rig in  and Evidence
Let us now address challenge (b). The idea that claims apt for objective truth are 
brought forth as part o f the best explanation o f the data on whose basis they are made.
25 I am not sure though whether this is so with respect to probabilistic or statistical laws.
2^  Note though that this is not to say that the categorical description applicable to the very data suggesting 
P which are now available is applicable to whatever data there may be available suggesting P. As 
mentioned earlier, this possibility is indeed ruled out: since "~W(WP) &  ~W(~WP)" is contradictory, 
there can be no categorical sentence apt for objective truth which is equivalent to "WP".
27 Indeed, this is one way of interpreting the outcome of the protocol-sentence debate which so much 
engaged the Logical Empiricists: even observation reports are 'hypotheses' in the sense that they may fail 
to be true although their conditions o f warranted assertibility obtain; and the obtaining o f the latter can be 
ascertained by using sentences which are, however, ill-suited to serve the role observation reports were 
intended to play in the fabric o f scientific theories. Cf. Neurath [P].
28 See, for instance, Woodward [SSCj and [TSCj.
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would appear to be easily refuted/^ The (alleged) counterexamples are basically o f two 
kinds:
(i) P inherits its warranted assertibility from an empirical generalisation whose 
inductive basis does not include P.
(ii) P is warranted by Q, where Q relates to events or states whose occurrence or 
obtaining is evidently no effect o f what P relates to— e.g. these events or states 
precede or even cause what makes P true.
Although Paul's tendency to do silly things when drunk may warrant the claim that he 
did something silly last night, the fact that Paul did something silly  last night is not 
causally responsible for all the silly things he did when drunk on previous occasions. 
But it  is precisely what he did on those occasions that allows us to speak o f his tendency 
to do silly things when drunk. In the same vein, the fact that Paul ingested a 
considerable amount o f alcohol last night may warrant the claim that he did something 
silly, but his ingestion o f alcohol can hardly be considered to be the result o f his having 
done something silly afterwards. Rather, he did something silly because he ingested 
alcohol.
The problematic nature o f (i) is not independent from (ii), nor is the problematic 
nature o f (ii) independent from (i). Consider (i) first. Apart from those cases in which P 
is itself a conditional, P w ill not yet be warranted by an empirical generalisation unless 
the relevant antecedent-condition o f such a generalisation can warrantedly be taken to 
be satisfied. However, i f  the (instantiation o f the) antecedent-condition Q related to an 
event or state whose occurrence or obtaining could be regarded as the result o f whatever 
event or state P relates to, then we would not yet have been presented with a 
counterexample to the account proposed in section (5.2). For there we did not demand 
that all presently available warrants for P be considered to be explained by P but only 
that P be part q/’what is considered to be an explanation o f these warrants. Accordingly, 
i f  P can be taken to explain Q— where Q in conjunction w ith the respective 
generalisation warrants P— the latter demand w ill be met and our account is after all in 
good standing. Problems arise only i f  Q does not relate to anything that can be seen to 
be the effect o f what P relates to— e.g. when (ii) is satisfied.
Next consider (ii): a state o f affairs preceding the occurrence o f whatever it is 
that makes P true can warrant P only i f  there is a wairanted generalisation which allows 
us to infer (the likelihood of) P from the obtaining o f that state o f affairs. I f  all we know
29 For the following, see Ennis' critique of Harman's [IBE] in his [EIB]: 524-28; and Jackson/Pargetter 
[COE]: 61-72.
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is that Q has been the case, we cannot arrive at the warranted belief that P succeeded or 
was even caused by Q, unless we have some assurance that the way things evolve is 
usually such that states o f affairs o f kind Q aie followed by states o f affairs o f kind P. In 
other words, (i) has to be satisfied as well.
Let us therefore consider the following case which results from a combination o f
(i) and (ii): the claim that Paul did something silly last night (Ga) is warranted on the 
basis o f (i) the generalisation that Paul tends to do silly things whenever he ingests a 
certain amount o f alcohol (Vx(Fx —> Gx)); and (ii) the claim that Paul ingested a 
significant amount o f alcohol last night (Fa).
Insofar as the premisses on which "Ga" rests are apt for objective truth, it 
follows by the account proposed that these premisses must themselves be taken to be 
part o f the best explanation o f the data on which their endorsement is based. 
Accordingly, the warrantedness o f "Ga" w ill be worth no more than the warrantedness 
o f all the premisses on whose basis it is held, hence be conditional on the explanatory 
credentials o f these premisses. We may say that "Ga" is warranted by both what 
warrants "Fa" and what warrants "Vx(Fx —> Gx)", and that the latter statements are 
warranted only i f  they may be regarded as pait o f the explanation o f the data which 
confirm them. Ex hypothesi, "Ga" must likewise be part o f the explanation o f the data 
which warrant its endorsement.
We must be clear on what we mean by saying that "P" is part o f an explanation. 
On one reading, "P" is part o f an explanation only i f  "P" explains part o f what that 
explanation explains. On another reading, "P" is already part o f an explanation i f  that 
explanation would not be true— and a fo rtio r i would not explain what it  purports to 
explain— i f  "P" was not. It is the latter, weaker reading which I shall adopt in defending 
the position canvassed in section (5.2) against the objection raised here. In other words, 
I  shall merely require that "P" be entailed by the explanation in question.
Accordingly, we may explicate the notion o f aptness for objective truth as 
follows: (|) is apt for objective truth i f  ( 1) in cases in which (j) is warrantedly assertible (|) 
itse lf is suited to explain why this is so, or (2 ) there is a (p not entailed by (j) but entailing 
(|) which is apt for objective truth.
Given this interpretation, it is now a pretty straightforward matter to see in which 
sense "Ga" may be part o f the explanation o f its warrants: "Ga" is entailed by "Fa" in 
conjunction with "Vx(Fx —> Gx)"; and the warranted assertibility o f "Ga" is established 
by the warranted assertibility o f both "Fa" and "Vx(Fx -A Gx)". Given that both "Fa" 
and "Vx(Fx - 4  Gx)" are apt for objective truth, it remains to be shown that
50 I here assume that ifcp is apt for objective truth so is whatever sentence it entails.
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(a) what warrants "Fa" does not relate to anything prior to what makes "Fa" true,
but can rather be seen to be caused by what makes "Fa" true; and that
(P) there is a sense in which "Vx(Fx —> Gx)" can feature as part o f a (causal)
explanation o f what are warrants for it.
Let us address (a) first. The criterion that claims apt for objective truth be entailed by 
the best explanation o f their warrants leaves room for the possibility that "Fa" is again 
warranted by a set o f premisses none o f which relate to anything that is caused by 
whatever makes "Fa" true. Insofar as we are here concerned with the nature o f empirical 
knowledge however, it would simply be unintelligible to say that this inferential 
grounding could go on forever. Ultimately, the premisses w ill have to relate to, or be 
inductively confirmed by, states o f affairs which we cannot know unless subjected to 
their causal powers. These states o f affairs— hence the objective tmth o f claims 
expressing them— are known by their effects (rather than their causes) which impinge 
on our senses. In other words, there can be no knowledge o f the past without knowledge 
of the present. This is not a heavy doctrine about the nature o f the past 
(phenomenalism), but a claim about our knowledge o f the past (a platitude). Hence there 
is no question that insofar as "Fa" is apt for objective truth (a) w ill ultimately be 
satisfied.
What about (P)? Can "Vx(Fx —> Gx)" ever explain or contribute to an 
explanation o f its inductive basis? Let us first ask what its inductive basis w ill be. It w ill 
consist o f a sequence of pairs o f warranted statements: {"F x /', "G x/', ... "Fx„", "G x,/'}, 
where for all i with 1< i < n, both "Fx/' and "Gx/' are apt for objective truth. The 
individual statements themselves w ill therefore be taken to be part o f the best 
explanation o f their warrants. The trouble is that "Vx(Fx -A Gx)" w ill not be entailed by 
the conjunction o f these statements.
But then what explanatory role is there for "Vx(Fx —> Gx)" to play? First note 
that we would neither include "~Fy" in the inductive basis for "Vx(Fx Gx)", nor "Gy" 
i f  "Fy" was not also warranted: these statements would not confirm the generalisation. 
The inductive basis for "Vx(Fx -4  Gx)" essentially consists of pairs o f statements. Since 
these pairs o f statements must themselves be warranted, there w ill accordingly have to 
be a pattern o f evidence in order for "Vx(Fx —> Gx)" to be warranted. This pattern is not 
yet explained by the piecemeal explanation o f what this pattern is constituted by. Thus, 
whatever the explanation o f the warrants for "Fx/' and the explanation o f the warrants 
for "Gx/' may look like, there is something further to be accounted for, viz. that the 
warrants for "Fx/' and the warrants for "Gx/' are concomitant for all i. There is
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accordingly no reason to deny that insofar as they are apt for objective truth 
generalisations like "Vx(Fx Gx)" may perform an explanatory role. What is still 
unclear is how they may perform this role.
To begin with, think o f generalisations about single individuals such as the 
generalisation about Paul. It is no accident that we spoke o f Paul's tendency to do silly 
things when dmnk. We have the tendency (!) to describe regularities exhibited by 
individuals in terms o f their susceptibilities, their traits or, more generally, their 
dispositions. Whenever we do so we appeal to subjunctive conditionals to back up our 
generalisation. This way o f talking is perfectly in order. Yet many philosophers have 
insisted that ascriptions o f dispositions, just as subjunctive conditionals, are true in 
virtue o f more basic facts, in particular facts about physical structures.5 ' These 
philosophers w ill have to agree that generalities— that what makes general statements 
true— can feature in explanations. Their reductionist programme w ill not yet fa il i f  
dispositions o f a kind cannot be reduced to physical structures of a kind; dispositions 
may be multi-realisable. What has to be guaranteed is only that any single ascription o f 
such a disposition to a given individual is reducible to the ascription o f an intrinsic 
property to that same individual.
For present purposes it does not matter whether this reductionist programme is in 
the end successful.52 Suffice it to say that even i f  this programme fails— because talk 
about tendencies and dispositions is irreducible say— it simply does not fo llow  that this 
kind o f talk should be abandoned nor that it  may be abandoned. The individual w ill not 
stop exhibiting the regularities in question; and we may accordingly be forced to say 
that her disposition to behave in such-and-such a way under certain specifiable 
circumstances is an irreducible fact about this individual— a fact which can still help 
explain why this individual behaves the way she does. How this latter claim may be 
understood w ill become clearer once we consider empirical generalisations ranging over 
more than one individual, i.e. individuals o f a kind.
It has been argued that natural kind terms or other terms introduced by scientific 
theory, may be defined in terms o f natural laws or theoretical postulates: something is 
denoted by such a term just in case it satisfies a specific set o f natural laws or 
postulates.55 To describe something as exhibiting certain regularities may therefore be 
one way to describe it as being o f a certain kind. Conversely, describing something as 
being o f a certain kind may entail that things o f that kind exhibit certain generalities.^^
51 Quine [WO]: § 46; Dummett [WTM/IIJ: 53-57.
52 Whence I save the trouble to explain what intrinsic properties are.
55 For the more general proposal, see Lewis [HDT].
54 To say that a theoretically introduced term denotes is to imply that the respective theory is realised, 
and the realisation o f the theory implies that the generalisations entailed by this theory are true; see Lewis 
[HDT]: 89-90.
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To say that someone is an epilectic is to imply that she instantiates a specific pattern o f 
behaviour provided certain in itia l conditions are satisfied.55 In the same vein, i f  
evidence is regarded as being available due to the presence o f things o f such a kind, it is 
regarded as being available due to the presence o f things exhibiting certain regularities. 
Thus i f  ascriptions o f natural kind terms can be part o f (be entailed by) explanations o f 
the evidence on which their application rests then so can general statements.5^
O f course not all empirical generalisations are natural laws or term-introducing 
theoretical postulates.5? But insofar as we take such generalisations seriously enough to 
induce them— whenever we proceed from the observed to the unobserved— we suppose 
that there is a lawlike generalisation for which this generalisation is merely a 
placeholder (just as dispositional predicates may be placeholders for non-dispositional 
predicates), or at least that there is a set o f lawlike generalisations which in conjunction 
w ith further premisses jo in tly  entail it. This may be called the covering law model o f 
empirical generalisation: whenever we accept a generalisation on the basis o f a pattern 
o f evidence, we conjecture that there is a natural law or a set o f natural laws which 
would help explain why this pattern o f evidence is available. I f  natural laws can feature 
in explanations, then generalisations which are not lawlike may be entailed by the best 
explanation o f the data on whose basis they can warrantedly be endorsed. Thus we can 
cater for the objective content not only o f natural laws, but o f empirical generalisations 
in general.58
W ith these considerations in place, there is then no problem in reconciling the 
alleged counterexamples w ith the account proposed in section (5.2). Claims apt for 
objective truth may inherit their warranted assertibility from the warranted assertibility 
o f other claims by being deducible from them; and although the former may not relate to 
the causes o f the warrants for the latter, the latter w ill ultimately do so: the former w ill 
hence be entailed by the explanation o f the warrants on whose basis they are endorsed. 
To return to our example: the claim that Paul did something silly last night is warranted 
because both the claim that he drank alcohol last night and the claim that he tends to do 
silly  things when drunk are warranted. That Paul drank alcohol last night w ill be part o f 
the explanation o f the data on whose basis we come to believe that he did (sensory 
evidence or testimony say). That Paul tends to do silly things when drunk w ill be part o f
55 This holds for physiological terms in general. Similar things can be said about psychological terms; cf. 
Lewis [PTI].
56 See Lewis [HDT]: 90.
57 Note that term-introducing theoretical postulates are not true by definition but defeasible empirical 
claims.
58 In the present context it is important to bear in mind that anti-realism is compatible with scientific 
realism, ie . the claim that theoretical terms refer; cf. Tennant [ARL]: 7-12. As Lewis has argued, not all 
theoretically introduced terms which do refer, refer to entities which we believe in only because their 
existence is posited by the theory in question. Lewis quotes H^O as a counterexample; [HDT]: 79.
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the explanation o f why he has displayed a certain pattern o f behaviour in the past: it may 
for instance be entailed by the warranted claim that he meets a certain physiological 
condition.
5.5 Inferences to the Best Explanation, and the ir M anifestation
Challenge (c) rightly demands that an account be given o f how we can discern 
explaining acts from the overall pattern o f assertoric use. As I shall argue in this section, 
the answer to this challenge w ill pave the way to an explanation o f how (O l) and (02) 
are manifested in use. Thus not only w ill we be able to show how "P" and 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" differ in the way they are being used— the former 
but not the latter performs a certain explanatoiy role 9^— but that this difference in use 
calls for an understanding o f the truth o f the former according to which
(01) "P" may (actually) be true, even i f  it fails to be at present warrantedly assertible
(02) "P" may (actually) fa il to be true, even i f  it is at present warrantedly assertible.
In order to answer (c) it  would be idle to compare the different warranted assertibility 
conditions o f the following two embeddings:
"It appears as i f  P because P"
"It appears as i f  P because it is warrantedly assertible that P".
For even the assertibilist w ill concede— and has to some extent been shown able to 
accommodate— that "P" and "It is warrantedly assertible that P" behave differently 
when embedded in complex sentences. The present case is even more complicated since 
"because" is not a truth functional connective."^® Thus we should better argue that we can 
discern from the freestanding uses o f "P" and "It is warrantedly assertible that P" alone
The latter may serve an explanatory role in explanations of why we come to assert or believe what we 
do.
Davidson has argued that sentences which appear to have the logical form "P because Q" actually have 
the logical form o f existentially quantified statements that quantify over events or states which are said to 
be causally related; [LFA] and [CR]. As far as I can see, the account proposed in this chapter is 
compatible with Davidson's analysis. Thus although Davidson rejects the idea that facts are causes, the 
existence o f an event or state that causes another nonetheless is a fact, and it is by means of stating such 
facts that one gives causal explanations. In this context it is again important to stress that the account 
defended here is exclusively concerned with empirical discourse.
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that both sentences serve different purposes: the former and not the latter can serve as an 
answer to the quest for an explanation o f why certain data are available.
I  have argued that such data are identified in terms o f what they suggest. 
Inasmuch as responsiveness to such data is a precondition for the participation in a 
practice which is disciplined by norms o f warranted assertion, awareness o f them must 
go hand in hand with a grasp o f their significance. The quest for an explanation o f such 
data need not be formulated in terms o f a vv/zy-question, although it usually w ill. 
Puzzlement, a facial expression o f doubt or irritation, the resistance to putting up with 
the status quo, a closer scmtiny o f the environment and the presented corpus delicti, or 
the readiness to consult an expert— all these behavioural characteristics manifest the 
quest for an explanation.
The important task is accordingly to show that uses o f "P" but not o f 
" It is warrantedly assertible that P" are appropriate answers which satisfy the speaker’s 
needs even though the assertion o f either is warranted under the very same 
circumstances. Hence our question seems to be: how can it be manifested that the use o f 
"P" satisfies the speaker's quest for an explanation? This is a misleading way o f putting 
it though, for appropriate answers to vv/iy-questions are assertions. And since we are 
bound to consider only such linguistic performances which are permissible moves in a 
rationally constrained practice, the only conditions under which "P" can be said to serve 
as an appropriate answer are accordingly those under which it is warrantedly assertible. 
Thus the circumstances under which the assertion o f "P" can serve as an appropriate 
answer are precisely those under which "It is warrantedly assertible that P" w ill be 
warrantedly assertible too. Since the speaker must be taken to know that the warranted 
assertibility o f "P" mandates the assertion o f "P", we prove unable to discern whether it 
is "P" or "It is warrantedly assertible that P" that satisfies her quest for an explanation.
Rather than considering circumstances under which her quest for an explanation 
can appropriately be satisfied, let us ask what the speaker herself can do under 
circumstances under which she has not yet a straightforward answer to her question. In 
the end it must be in terms o f what one can do with "P" but not with 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P", that we prove able to account for the manifestation 
o f their difference in assertoric content. Assertions however, can be effected by the use 
o f either.
The practice o f abductive reasoning— of making inferences to the best 
explanation— is not independent from the practice o f heuristic reasoning— of reasoning 
under a working assumption. It is by means o f heuristic reasoning that we may arrive at 
conclusions as to whether a given explanation is better than another."^ ^ Abduction is 
often called eliminative induction because it proceeds by eliminating alternative
Lipton [ITB]; 67-68, 89-90.
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hypotheses;42 and one way to eliminate these alternatives is by asking how, i f  one 
hypothesis is correct, the data speaking in favour o f another can be accounted f o r F o r  
example; assuming that Jones shot the sheriff I suppose that his fingerprints are on the 
deputy's gun because it was he who did it. Reasoning under this assumption I now try to 
find an explanation o f the deputy's secretiveness (he is suffering from a shock, or is 
perhaps in love with the eye-witness), the eye-witness' account that a clean-shaven man 
did it  although Jones has a beard (she is in love with Jones, or she has poor eyesight), 
and Jones' insistence that he cannot remember what happened (he tries to plead non 
compos mentis). Alternatively, assuming that the deputy shot the sheriff I  suppose that 
he is so secretive because it was he who shot the sheriff. Reasoning under this 
assumption I suggest that Jones' memory loss is due to the fact that he was 
chloroformed by the deputy, that his fingerprints are on the gun because the deputy 
imprinted them on the gun, and that the eyewitness reports that it was a clean-shaven 
man who did it because she has poor eyesight (the deputy has a beard too). O f course, 
faced w ith suitable alternatives piecing such stories together w ill not be enough. Their 
credibility w ill ultimately depend on whether their consequences can be backed up by 
additional infomiation. Heuristic reasoning as thus understood is essentially not 
counterfactual: reasoning under an assumption that is known to be established as false 
has no pay-off with respect to the quest for explanations o f the intended kind.
Now suppose a speaker is in a state o f information which is neutral w ith respect 
to "P" and "-P " yet contains warrants for "P" as well as warrants for "~P". Assume 
furthermore that the speaker displays her dissatisfaction with this epistemic situation. 
This dissatisfaction w ill accordingly be interpreted as expressing her intention to explain 
why she is in this situation, i.e. why the data in question have become available to her. I f  
as a consequence she goes on to reason under the assumption o f "P" and "~P" 
respectively, this heuristic reasoning w ill have to be understood as the attempt to 
overcome neutrality by way o f finding an explanation "Q" o f the warrants for "~P" 
given that the truth o f "P" is part of the best explanation o f the warrants for "P"— or o f 
the warrants for "P" given that the truth o f "~P" is part o f the best explanation o f the 
warrants for "~P". In favourable circumstances she w ill arrive at such an explanation 
"Q" and then be in a position to endorse "P" or "~P" as the case may be. What the 
speaker tries to find out then by reasoning under the assumption o f "P" and "~P" 
respectively, w ill be whether her beliefs— her doxastic resources as it were— are such as 
to allow for an explanation o f why those data have become available which are warrants 
for the other sentence. Depending on which sentence is assumed to hold— "P" or "~P"—  
this search for a further explanation w ill take a different route. The positive outcome o f
"^ 2 Cf. Harman [IBE]: 88-89. 
Woodward [SSC]; 232-39.
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this search w ill accordingly disclose whether "P" or whether "~P" can be regarded as the |
better explanation in the first place. Whether the outcome is positive though is at present )
inessential. Rather what is essential is that the search is undertaken at all. I
Alternatively, consider the case in which a speaker is warranted to assert "P" on j
the basis o f warrants for "P" yet in which the number o f counter-warrants against "P" |
gradually increases. Her growing uneasiness with this acquisition o f counter-warrants !
w ill accordingly be inteipreted as stemming from her obligation to account for their |
availability. Suppose then that she goes on to reason under the assumption o f "~P". |
Insofar as her claim to the truth o f "P" has the status o f a conjecture about the pedigree j
o f some o f the warrants she has for "P", her heuristic reasoning w ill have to be regarded i
as a precautionary check-up o f the explanatory power of her current belief set. In other j
words, in reasoning under the assumption "~P" she w ill have to be understood as testing j
whether a belief set that includes "-P " rather than "P" w ill not after all yield a more ijsatisfactory explanation o f all the data presently available. I f  she hits on an alternative |
explanation o f the warrants for "P" that is co-assertible with "~P" and whose truth in 
conjunction with the truth o f "~P" best explains the progressive acquisition o f counter- i
warrants against "P", she w ill then drop her belief in the truth o f "P" and endorse "-P " j
instead. t
In neither case however, would it be reasonable for the speaker to engage in 
reasoning under the assumption that "P" or "~P" were at present warrantedly assertible. j
In the first case it  is an established fact that neither "P" nor "-P " is at present i
warrantedly assertible whose acknowledgement forms an essential part o f the speaker's J
motivation to search for an explanation at all. To assume that the situation was different |
in this respect would be to assume that the quest for an explanation was misplaced. In I
the second case "P" is at present warrantedly assertible while "~P" is not, to the effect |
that the conjecture that "P" is true is mandated; unless this was so, the speaker would ;
not have undertaken the obligation to safeguard her current belief set against the I
possibility that a belief set including "~P" has more explanatory benefits. But to assume *
that "~P" rather than "P" was warrantedly assertible would be to assume a situation in 
which this obligation would not have been undertaken, to the effect that the attempt to |
meet it would be beside the point. Therefore in heuristic reasoning o f this kind, "P" and i
"~P" w ill behave differently from "It is warrantedly assertible that P" and j
"It is warrantedly assertible that ~P" respectively.
The assertibilist may try to counter these objections by suggesting the follow ing \
analysis of the content o f assumptions: to assume "P" is not to assume that "P" is at i
present warrantedly assertible but rather the anticipation of what would be the case were j
"P" to become warrantedly assertible. This reply should carry no conviction however, j
for it leaves unexplained how hypothetical reasoning may have any bearing on what one |
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ought to assert: the anticipation o f a change in information cannot contribute to such a j
change. I f  the assertibilist's analysis o f the content o f assumptions was right, heuristic |
reasoning could never move a rational agent towards endorsing or rejecting a claim, nor 1
could it ever reasonably be undertaken in the hope that it might have this result, but ]
ex hypothesi this is the case. i
In the present context it is o f some importance that heuristic reasoning neither i
involves the assertion o f what is assumed nor necessarily the assertion o f conditionals |
whose antecedent expresses that assumption. Hence even though heuristic reasoning j
may involve the use o f sentences embedding "P" and "~P", there has to be a |
freestanding use o f "P" and "~P" which is that o f assuming that one o f them holds and I
without which heuristic reasoning would not be what it is. But as I argued in section j
(4.5) o f chapter four, there is indeed good reason to regard assumptions as speech acts o f i
their own kind.
The manifestation of the explanatory role o f "P" and "-P " at the same time |
manifests their aptness for objective truth. Thus i f  the speaker reasons under the ?
assumption o f "P” in states o f informational neutrality, she considers it to be a genuine j
possibility that "P" is true despite the fact that it fails to be at present warrantedly |
assertible. For insofar as this piece o f reasoning is undertaken with the intention to 
overcome neutrality, it ought to be regarded as a possibility that as a result, "P" qualifies j
as part o f what can then be taken to be the best explanation o f all presently available 1
data. In the same vein, i f  the speaker reasons under the assumption o f "~P" in states 
which otherwise warrant the assertion o f "P" and may even come to endorse "~P" on 
this basis, then the very fact that she does so w ill be intelligible only i f  she regards the i
truth o f "-P ", hence the falsehood o f "P" as not yet being ruled out by the warranted j
assertibility o f "P". In other words, the speaker's behaviour w ill be intelligible only to j
the extent that she is taken to conceive o f the truth conditions o f "P" as satisfying (O l) |
and(02X |
Even so, we still owe an account o f how the fact that "P" and "It is warrantedly i
assertible that P" behave differently in contexts o f assumptions can so much as reveal a i
difference in their assertoric content. I f  such a difference in assertoric content was not i
already disclosed by the fact that both sentences behave differently in contexts o f '
denials, then one might wonder why reflections on their different role in contexts o f ;
assumptions should be o f any help either. The first thing to note is that while yielding an 
interpretation o f "P" as used in denials, assertibilism is at a loss to interpret the use o f 
"P" in the contexts o f assumptions at all. In particular what I assume in assuming that P \
is nothing I  can according to assertibilism assert. By contrast, assertibilism entails that :
what I deny in denying "P" is that it is not warrantedly assertible that ~P and this is i
clearly something I can even on that view assert. But now insofar as reasoning under an
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assumption made by means o f a sentence whose assertion is so far considered to be 
unwarranted may at all result in the readiness to assert that sentence, then what has been 
assumed ought better be something one can assert. Although the readiness to assert, say, 
"~P" is concomitant with the readiness to assert "It is warrantedly assertible that ~P", 
still what is being asserted by means o f the latter cannot be what has been assumed. We 
are therefore bound to conclude that it is by means o f sentences o f the former kind and 
not by means o f sentences o f the latter kind, that we can assert what we have assumed.
5.6 Assertoric Practice and Knowledge-why
Even i f  this complex pattern o f linguistic usage may allow for a systematic distinction 
between the roles "P" and "It is warrantedly assertible that P" play in the game we have 
been describing— so as to manifest (01) and (02)— the question has s till to be 
addressed whether this distinction is essential to the distinction between the objective 
truth conditions o f "P" and its conditions o f warranted assertibility. Insofar as the latter 
distinction is essential to the way we conceive o f assertoric practice, asking this 
question boils down to asking whether the rules o f the game we have been describing 
are essential to what we refer to as assertoric practice. I f  not, the difference in role 
between "P" and "It is warrantedly assertible that P" which we have discerned would at 
most be a reflection o f an underlying distinction which we have not yet captured—  
hence could be subjected to revisionist criticism whose success would not yet amount to 
the exorcism o f objective content. Challenge (d) accordingly suggests that the rules o f 
the game we have been describing need not be complied with in order for those rules to 
be complied with which one ought to follow when engaging in assertoric practice.
To begin with, let us be clear about the nature o f the game we have been 
describing. Brie fly put, participants in that game are knowledge seeking subjects whose 
pursuit o f objective truth is the striving for a set o f beliefs in terms o f which all 
incoming data can best be explained. According to this picture then the pursuit o f 
objective truth essentially involves the pursuit o f knowledge-w/iy. Those who engage in 
it  intend to render intelligible to themselves why they receive the data they do, hence 
what the source o f the causal influences is which they find themselves subject to. Thus 
their constant aim is to objectify their epistemic states by assigning these states— hence 
themselves— a place in the causal order. It is essential to this attempt at objectification 
that they thereby give an account o f how the rationality o f their doxastic past can be 
reconciled w ith its having been wrong-headed or impoverished all the same: they regard 
themselves as having given a wrong or incomplete picture o f reality because they 
received too little o f it in experience."^"^
44 Cf. Carl [OR]: 179-80.
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In what follows I w ill try to answer (d) in two steps. First I w ill address the challenge 
that participation in assertoric practice is not yet an epistemic enterprise. It is only after 
this challenge has successfully been rebutted that I w ill address the second challenge. 
According to this second challenge, my answer to the first falls short o f showing that the 
participation in assertoric practice is furthermore the pursuit o f knowledge-vy/ty.
Assertoric practice— or so we have assumed thus fai'— is governed by norms of 
warranted assertion. Very often though this assumption is stated in rather different 
terms, viz. that assertoric practice is governed by norms of correct assertion. Thus it has 
been argued that norms o f correctness must be operative in any practice whose moves 
qualify as contentful, and that since assertoric moves are said to have assertoric 
contents, they must accordingly be subject to norms of warranted assertion. Even 
though compelling as far as it goes, this thought cannot be the whole truth o f the matter. 
Indeed it cannot even be the essential bit. What is often missed is that the identification 
o f norms o f correct assertion w ith norms o f warranted assertion already involves an 
explanatory step without which talk about co/rrm/fulness would simply be misleading.
To begin with, the alleged contentfulness which accrues to performances in 
virtue o f the fact that there are conditions under which they qualify as correct or 
incorrect is better referred to as their significance. Thus, rules o f conduct lay down 
conditions under which certain actions count as mandated and conditions under which 
their omission does. Poking chop sticks into the contents o f a bowl is what you are 
expected to do at a certain point in a Japanese remembrance ceremony but counts as 
rude on every other occasion. Therefore, poking chop sticks into the contents o f a bowl 
is a significant act. I f  it  was not for the Japanese culture, doing so could at most be 
regarded as silly. But for all its significance, poking chop sticks into the contents o f a 
bowl can hardly be said to have a content in virtue o f the rules that determine the 
conditions under which doing so qualifies as correct. This is so for two reasons: on the 
one hand, i f  it  had content then one could convey that content by other means; i f  instead 
o f poking your chop sticks into the contents o f the bowl in front of you, you folded your 
hands however, the other participants would not so much as try to understand what you 
were doing but rather teach you what one is expected to do at that point o f the ritual, viz. 
to poke one's chop sticks into the contents o f that bowl. On the other hand, any content 
it might be said to have besides its significance— i.e. besides its being the thing to do at 
that point o f the ritual— w ill not be due to the rules which determine that it  is the thing 
to do at that point. Hence even i f  rules o f conduct determine conditions o f correctness, 
the rules due to which certain performances qualify as content bearers are not just any 
rules o f conduct.
It would be wrong to suggest that even though not all rules which determine 
conditions o f correctness likewise contribute to the determination o f content, some
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nonetheless do and that whether they do so ultimately depends on the kind o f 
performance they govern. According to this line o f thought, we have been misled by the 
example chosen, hence what we should rather do is consider performances which we 
already know to be content bearers. This w ill not yet do however. I f  a guest says to her 
host that the dinner is disgusting, this w ill count as inappropriate. But it would in the 
very same sense be inappropriate to spit it out onto the table (unless one does so under 
compulsion)— even i f  this is on the far end o f the scale. The fact that doing what the 
guest does can qualify as inappropriate in this sense is nothing due to which her remark 
has a content. For instance, its inappropriateness is perfectly consistent with the finding 
that it is correct as far as the dinner is concerned. Rather it would appear to be the other 
way round: the guest's remark can qualify as inappropriate in this sense because it has a 
specific content.
In other words, in order to get at content-determining conditions o f correctness it 
is not yet enough to specify rules that confer significance onto certain performances and 
to identify these performances as assertions. Rather, what one must do in the first place 
is to specify the kind o f correctness which is relevant for assertoric content. To identify 
the standards o f correctness without which assertions would have no contents at all w ith 
standards o f warranted assertion is to do precisely this. Accordingly, the question can be 
raised why this identification is apt. Assertions are moves whose content is given by the 
conditions under which they qualify as true. Why then could they not be said to have 
such a truth conditional content unless the practice o f making them was governed by 
norms o f warranted assertion?
As we have seen, we cannot explain why assertoric practice is governed by 
norms o f warranted assertion by simply pointing to the fact that the significance o f 
assertions requires such norms. Likewise, we cannot simply assume that insofar as 
significance requires standards of correctness, norms of warranted assertion are required 
for the contentfulness o f assertoric moves. Neither can the significance o f assertoric 
moves be reduced to their contentfulness, nor can standards o f correctness for assertions 
be reduced to norms of warranted assertion. Thus Wright takes a short cut when he 
maintains that
[i]n order for [...] sentences [which can be used to perform assertions] to be determinate in 
content at all, there has to be a distinction, respected for the most part by participants in the 
practice, between proper and improper use o f them. And since they are sentences with 
assertoric content, that w ill be a distinction between cases where their assertion is justified 
and cases where it is not.^^
Whatever has content is significant, and in order for a performance to be significant, 
there must be conditions under which it is appropriate and conditions under which it is
4  ^Wright [TO]: 17.
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not. Conditions o f warranted assertibility do indeed serve this purpose, but that they aie 
what an assertion must be said to have in order to have assertoric content at all, is a 
further insight which requires some elucidation.
Since Wittgenstein it has become common philosophical practice to demand that 
accounts o f content do justice to the fact that states and performances other than belief 
and assertion have a content: wishes, hopes, commands, etc. But to the best o f my 
knowledge, every sufficiently systematic account o f content has modelled the contents 
o f such states and performances on the basis o f truth conditions: wishes are wishes that 
something be true, hopes are hopes that something w ill turn out to be true, commands 
are commands that something be made true. In the same vein, almost every such 
account has taken the treatment o f beliefs or assertions as its starting point.^^ The 
connection between truth on the one hand and belief and assertion on the other, is pretty 
straightforward and has anyway been our concern all along. But that the content o f the 
other states and performances can be modelled along the lines suggested, is itself a 
striking fact whose explanation has received little  attention.
It is not our present concern to give such an explanation however. We have 
already taken a step in this direction by highlighting the content-determining role o f 
assumptions. Rather, what is important is that in order for the further constraint to be 
met, that an account be given o f those other states and performances, one's account o f 
the contents o f beliefs and assertions, once available, need not be altered but merely be 
extended. For instance: once the content o f sentences as they are used in assertions has 
fu lly  been explained— i f  only by appeal to the relation between assertions and 
assumptions— truth can be defined in terms o f assertoric content. I f  one furthermore 
wants to account for wishes, commands and the rest, all one must do is give a 
characterisation o f these other states and performances. For i f  a systematic account o f 
the content o f all states and performances is possible at all, then pace assertibilism it is 
like ly that the interpretees w ill use the same sentences, or grammatical transformations 
thereof, in order to express the same contents independently o f which speech act they 
perform or which intentional state they intend to convey.
As has been emphasised in section (2.1) o f chapter two, the notion o f meaning is 
a determinable that receives its determination within theories o f meaning."*? If, according 
to such a theory, the meaning o f such a sentence consists in its truth conditions, where
46 Only recently Davidson has suggested that the interpreter's entering wedge are the interpretee's 
preferences between the truth o f sentences; [SlCT]: 322-24. Others have tried to reduce belief to desire; 
cf. e.g. Grandy [RMB]: 451-52. Neither account however makes so much as sense, independently from 
the fact that contents are ultimately contents o f beliefs or assertions. This is trivially so in the reductionist 
case; and Davidson's modified account implicitly relates to the fact that speakers prefer the truth of one 
sentence to the truth o f another according to which sentences they believe (or hold true) to a higher 
degree.
4? In other words, theories of meaning explicate the notion o f meaning; cf. Carnap [LFP]: 3-8.
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its having these conditions is inter alia determined by the conditions under which it may 
warrantedly be asserted or believed, then this theory draws on notions which belong to 
the province o f epistemology. I f  this theory furthermore seeks to explain the meaning, 
i.e. the content, o f other intentional states on that basis, then this suggests that, in light 
o f this theory, epistemology is not modelled after the fashion of intentional psychology 
but rather conversely
For what it is worth, this view o f the matter at least provides an answer to the 
question o f why conditions o f warranted assertibility have a decisive role to play in the 
determination o f content, quite apart from the fact that their obtaining is public. I f  
assertions are conceived o f as performances o f knowledge seeking subjects, then it is 
not at all surprising that these performances are answerable to questions like "How do 
you know?" or "How does she know?" Answers to such questions w ill vary according to 
whatever it  is that is presented as true, therefore it w ill to some extent be possible to 
determine what is presented as true by the answers given. Once we take it that speakers 
comply w ith norms o f warranted assertion in the sense that they intend to make 
assertions only when they are justified in doing so, we can regard the conditions under 
which these assertions are assessed as appropriate by others to be conditions under 
which such answers need not be given. Accordingly, conditions o f warranted 
assertibility can then be taken to help determine what it is that is presented as true.
Even i f  this is the appropriate picture o f what we do in devising an account o f 
assertoric content, the question o f why we should go so far and assume that the 
linguistic practice under study is furthermore constrained by the quest for knowledge- 
why, nonetheless remains unanswered. Speakers might be said to present as true what 
they so present because the conditions are such that they are justified in doing so. But 
why should the speakers conceive o f themselves as taking the conditions under which 
they are so justified to obtain because what they present as true is true?
There is a sense in which this is obviously false: knowledge seeking subjects do 
not reason from whatever they claim to be the case to the obtaining o f conditions under 
which they are warranted to do so, in the sense o f justifying the latter by the former—  
indeed this would be characteristic o f dogmatists rather than knowledge seeking 
subjects. The sense in which "because" was here intended to be understood however, is 
causal: according to the account developed in this chapter, knowledge seeking subjects 
causally explain the obtaining o f certain conditions by what they take to be warrantedly 
assertible under those conditions. In other words, amongst what they take to be 
warrantedly assertible under certain conditions is what is supposed to state the cause o f 
the obtaining o f those conditions. Prior to their endorsement o f a claim which is
48 This echoes Dummett's remarks at the end o f his [W TM /II]: 92-93. Elsewhere Dummelt argues that 
the theory o f meaning is more basic than epistemology though; see [FPL]: chapter 19; and [CAP].
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intended to serve this role, they are faced with what they take to be warrants for the 
appropriateness o f such an explanation. And their closer scrutiny o f these warrants, 
which may or may not terminate in their endorsement of a certain claim, is the search 
for the causal source o f these wanants. The identification o f that source is 
simultaneously the assessment o f the reliability o f the evidence: both are effected by 
endorsing a certain claim or its negation. In fact how could this be otherwise? In basing 
one's claims on the evidence one possesses, how could one fail short o f taking the truth 
of what one claims ultimately to be responsible for the availability o f just that evidence?
One cannot so much as identify the source o f one's evidence in order to assess its 
reliability by getting into contact with that source itself where that contact is unmediated 
by any further evidence. This is not to say that one can never know that source but only 
the effects whose source it is."*9 The naive realists' idea of an immediate uptake o f facts 
is just as semantically obscure however, as the idea that such an uptake can without 
further ado be reconciled with fallib ilism  is epistemologically obscure. The abductive 
model o f belief formation yields a far more plausible account than such a McDowellian 
picture,-"’® While the search for the best explanation is conceded to be an ongoing affair 
such that fa llib ilism  poses no difficulty, what is represented in presenting a sentence to 
be objectively true is accounted for exclusively in terms o f warranted assertibility 
conditions and the role such a sentence plays in the overall project o f causally 
explaining why conditions o f that kind do obtain.
5,7 A Solution to the Problem o f Understanding
Davidson has argued that at least in the most basic cases, we intend to speak about the 
causes o f our beliefs— that in those cases our beliefs are about what we take them to be 
caused by.^‘ The account proposed here is faithful to this idea, but differs in important 
respects from Davidson's own.
First, according to the present view we can— even in the most basic cases— fail 
in our intention to speak about the causes o f our beliefs when expressing them. Such 
errors are not conceived as exceptions to the rule: massive error is not ruled out by 
methodological constraints on mutual interpretation. The claim that most o f our beliefs 
are true is not a theorem o f the account proposed, nor is it  suggested that whoever 
intends to communicate is bound to commit herself to this claim. On Davidson's account
49 Cf. Woodward [SSC]: 243-45.
^® McDowell [M W ] equates facts with true propositions and condemns the view according to which 
genuine experiences and illusions have a common description. But he neither addresses the question o f 
what (false) propositions are, nor does he account for the fact that genuine (veridical?) experiences and 
illusions are subjectively indistinguishable.
Davidson [CTK]: 317-18; [EC]: 332; [CoT]: 195; [EE]: 194-95; and [MTE]: 72-73.
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on the other hand, the speaker displays her grasp o f sense in saying o f what is true that it 
is true. For although Davidson leaves room for the possibility that a speaker may be 
mistaken in any particular case, such errors do not contribute to the determination o f 
truth conditional content: just as we were bound to restrict the scope o f content- 
determining verbal behaviour to those moves which qualify as correct, Davidson is 
bound to restrict it to the true ones insofar as, according to him, the only standard o f 
correctness is truth.
Secondly, according to the present account we intend to speak about the causes 
o f our beliefs in expressing them in the sense that we aim to best explain the availability 
o f those data which confer warranted assertibility onto sentences o f our repertoire that 
can be used to express these beliefs— and do so by way o f asserting these very 
sentences. The present account presupposes no more than that the causal chain leads 
from these data to such assertoric utterances: these data are what speakers respond to in 
making assertions. In performing such assertoric utterances in response to the data 
received— hence in expressing their beliefs— speakers give an account o f the causes o f 
these data. In this way they complete the account o f the causal chain— although they can 
o f course go wrong in doing so. Thus ultimately they intend to give an account o f the 
causes o f their beliefs too. But to engage in causal explanations is more than to produce 
what is ultimately the effect o f one's surroundings. Such explanations can be intelligible 
to others even i f  taken to be false. This cannot be the case i f  the contents o f the 
utterances— the beliefs expressed— are reckoned to be about whatever causes those 
u t t e r a n c e s . ^ 2  And we would not yet be entitled to conceive o f what someone else is 
doing as an exercise o f her intellect i f  we regarded the significance o f what she is doing 
as wholly determined by the causes which give rise to her doing it. In other words, to 
causally explain and to be caused are just two different pairs o f shoes. According to the 
present account, assertions and beliefs are thus not just responses to stimuli, but fallible 
conjectures about something which lies further down the causal chain and whose 
absence does not yet render the stance taken irrational.
In shunning what he terms 'epistemic intermediaries', Davidson leaves no room 
for the distinction between conditions o f warranted assertibility on the one hand and 
conditions which one states in expressing one's beliefs— Le. truth conditions— on the 
other.^^ Nor does he solve the problem o f distinguishing systematically between the 
contents o f "P" and "It is (at present) warrantedly assertible that P". Instead, a speaker's 
assertions are conceived o f as reports o f the very conditions o f utterance which lie open 
to her and the interpreter's view: these conditions are regarded as truth conditions. That
-‘’2 Davidson holds that this is the correct account o f the content o f utterances whose interpretation serves 
as the basis for interpreting all the rest; [EC]: 332.
”  [CTK]: 312.
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the interpretee thus manages to embrace reality and cast it in prepositional form— in 
other words to represent it— is explained in terms o f the fact that she does pretty much 
the same the interpreter does, where what the interpreter does is left u n e x p l a i n e d . ^ " *
Let representationalism be the view that the notion o f representation or 
aboutness is a primitive which is suited to play an explanatory role in theories o f 
meaning. Then despite all declarations to the contrary the externalist account o f truth 
conditional content that Davidson offers would appear to be representationalist— or no 
account at all.^^ For that the interpretee's assertions are about their causes is here cashed 
out in terms o f the contents o f the interpreter's beliefs. The question, how the causal 
relation between objects and events on the one hand and the interpretee's assertions on 
the other can be conceived as an intentional relation, is answered by saying that this 
causal relation is o f the same kind as that between these objects and events and the 
interpreter's beliefs, where the contents o f the latter are already given; and the aboutness 
o f mental states that are known to have a specific content no longer seems to stand in 
need o f explanation: contentful states are essentially intentional.
Indeed, it is otherwise hard to see how correspondence and coherence can be 
reconciled in the manner Davidson wants them to be reconciled once correspondence is 
explained in purely causal terms and coherence is explained in terms o f consistency: 
how can the fact, that a speaker's utterances on the one hand and objects and events in 
her v ic in ity on the other are causally related, help explain that these utterances have 
truth conditional content that makes them answerable to logical constraints? On the 
other hand, i f  we conceive o f the assignment o f the relevant causal relations as being 
informed by these logical constraints— according to Davidson not every causal factor 
counts as constitutive o f content— then it is likewise obscure how such an assignment 
can issue in an assignment o f truth conditional contents. Granted: talk about consistency 
makes sense only where it  makes sense to speak o f truth conditional contents. But even 
i f  we are bound to view the speaker as instantiating something that can be given a 
consistent interpretation in terms o f such contents, the question would still arise o f how 
the speaker's differential responses to objects and events in her vicin ity can confer these 
contents onto her utterances so as to make us so bound. In other words, it remains
5"* Cf. Dummetl [W TM/I]; 6 .
Rorty, who tends to think that Davidson has solved all problems in the area, contrasts representation 
with aboutness; [RB]: 133. Whatever he has in mind when he talks about representation, I have in mind 
what he has in mind when he talks about aboutness. According to Rorty, no further questions arise once 
we realise that aboutness and truth are indefinable. Not so: what we demand a justification for is 
Davidson's claim that what speakers do— their responses to distal stimuli— calls for an interpretation in 
terms o f truth conditions which presents the speakers as talking about these stimuli.
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unclear how the causal order and the logical order interact in such a way that truth 
conditional content emerges.-"’®
The need for such an account o f representation or aboutness has led some 
philosophers to endorse the view that reality itself exerts a rational constraint on our 
beliefs.-"’? Thus McDowell has argued that i f  our thinking is to have any bearing on 
reality at all— i f  it is in the business o f being endowed with truth conditional content—  
then reality itself must be contentful: in experience, it must present us with facts which 
we can simply take in, where our experience is conceived o f as our conceptual abilities 
being drawn into operation. To say that in experience our conceptual abilities are drawn 
into operation however, is no more than a platitude: what we need is precisely an 
account o f how the exercise o f these abilities can issue in so much as a representation of 
the world around us— what makes them conceptual abilities.®^ On the other hand, to 
contend that such representations are what we airive at when embracing facts-—where 
facts are ultimately understood as true propositions— is merely to refuse to give an 
account o f propositions by turning the true ones into denizens o f reality, while letting 
the notions o f taking in, embracing, grasping, etc. do all the work without in turn 
explaining them.®9
What McDowell should have said is rather that content externalism does not yet 
explain how speakers perform the magnificent task of talking about whatever causes this 
talking and in such a way that this talking can be true or false. But neither McDowell 
nor Davidson sets out to give such an explanation— at least none that does not in turn 
draw on truth conditional contents or representations. The notion o f representation or 
aboutness which is entwined with the notion o f truth conditional content is not 
intelligible independently o f the intentional attitudes o f assertion and belief: it is these 
latter notions by means o f which we express the intention to represent reality the way it 
is. In taking belief and assertion as prim itive Davidson simply helps himself to a certain 
vocabulary whose employment conceals the lacuna in the account he proposes: just 
combine talk about responsiveness to causal factors with talk about the intention to say 
something true about reality, and all o f a sudden you are in the favourable position to 
say that speakers intend to tell the tmth about the causes that prompt their beliefs—
-"’6 It is not surprising that Davidson has eventually come to the conclusion that the concept o f causality 
itself is essentially an interest-relative notion that has its proper place in intentional explanations rather 
than science; [TVK]: 162-63. However this may be, to say this much is not yet to explain what causes 
have to do with truth conditional content.
®? McDowell [M W ]: lectures I and II; and Putnam [POQ]: 64-68.
-’8 I f  the demand that such an account be given is to have force against McDowell himself, it needs to be 
shown not to presuppose any reductionist thesis he rejects. But I can neither see why the account 
developed in this chapter should be regarded as reductionist in spirit— any more than, say, the account 
proposed by Brandom [M IE]— nor, i f  this label is thought to apply after all, what arguments McDowell 
has to hold against it.
[M W ]: lectures I and II.
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where all you have to adduce in order to tell apart truth conditions appear to be the 
relevant causes. Since on this model the causes are what one takes them to be, the 
success o f this intention can accordingly be described in terms of truth— a notion which 
is again taken as primitive.
The present account by contrast does not pretend to explain the truth conditional 
content o f intentional states and performances in terms o f what causes them. Rather, the 
speaker herself is considered to give causal explanations in expressing her beliefs, and it 
is this activity— as well as the speaker’s compliance with norms o f warranted assertion 
— which is taken to determine the contents o f her assertoric utterances. To give such 
causal explanations is to render intelligible to oneself why one is in the informational 
state one happens to be in, hence it  is an operation o f one’s intellect.®® That the story 
which one tells about the causes o f this state is in the market for being true or false, is 
explained in terms o f its corrig ib ility in face o f further data that call for a different story 
altogether. Thus far such stories are no more than systematic mappings of available data 
onto a structure o f sentences whose difference in import is wholly determined by the 
conditions under which they would count as warrantedly assertible. These sentences 
differ from their non-categorical, non-objective countei-parts only insofar as the latter 
are debarred from playing any role in that structure.®*
In distinguishing between conditions o f warranted assertion and conditions o f 
truth in such a way that even under the former conditions truth conditional content can 
be manifested, we can after all account for the difference between knowledge o f 
meaning and knowledge o f fact which is central to Frege's distinction between grasp o f 
sense and recognition o f truth value: the speaker's mustering warrants, her assuming and 
finally endorsing a certain claim in order to explain these warrants under conditions 
where, on balance, this claim is warrantedly assertible, displays her knowledge o f what 
she is trying to establish as true or false— her grasp o f sense. The manifestation of her 
grasp o f sense however, is consistent with her lacking knowledge o f matters o f fact. In 
other words, she does not thereby already manifest her recognition o f truth value, for the 
conditions under which her assertion is warranted need not coincide with the conditions 
under which it  qualifies as true.
We thus eventually arrive at an account o f how Verstand and Verstehen are 
related to each other, and thereby manage to reconcile Frege's insights into the nature o f 
objective knowledge with Wittgenstein's insights into the nature o f communication: 
although making assertions or forming beliefs is preceded by grasp o f sense, this grasp 
o f sense is wholly manifested in use with the effect that what is grasped can be 
communicated without residue. Thus, while grasp of sense— entertaining a thought— is
®® See footnote 40.
®' Cf. Carl [OR]: 182-83.
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an exercise o f one's intellect in that it is an essential prerequisite o f making intelligible 
to oneself why one is in the epistemic state one happens to be in, it can nonetheless be 
conceived o f as a practical ability, viz- as the ability to engage in abductive and heuristic 
reasoning in response to intersubjectively accessible data. And although grasp o f truth 
conditions is wholly manifested in the mastery o f linguistic rules, what is grasped 
nonetheless relates to something independent from compliance with these rules.
Brandom tried to give such an account based on a conception o f contents as 
inferential roles. He failed however, because he proved unable to disentangle the 
consequences o f what is being said from the consequences o f saying it. We are now in a 
position to see more clearly where the deeper reason for this failure lies. Brandom does 
not address the question o f what it is for our assertoric practice to be constrained by 
objective truth as a goal o f enquiry: what it is we strive for in striving for objective truth 
and what obligation we undertake when presenting ourselves as having attained this 
goal.®2 He thereby leaves unexplained why we should engage in that practice at all— in 
other words what the rationale o f that practice is. Due to this shortcoming, he does not 
succeed in taking us beyond Wittgenstein, hence neither does he take us back to Frege.
Brandom calls attention to an important aspect o f the task o f giving an account 
o f understanding however, which we have not yet addressed: we must still explain how 
speakers can come by the semantic notions employed in devising a theory o f meaning 
for other speakers— in other words how they can arrive at such theories. Ex hypothesi, 
constructing such theories is sufficient, even i f  not necessary, for coming to understand 
what others say. But it is not enough to give such theories without explaining how— by 
the exercise o f the very same kind o f capacities the theory ascribes to them— speakers 
can construct such theories on their own. For it  is only i f  such an explanation can be 
given by invoking no more than the kind o f capacities already in play, that we can claim 
to have devised a theoretical representation o f the practical ability to theoretically 
represent: since a theory o f meaning is a theoretical representation o f such practical 
abilities, the practical ability to give a theory o f meaning must itself be accountable for 
in terms o f that theory.®^
Thus far it has not been assumed that the speakers themselves are in possession 
o f the concept of truth. This concept and the notion o f objective content in terms of 
which it is to be explained, are invoked in the course o f devising a theoiy o f meaning for 
a speaker: it is by ascribing to her knowledge o f truth conditions that we intend to 
explain her verbal behaviour. Pending a more refined description o f that behaviour, 
Davidson's claim that such ascriptions yield the best explanation o f what the speaker
62 To say that we seek to sort out who has the better reason is not yet to give an account of what it is to 
strive for objective truth or what the nature o f this goal is; cf. Brandom [MIE]: 601, where he more or 
less explicitly renounces the idea that such an account be given.
62 Brandom [M IE]: xix-xx, 116, 641-43, 650.
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does remained unconvincing. Having discerned a more complex pattern o f verbal 
behaviour we are now in a position to prove that Davidson's claim holds good: while 
norms o f warranted assertion at most explain why speakers strive to make assertions 
only i f  these assertions are warranted, these norms alone cannot yet account for the fact 
that speakers strive to arrive at warranted assertions. That they strive to do the latter is 
inter alia  manifest in their attempt to overcome neutral states o f information.
As Scriven observes, to say that an event or state is o f a certain kind— to 
describe it in a certain way— may sometimes explain why it does occur or o b t a i n . ^ " *  For 
instance, to say that the state o f my skin is a case o f sunburn is to say that it came to 
obtain because o f my exposure to sunlight. To explain a certain linguistic move in terms 
o f the performer's knowledge o f truth conditions is to describe her move as her saying 
that ( it is true that) P, for some P. Such accounts are o f the same kind as explanations o f 
one's informational states in terms o f facts: in explaining one's seeming to see that there 
is a wood pigeon in terms of there being a wood pigeon, one typically describes one's 
seeming to see as the seeing that there is a wood pigeon.^® In both cases, the same kind 
o f abilities are drawn upon, viz. abilities required to engage in abductive reasoning.
Whether in one's own case or in the case o f others, the explanans one alludes to 
in describing someone's assertion as the assertion that (it is true that) P systematically 
differs from the explanans one alludes to in describing someone's informational state as 
the seeing, or more generally the recognition, that (it is true that) P. As speakers are 
represented as being able to give explanations o f either kind, they may accordingly be 
credited w ith a conception o f truth explicable as follows:
M  is true i f f  SP(M says that P &  P).
In conceiving o f the two conjuncts on the right-hand side as mutually independent, 
speakers can accordingly be credited w ith a conception o f the systematic difference 
between expressing a belief and telling the truth: whether one expresses the belief that P 
by making assertoric moves o f kind M  depends on one's knowledge o f the truth 
conditions which moves o f kind M  enjoy; whether what one expresses is furthermore a 
true belief depends on whether this belief best explains the data on the basis o f which it 
is formed.
Eventually then, constructing theories o f meaning for others— and employing the 
notion o f objective truth in doing so— is something a speaker can be said to be able to
64 Scriven [EPL]: 175-77. Scriven rightly remarks that "an explanation o f [an] event must be more than 
the identifying description o f it, else to request an explanation o f X  (where 'X' is a description, not a 
name) is to give an explanation of X"; [EPL]: 177.
66 As examples o f what have come to be called "deviant causal chains" illustrate, this w ill not always be 
the case; therefore the claim made in the text is qualified by "typically".
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do just on the basis o f the capacities she is credited with by the theory o f meaning j
devised for herself: in giving such theories for others the speaker attempts to best |
explain the verbal behaviour o f her interlocutors. Accordingly, Brandom's constraint on I
accounts o f understanding has been met. j
In this chapter I  have attempted to devise an account o f our grasp o f objective i
truth conditions that satisfies the Manifestability Requirement. In empirical discourse, |
speakers who go in for asserting sentences to be objectively true embark on an I
explanatory project: they intend to explain and thereby make sense o f the information |
they receive by way o f relating it to a reality that is taken to make them receive this |
information. By the same token, participation in this practice engenders the obligation to 
explain why this information is received. The search for best explanations was shown to |
be linked to hypothetical reasoning. Explaining part o f the evidence one way rather than j
another constrains the explanation o f the remainder; and how the remainder might be ;
!explained can be explored by assuming that part o f the evidence is correctly explained I
in this way. Eliminating some o f these hypotheses by way o f concluding that we would I
be at a loss to explain the remainder i f  these hypotheses were regarded as true, may !
itself constitute a reason to endorse one rather than another such hypothesis. In this way |
hypothetical reasoning may be o f assistance when we try to overcome informational I
neutrality. In the same way it may be o f assistance when we try to reassure ourselves |
that our beliefs still form part o f the best explanation of all currently available evidence: j
we may eliminate their alternatives by way o f first assuming them and then concluding j
that given this assumption, a significant part o f the evidence we now have would go ■
unexplained. }
By appeal to hypothetical reasoning o f this kind— heuristic reasoning as I  have j
called it— we could account for the fact that speakers conceive o f some sentences in j
their repertoire as being endowed with objective truth conditions. Since heuristic i
reasoning, just as hypothetical reasoning in general, has its distinctive behavioural î
manifestations, our account was shown to comply with the Manifestability |
Requirement. «
It was argued in previous chapters that realists and anti-realists alike are forced !
to give an account which has both these properties. Accordingly, we now have to 
address the question o f whether on the basis o f the account proposed here, anti-realists j
prove able to show that speakers cannot be credited with a conception o f objective truth I
as exceeding the knowable. This w ill be the topic o f the final chapter. *
Chapter Six
Dummett argued that in the absence o f complex sentence-forming devices there would 
be no detectable difference between speech communities who went in for asserting what 
is currently warranted and speech communities who went in for asserting what is true. 
According to Dummett, the difference between truth conditions and warranted 
assertibility conditions only emerges once we try to give a systematic account o f the 
contribution sentences make to the determination o f the assertoric content o f complex 
sentences o f which they are constituents.
The Manifestability Requirement demanded that insofar as understanding cannot 
solely consist in verbalisable knowledge, knowledge of truth conditions, i f  essential to 
understanding, must be manifested in practical abilities. I f  knowledge o f truth 
conditions is sufficient for successful participation in assertoric practice however, then 
the conclusion seems apt that it  involves recognitional abilities. The crucial step in the 
anti-realist argumentation was to conclude from this that knowledge of truth conditions 
is already manifested in recognitional abilities; from there it was but a small step to the 
conclusion that the conditions knowledge o f which is thus manifested are conditions the 
knowing subject must be able to recognise as obtaining whenever they do obtain.
I  argued in chapter three that Dummett goes wrong when he suggests that the 
assertibilist— who identifies the designated value of a sentence with its warranted 
assertibility— cannot give a systematic account o f the assertibility conditions o f 
complex sentences. But i f  the assertibilist can after all devise such an account, then we 
so far lack any reason to believe on the basis o f what speakers do who engage in 
assertoric practice, that a sentence has truth conditions which may obtain while its 
warranted assertibility conditions do not, or which may fail to obtain while its warranted 
assertibility conditions nonetheless do. By the same token, nor is there so far any reason 
to believe that one’s ability to engage in assertoric practice manifests one's knowledge o f 
objective truth conditions. Since the notion o f objective truth alluded to ought to be 
accepted even by the anti-realist, then by Dummett's own lights, knowledge o f truth 
conditions must be manifested in more than those recognitional abilities which are 
required for successful participation in the practice that assertibilism so aptly describes.
The Inferentiality Constraint— the constraint that a systematic account be given 
o f how the assertibility conditions o f complex sentences are determined so as to make 
their inferential connections w ith other sentences explicit— was supposed to achieve 
what the Manifestation Argument alone could not achieve; to license the ascription o f 
objective truth conditions to assertoric performances. A ll the Manifestation Argument 
could be seen to achieve was showing that the conditions ascriptions o f the knowledge
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o f which are already justified by the practice o f making assertions must be conditions 
which are recognisable. This much is surely compatible with realism, for the conditions 
ascriptions o f the knowledge o f which is so justified are no more than conditions o f 
warranted assertibility.
Dummett's contention that assertibilism is already refuted by its inability to meet 
the Inferentiality Constraint would after all appear to be inessential to the anti-realist's 
Manifestation Argument, for corrections already call for an account o f content that the 
assertibilist is incapable o f giving. However, the trouble was that corrections are 
effected by means o f assertions and that there is no institution of making corrections 
alongside the institution o f making assertions: the corrections in question have no 
practical consequences assertions do not have. In particular, there are no further 
sanctions involved. Rather, assertions are to be identified as corrections in virtue o f the 
objective content that they have; and according to Dummett himself, that they have 
objective content must then be manifested in a practice other than solely the practice o f 
making assertions.
I f  this is so however, then it is no longer clear whether the recognitional abilities 
involved in knowledge o f truth conditions exceed the ability to recognise the conditions 
under which a sentence qualifies as warrantedly assertible or deniable: recognitional 
abilities are displayed in the practice o f making assertions, and i f  this practice in itself 
falls short o f justifying the attribution o f knowledge o f truth conditions, then that 
knowledge w ill further be manifested in other than recognitional abilities.
The idea accordingly was to look for another way o f justifying the ascription o f 
objective contents to assertoric performances. Brandom offered an account o f analytic 
consequence intended to reveal that assertibilism is at odds with our inferential practice: 
that the assertibilist can meet the Inferentiality Constraint only at the cost o f blinding 
herself to the ways in which we treat inferences as deductively valid. Although 
Brandom's account does not assign any explanatory function to the concept o f truth but 
rather conceives o f contents in terms o f inferential roles, still it may have laid the 
groundwork on whose basis the realism/anti-realism debate could then have been 
conducted— i f  only it had succeeded in undermining assertibilism. As I argued in 
chapter four however, Brandom's account fails in this respect.
We were then led back to a reconsideration o f what kind of content assertions 
must have in order to qualify as corrections. The difference between objective contents 
as thus understood and warranted assertibility conditions gave rise to the Problem o f 
Rational Belief Change. The upshot o f these reflections was that warranted assertibility 
conditions— i.e. those conditions knowledge o f which is already displayed in making 
assertions— must be linked to truth conditions in such a way that commitment to the 
truth o f a sentence is answerable to the recognition o f its warranted assertibility. And
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this meant that knowledge o f truth conditions is to be conceived o f as involving 
knowledge o f warranted assertibility conditions. The problem and the response it 
prompted illustrated Dummett's idea that unless knowledge o f truth conditions can 
somehow inform or guide assertoric practice it cannot qualify as what understanding 
consists in. ' Having knowledge o f truth conditions is knowing which truth conditions a 
given sentence has; and it may well so turn out that which truth conditions a given 
sentence has is at least partly determined by the conditions under which that sentence is 
warrantedly assertible and those under which it is to be denied. This would leave us 
w ith the task to explain what it takes to know that a sentence has objective truth 
conditions at all which are determined in this way, hence on which basis such 
knowledge may be ascribed. To accomplish this task is to provide the means to 
overcome assertibilism.
In chapter five I  attempted to explain objective content in terms o f the institution 
o f giving causal explanations. This attempt was further motivated by the idea that the 
institution o f giving causal explanations would allow us to see how commitments to the 
truth o f a sentence aie answerable to the recognition o f its warranted assertibility. The 
proposed solution was that in empirical discourse assertions w ith objective contents 
form part o f causal explanations o f the facts we may report by means o f assertions 
whose content is not objective.2 Indeed the claim that facts explain data was intended to 
ensure that a ll empirical sentences w ith objective contents, including observation 
sentences, can play an explanatory role their non-objective counterparts cannot.
Again we faced the problem that explanations are effected by means o f 
assertions. It was argued however, that the practice o f heuristic reasoning is essential to 
the institution o f giving causal explanations, in the sense that engagement in this kind o f 
reasoning is to be seen as a practical consequence o f one's quest for explanations. As a 
species o f hypothetical reasoning heuristic reasoning was distinguished from the 
assertion o f conditionals. The assertibilist could be shown to be at a loss to devise an 
interpretation o f certain assumptions and a fo rtio r i to account for the link  between what 
is assumed and what is asserted. The independence o f truth conditions from warranted 
assertibility conditions— as required by our objectivist conception o f truth— was 
conceived o f in causal terms and shown to be manifestable in hypothetical reasoning. A t 
the same time though, the relation between both kinds o f conditions was taken care o f—
* Dummett [LBM ]: 308.
2 Speakers do not typically report their epistemic states by means o f sentences like 
"It is warrantedly assertible that P" or "It appears as i f  P". But this observation does not undermine the 
cogency o f the current proposal. Obviously, one may give explanations without stating the explanandum, 
in particular i f  the explanans is understood to explain why it can warrantedly be put forward. In any case, 
our task was to recover a difference in assertoric content between "It is warrantedly assertible that P" and 
"P" from a difference in the way these sentences are being used. It is therefore no good objection to the 
proposed account that, as a matter o f fact, speakers hardly ever use sentences of the former kind.
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just as a solution to the Problem o f Rational Belief Change required. In order to attain 
these results however, we did not yet have to explicitly acknowledge that knowledge o f 
truth conditions resides in or calls for the ability to recognise a sentence as true i f  it  is 
objectively true. Whether this assumption holds good w ill have to be shown by 
connecting the different strands o f the account given.
Thus we have eventually arrived at an account o f how thinking objective 
contents is possible— possible, that is, under the constraint that such contents be 
communicable without residue by means o f language use. Accordingly, we have 
reconciled Frege's insight into the nature o f thoughts with Wittgenstein's demand that 
what we think be determined by the rules o f the language game in which we engage in 
order to communicate what we think. Until now realists and anti-realists have travelled 
together passing the point at which compliance with the Wittgensteinian constraint 
seemed to make betraying Frege's insight inevitable. I f  the realism/anti-realism debate is 
to be fought on semantic grounds at all, then we should now be able to draw some 
conclusions. It is ultimately the degree o f objectivity our thoughts may be said to enjoy, 
that lies at the heart o f this debate and the Manifestability Requirement is the only— or 
to be more careful, the most widely recognised— constraint on semantic theories that 
may provide for an upper bound.
In this chapter I  shall argue that i f  there is a case to be made for anti-realism, that 
case w ill not rest on the Manifestability Requirement. This leaves us w ith two options: 
either anti-realism cannot be vindicated unless by appeal to this requirement, hence 
ought to be rejected— the Dummettian Criterion rules out anti-realism; or there are other 
decision procedures which still are in need of being devised— the Dummettian Criterion 
does not arbitrate the debate. In either case temporary agnosticism about the apriority o f 
(EC*) is forced upon us:
(EC*) for all non-Moorean sentences S, i f  S is true, then S is knowably true.
To show this much is o f course not yet to vindicate moderate realism. For moderate 
realism is the claim that (EC*) cannot be known a priori, rather than the weaker claim 
that (EC*) is not presently known a priori. To show that (EC*) cannot be established on 
the basis o f the Dummettian Criterion however, deals a decisive blow against all foes o f 
realism who are armed w ith no more than the Wittgensteinian mace.2
In the next two sections I  shall discuss— and finally dismiss— a suggestion as to 
how truth might be understood by the anti-realist. Although showing this suggestion to
2 Throughout this essay I have been exclusively concerned with empirical discourse. Thus any existing 
arguments for the validity o f (EC*) with respect to another discourse, e.g. mathematical or ethical 
discourse, w ill have no effect on the propriety o f the general conclusion reached: in any case we ought to 
adopt temporary agnosticism towards global anti-realism.
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be inappropriate leaves the general debate untouched, doing so w ill help get into sharper 
focus which direction this debate must take; this line w ill then be pursued in the 
remainder o f this chapter.
6.1 Superassertibility and the Lim its o f  Truth
Crispin Wright has suggested that the notion o f superassertibility captures the anti­
realist's conception o f truth."* A  sentence S is superassertible just in case the actual world 
is such that there is a state o f information j  attainable by us such that S is warrantedly 
assertible in j  and for any enlargement o f 7 , 7 +, S remains warrantedly assertible in 7+ .6 
In other words, S is superassertible i f  and only i f  there are (actually) undefeasible 
warrants for S available (in principle) which are sufficient to license its assertion.
Since the claim that S is superassertible is an existential claim that is entailed by 
but does not entail the claim that one's present state o f information contains actually 
undefeasible warrants for S, the notion o f superassertibility fares well with the 
constraints imposed by our conception o f corrections— as the reader may herself check 
by returning to section (3.8) o f chapter three. The same applies to our conception o f the 
attribution o f shortcomings which are due to a failure to endorse what is objectively 
true, as it was described at the beginning o f the last chapter.
As we shall see shortly however, the idea that superassertibility and tmth are one 
and the same concept is in tension w ith the account developed in the last chapter. This 
account described a practice whose participants manifest their knowledge o f objective 
truth conditions. I f  the concept o f truth whose grasp they thereby manifest is distinct 
from that o f superassertibility, then it would seem that truth cannot be equated with 
superassertibility: at most superassertibility would appear to be suited to serve as a 
model for truth in other areas o f discourse such as ethics or mathematics; it is anyway 
not to be identified with truth for variable discourses.6
In the last chapter I  argued that assertions have objective contents insofar as they 
relate to facts (whose existence is implied by the existence o f facts) that are taken to 
causally explain the data on whose basis these assertions are warrantedly made. I f  this is 
correct, the truth o f an assertion o f this kind w ill consist in the existence o f such a fact.
"* [CDMJ: 411-18,422-25; and [TO]: 33-70; cf. as well Dummett [LBM]: 338.
6 It might be suggested that the reference to the actual world give the wrong result when one applies the 
definition to counterfactual superassertibility. But at least on one reading o f "actual" this is wrong: the 
actual world might have been different, which is to say, another world might have been actual. Here 
"actual" is a directly referring indexical that, i f  used in modal contexts, refers to that possible world 
which is contemplated as actual in those contexts; cf. Davies [MQN]: 220-42, especially 224-26.
6 O f course, there is still room for manoeuvre here i f  the anti-realist can avail herself o f the distinction 
between concepts and the properties they denote. However, see footnote 13 below for some doubts about 
the cogency o f this move.
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But then it seems obvious that the tmth o f such an assertion cannot consist in the fact 
that what is being asserted is superassertible, for one cannot causally explain why one is 
in possession o f warrants for this assertion by citing the fact that actually undefeasible 
warrants for it are attainable— even i f  the further assumption is being made that the 
warrants one possesses are warrants in virtue o f which what one asserts is 
superassertible. In the same vein, the fact that there is a man who has been or w ill be 
born such that for every woman who has been or w ill be born, that man is taller than 
her, does never causally explain why Dennis is taller than Maggie— even, that is, i f  
Dennis happens to be that man. I f  Dennis can (independently) be identified as such a 
man, then this may yield a reason to believe that insofar as Maggie exists, Dennis is 
taller than Maggie. What we are concerned with are causal explanations however, and 
not rational vindications. Thus we do not justify the claim that S is at present 
warrantedly assertible in terms o f the truth o f S nor in terms o f the further assumption—  
which i f  we endorse S we cannot help but make— that the warrants we presently have 
w ill survive the future. Rather we explain why these warrants have become available in 
terms o f the truth o f S, and here it seems that superassertibility is a poor candidate for 
truth.?
But what does this show w ith respect to (EC*)? A ll that seems to have been 
established so far is that the superassertibility o f S is not to be equated with its truth, as 
the fact in whose existence its truth consists is suited to causally explain what the fact in 
whose existence its superassertibility consists is not. Accordingly, it might be suggested 
that this leaves the status o f (EC*) quite unaffected, for this constiaint merely says that 
all (non-Moorean) truths have the feature o f being knowable. A  rather quick argument 
to be presented in due course w ill show that this suggestion is mistaken however. The 
upshot o f this argument w ill be that there is good reason not to regard (EC*) as 
conceptually necessary. O f course, to show this much is not yet to show that there is no 
good reason on whose basis (EC*) may be known a priori. But it might still be 
disconcerting for all those anti-realists who have proposed (EC*) as a piece o f 
conceptual analysis.
Wright's notion o f superassertibility incorporates a modalised version of the 
standard internalist conception o f knowledge that has emerged from the Gettier debate: 
according to this conception, to have knowledge is to have a justified true belief which 
is based on actually undefeasible warrants.^ For a truth to be knowable is accordingly 
for there to be such actually undefeasible warrants on the basis o f which a subject may 
come to endorse it. In other words, knowability entails superassertibility.
? Cf. Johnston [ORPJ: 94-96. 
8 Cf. Lehrer/Paxson [KUJ].
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It would appear that this account o f knowability is at odds with externalist 
epistemology. An externalist conception o f knowledge that makes the possession o f 
knowledge that P a matter o f how one is— externally— related to the fact that P 
immediately invites the thought that it is not only possible for one not to be so related to 
this fact, but possible that one is debarred from getting into the position o f being so 
related. I f  so the anti-realist would seem ill-advised to base her belief in (EC*) on such 
an externalist conception o f knowledge. It is actually far from clear however, whether an 
externalist epistemology is necessarily realist. Whether or not this is so need not detain 
us here. In the present context all that matters is whether a truth can be said to be 
knowable just in case it is superassertible, even i f  knowability is construed along 
externalist lines. Again, I  do not see any reason not to think so. Even i f  there was no 
externalist analogue o f the notion o f an undefeasible warrant which is applicable to first 
order knowledge, still the perspective we have to adopt is that o f the theorist o f 
understanding and viewed from this perspective, it must be possible to ascribe 
knowledge to a given speaker, hence to have second order knowledge. In other words, i f  
the speaker recognises a truth, then not only must it be possible for the theorist o f 
understanding to recognise this tmth herself, but also to recognise that the speaker does 
so. Accordingly, whatever externalist constraints the speaker must be said to meet in 
order to be credited with such knowledge, that she meets them must in turn be 
knowable. For example, it must be knowable that she is reliable. But then the claim that 
she is reliable can itself serve as a wairant for asserting what she asserts, and w ill, i f  
true, never be defeated by any other truth to which the theorist o f understanding can be 
externally related.^
Let us therefore define the notion o f knowability appealed to by the anti-realist 
as follows— bearing in mind that tmth and superassertibility are distinct:
(OK) S is knowable i f f  S is true and S is superassertible.
9 Cf. Brandom [M IE]: 217-21. It is part o f the externalist's stock in trade that a subject a may know that 
she knows P without firs t recognising that she satisfies the externalist conditions for knowing P. In the 
same vein, it might be suggested that someone else may know that a knows P without first recognising 
that a satisfies these conditions. To my mind, this is pretty unconvincing: it would require that you may 
acquire knowledge about my states o f knowing without first taking into account how I am related to my 
environment. However, nothing o f what has been said so far is inconsistent with this idea: it has merely 
been suggested that i f  a knows P it w ill be knowable that she satisfies the externalist conditions for 
knowing P. This can be so even i f  there are states o f knowing that a knows P which are not, at the same 
lime, states o f knowing acquired by first recognising that a satisfies the externalist conditions for 
knowing P.
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(OK) and (EC*) jo in tly  entail that for all non-Moorean sentences S,
i f  S is true, then S is superassertible.'®
The converse o f (EC*) is the Alethic Constraint:
(AC) i f  S is knowable, then S is true.
Applying (OK) to (AC) yields the following tautology:
i f  S is true and S is superassertible, then S is true.
(AC) and (OK) do not entail that i f  S is superassertible, S is true. Indeed that this 
conditional fails to be necessary is what you would expect: i f  two contingent empirical 
states o f affairs are distinct, then there should be a possible world in which one o f them 
obtains while the other one does not.^‘ Hence i f  it is impossible that S is true without 
being superassertible— as the necessity o f (EC*) would require— then the distinction 
between the fact that S is true and the fact that S is superassertible, should accordingly 
reside in its being possible for S to be superassertible without being true:
it  is possible that (S is superassertible and S is not true).
I f  S is not true, then by the Negation Equivalence:
(NE) S is not true i f f  ‘ -S ’ is true,
‘ -S ' w ill be true. Hence by (EC*) and (OK), ‘-S ' w ill be superassertible. Accordingly, it 
should be a genuine possibility that S and ‘-S ' both are superassertible:
it  is possible that (S is superassertible and ‘-S ' is superassertible).
But S and ‘-S ' cannot both be superassertible, for S and ‘-S ’ cannot both be 
warrantedly assertible in the same state of information, and any state o f information 
which confers superassertibility onto a given sentence must be attainable by someone
For the sake o f brevity, I shall henceforth omit the explicit restriction to non-Moorean sentences and 
presuppose that the sentences S being talked about are non-Moorean in kind.
' ‘ Cf. Fine [FOM]: 58-59.
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who has been in a state of information warranting its neg a tion .S o  something must 
have gone wrong.
Since we are presently concerned with the implications o f the account devised in 
the preceding chapter, we cannot blame the inconsistency on the assumption that the 
truth o f S does not consist in its superassertibility. Nor is it open to the anti-realist to 
object to (OK). But then unless she finds some fault with the criterion o f distinctness o f 
facts alluded to or its application to the present case, she w ill have to concede that the 
distinction between the fact that P and the fact that it is superassertible that P resides in 
its being possible that the former exists while the latter does not. Hence pending further 
argument, there is reason not to regard (EC*) as conceptually necessary.In  any case,
Given that superassertibility was intended as an anti-realist notion of truth, the actually undefeasible 
warrants which confer superassertibility on a given sentence must not be conceived o f as purely 
permissive: otherwise the anti-realist would leave room for the (im)possibility that both S and ‘-S ’ are i
true. I
It might for instance be argued on the anti-realist's behalf that all we have established so far is that the j
concepts expressed by "is knowable" and "is true" are two different modes o f presentation o f one and the I
same property— in just the same sense in which the concepts expressed by "is water" and "is H2O" are—  |
with the effect that (E C * )  w ill after all be metaphysically necessary. The question would then |
immediately arise, however, how we might nonetheless know (E C * )  a priori, although the claim that |
water is H2O can only be known a posteriori. This question might be answered by way o f comparing j
the relation between "is true" and "is knowable" to that obtaining between "is water" and I
"has whatever property, or set o f properties, is causally responsible for watery symptoms": the truth- I
predicate would then be said to denote whatever property, or set o f properties, is causally responsible for 
the availability o f undefeasible warrants for its instantiations. On this construal, it would still hold that 1
truth and superassertibility are distinct properties: the availability o f warrants for S is not a property o f S 1
which is causally responsible for the availability o f warrants for S. But it might now be suggested that j
these properties are nonetheless related in such a way that it is both necessary and a priori that whatever i
has the one has the other and vice versa. This w ill only be so, however, i f  "is true" is defined as denoting |
whatever property renders its instantiations superassertible—just as the natural kind terms "is water" is j
defined as denoting whatever property is causally responsible for watery symptoms: otherwise it cannot |
be ruled out a priori that S might be superassertible while lacking the property actually denoted by |
"is true". But i f  "is true" is defined in the way suggested, then it should be legitimate to use the following j
explanations interchangeably: j
(i) S is warranted because S is true 1
Î(ii) S is warranted because S has whatever property, or set o f properties,
causes it to be superassertible. i
But one may ask: how should the fact that S has a property causally responsible for the existence o f i
undefeasible warrants for S explain why there are, at present, warrants for S? True: i f  S is accepted as I
true on the basis o f the presently available warrants, then these warrants w ill be regarded as warrants in i
virtue o f which S is superassertible. But accepting S as true was supposed to be the outcome o f accepting i
an explanation like (i), not a presupposition o f the candidature of such an explanation. Yet, even i f  we *
bracket this concern, the presupposition that the presently available warrants are superassertibility- i
conferring— which, as just noted, is necessary to render the candidature of (ii) intelligible— w ill have the 
effect that (ii) won't be any better than (iii): ;
( iii)  S is superassertible because S has whatever property, or set o f properties,
causes it to be superassertible. :
But now (iii)  is entirely futile: it in effect states that whatever causes S to be superassertible causes it to be |
superassertible; and this is hardly an explanation o f why S is superassertible. Hence, "is true" cannot be ;
taken to be defined as denoting whatever property, or set o f properties, causes its instantiations to be i
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we are left w ith the task to settle whether (EC*), even i f  not conceptually necessary, can 
nonetheless be known a priori.
6.2 Theoretical Slack?
A t this point the friend o f superassertibility may retort that we can do without the 
causalist elements o f the account o f objective truth developed in chapter five: they 
constitute the theoretical slack anti-realists seek to eradicate in favour of a slimmer but 
empirically just as adequate theory o f understanding. To recall, these causalist elements 
themselves were introduced in the course o f an inference to the best explanation: they 
were taken to render intelligible why speakers display certain patterns of hypothetical 
reasoning in certain contexts; and it was this verbal behaviour that was then said to 
manifest the speakers' knowledge o f objective truth conditions. The superassertibilist 
may o f course suggest that there is verbal behaviour o f an altogether different kind 
which licenses the ascription o f such knowledge but also the identification of truth with 
superassertibility. But then what kind o f behaviour is it? Until this question has been 
answered, the present suggestion lacks any force and need not detain us here.
What we have to consider though, is the alternative suggestion that the very 
behaviour we have been concerned w ith can be rendered intelligible without conceiving 
o f speakers as being involved in the pursuit o f knowledge-w/zy. Thus the 
superassertibilist may argue instead that she can equally well explain:
(i) why reasoning under the assumption effected by the use o f S (or its negation) 
may be called for in informational states which are neutral with respect to both S 
and its negation, and
(ii) how the outcome of such reasoning may provide a reason to assert S (or its 
negation)
( iii)  why reasoning under the assumption effected by the negation o f S may be called 
for in informational states that license the assertion o f S, and
(iv) how the outcome o f such reasoning may provide a reason to assert the negation 
o f S (or to refuse to assert S).
superassertible. Therefore, (EC*) cannot be shown to be both necessary and a priori— even, that is, i f  the 
distinction between concepts and properties is being invoked. Since the anti-realist claims that (EC*) is 
known a priori, she w ill have to resist calling it necessary.
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Suppose that the assumption that S is true after all reduces to the assumption that S is 
superassertible. I f  this assumption is made in states o f informational neutrality, it  w ill 
not be counterfactual: the claim that there are warrants o f a certain kind which one may 
have, is not the claim that one has warrants o f this kind now. In this respect the 
superassertibilist seems better o ff than the assertibilist because the assumption that one 
has warrants for S now is contrary-to-fact i f  made in neutral states o f information; and 
as has been emphasised ad nauseam, counterfactual reasoning w ill never play the role 
that an answer to (i) to (iv) calls for.
But is the superassertibilist really in a more advantageous position? I f  one 
assumes that S is superassertible one assumes that the actual world is such as to contain 
de facto  undefeasible warrants for S which one may come to possess, hence that there is 
an actually attainable state in which one possesses such warrants. I f  S is presently 
undecided one knows that one is not now in a position one would be in i f  one attained 
such a state. Thus although the fact that S is presently undecided does not rule out that 
there is such a state, it  nonetheless rules out that one's present state o f information is a 
state o f this kind. Both the assumption that one was now in a state known to be different 
from the state one is actually in and the assumption that in future one can attain a state 
known to be different from the state one is actually in share this feature: they both relate 
to an unactualised epistemic possibility, even i f  only the former but not the latter is 
counterfactual. But then how can reasoning under an assumption which relates to such 
an unactualised epistemic possibility provide a promising starting point for the attempt 
to overcome actual informational neutrality? Assuming that there is a procedure o f 
warrant-acquisition which would result in knowledge o f S, i f  only it  was carried out, is 
to assume the outcome that carrying out some such procedure would have and not yet to 
carry out a procedure that may or may not have that outcome. Hence reasoning under 
the assumption that S is superassertible alone w ill never play the role which (i) to (iv) 
circumscribe.
By contrast, i f  we conceive o f speakers as having the intention to explain the 
information they now possess in terms o f facts expressible by sentences apt for 
objective truth, the speakers’ assumption that such sentences are true w ill not reduce to 
the assumption that there is a procedure o f warrant-acquisition the carrying out o f which 
would yield warrants for their assertion— independently that is o f whether or not these 
sentences are furthermore assumed to have the feature o f being superassertible: their 
assumed superassertibility w ill not be that feature whose assumption is o f relevance in 
assessing the costs and benefits that giving explanations by their means may have. I f  S 
is objectively true now there w ill be nothing unactualised about what makes it  so: i f  S 
states a fact which relates to causally efficacious states and events, these states and 
events can stand in relations to one’s present epistemic state, notably causal ones, whose
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nature can again be specified independently from any reference to unactualised 
epistemic possibilities. Given the speakers' intention to explain their present epistemic 
states, and the conception o f facts they accordingly bring to beai*, the chance o f 
eliminating alternative explanatory hypotheses by reasoning under the assumption o f 
their truth may provide a reason to engage in this kind o f reasoning in order to overcome 
informational neutrality. But then superassertibility does not constitute objective truth, 
at most it is an additional feature o f it.
The claim that a workable theory contains theoretical slack can only be justified 
on the basis o f a workable alternative. The identification o f truth with superassertibility 
yields no such workable alternative to the theory developed in chapter five. Accordingly 
this identification gives no comfort to the anti-realist who seeks to establish that that 
theory contains theoretical slack whose eradication w ill bring the truth o f anti-realism to 
light. She therefore ought to change tack.
6.3 Completeness and Superneutrality
It is a widely shared view among realists and anti-realists alike that we have no reason 
to suppose that the principle o f Completeness holds:
(C) either S is knowable or ‘ -S ’ is knowable.
Any anti-realist who shares this view is bound to opt for logical revisionism in 
remaining agnostic about the Law o f Excluded Middle too. For (EC*) in conjunction 
w ith (NE) and (AC) entails that
‘-S ’ is knowable i f f  S is not knowable.
And this biconditional turns (C) into an instance o f the Law of Excluded Middle. This 
means that the anti-realist's reason not to endorse Completeness cannot consist in the 
idea that with respect to a given pair o f sentences S and ‘-S ’ apt for objective truth, the 
actual world may be superneutral. The actual world is superneutral w ith respect to a 
sentence S and its negation just in case there is a state o f information j  such that neither 
S nor its negation is warrantedly assertible in j  and any enlargement o f j  is such that 
neither S nor its negation is warrantedly assertible in the enlarged state. Let us label the 
idea that there is a pair o f sentences S and ‘ -S ’ with respect to which the actual world is 
superneutral Superneutrality. The anti-realist w ill have to deny Superneutiality because 
Superneutrality would issue in a counterexample to Completeness and given (EC*)
‘4 Cf. Lipton [ITB]: 67-68, 89-90.
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yield a contradiction. But then the anti-realist cannot even conceive o f a world other 
than the actual world which is superneutral with respect to S and ‘-S ’ unless this world 
is at the same time conceived to be a world in which (EC*) breaks down. That the anti­
realist should concede the possibility o f worlds o f the latter kind was the upshot o f the 
argument presented at the end o f section (6.1). Thus while the intuitionist refuses to give 
a counterexample to the Law o f Excluded Middle in order to back up her agnosticism 
with respect to this law insofar as such counterexamples are logically impossible— the 
anti-realist refuses to give a counterexample to Completeness in order to back up her 
agnosticism w ith respect to this principle insofar as such counterexamples aie not to be 
found in the actual world. The anti-realist may therefore not yet be impressed by the 
finding that speakers have the conceptual resources to contemplate such 
counterexamples as long as it can be shown in addition that they engage in 
counterfactual reasoning when doing so.
By the same token however, i f  speakers can be shown to contemplate 
counterexamples to Completeness but cannot be shown thereby to engage in 
counterfactual reasoning, the anti-realist cannot argue her case by chaining them o f a 
contradiction, for doing so would be to beg the question: a contradiction can be 
recognised as being involved only to the extent that the validity o f (EC*) has already 
been acknowledged so as to rule out Superneutrality.
That there should be no worlds which are superneutral with respect to some S 
and ‘-S ’ is indeed hard to swallow. Since it is conceivable that neither S nor ‘-S ' is 
warrantedly assertible in some state o f information, it  is hard to see how the thought that 
this state o f information may have no enlargement in which S is warrantedly assertible 
and no enlargement either in which ‘-S ’ is warrantedly assertible, may involve a 
contradiction. As we have seen, (EC*) need not rule out this possibility: it  just entails 
that it  is not actualised. But since there are in fact some S and ‘-S ’ neither o f which is at 
present warrantedly assertible, why should we be confident that it is not the case that our 
present state o f information has neither an enlargement which warrants S nor one that 
warrants ‘ -S ’ ? And how could this confidence be less than the confidence that there is 
either an enlargement that warrants S or an enlargement that warrants ‘-S ’ ? In other 
words, how can we be assured that there are no S and ‘ -S ’ with respect to which the 
actual world is superneutral without thereby being assured that either S or ‘-S ' is 
actually superassertible? Logic tells us that S and ‘-S ' cannot both be false but this has 
any bearing on Superneutrality only i f  (EC*) is being assumed. (EC*) tells us that it  can 
be guaranteed that either S or ‘ -S ' is superassertible only provided the Law o f Excluded 
Middle is being assumed; that this law ought not to be assumed cannot then in turn be 
based on the idea that we have no guarantee that either S or ‘ -S ’ is superassertible. In 
other words, the anti-realist should stop tugging at her bootstraps.
2 0 6
The leading thought behind the Manifestability Requirement has been that the concepts 
whose extensions we can delineate on a p rio ri grounds are concepts whose possession 
we are justified in ascribing to speakers including ourselves. (EC*) is supposed to set a 
lim it to the extension o f objective truth where objective truth applies to sentences, or 
utterances o f them, which express objective contents. The Manifestation Argument was 
intended to show that we are not justified in attributing to speakers the ability to 
entertain or communicate objective contents which determine truth conditions whose 
obtaining it may be beyond the speakers' ability to recognise. I f  this argument had been 
successful we would have been in a position to say that i f  a sentence were endowed with 
truth conditions whose obtaining it  may exceed our powers to recognise, then that this 
was so would not be manifested in our linguistic practice. The Manifestability 
Requirement would then have allowed us to conclude that there is no such sentence.
The idea is now to investigate whether the anti-realist can rule out 
Superneutrality with respect to sentences that bear objective contents without yet 
admitting Completeness by means o f showing that i f  Superneutrality holds with respect 
to some S and ‘ -S ’ , then neither S nor ‘ -S ’ bears objective content. For even i f  S and 
‘ -S ’ do not bear objective contents, they may still be significant. Instead, asserting them 
may then be to claim no more than that they are warrantedly assertible. Since the anti­
realist has no problem in conceding that S and ‘-S ’ may both fail to be warrantedly 
assertible at some point, neither w ill she have any problem in conceding that this very 
fact is itself superassertible: i f  neither S nor ‘-S ’ is at present warrantedly assertible, 
then this situation itself w ill not be altered by any further information becoming 
available at a later s t a g e .After all, that neither S nor ‘-S ’ is at present warrantedly 
assertible does not involve a contradiction, even i f  (EC*) is assumed.
Since we are no longer concerned w ith the modal status o f (EC*), we must 
consider a state o f information which is neutral w ith respect to S and ‘ -S ’ and yet which 
the speakers whose behaviour we study can actually occupy. Suppose the anti-realist 
conceded that there is no enlargement o f this state o f information such that either S or 
‘-S ’ became warrantedly assertible in the enlarged state of information. She would then 
have to conclude that neither S nor ‘ -S ’ bears objective content.
The trouble lies in the fact that whether or not S and ‘-S ’ bear objective contents 
is partly manifested in neutral states o f information. It is in states o f this kind that 
speakers engage in heuristic reasoning in order to resolve their ignorance and thereby 
display their knowledge o f truth conditions. Thus it  would now appear to become a 
matter o f whether the speakers in question do or do not engage in this reasoning whether 
the anti-realist can drive her point home.
Cr. Wright [COM]: 407.
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But suppose they do. A t this point the anti-realist w ill object that she never intended to 
base her conclusions on what speakers actually do. Pointing to the logical revisionist she 
w ill claim equal right to criticise actual practice: just as logical revisionism could not 
get o ff the ground i f  the intuitionist was debarred from criticising actual inferential 
practice, so too anti-realism would never have the chance to get a grip i f  the way 
speakers actually behave was sacrosanct. This is not an altogether happy parallel 
though, for the incoherence in actual practice which the logical revisionist intends to 
reveal resides in a conflict between our practice o f drawing inferences and our 
conception o f the validity o f the rules we employ. Deductive inferences should be truth
ipreserving, hence tailored to f it  our conception o f what it is for premisses and 
conclusions to be true. The logical revisionist claims that there is no aspect o f the use o f 
premisses and conclusions respectively that justifies the attribution to speakers o f a j
grasp o f bivalent truth conditions. In the present case there is an aspect o f use that \
justifies the attribution to speakers o f a grasp o f objective contents however, and the j
only incoherence that has as yet been identified i f  any, is one between this aspect o f use j
and (EX:*). I
Even i f  the parallel does not hold, we may still concede that there are ways to j
criticise actual practice which are open to the anti-realist. What she has to aigue for is |
that in the case at hand the speakers' behaviour is somehow at odds w ith the conception 
o f truth we are justified in attributing to them. Suppose the anti-realist asked the 
follow ing question: even i f  in the case at hand speakers displayed their understanding o f |
S and ‘ -S ’ as being endowed w ith objective contents, would they be rational in doing so j
i f  they had reason to assert that neither S nor ‘-S ’ is knowable just as the assumption o f |
Superneutrality contends? |
Indeed i f  the hypothetical reasoning we are concerned with is undertaken in I
order to overcome ignorance and i f  there was reason to believe that ignorance cannot be I
overcome, there would be no point in engaging in this kind o f reasoning. The realist is !
bound to concede this. She w ill hasten to add however, that there is a vital difference j
between taking oneself to have the chance o f being successful and taking oneself to |
have a guarantee o f not being unsuccessful. Just as the realist may be reluctant to j
postulate the existence o f unknowable truths, hence to commit herself to the existence o f |
a counterexample to (EC*), neither may she be ready to concede that speakers ever have i
a reason to believe that the actual world is superneutral with respect to any given pair S j
and ‘-S ’ .'^ She w ill resist making any such commitment i f  her realism is moderate. Yet, I
The sceptic who takes Superneutrality to obtain must give a reason for this belief. Even i f  such a 
reason can be given it w ill presuppose a realist conception o f truth. Since the moderate realist neither 
intends to base her view on the prospects o f scepticism as thus conceived, nor to beg the question against 
the anti-realist, she should not base anything she says on the idea that there may be a reason to believe in 
Superneutrality.
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just as she denies that there is any reason to believe in Completeness or (EC*), she |
denies that there is a reason to rule out Superneutrality. The realist/anti-realist debate is !
precisely the debate about whether it can be ruled out that unknowable truths are an 1
actual possibility; this question has not been answered in the positive by way o f j
showing that i f  speakers had a reason to believe that they were debarred from getting to I
know the truth-value o f S, they would not even try to do so. |
I f  (EC*) was knowable a p rio r i as the anti-realist contends, then there would be |
a standing reason to deny that neither S is knowable nor ‘ -S ' is knowable— a reason ;
which is available in all states o f information. Now suppose the anti-realist asked the j
follow ing question: even i f  in the case at hand speakers do in fact display their I
understanding o f S and ‘-S ' as being endowed with objective contents, can they s till be 1
considered as rational in doing so i f  they lack a reason to deny that neither S nor ‘- S 'is  
knowable? I f  not then insofar as they are fu lly  rational the speakers must take I
themselves to be in possession o f a standing reason to rule out that neither S nor ‘-S ' is ■
knowable. [
But just when is a statement o f the form ‘-Q  &  -R ’ warrantedly deniable? As I
has been argued in the third chapter, this w ill be so just in case either ‘ -Q ’ is 
warrantedly deniable or ‘ -R ’ is or it is a consequence o f certain principles that I
‘ -Q  &  -R ’ ought to be denied. The first two disjuncts do not obtain in the present case j
because the speakers are taken to be in a state o f information which is neutral w ith j
1respect to S and ‘ -S ’ and a fo rt io r i neutral with respect to ‘It is knowable that S’ and I
‘ It is knowable that -S ’ . This leaves us with the question o f whether the third disjunct
obtains. However, the only principle from which it  may follow that ‘It is neither
knowable that S nor knowable that -S ’ ought to be denied is the Epistemic Constraint! j
Accordingly, the suggestion that the speakers would not be rational in doing what they j
do i f  they lacked a reason to deny Superneutrality, is just the question-begging thought
that they ought to subscribe to (EC*). As long as they do not however, there is as yet j
nothing in what they do which betrays an incoherence on their part. We have therefore I
to conclude that so far the anti-realist has not succeeded in her attempt to vindicate j
(E C *^  :
6.4 Causes and Best Explanations
In what follows I shall present what I  take to be the anti-realist's best shot. Part o f the j
account o f assertoric practice developed in the preceding chapter was that speakers i
conceive o f truth in such a way that i f  S is true, S w ill be part o f the belief set which i
best explains all data ever available. The anti-realist now argues that i f  this is so, there ;
ought to be data available on whose basis we can come to know that S is true i f  it is true. I
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Since not both S and ‘-S ' can be true, then by (NE), neither can both be entailed by the 
best explanation o f all the data ever available. This is indeed already a part o f what it is 
for an explanation to be best. Thus although we have no reason to suppose that either S 
or ‘-S ' w ill be part o f the best explanation o f all data ever available, speakers who 
conceive o f truth in this way have a standing reason to suppose that i f  S is true, there 
must be some data available that decide the issue. Hence Superneutrality is ruled out.
The realist w ill contend that a belief set best explains all available data insofar as 
it mentions their causes and reject the alternative suggestion that a belief set mentions 
the causes o f all available data insofar as it best explains them. It is in this sense that we 
may be debarred from telling what the best explanation is, or so the realist w ill argue. In 
order to give substance to this contrast the realist w ill ask us to distinguish between data 
which are available and data which are not. I f  an explanation is considered best i f  it 
states the causes o f the phenomena to be explained, then since a belief set that best 
explains all data, whether available or not, best explains all data which are available, 
there is so far no contradiction involved. In other words, the realist is a realist about best 
explanations by being a realist about information.
The anti-realist w ill retort that talk about unavailable data is a contradiction in 
terms: data are what is given to us. Hence to say that there may be data which we have 
no access to is simply unintelligible. After all, it  has been conceded all along that data 
are identified by our response to them; and while it  makes sense to assume the existence 
o f something that has not yet been but nonetheless can be so identified, the suggestion 
that there may be something so identifiable which we cannot so identify is devoid o f 
sense.
This is fair comment. So far the stmggle seems to be about words however, 
rather than anything else. According to the realist, it is one thing to say that certain 
features o f reality can be identified as data only to the extent that we have the ability to 
classify them in these ways; it is quite another to say that in order for there to be such 
features o f reality, we must always be in a position to exercise this ability. In other 
words, the realist holds that we ought to distinguish the fact that we have the ability to 
respond to features o f reality in a certain way from the fact that we are always able to 
exercise this ability. Indeed, as was suggested in section (2.2) o f chapter two, the anti­
realist who is to give an account o f our understanding o f pro tern, undecidable sentences 
had better allow for such a distinction.
It is important to keep in mind though that the realist is not thereby committed to 
the existence o f features o f reality we have no access to. I f  the world has holes where we 
have white patches on the map then so be it. The point is just that we have no reason to
This may even be regarded as a theoretical advantage for the realist because she can give a 
straightforward answer to the question o f what it is for an explanation to be the best.
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think that where there are white patches on our map there are holes in the world. A  
subtle but crucial distinction that even the anti-realist w ill be ready to draw. Realists and 
anti-realists only disagree whether we are able to f i l l  in the details wherever a white 
patch does not cover a hole.
In face o f this realist rejoinder, the anti-realist's immediate response should be: 
where is it manifested that we take such putative features o f reality into consideration 
whenever we give explanations? For it is only i f  this question has been answered that 
we have reason to credit speakers with a conception of best explanations that tracks 
realistically conceived causes. No such answer seems to be forthcoming however, 
because it is agreed on all sides that it  is impossible for speakers to respond to features 
o f reality they have no access to, i f  indeed there are any. There would accordingly 
appear to be nothing on the basis o f which we might be justified in attributing to 
speakers abilities they may forever be debarred from fu lly  exercising. And the realist's 
modesty not to assume that we are forever debarred from fu lly  exercising what we are 
able to do w ill do nothing to help her out o f this impasse. Bad news for the realist.
6.5 Assumptions and the ir Conclusions
In the last section, the anti-realist was seen to capitalise on the observation that trivia lly, 
the speakers' concern about inaccessible data cannot be manifested in their response to 
them. But then since knowledge of objective truth conditions could not be manifested 
by the speakers' response to conditions o f utterance and since it is their grasp o f 
objective truth conditions which reveals, i f  at all, their concern about inaccessible data 
— insofar as this concern is a concern about what objectively true sentences are 
supposed to explain— it seems to be too rash to conclude from the triv ia lity mentioned 
that they cannot manifest a realist conception o f best explanations. To draw this 
conclusion would be to commit the same kind o f fallacy that was already embodied in 
the original Manifestation Argument, viz. to presuppose that the ability to reach verdicts 
is all there is to the manifestation o f understanding. Accordingly it is a move we should 
despite its initial plausibility resist. This in itia l plausibility has already been undermined 
by assertibilism anyway. Instead we should investigate whether the speakers' practice o f 
making assumptions rather than assertions is at odds with the idea that they can be 
credited w ith a realist understanding o f truth and best explanation.
The leading thought has been since the very beginning that the concept whose 
lim its we are concerned with, i.e. truth, is a concept we are justified in ascribing to 
speakers. This principle is in effect the converse o f Brandom's constraint on theories o f 
understanding according to which we cannot just confine ourselves to explaining the
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speakers' understanding in terms o f the concept of truth but ought to explain as well 
how, by having this understanding, the speakers can be said to possess this concept.
The anti-realist's contention was that the speakers' concept o f truth is one that is 
co-extensional w ith the concept o f knowability or knowable truth. It was the upshot o f 
section (6 .1) that the anti-realist should agree that both concepts nonetheless differ, or at 
least that truth and superassertibility do. It is therefore legitimate first to enquire what it 
takes for speakers to have the concept o f knowability (or superassertibility) and 
secondly, to check whether truth and knowability (or superassertibility plus truth) may 
diverge in contexts which are not counterfactual. Once such a divergence can be made 
manifest, the principle that what can be assumed can be asserted w ill allow us to 
conclude that S and Tt is knowable that S’ (or ‘S &  it is superassertible that S’) differ in 
assertoric content.
What we want to know in the first place then is how Tt is knowable that S’ is 
used to state what it does. Since the fact that a given sentence is endowed w ith objective 
content ultimately becomes manifest in hypothetical reasoning, we must enquire how 
Tt is knowable that S’ is used in such contexts. The hypothetical reasoning in question 
was required not to be counterfactual. Accordingly, i f  Tt is knowable that S’ and S 
behave differently in heuristic reasoning, then the conclusion seems apt that they differ 
in objective content. I f  this is so the realist's conception o f best explanation cannot be 
ruled out as a conception speakers can be credited with.
In contrast to Tt is at present warrantedly assertible that S’ the sentence 
Tt is knowable that S’ not only has the same warranted assertibility conditions as S but 
also seems to have the same warranted deniability conditions as S. For clearly, to deny 
that it  is knowable that P requires wairants stronger than those which warrant the denial 
that it  is at present warrantedly assertible that P; and which warrants could these be 
other than those which warrant the denial o f P?-^ For the sake o f argument, we may 
therefore concede that, insofar as "P " and "-P " are not Moorean in kind, the following 
inference preserves warranted assertibility and, i f  objective truth entails the availability 
in principle o f warrants, w ill also preserve objective truth:
- ( I t  is knowable that P)
It is knowable that -P
Since it does not matter whether the argument to be presented is run in terms o f Tt is knowable that S’ 
or ‘S &  it is superassertible that S’ , I shall henceforth omit reference to the latter. A ll that matters is that 
we can compare the use o f two different sentences, S and one o f the two sentences just mentioned.
Recall that a sentence was said to be knowable just in case it is both true and superassertible. 
Accordingly, the fact that superassertibility cannot play the explanatory role assigned to truth does not 
show that knowability cannot.
Again the sceptic may object to this. But then she owes us a reason for sharing her view. See footnote 
16.
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Owing to (AC) the sentence Tt is knowable that S’ furthermore differs from 
Tt is at present warrantedly assertible that S’ in that it can feature in heuristic reasoning 
which is undertaken in neutral states o f information. Indeed, it would appear that to this 
extent Tt is knowable that S’ can play the very same role S can play. However, as I  shall 
argue, its negation behaves in a way rather different from the way the negation o f S does 
— or to be more careful, there is no reason to rule out that this is so.
Recall that reasoning under an assumption ought not to be equated w ith the 
endorsement or assertion o f conditionals. Assumptions are freestanding uses o f the 
sentences assumed which contrast w ith assertions. I f  we hold that reasoning under an 
assumption need not consist in the endorsement or assertion o f a conditional however, 
then we are bound to acknowledge yet another use to which sentences may be put. 
Reasoning under an assumption essentially involves the drawing o f conclusions which 
can neither be regarded as assertions. Conclusions are conditional on an assumption 
being made— they need an assumption as their opening as it were.
It is at least clear that engagement in hypothetical reasoning must be governed 
by certain norms. Otherwise it would be permissible to regard both a sentence and its 
negation as conclusions o f the same assumption, even i f  this assumption was not already 
inconsistent— which would render the whole enterprise o f non-counterfactual 
hypothetical reasoning futile.-^ On the other hand, insofar as abductive reasoning is to 
some extent creative, we cannot expect that throughout, the rules governing hypothetical 
reasoning dictate that all conclusions which one is permitted to draw from a given 
assumption are conclusions which one is committed to draw from this assumption. Nor 
can we expect that generally, i f  it  is not permissible to regard a certain sentence as a 
conclusion o f a given assumption, we are thereby permitted to regard its negation as 
such a conclusion. For the conclusions that might be drawn are conditional on the 
assumption being made, and what is being assumed may have no bearing on whether a 
given sentence or its negation is true. A ll we need to know though is that it  is not 
permissible to draw certain conclusions from certain assumptions where this does not 
necessarily result in the permission to conclude their negations.
It seems reasonable to demand that i f  two sentences S and R can a p r io r i be 
known to be materially equivalent although they do not entail each other, then S and R 
w ill have the same set o f sentences as their conclusions provided the hypothetical 
reasoning in question is not counterfactual. It follows from this that i f  two monadic 
predicates 0  and Y  can a p rio r i be known to be co-extensional although they express 
different concepts, then for any argument a, ‘0 a ’ and ‘'F a ’ w ill have the same set o f 
sentences as their conclusions— again provided their assumption is not conceived o f as
O f course, in cases in which the assumption itself is inconsistent both sentences and their negations 
w ill be included in the set o f conclusions; this is just reductio ad absurdum.
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contrary to fact. For example, insofar as I know on the basis o f the statutes alone that the 
eldest member presides over the committee, my assumption that the eldest member o f 
the committee is involved in a car accident w ill allow me to draw the same conclusions 
as does my assumption that the chairman o f the committee is involved in a car accident 
— unless I  take myself to know that the eldest member o f the committee is not involved 
in a car accident. For then I  would engage in counterfactual reasoning; and I may 
assume— contrary to fact— that the eldest member did not preside over the committee.
In the same vein, it seems reasonable to demand that i f  S and R can a p rio r i be 
known to be materially equivalent although they do not entail each other and i f  neither 
is taken to be established as false, then for any sentence T not known to be false, 
‘S &  T ’ and ‘R &  T ’ w ill have the same set o f sentences as their conclusions. Thus in 
the example given: i f  I  assume that the eldest member o f the committee is involved in a 
car accident and that the next meeting is scheduled for this Friday, I  w ill have to 
conclude whatever I  have to conclude from the assumption that the chairman o f the 
committee is involved in a car accident and that the next meeting is scheduled for this 
Friday.
As we have seen, (EC*) in conjunction w ith (NE) and (AC) entails that
‘-S ’ is knowable i f f  S is not knowable.
Thus i f  (EC*), (AC) and (NE) are all knowable a priori, then in neutral states o f 
information not only should ‘-S ' and ‘It is knowable that -S ’ have the same sentences 
as their conclusions but ‘ -S ’ and ‘ - ( I t  is knowable that S)’ too. The question 
accordingly becomes whether in states o f information which are neutral with respect to 
S and ‘-S ’ there is a sentence which qualifies as a conclusion o f ‘-S ' but not o f 
‘ - ( I t  is knowable that S)’ or vice versa— or rather, given the nature o f the norms 
governing hypothetical reasoning, whether there can be such a neutral state o f 
information in which the refusal to regard a given sentence as a conclusion o f one o f 
either w ill be penalised while in the very same state the refusal to regard that sentence as 
a conclusion o f the respective other w ill not be so penalised.
Consider the sentence ‘ -S ' itself. Surely, the refusal to regard ‘ -S ' as a
conclusion o f itself w ill never be tolerated. But why should there not be neutral
states o f information in which the refusal to regard ‘-S ' as a conclusion o f 
‘ - ( I t  is knowable that S)’ w ill be tolerated— or even be mandated? Likewise: may there
not be states o f informational neutrality in which regarding the sentence
"There are features o f reality inaccessible to us" as a conclusion o f 
‘ - ( I t  is knowable that S)’ goes uncontested while regarding that sentence as a 
conclusion o f ‘-S ' does not?
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The anti-realist w ill reply that since S and Tt is knowable that S’ are known to share 
their conditions o f warranted denial, there w ill just be no reasoning under the 
assumption that S is not knowable which could provide for an incentive to endorse what 
has been assumed and at the same time involve conclusions not included in the set o f 
conclusions which it is permissible to draw from the assumption o f ‘ -S ’ . Insofar as in 
the case at hand engagement in heuristic reasoning is rational only to the extent that one, 
takes oneself to have a chance o f resolving neutrality, any reasoning under the 
assumption that S is not knowable which involves conclusions not involved in the 
reasoning under the assumption o f ‘-S ’ w ill therefore be irrational unless it is after all 
conceived to be counterfactual. In a similar vein, since S and ‘It is knowable that S’ 
share their conditions o f wairanted denial, any sentence that is regarded as a conclusion 
o f ‘ -S ’ but not o f ‘ - ( I t  is knowable that S)’ w ill be one which becomes warrantedly 
assertible as soon as we are in a position to assert ‘- ( I t  is knowable that S)’ . Since to get 
into such a position is the ultimate goal o f heuristic reasoning, to exclude this sentence 
from the set o f conclusions o f ‘ - ( I t  is knowable that S)’ can only be reasonable i f  one's 
reasoning under this assumption is taken to be counterfactual. That ‘-S ’ and 
‘ - ( I t  is knowable that S)’ behave differently in counterfactual reasoning has already 
been conceded without this affecting the anti-realist's contention that (EC*) holds 
a prio ri.
Counterfactual reasoning is to be distinguished from reasoning under an 
assumption which is as a matter o f fact false: in counterfactual reasoning the assumption 
is taken as known to be false independently o f whether it  actually is. Not so in heuristic 
reasoning: in neutral states o f information, speakers who reason under the assumption 
that S is not knowable or under the assumption o f ‘-S ’ do not thereby engage in 
counterfactual reasoning because they lack a reason to believe either o f these 
assumptions to be false. Now the anti-realist's contention was that in neutral states o f 
information, ‘ -S ’ and ‘ - ( I t  is knowable that S)’ share their conclusions: i f  there was a 
conclusion that one is allowed to draw from ‘- ( I t  is knowable that S)’ but not from ‘-S ’ , 
it would already be guaranteed that one w ill never be in a position to assert that 
conclusion; on the other hand i f  there was a conclusion that one is allowed to draw from 
‘-S ’ but not from ‘ - ( I t  is knowable that S)’ , the lack o f permission involved would 
betray the fact that necessarily, i f  one is in a position to assert ‘- ( I t  is knowable that $ )’ , 
hence all o f its conclusions, then one w ill be in a position to assert ‘ -S ’ , hence all o f its 
conclusions. In either case, the rationality o f the normative restraints can be maintained 
only i f  the reasoning which is so restrained is after all conceived to be counterfactual 
reasoning. Since it cannot be counterfactual insofar as undertaken in states o f 
informational neutrality however, these normative restraints are irrational— or so the 
anti-realist argues.
Edgington writes that "[w]e are constantly faced with a range o f epistemic possibilities— things that, as 
far as we know, may be true, when the question whether they are true is relevant to our concerns. As part 
o f such practical or theoretical reasoning, it is often necessary to suppose (or assume) that some epistemic 
possibility is true, and to consider what else would be the case, or would be likely to be the case, given 
this supposition. The conditional expresses the outcome of such thought processes"; [DCH]: 177-78. As I 
have argued towards the end o f chapter four, the outcome of an inferential thought process set o ff by an 
assumption (or supposition) need not be the assertion of a conditional: i f  assumptions are cognitive acts, 
or speech acts, o f their own kind, then so are conclusions. And as I have argued in chapter five, the 
assertions to which such inferential thought processes may give rise include assertions o f what was being 
assumed. Here I argue that we are free to suppose or assume something to be true which cannot be known 
— e.g. a Moorean sentence— and that, in such cases, the only assertions to which reasoning under 
assumptions o f this kind may lead are assertions of conditionals.
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In heuristic reasoning one leaves room for the possibility that the assumption being 
made is actually true. In this sense heuristic reasoning is not counterfactual. According 
to the realist however, this is not the same as to say that in heuristic reasoning one is 
bound to hold that one may get into the position to assert (or deny) what is being j
assumed. Accordingly, to equate a lack o f prospect ever to assert (or deny) the j
conclusions drawn from a given assumption with a reason to believe that this j
assumption is false— hence to conceive o f one's reasoning as counterfactual— is just to 
beg the question. O f course the heuristic reasoning undertaken in neutral states o f 
information was considered to be fuelled by one's attempt to overcome informational I
neutrality. This much was in effect sufficient to distinguish between the assumptions |
effected by means o f S and Tt is at present warrantedly assertible that S’ respectively: |
reasoning under the latter assumption in states o f informational neutrality is j
counterfactual and therefore not to the purpose. But this does not mean that the only ]
reason to engage in heuristic reasoning is that it may help us to overcome informational |
neutrality— in the sense that it  may have the effect that one is put in a position to assert |
the assumption as well as its conclusions. The anti-realist's complaint must therefore be j
that insofar as it is not done for this reason, heuristic reasoning is pointless. |
There is a pay-off which heuristic reasoning may have however, which is less I
than that it  helps us to overcome informational neutrality: it may bring us to endorse |
conditionals that are warrantedly assertible even though their antecedents are not.22 To !
say that this pay-off is one which counterfactual reasoning may equally have is just |
another petitio. As we have already seen, reasoning under the assumption that S is not |
Iknowable cannot be counterfactual i f  undertaken in states of informational neutrality, Iihence neither are the conditionals which we arrive at by these means counterfactual |
conditionals. To see this, suppose that ‘S &  - ( i t  is knowable that S)’ was being I
Iassumed. I f  reasoning under this assumption was conceived to be counterfactual, then ;
the follow ing conditional I
‘ i f  S &  - ( i t  is knowable that S), then -S ’ i
2 1 6
should be amongst the warranted conditionals arrived at by these means. But it may well 
not be; and the only reason to think that this betrays an incoherence on the speakers' part 
is the idea that this conditional is a counterfactual conditional because (EC*) holds 
which renders its antecedent false. But why should the speakers believe in (EC*)?
It is natural to think that the conditionals whose endorsement is a consequence o f 
reasoning under assumptions such as ‘ - ( I t  is knowable that S)’ do themselves belong to 
philosophy. But then the realist/anti-realist debate is itself a debate which pertains to 
philosophical discourse. And now it seems that the realist and the anti-realist, rather 
than debating whether the other can meet the Manifestability Requirement, disagree 
about whether the other should manifest her view. In other words, the debate is no 
longer concerned with the question o f whether there are any facts that justify  the 
attribution to the realist o f an epistemically unconstrained notion o f truth, but rather 
with the question o f whether truth should or should not be so conceived. Therefore, the 
a p rio r i reasons for (EC*) w ill have to be sought outside the semantic arena.
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